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In May of 1993, President Clinton's Commission for the Future of
Worker-Management Relations began its investigation of whether a major
overhaul of United States labor law is necessary to encourage high-per-
formance workplaces and labor-management cooperation.' Even if its
recommendations, due in November 1994, do not yield immediate con-
gressional fruit, the Commission's work is likely to influence the study
and politics of labor law reform for some time to come. The Commission
is chaired byJohn Dunlop, the eminent labor-relations specialist and for-
mer Secretary of Labor. Its membership includes some of the nation's
foremost academic and political proponents of far-reaching labor law re-
form.2 The Commission's Chief Counsel is Harvard Law School's Paul
Weiler, who, over the last decade, has built the most formidable edifice of
comprehensive reform proposals within the legal academic community.3
The appointment of the Dunlop Commission registers several seis-
mic changes in the topography of labor relations in recent decades. 4
First, the percentage of private-sector employees in unionized workplaces
has declined from nearly 37 percent in 1953 to less than 12 percent to-
day.5 The resulting "representation gap" in workplace governance is a
salient policy concern for philosophic proponents of industrial demo-
cracy6 and for economic supporters of those welfare-enhancing work-
place arrangements that require collective action by employees. 7
1. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations Mission
Statement, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at F-I (Mar. 25, 1993).
2. In addition to Dunlop, the Commission members are former Secretaries of Labor
Ray Marshall and W.J. Usery, former Secretary of CommerceJuanita Kreps, former United
Auto Workers President Douglas Fraser, Xerox Corp. President Paul Allaire, Standard
Technology CEO Kathryn Turner, and industrial relations scholars Thomas Kochan of
MIT, Richard Freeman of Harvard, and Paula Voos of the University of Wisconsin. See
Kathryn Turner Named to Dunlop Commission, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 5, 1993);
Reich, Brown Announce New Panel to Examine Workplace Cooperation, Employee
Participation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-1 (Mar. 25, 1993).
3. See Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects
for Union Representation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 351 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, Striking a New
Balance]; Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises to Keep].
Professor Weiler's proposals are updated and elaborated in Paul C. Weiler, Governing the
Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law (1990) [hereinafter Weiler,
Governing the Workplace]; Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: Employee
Representation in the Eyes of the Law, in Employee Representation: Alternatives and
Future Directions 81 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) [hereinafter
Employee Representation]; Paul Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the
Workplace, 102 Yale LJ. 1907 (1993). Of course, many other legal academics have
contributed to the reform debate. See infra Part VI.
4. These changes are discussed in detail infra Part V.
5. See'David G. Blanchflower & Richard B. Freeman, Unionism in the United States
and Other Advanced OECD Countries, 31 Indus. Rel. 56 (1992).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 656-694, 861-882.
7. See Richard B. Freeman &James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 8-10 (1984).
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Concurrent with the fall of organized labor, the annual growth in
labor productivity slowed from a median of three percent in the post-
World War II boom years to little more than one percent since the late
1960s.8 This climacteric coincided with an intensification of global eco-
nomic competition and volatility in product and capital markets. These
years also saw the emergence, led by Japan, of "lean" production systems
that seem to break with the hierarchical mass-production model at the
core of United States industry.9 Many variants of the emergent organiza-
tions are based on principles of flexible collaboration and consultation
between employees and managers within the firm and among fluid net-
works of firms.
Their adaptability and delegation of discretion to frontline work
teams give such "high-performance" firms and networks the potential for
enhanced productivity, innovation, and employee learning. The United
States' regime of adversarial, bureaucratic labor relations seems to fly in
the face of the high-performance principles of cooperation and trust.
That regime not only imperils labor productivity and participation. Its
discouragement of high-skill, high-discretion work processes, together
with the fall of organized labor, has helped produce the most unequal
distribution of incomes and job opportunities of any advanced industrial
country. 10
The reform balloons floated by Weiler, Dunlop Commission mem-
bers, and other legal commentators over the years include various pro-
posals to fill the workplace representation gap." To revive the labor
movement, the proposals promise to reduce the cost of union organizing
and to enhance the benefits of unionization. To make organizing easier,
the revised legal regime would require an employer to bargain with a
union that obtained the signatures on authorization cards, or the votes in
an "instant election," of a majority of bargaining-unit employees. Alterna-
tively or concurrently, the law would require employers to bargain with
"minority" unions representing only those workers who voluntarily join,
at least in workplaces without a majority representative. Under both
8. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Monthly Lab. Rev., June 1992, at 112.
9. Some important elements of the most advanced participatory workplaces include
dramatically flattened managerial hierarchies; delegation of discretion over work methods
and organizational decision-making to "self-managing teams" of frontline workers;
conversion of fragmented, rule-bound job classifications into flexible, high-skill work
processes; greater horizontal coordination of activity among teams rather than vertical
bureaucratic control; joint committees of labor and shareholder representatives to make
strategic decisions about enterprise operations, technology, and capital allocation; and
consultative or consensus modes of problem-solving, rather than adversarial arbitration
and economic warfare. For details, see infra Part V.
10. See Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Rising Wage Inequality: The United
States vs. Other Advanced Countries (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
11. The relation between employee representation and enterprise performance is
analyzed and empirically assessed at length infra text accompanying notes 796-825.
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schemes, union supporters could avoid altogether the aggressive, well-fi-
nanced anti-union campaigns that managerial consultants have made a
precision missile against unionization. That is, legal reform would erase
the present period of several weeks or months of campaigning that cur-
rently pass between the time the union requests recognition and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board ballot.
Other proposals would afford unions, once organized, greater bar-
gaining power in first and subsequent contract negotiations by protecting
striking workers-perhaps even secondary strikers' 2-against permanent
replacement. In addition, unions could lawfully use their enhanced
strike power to influence strategic technological and capital allocation
decisions now beyond the bounds of legally mandated bargaining. Many
have also proposed-in the event that American workers of the 1990s do
not rise to the occasion-that the law simply mandate elected employee
councils in every workplace to consult with management and to enforce
individual employment rights already on the books.
Leading scholars from across the political spectrum-addressing the
question posed to the Dunlop Commission of how best to encourage la-
bor-management cooperation-have proposed the outright repeal of the
federal prohibition on management-established participatory teams and
representative committees.18 Tt may surprise strangers to labor law to
learn that such popularly touted schemes as employee-led work teams,
joint labor-management committees, quality circles, and other flora of
the new cooperative workplace are sprouting illegally. But in the last
eighteen months, two long-awaited NLRB decisions reaffirmed that the
language and history of the 1935 legislative ban on company unions
reach cooperative representative committees and perhaps the vast por-
tion of self-managing teams that have some form of "representative" team
leader. The ban applies to all nonunion workplaces and, when manage-
ment unilaterally establishes or excessively supports the collaborative
schemes, to unionized workplaces. 14 Employer spokespersons immedi-
12. Secondary strikers withdraw their labor from employer B (the secondary
employer) in order indirectly to inflict hold-out costs on employer A (the primary
employer with whom the union is negotiating). The secondary employer may be a
supplier or customer of the primary employer. Such strikes are presently outlawed by
Section 8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, as amended by the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1988). Employers may lawfully discharge secondary strikers and may obtain injunctions
and damages against a union that conducts a secondary strike.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1993); Electromation,
Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992). These cases interpret Section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA, which
prohibits employers from "dominat[ing] or interfer[ing] with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1988). Section 2(5) defines "labor organization" broadly enough to
include any ongoing employee entity, even if informal and bearing no resemblance to an
independent labor union. See id. § 152(5). Dictum in Electromation, however, reaffirmed
the Board's ruling in General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977), which permitted an
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ately announced their renewed support for already-drafted legislation
that would expressly authorize employers unilaterally to establish and
support such entities. 15 Meanwhile, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland,
in the same phrases deployed by opponents of company unions in the
1930s, denounced managerial cooperative schemes as "sham organiza-
tions designed to prevent real worker empowerment."16
This Article proposes that the Dunlop Commission recommend a re-
vised labor law regime designed to achieve three goals: first, to support
employees' capacity to engage in well-informed, egalitarian deliberation
and affirmative choice over modes of workplace governance, including
the options of in-house participatory and representative schemes, as well
as more empowered, trans-enterprise outside unions; second, to en-
courage the diffusion of flexible, "continuous-learning" organizations
and networks with the innovative and productive capacity to succeed in
global competition; and third, to enhance opportunities for cumulative
employee responsibility and self-transformation in the work process and
in organizational decision-making. The first and last goals require that
the legal regime protect workers against organizational forms pregnant
with routinized, task-fragmented work processes and with coercive or pa-
ternalistic manipulation of employees' subjective perceptions and inter-
ests about workplace governance issues. I argue that, in order to achieve
these goals, labor law needs more robust reconstruction than even the
worthwhile, far-reaching programs advanced by Commission members in
their past public statements and writings. A new legal regime should em-
body the collaborative, self-revising organizational principles that are as
appropriate to the transformation of public institutions as to that of pri-
vate bureaucracies.
Competing legal commentators frequently posit, without much em-
pirical defense, that management-supported teams and representative
committees have predictable effects on employees' subjective experi-
employer to establish participatory work teams that lack representative team leaders. The
General Foods distinction between participatory and representative structures is hard to
square with the language of § 2(5), which explicitly includes "participat[ory]" employee
entities within the definition of "labor organization," and with the legislative purpose of
protecting workers against employers' illegitimate deflection of workers' organization of
outside unions. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. In any event, the most
advanced, "best practice" self-managing teams have elected or rotating team leaders who
serve representative or liaison functions vis-a-vis the rest of the organization. See infra note
995 and accompanying text. Such teams may therefore fall outside the General Foods
exception to the ban on inside entities.
15. The companion versions of the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act of
1993 are S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (pending in committee), and H.R. 1529, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same).
16. AFL-CIO's Kirkland Tells UFCW Delegates that Organizing Is Key to Better Life,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-19 (July 27, 1993). The AFL-CIO's Committee on the
Evolution of Work also recently declined to support government-mandated employee-




ence. 17 Supporters of repeal of the company union ban propose that the
current cooperative schemes enhance workers' subjective trust in man-
agement, unleash their intrinsic motivation to work creatively and col-
laboratively, or spur them to seek greater workplace participation. At
worst, they are relatively ineffective innovations that leave workers subjec-
tively indifferent or only slightly satisfied. In any event they have no more
malignant effect on worker consciousness than other management-estab-
lished benefits or work arrangements. Hence, managers' unilateral im-
position of collaborative schemes does not disserve the core regulatory
purpose of labor law-to protect workers' right to choose whether to
form full-fledged unions.
Opponents-echoing the original legislative enactors, as interpreted
by the Board and the Supreme Court-maintain that cooperative
schemes either overtly coerce or subtly manipulate workers' behavior and
subjectivity. Under management's asymmetric power, cooperative prac-
tices paternalistically alter workers' descriptive perception of workplace
reality or their normative sense of their own preferences and interests in
ways that serve managerial interests. The proposition, in the argot of
economists and cognitive psychologists, is that capital suppliers' manage-
rial agents, acting either in the distributive interests of their principals or
in their independent interest in managerial control, use their bargaining
power to generate "endogenous" changes in the "preferences" or
"perceptual frame" of weaker contracting parties. Stated in the terminol-
ogy of critical theory, employers exercise domination over workers
through "hegemonic" transformations in worker consciousness or ideol-
ogy, either as an alternative or a supplement to coercive forms of control.
In lay terms, cooperative schemes "coopt" workers. That is, such schemes
do deflect workers' group choice over workplace governance modes, and
in a systematic direction-away from the full collective bargaining that
the New Deal policy equates with objective "industrial democracy."
In order to generate and defend my specific legal proposals, this Ar-
ticle undertakes theoretical, empirical, and normative elaborations of the
asserted modes of instrumental coercion and psychological transforma-
tion on which the legal debate about collaborative workplace governance
turns. At a theoretical level, the Article seeks to illuminate and sharpen
the shadowy concepts of "endogenous preference transformation," "heg-
emonic consciousness," and "cooptation" under conditions of "asymmet-
ric bargaining power" or "domination" within workplace relations. At an
empirical level, it attempts to assess whether specific institutional and cul-
tural practices in fact achieve various theoretically refined modes of coer-
cion and consciousness-transformation. For purposes of my legal-policy
inquiry, the Article's empirical reservoir includes both the historical ex-
perience of workers under classic company unions-the original target of
the statutory ban on collaborative work relations-and contemporary em-
17. See infra text accompanying notes 832-833 and infra notes 832, 990.
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ployees' experience of new forms of cooperative work relations. Many
legal commentators have posited that old-style company unions ubiqui-
tously implemented coercion and psychological cooptation, even if those
commentators diverge in their assumptions about whether those
processes occur among today's workers and workplaces. Finally, at a nor-
mative level, the Article assesses various bases for distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate systems of (1) instrumental incentives (coer-
cive sanctions or rewards) applied by management within the employer-
employee authority relation; and (2) ideological and discursive schemes'
deployed by employers to influence employees' cognition, affect, or voli-
tion. Labor law pervasively draws normative lines between the legitimate
and the illegitimate exercise of employers' material and communicative
resources. More often than not, thejustificatory grounds for the norma-
tive judgment are not well specified.
This inquiry primarily aims to prescribe a new labor law policy. As a
by-product, it affords an opportunity to explore two issues of burgeoning
interest to legal theorists-theoretical issues that may be illuminated
when examined in a detailed doctrinal context. The first is the question
of how the legal system depicts or constructs human "subjectivity."' 8 The
legal "construction" of subjectivity has two different meanings in the con-
text of the debate over labor law reform. 19 First, it denotes the NLRB's,
the courts', and legal commentators' conceptions of the subjective state
that serves as the standard of a responsible, freely choosing employee.
The pervasive normative line-drawing mentioned above generally turns
on some such conception, because labor law is so fraught with questions
of coerced versus autonomous or responsible choice. The conceptions of
subjectivity that inform this line-drawing are diverse and fragmented in
part because the New Deal labor policy itself incorporated in the law new
modes of valuation-new understandings of the good or right-in the
sphere of work. That is, once the legal mind envisioned the workplace as
a quasi-political rather than (as at common law) a purely contractual
zone, labor law's picture of the "choosing subject" took on characteristics
of the deliberative, reason-giving citizen, in addition to those of the calcu-
lating, instrumental bargainer. And, in response to claims that collabora-
tive schemes reduce labor-management adversarialism, the courts have
more recently been drawn to a conception of the potentially trusting, re-
lational self-a descriptive and evaluative crossover from the sphere of
18. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the
Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale LJ. 105 (1993); James Boyle, Is Subjectivity
Possible? The Post-Modem Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 489 (1991); Meir
Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 959 (1992);
Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627 (1991). For earlier,
valuable treatments of the question, see Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-
Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984); Mark
Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769.
19. The distinction between these two meanings is sometimes blurred in analyses of
the legal construction of subjectivity.
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intimacy to the world of work. My analysis thus suggests a strong affinity
between the law's demarcation or blurring of plural social arenas and
modes of valuation,20 on the one hand, and its various, not-always-coher-
ent instantiations of the responsible self, on the other.
The legal construction of subjectivity also denotes the way in which
the instrumental incentives and symbolic messages of legal rules and dis-
course actually affect non-legal actors' subjective experience. As already
mentioned, a central issue in the debate over legal policy toward coopera-
tive work arrangements is how different legal regimes, by influencing
workplace institutions and culture, will shape workers' motivation, com-
mitment, interpersonal skills, and development of the capacity for learn-
ing and self-revision within fast-changing organizational contexts. The
abstract questions of subjectivity in legal theory thus link with the impor-
tant practical problem of enhancing employees' capacities for organiza-
tional learning and innovation in a time when enterprise performance
depends increasingly on such capacities.
2 1
The legal construction of subjectivity is closely related to the second
question of legal theory on which I hope to shed light that reaches be-
yond the debate on labor law reform. Such concepts as "domination,"
"ideological hegemony," and "power" serve widely as touchstones in criti-
cal, postmodernist, pragmatist, feminist, and race theory. Their general
or contextual meanings-and their distinction from liberal concepts of
-substantive equality or autonomy--are not always well elaborated.22 The
project of conceptual clarification and enrichment is unavoidable in the
workplace governance debate, if only because a key provision in the
NLRA explicitly prohibits "dominat[ion]." 23 Such clarification may prove
useful in other areas of legal analysis that may be characterized as terrains
of asymmetric power, such as racial, gender, and statist hierarchies.
As to both issues-the legal construction of subjectivity and the
meaning of domination in normative jurisprudence-my analysis and
proposals rest on a radical-pragmatist or reflexive conception of intersub-
20. On the plurality of incommensurable modes of valuation and self-understanding
across and within different spheres of social life and law, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of
Freedom 321-66 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
779, 784-85 (1994); Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 Mich.
L. Rev. 1520, 1530-59 (1992) (reviewing Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge (1990)).
21. My project is thus in the spirit of Dominick LaCapra's endorsement of concrete
institutional invention even in the face of now widely accepted notions of interpretive
indeterminacy and of the subordinating potential of any regulative ideal. See Dominick
LaCapra, Soundings in Critical Theory 23-25 (1989).
22. For some postmodernists, of course, the lack of elaboration is a virtue, on the
grounds that even finely textured, contextual conceptual schemes (1) constrain or distort
authentic experience, (2) falsely suggest that experience pre-exists-and can be
transparent or mirrored in-thought or utterances, or (3) falsely presume the possibility of
simultaneous identity and difference between concept and experience or between signifier
and signified.
23. See supra note 14.
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jectivity and the relational self.24 In that conception, through communi-
cation and interaction individuals may simultaneously transform their
identities25 and their social contexts.2 6 Such interchanges may be instru-
mental, in the sense that they aim to alter or deploy relative bargaining
power or incentives for joint practical activity; or they may be noninstru-
mental-that is, experiences of reasoned persuasion, emotional or
perceptual transfiguration, or evaluative redefinition. One of the aims of
this Article is to explore, within specific historical settings, the various
descriptive relations among law, noninstrumental transformations in indi-
vidual and group identity, and the parties' instrumental capacities to ex-
ert distributive power and achieve practical cooperation.2 7 My normative
jurisprudence, as well, relies on a radical intersubjectivist vision that seeks
to promote individuals' capacity for egalitarian communication, mutual
affirmation of autonomy, and self-transformation within relationships of
mutual vulnerability.28
Part II of this Article begins by examining the claims made by legisla-
tors, early NLRB and court decisions, and other observers about the ways
in which old-style company unions illegitimately coerced or ideologically
manipulated employees. I parse and elaborate those claims in light of
more recent theoretical and empirical studies of the economics, culture,
and psychology of relations of authority or asymmetric power. I begin
with legal actors' explicit or implicit understandings of worker subjectivity
and behavior under company unionism; then, based on more sophisti-
cated current theories, I "work up" those understandings into more con-
ceptually specific and potentially plausible explanations of workers'
experiences. In this way, I draw on the legal materials as a reservoir of
contextualized, detailed conceptions of subjectivity that enable us to give
24. For incisive formulations of this conception, see, e.g., Jessica Benjamin, The
Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (1988); John
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct 1922: The Middle Works of John Dewey (Jo Ann
Boydston ed., 1988); Roberto M. Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personality (1984).
25. By identity, I mean an individual's more or less coherent or fragmented clusters of
perception, affect, cognition, volition, and other intrapsychic phenomena.
26. By social context, I mean people's more or less shared or contested
understanding of their past and present relations, and their resulting expectations about
the meaning and behavior that may be reenacted, altered, or created in their future social
roles and institutions.
27. For example, noninstrumental transformation of the parties' shared norms,
individual desires, or moral commitments may alter their relative bargaining power. See
infra notes 305-312, 407-417, 777-787 and accompanying text. Noninstrumental
transformations in the parties' dispositions to trust or distrust may alter their capacity for
practical reciprocity and cooperation. See infra notes 279-282, 376-386, 638-655 and
accompanying text. Conversely, for example, instrumental alterations in relative
bargaining power may encourage or discourage sentiments of shared interests, trust, or
resentment. See infra notes 796-825 and accompanying text. And, legal symbols and
sanctions, in turn, may affect both relative bargaining power and the parties' norms of
fairness and dispositions of trust and distrust. See infra text accompanying notes 838-882,
908-910, 1014-1017.
28. See sources cited supra note 24.
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more precise content to the murky concepts of hegemonic consciousness
and psychological cooptation. Part II ends by hypothesizing that the legal
system's understanding of the coercive and hegemonic effects of com-
pany unions was in part fictive and one-dimensional. The NLRB and the
courts articulated this one-sided understanding in order to justify the stat-
ute's absolute ban on an institution that likely had complex and contin-
gent effects on workers' subjectivity and behavior.
Part III then argues that latent in the NLRB's and courts' own de-
scriptions-though not explicitly acknowledged in their legal analyses-
of company unions was a wide range of workers' subjective experience.
Board and court narratives depicted such nonhegemonic and noncoer-
cive labor-management interactions as "pure reformism" (defined simply
as the satisfaction of employees' pre-existing preferences) and presump-
tively legitimate consultative and informational exchanges that promoted
norms of trust and commitment. Workers' experience also included such
"counterhegemonic" ideological responses as indifference, skepticism, in-
dignation, and resentment, and such counterhegemonic instrumental
boomerangs as the managerial provision of resources and communica-
tional channels that aided workers' collective action. Again, Part III
"works up" these latent depictions of workers' subjective experience into
more theoretically specific and refined concepts.
Part IV turns to historical evidence of the actual experience of work-
ers under company unionism in order to assess the conceptual formula-
tions and claims about that experience elaborated in Parts II and III. Part
IV concludes that workers' experience of company unionism was in fact
highly variable, contingent, and dependent on the complex "local" path
of institutional and cultural forces in different workplaces. I nonetheless
find in the historical evidence some generalizations or regularities rele-
vant to the legal debate over current forms of cooperative work relations.
The many case studies and large-scale surveys suggest that coercive, hege-
monic, nonhegemonic, and counterhegemonic subjective experiences
obtained concurrently among company-unionized workforces. At the
same time, there were inherent tensions between different experiences.
Most broadly, company unions that relied more heavily on modes of
structural coercion were likelier to yield either distrustful resignation or
backlashes of indignation and resentment among workers. Those com-
pany unions that implemented greater genuine benefits and certain
forms of cultural hegemony were likelier to generate a complex dynamic
of "contested trust." Workers often did partially internalize professed
managerial norms of community, loyalty, and democracy. But they also
deployed those norms in "wars of position" by developing expanded no-
tions of reciprocal obligation and demanding that employers live up to
employees' reinterpretation of managers' own stated norms. This is a sa-
lient example of the way in which a shift in cultural norms could decisively
influence relative bargaining power in the workplace.
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The historical evidence also shows that those employers who, will-
ingly or under government or union pressure, set up more robust com-
pany unions were likelier to see their employees convert the in-house
structures into partially or fully independent unions. Perhaps of greatest
relevance for the current policy debate, the evidence shows convincingly
that company unions, as representative structures, generally had weaker
effects on rank and file employees than on the cadre of representatives
who bore the brunt of employer intimidation and seduction. The com-
pany unions simply failed to penetrate the daily work experience of most
frontline employees sufficiently to have deeper instrumental and ideolog-
ical effects on them. Although the historical evidence shows that com-
pany unionism was widely coercive and manipulative, it nonetheless
confirms the hypothesis that the early Board and court decisions embod-
ied substantial fictionalization.
Part V, drawing on the conceptual scheme and empirical findings of
instrumental and ideological processes developed in the analysis of in-
terwar workplaces, examines the dynamics of current high-involvement
organizations. It starts with a quick synopsis of the development and dif-
fusion of flexible work organizations in the current international and do-
mestic economic environment. Tracking my analysis of old-style
company unionism, I again present and elaborate the theoretical claims
made about the promise and peril of the new cooperative workplaces.
Part V then examines the potential instrumental and psychological en-
hancement of productive efficiency in high-involvement organizations,
and presents a succession of other appealing normative arguments-
from autonomy, self-realization, and radical pragmatism and democ-
racy-for heightened worker participation.
Although the promise of team-based organizations is fulfilled in
many current experiments in North America and Europe, there is also
undeniable evidence that collaborative organizations can degenerate if
in-house teams and representatives become "integrated" into coercive or
psychologically manipulative managerial structures. Collaborative organi-
zation may then become an infrastructure both for deflecting workers'
ongoing capacity freely to choose workplace governance modes and for
implementing the deskilled, intensified labor-sweating permitted by "flex-
ible" work allocation. Such coercion and hegemony may be more egre-
gious than under old-style company unionism precisely because
paternalistic norms, surveillance, and opportunities for intimidation are
built-in to day-to-day organizational routines. Team "facilitators" or com-
mittee "coordinators" are ambiguous authority figures who are imbri-
cated with team members and representatives in intimate, daily, face-to-
face processes of work and decision-making. Although the facilitators are
ostensible peers of frontline workers, they in fact may be fully trained and
coached by management. And they may exercise potent discretion in dis-
tributing instrumental rewards or sanctions and psychological affirmation
or anxiety in a flexible, non-rule-bound workplace.
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At the same time, team workplaces pose their own idiosyncratic po-
tential-greater than that of interwar company unions-for employees to
heighten their bargaining power and to redefine and expand manageri-
ally proclaimed norms of participation and reciprocal obligation. Part V
concludes by summarizing the emerging consensus among political econ-
omists that collaborative enterprises tend to be more productive, and are
less likely to embody instrumental and ideological domination, when they
implement comprehensive participation at both shopfloor and strategic
levels. That is, delegation of egalitarian deliberation to self-managing
teams, and the capacity of employee representatives meaningfully to in-
fluence strategic decisions of upper management, are mutually depen-
dent and reinforcing. The mobilization of frontline workers from below
encourages the responsiveness of their employee representatives. The
strategic role of representatives can, in turn, safeguard the delegation of
responsibility and the distribution of a fair share of the fruits of produc-
tive efficiencies to autonomous teams.
Part VI situates the legal doctrines bearing on labor-management co-
operation within the overall regulatory scheme of federal labor law,
which in part determines the capacity of employee representatives to play
an empowered, strategic role. This Part summarizes various widely en-
dorsed proposals for overall labor law reform. It concludes that those
proposals are worthwhile, but, without additional robust legal-institu-
tional innovation, unlikely to contribute dramatically to the rejuvenation
of employee representation or the diffusion of high-performance
workplaces.
Finally, Part VII develops law reform proposals designed to en-
courage the diffusion of the most democratic, empowering, and produc-
tive forms of high-involvement organization. In light of the pathological
potential of collaborative workplaces, my reforms would retain a ban on
in-house participatory and representative structures that fail to meet spec-
ified indicia of independence and empowerment sufficient to protect
against managerial coercion or manipulation. These standards could be
implemented through reinterpretation of the ban on "dominat[ion]" of
worker entities already contained in NLRA Section 8(a) (2) or through
more particularized statutory amendment. Hence, I oppose the wide-
spread call for the outright repeal of that section. On the other hand,
unlike present law, my proposal would allow in-house options that fulfill
the new standards of non-domination. Unlike proposals for allowing
management (or government 29) unilaterally to impose these in-house op-
tions, however, my regime would require that they be affirmatively cho-
sen by employees.30
29. As in the proposal for government-mandated works councils.
30. This requirement resurrects the law prevailing in 1933-35, when labor-board
election ballots included nonunion, outside union, and in-house union options. See infra
notes 508-509 and accompanying text.
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The NLRA's principle of employee choice of governance modes
would thus be retained, but with an expanded choice-set: nonunioniza-
tion, autonomous teams, strategic representative councils, and full-
fledged unionization. Workers would be free to choose any combination
of the first three or the last three options. There is no good reason, and
there are several bad ones, for allowing employers to impose potentially
paternalistic or coercive collaborative structures, while pro-union workers
are required to run the difficult gauntlet of mobilizing collective action
for fuller forms of workplace participation.
This expanded choice-set, however, requires vastly deepened govern-
ment protection and facilitation of the ideal of employees' egalitarian
deliberation over governance modes.3 1 I propose a system of regional
Centers for Advanced Workplace Participation that would combine the
functions of the NLRB regional offices and of the nationwide network of
Manufacturing Outreach Centers that the Department of Commerce is
currently establishing.32 On statutorily designated occasions, these Cen-
ters would hold intensive Conferences for Employee Choice. The Con-
ferences would afford workers a forum for well-informed, egalitarian
deliberations radically removed from the property and control of the em-
ployer, although managerial representatives would be vital stakeholder
participants in the deliberations. Experiments in stakeholder, organiza-
tional-design conferences in North America, Scandinavia, and elsewhere
are the institutional forerunners of such Conferences.
The Centers would provide employees with access to information
about best-practice, high-performance workplaces and about the promise
and danger of different governance options. Employees would be enti-
tled to such information from Center staff, but also from unions, other
employee associations, private consultants, or educational institutions.
The Centers would affirmatively encourage employees to opt for more
participatory, collectively empowering governance options both through
direct information dissemination and through conditional funding for
worker training, career development, and "proactive capacities" to par-
ticipate in strategic technological and organizational-design decisions.
Workers and managers are likely to find such incentives increasingly at-
tractive in the new environment of heightened economic insecurity,
rapid corporate reconfigurations, and training-intensive, high-perform-
31. My proposed regulative ideal of "egalitarian deliberation" would replace the
Board's longstanding ideal of ensuring "laboratory conditions" for free worker choice.
The former, unlike the latter, emphasizes that the process of worker choice is dialogic,
preference- and perception-shaping, and vulnerable to distortions by inegalitarian
distributions of speech opportunities and information. See infra notes 113-133 and
accompanying text. The ideal of egalitarian deliberation is, in fact, more faithful to the
pragmatic cooperationism that animated Robert Wagner and his circle of labor
progressives. See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power,
Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1412-30 (1993).
32. The new federal centers are inspired by widely successful state and local programs
of the 1980s and early 1990s. See infra notes 927-931 and accompanying text.
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ance organizations. Through the deliberative Conferences, the encour-
agement of cooperative workplace teams and councils, and the use of
nonadversarial modes of dispute resolution, the Centers would contrib-
ute to the growth of high-trust, consultative labor-management relations.
This "facilitative" approach to legal regulation would also incorporate
principles of decentralized governmental experimentation and revision,
as the regional Centers engage in mutual learning and redesign in con-
sultation with enterprise and community stakeholders.
This legal regime would encourage unionization not only through
the conditional-funding incentives just mentioned, but also through the
new role for labor organizations in supplying the training, career-develop-
ment, and other resources to which workers would be statutorily entitled
both for their governance deliberation and for their roles in autonomous
teams and strategic representative councils. The regime would also tend
to revitalize the labor movement by requiring unions to compete with
alternative modes of participatory governance. Concurrently, unions or
wholly new employee associations, as support-providers to participatory
teams and strategic representatives, would face incentives to shift from
distant bureaucratic service organizations to "mobilizing" models of
unionism. My proposed regime would also allow more encompassing
bargaining agents-with heightened bargaining power-that span net-
works of horizontally and vertically related enterprises. Such collabora-
tive networks are a growing, dynamic feature of the new economic
landscape of flexible organization. Trans-enterprise union-management
governance mechanisms could supply the public goods of general and
network-specific training, and career readjustment programs, which are
beyond the capacity of individual enterprises in the new flexible labor
markets.
By encouraging more encompassing and more participatory forms of
self-chosen workplace governance, the legal regime would help steer
United States enterprises toward a high-learning, high-wage path of eco-
nomic growth rather than the low-skill, low-wage path of least resistance.
Most important, the law would actively encourage deliberative self-gov-
ernance and high-challenge, self-transforming experiences in employees'
daily lives.
II. CONCEPTIONS OF DOMINATION AND HEGEMONY IN THE APPLICATION
OF SECTION 8(a) (2) TO CLASSIC COMPANY UNIONISM
All major schools of academic thought on the employment relation
(other than some currents within neoclassical economics) 33 recognize
33. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 777 (1972) (denying that authority is a
relevant concept in the analysis of employment relations). By contrast, leading
institutionalist and transaction-cost economists put the concepts of "authority" and
"hierarchy" at the center of their models and frequently acknowledge the importance of
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that it, like any authority relation, combines instrumental and ideological
mechanisms for securing compliance with exercises of management's
asymmetric decision-making power.34 Managerial strategists and func-
tionaries have, historically, almost always self-consciously cast their labor-
relations techniques in the dual language of instrumental discipline and
noninstrumental consent or commitment.35 This was especially true in
the 1930s. Under the intense pressure of mass labor unrest and political
challenges to unbridled managerial authority, managers, while fervently
retaining the 1920s mentality that their authority was "natural and right,"
understood clearly that "[t]hey were engaged in a complex struggle for
moral authority."3 6
employee attitudes, motivation, culture, and trust. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The
Economic Institutions of Capitalism 206-39, 268-71 (1985); RonaldJ. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 313, 334-39 (1985);
Victor P. Goldberg, Bridges Over Contested Terrain: Exploring the Radical Account of the
Employment Relationship, 1J. Econ. Behav. & Organization 249, 264 n.33, 271-72 (1980).
34. "[A]ctivity devoted to changing the image of the world and especially the values or
preference orderings in the minds of somebody else" constitutes "a major part of industrial
relations." Kenneth E. Boulding, The Pathologies of Persuasion, in Unconventional
Wisdom: Essays on Economics in Honor ofJohn Kenneth Galbraith 3, 12 (Samuel Bowles
et al. eds., 1989). Indeed, grand theorists as diverse as Freud, Weber, Gramsci, and
Foucault see civilization itself as a complex of coercive and cultural-psychological means to
discipline labor for purposes of society's material reproduction. See Michel Foucault,
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, at 104-08 (Colin
Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980); Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its
Discontents 55-63 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1961); Antonio Gramsci, Selections from
the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 206-320 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey N. Smith
eds. & trans., 1971); Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 271 (Hans H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
35. The locus classicus on managerial ideology is Reinhard Bendix, Work and
Authority in Industry (1956). For samples of the vast sociological and economic research
demonstrating that managerial thinking is correct in this respect-that is, that worker
behavior is (perhaps inevitably) strongly affected by symbolic and psychological processes
in addition to instrumental incentives-see, e.g., Jon Elster, The Cement of Society. A
Study of Social Order 121-22 (1989) (summarizing evidence that workplace is a "hotbed"
of cultural norms affecting behavior in ways not captured in instrumentalist rational choice
theory); Charles F. Sabel, Work and Politics 1-30, 78-193 (1982) (exploring cultural and
psychological influences on various worker cohorts); Haig R. Nalbantian, Incentive
Compensation in Perspective, in Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Sharing 3, 27-33 (Haig
R. Nalbantian ed., 1987) (summarizing discrepancy between economic models of
instrumental "extrinsic" incentives and empirical findings that worker behavior is affected
by "intrinsic" psychological motivators and social environment); Arthur L. Stinchcombe,
Work Institutions and the Sociology of Everyday Life, in The Nature of Work: Sociological
Perspectives 99 (Kai Erikson & Steven P. Vallas eds., 1990) (summarizing cultural
dimension of work life).
36. HowellJ. Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American
Business in the 1940s, at 6, 10 (1982).
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Indeed, the deepened paternalistic strategy of welfare work37 in the
1900s and 1910s and of welfare capitalism 38 in the 1920s-of which com-
pany unionism was a keystone-had already marked a deliberate shift in
the balance from the coercive sanctions of the "drive system" of work dis-
cipline toward more psychologically transformative techniques for elicit-
ing worker compliance.3 9  The head of the famed Sociological
Department of the Ford Motor Co.-a pioneer of the paternalist strat-
egy-said, "[A]s we adapt the machinery in the shop to turning out the
kind of automobile we have in mind, so we have constructed ou[r] [com-
pany] educational system with a view to producing the human product in
mind."40 Historian David Montgomery concludes that "to those in busi-
ness [in the 1920s] who were enthusiasts for employee representation,
works councils and managers trained in industrial psychology were
inseparable."41
It was within this social context of ubiquitous instrumental and ideo-
logical mechanisms for deploying managerial power that the NLRB was
charged with the imposing task, injustice Douglas's words, of "free [ing]
the collective bargaining process from all taint of an employer's compul-
sion, domination, or influence."42 In seminal opinions interpreting Sec-
tion 8(a) (2) of the NLRA, the Board and the courts offered their most
comprehensive accounts of the ways in which structures of managerial
37. Employers in the "welfare work" movement aimed to prevent labor unrest and
raise productivity through "programs ranging from thrift clubs, compulsory religious
observances, and citizenship instruction, to company housing, outings, and contests. The
idea was that the firm could be used to recast the worker in a middle-class mold: uplifting
him, bettering him, and making his family life more wholesome." Sanford M. Jacoby,
Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in American
Industry, 1900-1945, at 49 (1985).
38. "Welfare capitalism" refers to progressive employers' package of various nonwage
benefits, profit-sharing, and company unionism. Less frequently, this paternalistic strategy
included rationalized job ladders, higher wages, and restraints on foreman discretion. See
Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 (1970); David Brody, Workers
in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle 48-59 (1980).
39. See Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule 129-30 (1991);Jacoby, supra note 37, at 49-64
(showing that paternalism of welfare work and instrumentalism of foremen's drive system
coexisted in 1900-1920); Gerald Zahavi, Workers, Managers, and Welfare Capitalism: The
Shoeworkers and Tanners of Endicott Johnson, 1890-1950, at 1-30, 99-125 (1988). By
the late 1910s, one of the foundational ideas of even the scientific management approach
to labor discipline-best known for its rigorous scheme of instrumental incentives for the
performance of minutely specified behaviors-was that "managers must transform the
consciousness of their workers," an idea that "remains central to virtually all managerially
inspired efforts to recast the workplace environment." Nelson Lichtenstein, The Union's
Early Days: Shop Stewards and Seniority Rights, in Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team
Concept 65, 66 (Mike Parker &Jane Slaughter eds., 1988) [hereinafter Choosing Sides];
accord Jacoby, supra note 37, at 102-05; Daniel Nelson, Frederick W. Taylor and the Rise
of Scientific Management 168-202 (1980).
40. Stephen Meyer III, The Five Dollar Day: Labor Management and Social Control
in the Ford Motor Company, 1908-1921, at 156-57 (1981) (quoting S.S. Marquis).
41. David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor 413-14 (1987).
42. International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940).
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authority ostensibly "dominated" workers, instrumentally and ideologi-
cally. The immediate aim of that crucial provision was to settle the pri-
mary legal-institutional contest in the 1930s workplace-that is, to
extinguish the company-union structures that managers had interposed
as a last-ditch alternative to outside unionization.43 But the drafters of
Section 8(a) (2) deliberately used open-textured terms that forbade man-
agement to "dominate," "interfere with," or "support" any entity through
which employees as a group "deal[ ]" with employers over conditions of
work.44 In light of this protean language, it is not surprising that the
Board's and the courts' contextual accounts of company unionism were
infused with understandings of the general forms of illegitimate domina-
tion that potentially infect collaborative relationships under conditions of
asymmetric power in the workplace and elsewhere.
For present purposes, this Part distinguishes three social "technolo-
gies" for exercising and securing managerial power, each of which corre-
sponds to a set of more specific justifications for the ban on company
unions. 45 Some liberal and legal-economic thinkers doubt that the con-
43. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1886 & n.18, 1401-03, 1452-53, 1461, 1495
n.495. The typical interwar company unions (also known as "works councils" and
"employee representation plans") centered around periodic consultative meetings
between employee and managerial representatives of a single enterprise or plant. The
subjects of consultation included individual grievances, production problems, and, less
frequently, wages and benefits. The company union was generally initiated and funded by
management. Management retained final unilateral authority over all questions of
company union structure, policy, and grievance resolution. Employees were not permitted
to elect representatives from outside the company workforce, and, of course, the employer
provided no strike funds. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bull. No.
634, Characteristics of Company Unions 32-77 (1937). The evolution and variation in
company union plans are discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this Article.
44. The core language is set out supra note 14.
45. I adopt Foucault's term-"technologies of power"-because the object of analysis
is the operation of local institutions (labor-management behaviors and discourses) for
deploying disciplinary power. See Foucault, supra note 34, at 104-06. The substantive
analysis of the technologies, however, diverges from Foucault's. Although he does see
social practices and discourses as (interwoven) elements of power relations, the analysis
below gives greater emphasis to the interior psychological life and relatively autonomous
social communities of workers as important components of the process through which
power is exerted and resisted. Also, while Foucault highlights the way in which power is
"locally" instituted, this Article's analysis reemphasizes the legal realists' and positivists'
familiar insight that the legal regime's coercive and ideological authority ultimately stands
behind the employer's disciplinary regime. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
(1961); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 8-14 (1927).
Management constructs and enforces workplace rules-engages in private law-making-by
exercising the power delegated by property, contract, corporate, and labor law. The state's
police powers enforce employers' sanction of discharge against employees who violate
those private rules. Of course, because state authority ultimately turns on legal and
nonlegal actors' internalization of norms of legal legitimacy or inevitability, there is a
mutually reinforcing relation between the "local" cultural and psychological reproduction
of the legitimacy or naturalness of private power and the "central" power of the state. See,
e.g., Gabel, supra note 18, at 1577-86; Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan.
L. Rev. 57, 93-95 (1984).
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cept of "power" has much payoff in positive or normative legal analysis.
This Article's focus on the legislative regulation of private actors' modes
of deploying power, however, does not impose a conceptual scheme for-
eign to the language and purposes of American labor law.46 To the con-
trary, in its first decision upholding the constitutionality of statutory
protections of workers' collective action, the Supreme Court capsulized
those protections as limits on "the use of the authority or power of either
party to induce action by the other in derogation of what the statute calls
'self-organization.' "47
The first social technology of power has instrumental or coercive ef-
fects on employees: management exercises its power by altering the
choice set-the penalties and rewards, costs and benefits of the deci-
sional options-faced by workers.48 Management, for example, tells
workers that they will be discharged or the plant will close if they union-
ize. The second technology is also instrumental or coercive, but the em-
ployer, rather than alter workers' set of governance choices, transforms
the "procedural" conditions within which workers engage in group delib-
eration and choice. Management bans meetings among workers, for ex-
ample, or requires that managerial representatives be present at all
meetings among workers or worker representatives.
The final technology of power-call it ideological, rather than in-
strumental-is simply a residual category that includes all other means by
which the structure or exercise of managerial authority alters workers'
consciousness. Such alterations include transformations in workers' nor-
mative preferences, interests, and values; in their affective orientations,
desires, and impulses; in their preconscious behavioral dispositions, com-
pulsions, and habits; and in their descriptive beliefs about workplace real-
46. Notwithstanding their centrality in the Wagner Act scheme, the concepts of
"power," "unequal bargaining power," and "relative bargaining power" remain largely
unexplored in labor-law adjudication and commentary. See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note
31, at 1491 n.472; Douglas Leslie, Retelling the International Paper Story, 102 Yale LJ.
1897, 1902 (1993); cf. Robert E. Scott & Douglas L. Leslie, Contract Law and Theory 67
(1988) (examining confusions in the use of the concept of unequal bargaining power in
contract law). Although this Article does not offer an explicit theory of relative bargaining
power, my analysis of domination aims to provide some conceptual building blocks for
future articulation of a comprehensive theory relevant to labor jurisprudence.
47. Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568
(1930) (interpreting the Railway Labor Act of 1926). This case was the primary legal
precedent on which Senator Wagner and other proponents of the Act relied in their
defense of its constitutionality. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, at 2317 (1949)
[hereinafter Legis. Hist.].
48. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 349,
352-57 (1984) (labelling analogous instrumental effects of law "coercive"). At this stage, as
in Kornhauser's and earlier legal realists' usage, the term "coercion" is not intended to
have normative connotations. See id.; see also Cohen, supra note 45, at 8-14; Robert L.
Hale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 Am. Lab. Legis. Rev.
155, 155-60 (1925). The next section addresses the problem of distinguishing legitimate
from illegitimate coercion.
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ity.49 For example, management implements trust-building training
programs, or ongoing transmission of "familial" corporate symbols and
principles, or consultative workplace arrangements, each designed to al-
ter workers' affective or cognitive sense of unity of purpose with the
enterprise.
The first two technologies of power may also have such intrapsychic
effects in addition to their external effects on the actual sanctions and
rewards facing workers who make alternative governance choices or en-
gage in communicational activities. Of course, even the "purely" instru-
mental impact of those two technologies depends on workers' cognitive,
affective, and motivational response to managements' threats or offers.
All human practices-whether employers' activity or employees' re-
sponses-interweave outward behaviors (physical movements, gestures,
and speech acts) and associated internal meanings, beliefs, and affects.50
Thus, both "instrumental" and "ideological" practices are complexes of
action and subjective states. At the same time, management's intended
meanings need not match workers' attribution of meanings to specific
managerial acts and utterances. The problem of intersubjective interpre-
tation of others' meanings, beliefs, and motives is ubiquitous.5 1 In the
analysis of economic activity, it is easy to forget that such "hard" con-
straints as "institutions," "organizational structures," and even "markets"
are constituted, reproduced, and changed by participants' enactments
and creative transformations of psychologically internalized role struc-
tures. The degree of institutional constraint is therefore always problem-
atic, because role structures are clusters of inherently ambiguous, more
or less convergent or contested, intersubjective expectations and norms
about others' meaningful behavior.52
A vast range of managerial deployments of the three social technolo-
gies of power was routine and legal under the common law and remained
so even after the enactment of the NLRA.5 3 Each of the three technolo-
gies does, however, contain a category of managerial practices-call the
respective categories structural coercion, distorted communication, and
hegemony-that the Board and courts invoked to give content to Section
49. Some distinctions and relations among these elements of subjective experience
are discussed infra notes 164-328 and accompanying text.
50. See the essays collected in 1 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers: Human Agency
and Language (1985).
51. See Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 17-36, 124-39
(1984).
52. See generally Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality (1966).
53. For example: "pure coercion" by management's threats of discharge for shirking
job duties, or promises of bonuses for good performance; "procedural coercion" by
management prohibitions, also backed up by the discharge threat, on union solicitation
during work hours; and "consciousness-shaping" by management-sponsored training or
athletic and social events aimed at eliciting employee loyalty to the enterprise.
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8(a) (2)'s central concept of illegitimate "dominat[ion]."54 In this Part, I
parse and taxonomize these managerial practices and recast them in vari-
ous recent conceptual frameworks of economic sociology, psychology,
and cultural anthropology. That is, I attempt to provide plausible theo-
retical underpinnings to the Board's and courts' various arguments about
how company unions systemically coerced and coopted workers. The fi-
nal section of this Part sketches theoretical grounds for doubting that
those arguments accurately captured the whole instrumental and ideolog-
ical story of company unionism or, more generally, of any relationship of
authority or power. Parts III and IV then elaborate and historically assess
these grounds for doubt about the Board's and courts' claims about
domination.
Before exploring these legal conceptions of illegitimate workplace
domination, it is important to understand the interpretive puzzle that
Section 8(a) (2) presented to the Board and the courts.5 5 The framers of
the Wagner Act believed that workers' objective interests and entitle-
ments lay in outside unionization. The Act therefore sought to protect
workers' right to unionize-their right of free economic association-by
prohibiting employer interference with union organizing campaigns. But
the Act allowed workforces the option-in government-supervised, ma-
jority-rule, secret-ballot elections-to remain nonunionized. Indeed, the
drafters insisted that the Act rested on an absolute right to free group
choice between unionization and nonunionization, notwithstanding that
the nonunion workplace was, in their view, a state of objective despotism
or "economic slavery." Hence, the puzzle of the company union ban: if,
owing to liberal principles of free choice, the Act permits nonunion des-
potism, why does it ban company-union despotism? 56 The Board and the
courts attempted to solve the puzzle by proposing that structural coer-
cion, distorted communication, and ideological hegemony systemically
and irremediably infected company unions, but not nonunion work-
places. The ban on company unions therefore protected, rather than pa-
ternalistically overrode, workers' free group choice. Sections A through
C proffer plausible descriptive and normative arguments for this solution
to the interpretive puzzle. Section D then presents some grounds that
challenge the simplicity of the Board's and courts' solution.
54. See supra note 14.
55. For a more extended treatment of this puzzle, see Barenberg, supra note 31, at
1442-59.
56. The weaknesses of various potential justifications for the company union ban-
including "simple coercion," "contracting into slavery," "principal-agent conflict,"
"collective disempowerment," and "agenda effects"-are canvassed in id. at 1442-50. The
primary weakness of each of these justifications rests on the simple fact that each would
equally justify a statutory ban on nonunion workplaces. See id.
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A. Domination Proper: The Company Union as an Infrastructure of
Illegitimate Coercion
In order to achieve workers' free group choice, the proponents of
the NLRA sought to eliminate "simple coercion," understood as an em-
ployer's direct threat or offer that conditioned workers' job security or
compensation on their vote against outside unionization. At the same
time, the Act's framers believed that employers engaged widely in simple
coercion to ensure workers' "choice" of company unions over outside un-
ions. The objective of eliminating simple coercion is nonetheless not a
strong justification of the company union ban.57 The proponents of the
Act were committed to the view that workers' choice over modes of gov-
ernance could be cleansed of that form of instrumental impairment.
Their commitment is demonstrated in part by the statutory permission of
the nonunion option even though they believed that the choice between
unionizing and not unionizing had been equally widely subject to simple
coercion.
1. The Idea of Structural Coercion. - The NLRB and the Supreme
Court, in their early interpretations of Section 8(a) (2), suggested an al-
ternative instrumental basis for the ban, which might appropriately be
called structural coercion or domination proper. In early decisions, the
Board's and the Court's initial premise was that the company union ban
was designed primarily to protect (not paternalistically to override) work-
ers' free choice.58 They also strongly intimated agreement with Senator
Wagner's belief that workers' objective interests and subjective prefer-
ences lay in collective bargaining through outside unions.59 The Board
57. Senator Wagner was insistent in his belief that the Act's general safeguards against
employer interference with secret-ballot elections would erase such simple coercion. See
id. at 1444 & n.291.
58. See, e.g., NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1940), enforcing 6 N.LR.B.
654 (1938); NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,. 308 U.S. 241, 250
(1939), enforcing 8 N.L.R.B. 866 (1938); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
303 U.S. 261, 266 (1938), enforcing 1 N.LR.B. 1 (1936); International Harvester Co., 2
N.L.R.B. 310, 345-55 (1936); Wheeling Steel, 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 709 (1936). That is, the
Board and the Court did not rely on any of the choice-overridingjustifications canvassed in
Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1445-51.
Between 1936 and 1947, the Board disestablished some 1400 company unions. See
Labor Relations Program: Hearings on S. 55 and SJ. Res. 22 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 98-99 (1947) [hereinafter Hearings
on S. 55] (testimony of Professor Leo Wolman). The discussion in this Part draws most
heavily on those Board and Supreme Court decisions that discussed the dynamics of
company unions at length and generated fresh diagnoses of their ostensible illegitimate
practices of domination. Generally, such cases involved highly visible, prototypical
company unions. The vast majority of Board decisions reinvoked the key descriptive and
justificatory phrases of these generative cases. Tabulations of the grounds for
disestablishing company unions in several hundred randomly sampled cases are on file
with the author.
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272, 275 (1938)
(quoting approvingly the NLRB's finding that the operation of the company union
repressed the "employee's impulse" to unionize), enforcing 2 N.LR.B. 431 (1936).
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and the Court did rule that widespread "simple coercion" of workers con-
stituted violations of Section 8(a) (2) for "interference" with the "forma-
tion" of inside unions, as well as violations of Section 8(a) (1) for
"coerc [ion]" of workers in the exercise of their right of self-organization. 60
But they also frequently found employer "domina[tion]" under Section
8(a) (2) on the ground that the ongoing operation of the inside union
"would in itself be a continuing obstacle to the exercise of the employees'
right of self-organization." 61 A company-dominated union provided an
employer "with a device by which its power may ... be made effective
unobtrusively." 62
Something about the ongoing structure and functioning of company
unions, then, was thought to impair the workers' capacity for free collec-
tive choice over modes of workplace governance. The underlying norma-
tive principle is that, even if workers should be free knowingly to choose a
weak or conflicted collective agent, they should not be free knowingly to
choose a regime that undermines their (and subsequently hired employ-
ees') ongoing capacity to make autonomous choices over modes of work-
place governance. 63  Administrative and judicial sanctions could
eliminate the ad hoc instrumental incentives constituting simple coercion
in the nonunion workplace, but incentives that inhered in the structure of
company unionism could not be eliminated without banning that govern-
ance mode altogether. "Domination" is an apt label for such structural
incentives-at least if there is a plausible normative case that those incen-
tives constitute illegitimate coercion.
2. The Idea of Structural Coercion. - As noted above, management
pervasively uses instrumental incentives (threats and inducements, penal-
ties and rewards) in workplace governance. While some legal scholars
label all such incentives "coercion,"64 it is more appropriate for our pur-
poses to reserve that term for the instrumental practices made illegal by
the Act-to use the term, that is, in a normative rather than descriptive
sense.65 "Structural coercion" shall therefore refer to the illegitimate in-
60. See supra note 14 and infra note 65.
61. Pennsylvania Greyhound, 303 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added); see also Newport News
Shipbuilding, 308 U.S. at 250 (employee free choice "may be obstructed by the existence
and recognition by the management" of a dominated organization).
62. Pacific Greyhound, 303 U.S. at 275 (quoting Board approvingly) (internal
quotations omitted).
63. Cf. Michael McPherson, Efficiency and Liberty in the Productive Enterprise:
Recent Work in the Economics of Work Organization, 12 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 354, 367 (1983)
("[T]he argument that workers can protect themselves from manipulation through freely
contracting out of such influence is not persuasive, since there are obvious problems about
enforcing contracts not to be deceived or manipulated.").
64. See supra note 48.
65. Liberal and critical theorists agree that the concept of "coercion" is both
"nonlexically normative"-it can be used both descriptively and normatively--and
"protean"-it is open-textured or less than fully specified. See Peter Westen, "Freedom"
and "Coercion"-Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 Duke LJ. 541,546-48; see also Mark
Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 102-10, 126-37 (1987) (expressing same idea).
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strumental incentives that the ongoing operation of a company union
brings to bear on employees' exercise of their right to choose modes of
workplace governance. Those illegitimate incentives include coercive
threats in the relatively restricted, if contested, sense that libertarian phi-
losophers have explored.66 But the Board and the courts also found a
broader range of instrumental incentives to be normative impairments of
worker choice, such as bribes and "coercive offers," "manipulative" or "ex-
ploitative" inducements, and certain incentives that altered employees'
communicative opportunities or that otherwise ostensibly transformed
their preferences and perceptions.67 As Part I noted, these normative
stances generally reflect explicit or, more often, implicit conceptions of
subjectivity. Such conceptions frequently embody plural, sometimes in-
consistent, understandings of what constitutes an autonomous, choosing
subject or self. The next subsection identifies and conceptually elabo-
rates the features of company unions that the framers and early interpret-
ers of Section 8(a) (2) saw as illegal domination in the form of structural
coercion.
3. Company Union Practices Constituting Structural Coercion.
a. Trasformismo: Incentives to Realign the Leadership Cadre. - Propo-
nents of the company union ban often asserted that a conflict of interest
inhered in management-supported employee representation schemes be-
cause management sat on both sides of the table. That is, management
Because the concept of "coerc[ion]" appears in the unfair labor practice provisions in
Section 8 of the NLRA, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988), it makes sense to reserve the term
for its normative role for purposes of discussing Section 8(a) (2). Section 8(a) (1) prohibits
employer practices that "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights to self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted
activities. Because Section 8(a) (1) is an umbrella provision that includes the more specific
unfair labor practices of Sections 8(a) (2)-(5), the illegal practice of dominating a labor
organization under Section 8(a) (2) is also interference, restraint, or coercion under
Section 8(a) (1).
66. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in
Honor of Ernest Nagel 440, 440-53 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (distinguishing
between coercive "threats" and noncoercive "offers" based on whether people view a
change in available alternatives as a gain or a loss relative to a baseline of "what the normal
and expected course of events is").
67. Some of the high points in the voluminous legal and philosophic literature on
coercive threats and offers, in addition to the sources cited supra notes 63-66, include 1
Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others passim (1984); Kent
Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, & the Uses of Language 79-109, 239-59 (1989); Alan
Wertheimer, Coercion passim (1989). On the less explored concepts of choice-disabling
manipulation and exploitation, see, e.g., 4Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal
Law. Harmless Wrongdoing 176-276 (1988) [hereinafter Feinberg, Harmless
Wrongdoing]; Alan Ware, The Concept of Manipulation: Its Relation to Democracy and
Power, 2 Brit.J. Pol. Sci. 163, 163-81 (1981); Daniel Wikler, Persuasion and Coercion for
Health, in Paternalism 35, 35-56 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). On the normative evaluation
of preference- and perception-transformations, within the liberal tradition, see Gerald
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy 3-84 (1988); Lawrence Haworth,
Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics 6-52, 176-229 (1986); and
within critical theory, see infra text accompanying notes 156-260.
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deployed incentives that disaligned the interests of worker representatives
from the interests of the rank and file. This was often depicted as a de-
fect in representation or agency.
68
Early interpreters characterized worker representatives not just as
(conflicted) agents of the rank and file, but also as a subgroup of rank
and file employees themselves. The inside union targeted that subgroup
with threats of loss or offers of gain of bonus pay, perquisites, promo-
tions, welfare benefit "patronage," opportunities to distribute such pa-
tronage to the rank and file, status, and, most important, the job itself-
all conditioned on the representatives' active support.69 The company
union was thus an apparatus that tended to produce a cadre of workers
opposed to outside unionism because especially beholden to, or intimi-
dated by, management's preferred mode of governance. 7°
In this way, the phenomenon that legislators had identified primarily
as a problem of principal-agent conflict was reinflected by the Board and
the courts as a problem of impairment, by the inherent operation of the
company union, of worker representatives' autonomous choice of govern-
ance modes. For example, the Board's principal theme in its 1938 Repub-
lic Steel decision-which gave one of the Board's most exhaustive factual
descriptions of a dominated company union-was the myriad ways in
which the ongoing functioning of the company union generated,
through threats, coercive offers, and manipulation directed at worker
representatives, a core of "loyal" workers actively supporting the company
union option and opposing the CIO during organizing drives and elec-
tions.' 1 Indeed, proponents of "welfare capitalism" in the 1920s and
1930s themselves widely believed that company unionism had such an
effect.72
Because workers tended to elect "natural" shop-floor leaders as their
company union representatives, the infrastructure of company union in-
68. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1446-49.
69. One could understand these discriminatory incentives as the kind of "selective
incentives" that are one means of solving a collective action problem-in this instance, the
problem of inducing collective action in support of the company union. See, e.g., Pamela
E. Oliver, Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action, 85 Am.J.
Soc. 1356 (1980). Such a "solution," however, rests on a prior achievement of collective
action-in this instance, the employer's establishment of the very company-union
apparatus that imposes the selective incentives. See, e.g., Michael Taylor, The Possibility of
Cooperation 22 (1987).
70. The tendency of this incentive effect, of course, might have been resisted by worker
representatives. For example, supporters of autonomous unions, who might have served as
company union representatives in order to "bore from within," might have received the
favors and threats targeted at representatives without abandoning allegiance to an outside
union. Many contemporary observers reported, however, that even pro-union workers
sometimes succumbed to the incentives faced by company union representatives. See infra
note 507 and accompanying text.
71. See Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.RIB. 219, 230, 236-49, 256-61, 338-42 (1938),
enforced, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939).
72. See infra notes 543-552 and accompanying text.
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centives had the potential to deflect a crucial worker subgroup. Various
theorists have modeled the potential importance of "organizational en-
trepreneurs" and of a "critical mass" of activists for overcoming the free-
rider obstacles to collective action.73 Such formal models are concordant
with the empirical importance of the leaders of informal shop-floor
groups in the union organizing process. Prominent pioneers in the Steel
Workers Organizing Committee of the CIO, for example, wrote:
In going about the task of organizing a group of workers in a
given plant into a labor union, we have consciously sought out
the leaders of these informal groups throughout the plant, in-
terested them in taking a lead in forming the union, and found
that their joining the union invariably caused the members of
the informal organization to follow suit. In labor-union par-
lance these leaders are called "the men with a following."74
If the Board was accurate in finding that company unions diverted such
entrepreneurs or activists from the cause of independent unionization,
the inside union provided an instrument for managerial preemption of
one of the core social processes of collective organization and action.
Gramsci identified this process of instrumental realignment of the poten-
tial leadership subgroup of a subordinate group as a key, nonideological
means by which systems of asymmetric power or domination are main-
tained, and gave it the name trasformismo.75
Although trasformismo captures one aspect of the general phenome-
non of "cooptation" that contemporaries (and others since) attributed to
company unions, does this specification of "structural coercion" justify
the Act's differential treatment of the company union option and the
nonunion or nondominated company union options? While employers
may have used the company union apparatus as a means for directing
threats and bribes at company union representatives, could the Act have
solved the problem by simply banning threats and bribes directed against
any subgroup of workers, whether in a nonunionized, company-union-
ized, or outside-unionized setting, rather than banning the company
union altogether? The Act could have prohibited the company-union-
ized employer from conditioning bonus pay, promotion, or continued
73. See, e.g., Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth,
Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 85 (1982); Pamela E. Oliver & Gerald Marwell, A Theory
of the Critical Mass I: Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of
Collective Action, 91 Am. J. Soc. 522 (1985); Pamela Oliver & Gerald Marwell, The
Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass II, 53 Am. Soc.
Rev. 1 (1988).
74. Clinton S. Golden & Harold J. Ruttenberg, The Dynamics of Industrial
Democracy 182 (1942). For an exemplary ethnographic case-study of this process, see
Peter Friedlander, The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936-1939: A Study in Class and
Culture (1975). See also Sidney M. Peck, The Rank-and-File Leader (1963) (surveying
roles and attitudes of shopfloor leaders).
75. See Antonio Gramsci, I1 Risorgimento 157-58 (1949). An English-language
summary of Gramsci's analysis can be found in Joseph V. Femia, Gramsci's Political
Thought 47-48 (1987).
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employment on an employee representative's (and, of course, a rank and
file employee's) vote in an NLRB election, just as the Act prohibits the
employer from extending such bribes or making such threats to individu-
als or groups of workers in the nonunionized or unionized workplace.
Indeed, an early, discarded draft of the company union provision pre-
pared by Wagner's Senate office focused principally on banning such spe-
cific practices.76
A plausible premise of the drafters of the final Wagner Act, however,
was that the company union deflected employee representatives' actions
and decisions because of ineradicable intimidation, or ineradicable "rents"
afforded by virtue of the heightened status or expanded opportunities for
winning employer favor or for skimming patronage that inherently at-
tached to the office. 77 These ostensibly ineradicable mechanisms, of
course, were precisely the basis for the irremediable-conflict-of-interest
justification for banning the company union.78 Even so, the question re-
mains whether these instrumental incentives would illegitimately influ-
ence the representative's choice over modes of workplace governance in
an NLRB secret ballot election. A company union representative could
curry favor with, or knuckle under to, management in pressing grievances
or negotiating wages, but still vote autonomously for or against the com-
pany union when casting a secret ballot. Management's instrumental
penalties and bribes could be conditioned on compliant policies and de-
cisions by company union representatives, but they could not be condi-
tioned on representatives' vote in NLRB elections.
The only instrumental influence of the company union's operation
on the representative's governance choice itself, then, would be the indi-
rect effect of ineradicable rents and intimidation on the representative's
calculation of the relative costs and benefits to him of, respectively, a
company-unionized, an outside-unionized, and a nonunionized work-
place-not the direct effect of (even structurally inherent) threats or
bribes conditioned on his secret ballot vote.79 A company union repre-
sentative would have to weigh not only the changes in wages, benefits,
76. The provision would have made it illegal for an employer "to extend or to
withhold special privileges, such as group insurance, donations to relief funds, and the
like, depending upon whether an employee or employees belong or do not belong to any
such [labor] organization." It also would have forbidden "discriminatory practices as to
wage and hour differentials, advancement, demotionjob tenure, or any other condition of
employment, to encourage employees to join, or to attempt to dissuade them from joining
any such organization." Undated Memorandum, 694 LA 715, Folder 7, in The Robert
Wagner Papers, Georgetown University.
77. Observers often characterized company unionism as a form of systematic graft.
See, e.g., Irving Bernstein, Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker,
1933-1941, at 465 (1970).
78. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1447 & nn.298-99.
79. This analysis considers only the instrumental incentive effects of the carrots and
sticks faced by company union representatives. The indirect psychological effects of bribes
and threats are examined infra text accompanying notes 177, 193-198, 214-218.
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union dues, and dignity that would come with outside unionization, but
the loss of the ineradicable benefits and costs that accrue to him or her by
virtue of holding the company union office.
In what sense is this indirect incentive effect, viewed within the basic
structure of the Act, illegitimate? Think, for example, of individual work-
ers in nonunionized workplaces who receive bonus pay based on skill,
seniority, shift, or the like, or who receive greater across-the-board wages
(so-called "union threat" wages) as a means of preempting a potential but
nonimmediate union threat. Such pay gives these workers greater incen-
tive to vote for maintaining the nonunionized workplace, yet the Act
neither prohibits such practices nor eliminates the nonunion option on
the ground that those workers' votes would otherwise be coerced. Simi-
larly, employees acting as representatives in a nondominated company,
union face the same kind (though not the same degree)8 0 of ineradicable
incentives as those faced by representatives in a dominated company
union.
The relevant normative principle in play is that the illegitimacy of an
act of coercion-including the making of a "coercive offer"-rests not
simply on the coercing party's alteration of the choice conditions facing
the coerced party, but on whether the altered rewards and penalties in
some contextually compelling sense wrongfully condition the choice.8 '
Although adjudicators and commentators occasionally reach conclusions
of statutory "coercion" or "noncoercion" predicated solely on manage-
ment's descriptive manipulation of the workers' choice set, there is noth-
ing automatic in the concept of "coercion" that dictates either normative
conclusion8 2 The fact that management offers workers a third choice
with a particular distribution of costs and benefits-the company union,
in addition to nonunionization and outside unionization-may but need
not be seen as a wrongful influence on group choice. Adding that ele-
ment to workers' choice set could be seen, indeed, as an enhancement of
workers' substantive autonomy. Their range of real options has in-
creased; and if workers choose that option they have exercised autonomy
and maximized the satisfaction of their preferences, whatever manage-
ment's interest in the matter.
80. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1448 n.303.
81. Liberal and critical theorists argue compellingly that a contextual moral
evaluation of party A's motivation for altering the choice set faced by party B is
unavoidable if normative judgment is to be passed on the "autonomy" of party B's choice.
See 3Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self 189-268 (1986);
Kelman, supra note 65, at 131; Westen, supra note 65, at 584-86. Thus, the normative
proposition-which requires justification-is that it is illegitimate for the employer to
condition the representatives' receipt of ineradicable benefits on the group's choice of the
company union.
82. See, e.g., Charles C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6, 42 (1982) (blurring




But of course the same could be said of bribes offered to voters in a
political election. Casting trasformismo as a form of vote-buying rests on
contextual conceptions of (1) the proper mode of valuation within the
new legal regime of "industrial democracy," and (2) the standard of free
citizen-worker subjectivity and choice within that democracy. Wagner
and his allies intended the statutory regime to implement and safeguard
workers' freedom of association. The starting premise of the National
Labor Board of 1933-34, chaired by Wagner, was that the choice of work-
place governance mechanisms was solely for the workers to make. The
Board established the regime of government-supervised elections pre-
cisely in response to management's efforts to intervene in what the Board
initially thought could be a collective choice privately orchestrated by the
workforce.83 In this vision, the "demos" of industrial democracy is the
workforce, and the process of group deliberation and voting is the prov-
ince of that demos alone. For management to condition the provision of
managerial resources on the outcome of that choice is a distortion of
democratic process and of principled, deliberative citizenship. Even if it
were thought legitimate or noncoercive for management to engage in
reasoned argumentation to persuade workers not to unionize, manage-
rial attempts to alter the choice by instrumental manipulation go beyond
such noncoercive persuasion. The sphere of reasoned "political" deci-
sion should not be tainted by pecuniary deals.84
On this understanding of Section 8(a) (2), there are at least two rea-
sons why management's instrumental manipulation of wages in the non-
unionized (by contrast with a company-unionized) workplace does not
constitute such a distortion of democratic choice. First, a rank hierarchy
or an across-the-board, union-threat wage increase in a nonunion work-
place is not intrinsically conditioned on the outcome of the NLRB elec-
tion. A vote to unionize does not automatically terminate the regime of
benefits and costs associated with the rank hierarchy or the payment of a
83. The NLB's initial position was that the process of workers' collective choice of
representatives was for the workers themselves, not the government, to formulate and
conduct. Answering an early inquiry about what procedure workers should use to choose
their representatives, William Leiserson, secretary to the NLB, responded that "that is a
matter for the employees to decide for themselves. They may call a meeting and elect the
representatives in any way they desire." Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions:
Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960, at 113
(1985). But in the face of employer conduct that raised the transaction costs of employees'
collective efforts to organize and choose representatives (by threatened and actual
discharges, use of informants, refusal to acknowledge the collectively chosen representative
as such, imposition of biased management-imposed procedures for collective choice, and
the like), "the Board was slowly forced by employer interference" to impose its own
procedure for collective choice: the government-supervised, majority rule, secret-ballot
election. See id. It was this experience of the NLB that cast the die for the election
process that became a centerpiece of the NLRA. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at
1401-03, 1450-61.
84. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 281-311 (1983); Sunstein, supra note 20,
at 780-85.
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union-threat wage. Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, in fact, prohibits an em-
ployer from engaging in such retaliatory discrimination against a newly
unionized workforce. A vote against the company union, to the contrary,
automatically terminates the built-in rents and costs flowing to company
union office-holders because the structure of offices is necessarily
dismantled.
Second, the rank hierarchy or across-the-board increase may have
more substantial legitimate contextual purposes or effects, other than
simply altering workers' governance choice, than does the company
union. The standard for measuring whether there is such a substantial
purpose or effect is supplied by other basic goals of the Act beside safe-
guarding workers' freedom of association-namely, achieving worker
consent and productivity-enhancing cooperation via increased bargaining
power. In Wagner's view, the altered incentives that the company union
imposed on employee representatives' governance choice brought
neither a gain in employee bargaining power comparable to the empow-
erment of an outside union or of a nondominated company union, nor a
gain in efficiency comparable to that stemming from the cooperation in-
duced by such empowerment.8 5 Likewise, such trasformismo does not re-
ward meritorious work performance like the nonunion compensation
hierarchy, nor does it redistribute income or implement trust-enhancing
norms of fair exchange to the extent that the payment of union-threat
wages does.8 6 The built-in, selective incentives to company union repre-
sentatives thus smack more of simple vote-buying: the predominant pur-
pose and effect of company unionism are simply to condition net benefits
to a particularly important subgroup of employee-leaders on the outcome
of the group's governance choice.8 7
85. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1449, 1465-89.
86. On such trust-based "gift exchange," see id. at 1485-87. Wagner and other
legislators did not articulate these particular distinctions between nonunionized and
company-unionized workplaces. It was, however, implicit in the Wagner Act scheme that
reducing the transaction costs of unionization would raise the bargaining power of even
nonunionized workers by making their threat to unionize more credible. Nonunion
workers could thus expect to receive a union-threat premium that, unlike the ineradicable
perquisites of company union representatives, was not inherently tainted by built-in
discrimination among workers.
87. The Supreme Court's much-debated holding in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405 (1964)-barring employers from raising workers' wages and benefits during an
NLRB election campaign, but only if the employer's purpose and the foreseeable effect are
to alter the election outcome-can be rationalized within this analysis. If the employer's
purpose is to implement a routine and presumptively independently justifiable merit
increase, there is no unfair labor practice regardless of the concurrent incentive effect on
workers' votes. A nonroutine wage increase during an organizing drive may be thought to
constitute an illegitimate distortion of democratic choice for any of three reasons. First,
the Supreme Court thought that the middrive wage increase constituted an implicit threat
to workers to withdraw those or other benefits should workers vote to unionize. See id. at
409. For the Court, then, the middrive wage increase or other potential benefits, unlike
the predrive increase, are implicitly conditioned on the outcome of the election and
therefore akin to a bribe or threat. Second, it is unlikely that the middrive increase would
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b. Infrastructure of Surveillance and Illegitimate Incentives by Peers. -
Early interpreters of Section 8 (a) (2) portrayed the company union appa-
ratus not only as a selective-incentive apparatus that structurally bribed,
coerced, and manipulated worker representatives qua employee-voters.
They also depicted that apparatus as an institutionalized vehicle for, in
turn, structurally bribing, coercing, and manipulating other rank and file
employee-voters. That is, many Board and court opinions highlighted
how worker representatives acted as the shock troops in management's
campaign of anti-union threats and promises directed at the rest of the
workforce. In its Douglas Aircraft decision of 1938, for example, the Board
rested its finding of "domination" in part on the fact that worker repre-
sentatives dispensed welfare fund benefits only to those workers willing to
support the company union, and led a campaign of coercive threats
against workers supporting the CIO union.88
Did the company union apparatus make such coercion and bribery
any less remediable than the coercion and bribery that management
could bring to bear on nonunion workers in the absence of the company
union infrastructure of worker representatives? Or could management
just as effectively add coercion and bribery of rank and file workers to the
job responsibilities of managerial and supervisory employees in the non-
union workplace as it could to the job responsibilities of worker repre-
sentatives in the company union workplace?
There are three possible grounds for thinking that the cadre of com-
pany union representatives provided a more effective political machine
for management than did supervisors. First, to the extent that the tras-
formismo phenomenon was real, company union representatives were self-
motivated to promote the company union among rank and file workers.8 9
have the trust-enhancing effect of the predrive increase, because the former is more
patently a response to instrumental threat rather than a credible commitment to the
norms of fair gift-exchange. Third, while it is true that the ongoing threat of unionization
may inhibit the employer from withdrawing a middrive increase if the workers vote down
the union, the managerial manipulation may, by preempting the union drive, have caused
the workers to dissipate or waste limited resources available to organize for collective
action. That is, should workers attempt to unionize in response to management's
withdrawal of a middrive wage increase, the total transaction costs of unionization will be
higher, defeating the statutory purpose of minimizing workers' costs of free association.
Permitting such managerial strategic behavior raises the costs of unionization and thereby
diminishes the empowering effect of the union threat.
Notwithstanding these rationalizations of the Exchange Parts holding, there are
stronger arguments cutting the other way. That is, wage increases intended to prevent
unionization may impair workers' governance choice more greatly if granted before than
after a union organizing drive begins. The potency of human resources granted to workers
prior to union organizing campaigns is discussed infra text accompanying notes 886-895.
88. See Douglas Aircraft Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 242, 248-50 (1938); see also Republic Steel
Corp., 9 N.L.R-B. 219, 234-42 (1938); Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. 626 (1936).
89. That is, even if management did not explicitly condition representatives' benefits
or job security on their deployment of instrumental incentives against the rank and file,
representatives would be motivated in the same direction by their own interests-
generated by trasformismo-in the continued existence of the company union. Supervisors,
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Although the analysis above may cast some doubt on how powerful that
phenomenon was, worker representatives' motivation to impose instru-
mental incentives on other workers need not itself have been created by
instrumental means. To the extent that any of the hegemonic processes
discussed below were effective in transforming representatives' prefer-
ences, representatives might be noninstrumentally motivated to bribe
and coerce rank and file workers.9 0
Second, company union representatives, as coworkers of the rank
and file, had additional instrumental penalties and rewards to impose on
noncompliant workers, the potency of which should not be underesti-
mated: the ostracism or approbation of peers, particularly peer leaders,
within a small workplace community.9 1 Precisely because company union
representatives were caught in conflicted status, however, rank and file
workers could subject worker representatives who bribed and threatened
on behalf of managerial rather than worker interests to the same kind of
peer penalties, which rank and file workers could not inflict as effectively
on supervisors in the nonunion workplace. The balance of forces in this
respect would depend on, among other things, how effectively the rank
and file could mobilize social norms of worker autonomy and empower-
ment and how effectively company union representatives could mobilize
norms of organizational solidarity-issues that could be expected to tum
heavily on the wider politico-economic climate and on the culture and
practices of labor relations in the particular workplace. 92 The effective-
ness of the rank and file's "counter-ostracism" would be further dimin-
ished by second-order free-rider problems. Applying peer pressure to
company union representatives is itself a public good whose provision is
costly to individual frontline workers. 93 Such second-order costs would
whose formal terms of employment would remain the same under nonunionization or
unionization in the absence of affirmative employer action, would have no such built-in
incentive to impede unionization among the rank and file. Of course, this rationalization
of Section 8(a) (2) rests on a simplified model based on such built-in, formal incentives.
Supervisors may in fact experience various contingent, self-regarding motives to oppose
either unionization or company-unionization. Supervisors might well anticipate, for
example, that both of the latter governance modes would cause them disutility by curbing
their power or discretion.
90. "[T]hose who provide selective incentives for people who would join [in some
collective activity, such as company unionism) only for selfishly rational motives need not
themselves be guided solely by this motivation." Elster, supra note 35, at 42.
91. There is historical evidence of this sort of penalty, as well as of the "counter-
ostracism" by the rank and file. See infra Part IV. Michael Taylor and Mancur Olson
emphasize the way in which the members of a small group-particularly a "community"
exhibiting shared beliefs, direct relations, and generalized reciprocity-can solve collective
action problems by "wield[ing] with great effectiveness a range of positive and negative
sanctions, including the sanctions of approval and disapproval." Olson, supra note 73, at
23-24; see also Taylor, supra note 69, at 23.
92. See discussion infra Part IV.
93. On the second-order free rider problems that diminish individual workers'
willingness to bear the cost of "mutual monitoring" of coworkers' behavior on behalf of
group interests, see Elster, supra note 35, at 40-41; Taylor, supra note 69, at 80.
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be less of an impediment to representatives' peer pressure of the rank
and file, because the company union structure, initiated by management,
itself "solved" the representatives' collective action problem in this
respect.94
A third ground, mentioned in the legislative proceedings, again rests
on the fact that worker representatives, unlike supervisory personnel,
were coworkers of the rank and file. An officer of an AFL local union
told the Senate committee:
The only reason why the company unions oppose the bill is that
it would prevent them from spying on their fellow workers
openly in the guise of representing them in the presentation of
their grievances and get [sic] paid for it by their employer, in-
stead of having to operate under cover.95
Public opponents of company unions widely argued that employee repre-
sentatives served as an institutionalized substitute for the army of under-
cover "labor spies" supplied by scores of management agencies to many,
if not most, leading American corporations in the 1920s and 1930s,
before the practice was made illegal by the Wagner Act.9 6
The "panoptic"97 surveillance of rank and file workers by company
union representatives constantly in their midst-and whose very function
was to elicit and transmit to management information about employees
who felt aggrieved by workplace conditions-would, by raising the
probability of detection and reprisal, have a greater chilling effect on pro-
union activity within informal shopfloor groups than would surveillance
by supervisors in the nonunion shop.98 In the terminology of institu-
94. On the way in which a system of sanctions to induce collective action itself
depends on prior solution of a collective action problem-as management's initiation of
the company union helped company union representatives to overcome free-rider
problems in deploying sanctions against rank and file workers-see Taylor, supra note 69,
at 30.
95. National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm.
on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 564 (1935) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1958],
reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 1950 (testimony ofJohn D. House).
96. See, e.g., Robert W. Dunn, Company Unions 52 (1927) (company union at
Forstmann and Huffman said to be "a nest of stool pigeons and spies"); id. at 28 (quoting
Goodyear worker's view that the company union "'embodies a secret espionage system'");
id. at 203 (company unions serve "as intelligence systems"). A study by the National Labor
Relations Board in 1936 estimated that there were some 230 agencies. Estimates of the
number of undercover informants ranged from 40,000 nationwide to 135,000 supplied by
the three leading agencies alone-the William J. Bums, Pinkerton, and Thiel firms. See
Leo Huberman, The Labor Spy Racket 5-6 (1937) (citing study presented to LaFollette
Committee on Civil Liberties). The in-house personnel departments of some companies
performed such espionage functions. The Ford Sociology Department is the most notable
example. See Meyer, supra note 40, at 172-73, 175.
97. This concept, revived by Foucault, derives from Jeremy Bentham's design of a
prison in which inmates knew they were vulnerable to secret visual surveillance at all
moments. See infra text accompanying notes 727-730 and note 729.
98. This phenomenon is similar to the potentially greater monitoring of worker
shirking that coworkers can undertake, compared to monitoring by supervisors whose
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tional economics, the cost of extracting information impacted in the so-
cial groupings of workers on the shopfloor would be lessened, and the
potential for instrumental deflection of rank and file choice thereby
heightened, by the infrastructure of company union representatives that,
unlike supervisory employees, penetrated into those very groupings.99
Even if this were not the case, any surveillance of workers' union activities
constitutes coercion under the Act because of the consequent fear of em-
ployer retaliation. 100 While such supervisory surveillance of a nonunion
workforce can be proscribed short of foreclosing the nonunion option,
surveillance of coworkers by company union representatives was embed-
ded more deeply in the company union structure, at least in workplaces
where union activity could be expected to germinate in interdependent
groups of workers.
The normative taint of this mode of structural coercion can be char-
acterized in two ways. First, as with the manipulation of incentives facing
workplace representatives discussed above, the built-in dispensing of costs
and benefits to the rank and file through the company union apparatus
smacks of vote-buying. Second, management's use of company union
representatives as a cadre of organizers could be understood as a distor-
tion of the process of workers' democratic deliberation and choice, even
if company union representatives engaged only in reasoned persuasion
and not instrumental manipulation. The latter is best characterized as a
form of "distorted communication," the social technology of power dis-
cussed in Part II.B below.
c. Discriminatory Organizational Funding, Recognition, and Bargaining
Concessions. - Legislators and early Board and court decisions justified
the company union ban on the ground that workers' right of self-organi-
zation was damaged by management's discriminatory conferral of at least
three kinds of advantages to company unions.10 1 While management
would readily provide (1) organizational funding, (2) formal recognition,
and (3) substantive bargaining concessions to company unions, it would
deny (or resist giving) those advantages to outside unions or
observation of individual and .work team behavior is necessarily sporadic and, because of
worker counter-strategies, non-random. See, e.g., Louis Putterman, On Some Recent
Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor, 22 Econ. Inquiry 171, 174 n.5 (1984). For a vivid
ethnographic study of the importance in union organizing of workers' degree of suspicion
of surveillance by coworkers, see Friedlander, supra note 74. For an historical assessment
of the claim that inside union representatives monitored the union activity of their rank
and file coworkers, see discussion infra text accompanying notes 544-552.
99. Company union representatives' information gathering is in this respect akin to a
cost-free "joint product" of the representatives' regular duties both in production and in
company union grievance administration.
100. See, e.g., Hendrix Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 397,408-09 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d
100, 104 n.7 (5th Cir. 1963).
101. See, e.g., Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 338, 349 (1939);
Link Belt Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 854, 866-67 (1939); J. Greenebaum Tanning Co., 11 N.L.R.B.
300, 311-13 (1939); Douglas Aircraft Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 242, 252-53 (1938); Industrial
Rayon Corp., 7 N.L.R.B. 878, 896-97 (1938).
789
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
nondominated inside unions-or so, at least, workers facing a choice be-
tween company unions and outside or nondominated inside unions
would anticipate. This managerial manipulation of incentives could
amount to "structural coercion" in the normative sense discussed above:
the incentives are conditioned on the outcome of the group vote and
their predominant purpose or effect is to alter workers' governance
decision.
Do these discriminatory advantages inhere in the operation of com-
pany unions, or could they be eliminated without banning the company
union itself? Section 8(a) (2) itself prohibits employer contributions of
"financial and other support" to a labor organization, and that proscrip-
tion is enforced by orders to cease the contributions, not by orders to
disestablish the organization (the remedy for unlawful "domination"). At
the same time, Section 8(a) (5) requires that the employer recognize the
union chosen by a majority of the bargaining unit members, 10 2 and
thereby formally forecloses discriminatory recognition of a company
union and nonrecognition of a nondominated, majority union. Simi-
larly, Section 8(a) (3)'s ban on discriminatory conduct discouraging or
encouraging union activity' 03 and Section 8(a) (2)'s ban on support of
and interference with a labor organization would proscribe discrimina-
tory concessions to, or recognition of, company unions, assuming the or-
ganizations themselves were not banned.
These two discriminatory advantages-financial support and transac-
tion-cost-free recognition by the employer-might seem to be necessary,
and perhaps sufficient, defining features of dominated company unions
as they were pictured by the Wagner Act's framers and by contemporane-
ous managerial proponents of company unions.10 4 If so, the prohibition
of these features would make the company union ban unnecessary. Even
assuming these two features were formally proscribed and the still-con-
flicted'0 5 inside union placed on the ballot, however, workers could still
reasonably believe that they faced an inducement to vote for the com-
pany union, in that management could be expected costlessly to recog-
nize the company union, while there would remain some positive
possibility that the outside union would have to incur the transaction
102. Under Section 8(a) (5), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
(1988).
103. Under Section 8(a)(3), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by
discrimination in regard to ... any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1988).
104. Legislators mentioned other important features, one or more of which may also
have been thought necessary or sufficient to the definition of company-dominated unions.
These include management's ultimate unilateral authority over grievance and substantive
policy resolutions, management veto power over changes in the structure of the company
union, and lack of strike funds or other substantial independent funds. See Barenberg,
supra note 31, at 1442-60.
105. See supra note 104.
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costs of administrative or direct-action efforts to compel a resistant em-
ployer to recognize it even after winning an NLRB election.
Could the same be said for the third discriminatory advantage men-
tioned above: workers' anticipation that management would be more re-
sistant to granting substantive bargaining concessions to an outside union
than to a dominated company union? This anticipated resistance could
take the form of (1) lower absolute wages and benefits conceded to the
outside union than to the company union; (2) lower relative wages and
benefits to the outside union, in the sense that management would de-
ploy whatever bargaining power it had more aggressively against the
outside union than against the company-dominated union, even if man-
agement's bargaining power against the outside union were (in some
sense) 106 less than that against the inside union; or (3) relative backload-
ing of any wage and benefit concessions to the outside union compared
to any concessions to the company union, due perhaps to the delay
caused by harder bargaining with the outside union. Again, workers
could reasonably believe that there was some possibility that the resistant
employer would be able to impose each of these forms of discriminatory
advantage to some degree even if they were proscribed, because of the
positive transaction costs in enforcing the proscriptions. But is it plausi-
ble that workers would anticipate that management would act in each of
these ways, whether proscribed or not? That is, are employers' implicit or
explicit threats to discriminate in favor of company unions credible?
Even though it was raised several times in the legislative hearings and
frequently invoked in early Board interpretations of Section 8 (a) (2), ver-
sion (1) of the discriminatory concession claim may at first seem difficult
to credit, at least if we accept the premises of the proponents of the Act.
The plausible premise of the framers of the Wagner Act was that
nondominated unions could exert greater bargaining power than domi-
nated company unions because the former amassed strike funds and, in
the case of nondominated outside unions, organized workers across firms
in the relevant labor market. If, as Senator Wagner and others also be-
lieved, unionized enterprises had greater productive efficiency than
nonunionized or company-unionized enterprises, 10 7 then unionized
workforces might be expected to use their greater bargaining power to
106. For theories of bargaining that rest on various explicit or implicit baselines for at
least ordinal comparisons of parties' relative bargaining power, see Elster, supra note 35, at
50-96.
107. Due to enhanced labor productivity stemming from unionized workers' greater
job security and protection of fair distributive shares, and consequent enhanced trust,
morale, and collective self-discipline. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1427-30, 1465-88.
The weight of the available empirical evidence confirms the counter-conventional view that
unions raise productivity, even if they lower profits by increasing labor's distributive share.
See, e.g., Blanchflower & Freeman, supra note 5, at 68. But cf. Barry T. Hirsch, Labor
Unions and the Economic Performance of Firms 35-66, 91-111, 115-25 (1991) (arguing
that evidence of unions' effect on productivity is inconclusive).
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extract larger absolute wage shares from the larger corporate residual
available to workers and shareholders.
Nonetheless, there are conditions under which the employer might
offer workers a higher absolute wage if they voted for the company union
over the outside union, even on Wagner's premise that the unionized
workplace was both more productive and more labor-empowering than
the company-unionized workplace.' 08 If the combination of transaction
costs to workers of unionizing (including initial organizing costs and
ongoing union dues) and management's disutility from the constraints of
collective bargaining were large enough to outweigh the hypothesized
gains in labor's distributive share from unionization, management might
opt to pay a union-threat package of company union wages and benefits
sufficient to forestall workers' choice of unionization. This result is more
probable to the extent that management's commitment to a union-free
environment rises to an ideological or moral principle-a realistic prem-
ise in the age of mass production systems built on the logic of centralized
coordination of decomposed work processes. 10 9 The repeat-play oppor-
tunities for workers' governance choice and for labor-management bar-
gaining may also give credibility to management's threat to absorb
losses-by favoring company unions and disfavoring outside unions-
that are otherwise irrational in the short-term.110
Versions (2) and (3) of the discriminatory concessions claim seem to
do no independent work in shaping worker incentives to vote for the
company union or the outside union. Management has no credible
threat of relaxing the tenacity of its bargaining positions beyond the
point of offering an absolute union-threat wage sufficient to bribe the
workers not to choose independent unionization. If management indeed
has the discretionary capacity to backload wages or deploy whatever bar-
gaining power it has more aggressively to resist concessions, management
cannot credibly promise not to use that capacity to reduce labor costs to
the union-threat level if the workers choose company unionism.
While management's threat to provide higher absolute wages and
benefits to the company union than to the independent union may be
credible in some circumstances, this nonetheless does not seem to pro-
vide grounds for banning the company union while permitting the non-
union option. Once the nonunion option is available, the employer has
108. Professor Getman argues that workers are unlikely to believe that of two rival
outside unions the one favored by management will yield greater wages and benefits. The
inference workers would draw from management's preference is, to the contrary, that the
preferred union will yield lesser gains. See Julius Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine:
An Example of the Need for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 292,
306-07 (1964). The analysis below suggests that such an implication would not always be
accurate in the analogous instance in which management's preferred union is a company
union.
109. See MichaelJ. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide 64 (1984).
110. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1474.
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an incentive to threaten to exert maximum bargaining power against the
outside union, whether to diminish the net benefits of unionizing for the
particular body of voting workers or to develop a reputation that deters
unionization in other existing or future bargaining units. The presence
of a company union option does not alter management's incentive to act
relatively more or less advantageously toward the outside union, other
than by offering the union-threat level of wages and benefits to a
workforce that chooses either the company union or nonunionization. If
management's payment of union-threat wages is considered a norma-
tively justifiable alteration of the instrumental incentives facing workers
in their choice between unionizing and nonunionizing,111 the same
would apply in their choice between outside and company unions. If the
payment of such "discriminatory" wages is permitted in the nonunion
workplace only because of the administrative difficulty of policing against
the practice, again the same would seem to apply to the company union
workplace.
This theoretical analysis notwithstanding, the framers and early inter-
preters of Section 8(a) (2) believed that management pervasively condi-
tioned greater wages and benefits on workers' choice of a company union
over an outside union, but did not appear to believe that management so
conditioned the choice between nonunionization and unionization.
That is, management would, if financially able, pay the union-threat wage
to nonunion workers to satisfy workers' preferences sufficiently to pre-
empt their desire to unionize, but without any threat or warning to lower
that wage if workers chose to unionize. Accepting this (inconsistent) em-
pirical premise, the company union option resembled systematic bribery
or threats-a form of "structural coercion"-in a way that the nonunion
option did not."12
B. Domination as Distorted Communication
1. The Ideal of Egalitarian Deliberation. - The idea of domination as
structural coercion looks to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of managerial
alteration of the costs and benefits of the governance options facing
workers voting in an NLRB representation election. Management can
also influence worker choice by altering the conditions within which
workers interact and communicate prior to marking their ballots. In the
post-War period, administrative regulation of these conditions has been
111. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
112. Nonetheless, this mode of structural coercion may be less normatively tainted
than the two modes discussed above-trasformismo and infrastructural coercion. If the
former is predicated on the overall pareto-superiority of company unionism when the
governance costs of independent unionism are taken into account, management's
manipulation of the choice set has a substantial, legitimate effect. If instead management's
payment of a lower absolute wage to workers who choose unionism is a strategic effort to
develop a reputation for reprisal, then there may be no such justification for the threat,
and this mode of structural coercion would be just as illegitimate as the other two.
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guided by the standard of maintaining "laboratory conditions" for "free
and reasoned choice" by workers. 113 While the laboratory-conditions
standard encompasses safeguards against the instrumental interference
captured in the analysis of structural coercion above,114 it also serves as
the regulative ideal for ensuring the proper conditions for communica-
tion among workers, union organizers, and employers. 115 The Board and
court decisions defining that regulative ideal reflect a familiar conception
of free choice succinctly summarized in a leading text:
Such a choice implies that employees should have access to rele-
vant information, that they should use this data to estimate the
probable consequences if the union is selected or rejected, and
that they should appraise these consequences in the light of
their own preferences and desires to determine whether a vote
for the union promises to promote or impair their self-interest.
This definition provides a key to the meaning of a free and un-
restrained choice under the statute. Ideally, at least, the em-
ployees should be free from restrictions which unduly obstruct
the flow of relevant information .... 116
As a normative conception of human choice, this standard may seem
unexceptionable on first glance. From the standpoint both of the Act's
framers and of attractive independent conceptions of collective delibera-
tion and choice that elaborate the framers' view, however, the laboratory-
conditions standard is limited and incomplete. That standard elides
three aspects of group choice that were underscored by the drafters and
113. "In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in
which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B.
124, 127 (1948). The laboratory conditions standard enunciated in General Shoe has been
reaffirmed repeatedly. See, e.g., Midland National Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982)
(reaffirming laboratory conditions standard in both majority and dissenting opinions);
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240 n.7 (1966).
114. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-20 (1969) (defining
outlawed employer threats); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964)
(defining outlawed employer provision of benefits); Operating Eng'rs Local 49 v. NLRB,
353 F.2d 852, 855-56 (D.C. Cir. 1965), on remand, 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967) (defining
outlawed employer interrogation and polling).
115. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 849 (1992) (employer may
deny union organizers access to employer parking lot to communicate with employees,
unless off-property communication is infeasible); NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone
and Avondale), 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958) (union not entitled to reply speech after
employer gives mandatory "captive audience" anti-union speech to workforce, unless
union has unequal communicational alternatives); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793, 803 (1945) (employer may not penalize workers for communicating among
themselves during work breaks); Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (after election
petition filed, union is entitled to list of employees in order to allow adequate
communication).
116. Archibald Cox et al., Cases and Materials on Labor Law 119 (11th ed. 1991); see
also Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 46-47 (1964) (presenting similar
summary).
[Vol. 94:753
1994] DEMOCRACY AND DOMINATION IN LABOR LAW 795
early interpreters of the Wagner Act:117 first, workers' preferences, inter-
ests, and emotional bonds are not exogenously fixed but rather created,
transformed, and chosen; second, this process of interest-formation, as
well as formation of perceptions about the descriptive reality of the work-
place, is a group or intersubjective process; and third, substantive equal-
ity, autonomy, or other democracy-underpinning values provide
normative criteria for evaluating the conditions for group deliberation
and choice. These three aspects are central to an ideal of "egalitarian
deliberation" that informs an array of current views about collective
choice in social and political theory, ranging from civic republicanism," 8
to radical or socialist democracy," 9 to leading liberal (e.g.,John Rawls's)
accounts of democratic process in ajust society,12 0 to a "discourse ethics"
of ideal communication. 12 1
117. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1418-22, 1427-30, 1434-38, 1454-56, 1475-88.
118. For a sample of the voluminous legal academic literature, see, e.g., Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1695
(1989); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale Lj. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Law's Republic]; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985). These legal writings
followed a revival of republicanist thought in political and historical writing. See, e.g.,
J.GA. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (1975); MichaelJ. Sandel, Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice (1982); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787 (1969); Joyce Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 Win. &
Mary Q. 20 (1986).
119. See, e.g.,Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in The Good
Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Petit eds., 1989)
[hereinafter Cohen, Democratic Legitimacy]; Joshua Cohen, The Economic Basis of
Deliberative Democracy, 6 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, Spring 1989, at 25, 30-39 [hereinafter Cohen,
Economic Basis]; David Miller, In What Sense Must Socialism Be Communitarian? 6 Soc.
Phil. & Pol'y, Spring 1989, at 51.
120. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls argues that a well-ordered
democracy incorporates all three aspects of egalitarian deliberation enumerated above: it
shapes the interests and identities of citizens, see id. at 234; it embodies intersubjective
deliberation aiming at the public good, see id. at 226, 360-61, 472; and it secures the "fair
value" of opportunities for communicative participation by means of egalitarian
distribution of resources. See id. at 225-26, 277-78. See also John Rawls, The Basic
Liberties and Their Priority, in III Tanner Lectures on Human Values 42-43 (1982). For a
good discussion of these aspects of Rawls's theory, see Cohen, Democratic Legitimacy,
supra note 119, at 18-20.
121. See, e.g., IJfirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and
the Rationalization of Society (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter Habermas,
Communicative Action]; Seyla Benhabib, In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel:
Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy, in
Hermeneutics and Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics 1 (Michael Kelly ed., 1990);Jean
Cohen, Discourse Ethics and Civil Society, in Universalism vs. Communitarianism:
Contemporary Debates in Ethics 83, 83-101 (David Rasmussen ed., 1990); Jfirgen
Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophic Justification, in The
Communicative Ethics Controversy 60 (Seyla Benhabib & F. Dallmayr eds., 1990)
[hereinafter Habermas, Discourse Ethics]; cf. C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and
Freedom of Speech 48-51 (1989) (arguing for similar communicative rights alternatively
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By emphasizing the accessibility of relevant information about the
empirical effects of unionization, 12 2 the laboratory-conditions standard
resembles the "marketplace of ideas" justification for constitutional free
speech rights. The key desideratum is to encourage the discovery of truth
by ensuring a sufficiently robust market in information. 123 The ideal of
egalitarian deliberation instead shifts the focus to the participatory rights
of group members to shape their collective destiny, including the trans-
formation of their preferences, interests, values, and individual and
group identities. This ideal is concordant with the Deweyan pragmatist-
progressivist intellectual vision held by the political elite that fashioned
the Wagner Act.124 Joshua Cohen provides a clear contemporary state-
ment of an ideal deliberative procedure: 125
In ideal deliberation parties are both formally and substantively
equal. They are formally equal in that the rules regulating the
procedure do not single out individuals. Everyone with the de-
liberative capacities has equal standing at each stage of the de-
liberative process. Each can put issues on the agenda, propose
solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in criticism of pro-
posals. And each has an equal voice in the decision. The par-
ticipants are substantively equal in that the existing distribution
of power and resources does not shape their chances to contrib-
ute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an authorita-
tive role in their deliberation. 2 6
from Habermasian ideal of communicative action, from liberty-based justification of legal
obligation, and from actual commitments of liberal democratic societies).
122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 121, at 6-46.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
125. Proponents of deliberative democracy or egalitarian communication, of course,
do not expect that actual institutions can fully realize such a formal, abstract definition of
ideal deliberative conditions. Pildes and Anderson, for example, accept the three
descriptive features of deliberative group choice presented in the text, but emphasize that
[plolitical legitimacy ... should not be treated as an abstract concept, to be
gauged by reference to unattainable ideals. The question of legitimacy must be a
pragmatic and comparative one-a question of institutional arrangements more
or less legitimate than other alternatives that could be constructed.
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2196 (1990).
Nonetheless, Pildes and Anderson evaluate practical institutions in light of a regulative
ideal not unlike Cohen's:
[T]he distribution of effective ability to contribute to meaning making in
democratic politics becomes central for evaluating democratic institutions,
norms, and democratic political culture in general.
Any practice or institution, public or private, that systematically deprives
groups of the power to participate meaningfully in deliberative politics is
challenged by [this] conception of democratic legitimacy ....
Id. at 2203-04.
126. Cohen, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 119, at 22-23. This is only part of
Cohen's specification of the ideal procedure.
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The ideal deliberative procedure is designed to neutralize the effect of
relations of power and subordination on deliberative procedure and out-
comes. Interest- and preference-formation are thus freed from the dan-
gers, inter alia, of non-autonomous "adaptive preferences"-preferences
that adapt to circumstances without the exercise of the agent's delibera-
tive capacities. 127 They are also freed of "accommodationist prefer-
ences"-preferences that accommodate, even after individual or group
self-reflection, to unjust relations of subordination, such as the Stoic
slave's preference to remain enslaved. 128 Deliberation under conditions
that fall short of the ideal can be characterized as "distorted" or "domi-
nated" communication.
Three unappealing features are sometimes incorrectly taken to be
inevitable correlates of the ideal of egalitarian communication. First, that
ideal is said to exclude or devalue pluralist difference and disagreement
among participants and to require homogenizing consensus and closure
of ongoing deliberation. 129 Quite the contraryl 3 0-as current "best prac-
tices" in egalitarian work-team decision-making, discussed below in Part
V, demonstrate. Second, the principle of egalitarian communication is
sometimes thought to entail acceptance of the dubious concept of objec-
tive "false consciousness." 13 One can, however, embrace an entitlement
to deliberative democracy without maintaining that the substantive deci-
sions or identity-transformations that issue from that procedure are true
or good. Third, some proponents depict egalitarian deliberation as a
process of narrowly rational argumentation and persuasion.'x 2 However,
the intersubjective dialogue over group interests, values, and identity
need not (and probably cannot) exclude appeals to deeply felt emotions
and intuitions that may not be fully articulable or accessible to others.' 33
127. Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 18, at 977 (arguing that ascription of responsibility
for choice may rest on an agent's deep reflection and decision to identify with internal
traits or will, even if the latter are historically determined and unchosen).
128. See Cohen, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 119, at 25; see also Jon Elster,
Sour Grapes 109-40 (1983); Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas
and the Frankfurt School 78-88 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1146-50 (1986).
129. See Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
308, 319 (1985); Don Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 Pol. Theory 473, 488
(1986).
130. See, e.g., Robert D. Putman, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in
Modem Italy 117 (1993); Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 29-30
(1987) (presenting argument for pluralist deliberation); Michelman, Law's Republic,
supra note 118, at 1528-32 (same).
131. The concept of "false consciousness" is also distinguishable from the
nonessentialist understandings of "hegemonic consciousness" (subjective states that
reinforce unjust power relations) discussed in the next section.
132. See, e.g, Habermas, Communicative Action, supra note 121.
133. See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modem Identity
3-107 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (forthcoming,
from Oxford University Press) (manuscript at ch. 14) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). The emotive aspect of group debate does require difficult, but unavoidable,
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2. Company Union Practices That Constitute Distorted Communication. -
The framers and early interpreters of the Section 8(a) (2) ban empha-
sized that coinpany unionism undermined workers' autonomous choice
by distorting the conditions for workers' egalitarian deliberation. Sum-
marizing the key features of the company-dominated union in introduc-
ing the Labor Relations Act before the Senate Education and Labor
Committee in March 1935, Senator Wagner pointed to the employer's
"participat[ion] in [the inside union's] deliberations as an organic en-
tity." 1' 4 Even the leading corporate spokesperson against the Act, while
defending employers' right to establish company unions, conceded that
employers should be barred from using company unionism to "dominate
the free opinion of the employee, except by argument or reasoning. "l s9
The decisions of the NRA labor boards of 1933-35, which were codified
in the NLRA unfair labor practice provisions, had repeatedly under-
scored the company unions' illegitimate interference with the procedures
for workers' "collective discussion" and for the formation of their collec-
tive "desires," "wishes," "will," and "opinions." 36 This concern was car-
ried forward in the early interpretation of Section 8 (a) (2). These various
pronouncements identified several specific mechanisms by which com-
pany unionism dominated workers' communication.
a. Bans on Employee Meetings. - The company union apparatus typi-
cally made no provision for meetings among rank and file workers either
before their votes to endorse the company union and to elect representa-
tives or during the operation of the organization. Meetings between rank
and file workers and their elected representatives, or even among the
representatives alone, were also rare. In one of its earliest decisions, the
Wagner-chaired National Labor Board of 1933-34 condemned the estab-
lishment of the company union by the Corcoran Shoe Company because
the employer "precluded any deliberation on the part of the employees,
and prevented a true expression of their will."' 3 7 Its successor, the old
NLRB of 1934-35, frequently cited the lack of a "reasonable opportunity
[for workers] to talk" about whether to endorse the company union, 38
and the preemption of any "means for the formulation of the collective
wishes of employees" because the company unions banned general meet-
contextual judgments about the legitimacy of intersubjective appeals to "opaque" or
substantively illicit affective inclinations or compulsions (e.g., racism, xenophobia) as bases
for group choice. See infra text accompanying notes 220-231.
134. Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 95, at 41, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra note
47, at 1417.
135. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 355 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings on S.
2926], reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 389 (statement of James A. Emery,
General Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n Mfrs.).
136. See cases cited infra notes 137-139.
137. Joseph F. Corcoran Shoe Co., 1 N.L.B. 78, 80 (1934).
138. See, e.g., Kaynee Co., 2 N.L.R.B. [old] 33, 34 (1934).
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ings.' 3 9 In an article read to the Senate committee in its second day of
hearings on Wagner's 1934 Labor Disputes bill, an automotive industry
trade paper advised: "It is thought to be bad policy to permit employee
representatives to meet privately since there is no control over the issues
that they bring up and, also, because the group forms a majority opinion
on any given issue, which is hard to change .... "-140 The Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund's influential report supporting Wagner's 1935 Labor Relations
bill concluded: "Failure to provide for rank-and-file meetings is an im-
portant shortcoming of company-union plans. Such meetings are neces-
sary to give "public opinion" in the plant an opportunity to crystallize and
become a real force, and to develop a sense of solidarity among the em-
ployees." 141 Post-Wagner Act NLRB and court decisions continued to
highlight company unions' outright denial of workers' opportunities for
"collective discussion" and group opinion-formation. 14 2
b. Managerial Participation in Employee Deliberations. - Company
union representatives typically assembled only in the presence of mana-
gerial representatives. The framers and early interpreters stressed the dis-
torting effects of this practice on the deliberations among employee
representatives. As already noted, Senator Wagner saw employers' partic-
ipation in the organic deliberations of a labor organization as a central
feature of company unionism, and employers' associations were aware of
the importance of management's control of the agenda when representa-
tives assembled. 143 The Wagner-drafted Senate Report to his 1934 bill
cited employers' "dictating to the organization officials the procedure or
agenda for meetings" as a prime manifestation of employer "domination"
under Section 8(a) (2).'" Legislators and early interpreters also main-
tained that, apart from agenda-control, management's mere presence at
meetings of representatives or of the rank and file distorted employee
communication and interest-formation, owing to the inherent threat of
managerial reprisal against disfavored employee expression. 145 In one of
139. See, e.g., International Nickel Co., 2 N.L.R.B. [old] 271,272 (1935)B.F. Goodrich
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. [old] 181, 183 (1934); Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 1 N.L.R.B. [old) 173,
176 (1934).
140. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 93, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra note
47, at 123 (testimony of William Green, President, A.F. of L.) (quoting trade paper).
141. Twentieth Century Fund, Labor and the Government 109 (Alfred L. Bernheim &
Dorothy Van Doren eds., 1935).
142. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 270 (1938);
Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670, 687 (1948); American Enka Corp., 27 N.L.R.B. 1057,
1070 (1940), enforced, 119 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1941); Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B.
219, 230 (1938), enforced in part, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939); International Harvester
Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 329, 348 (1936).
143. See supra notes 134, 140 and accompanying text.
144. S. Rep. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934), reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra
note 47, at 1104.
145. In Senate hearings on proposed amendments to the Railway Labor Act in 1934-
which included company union provisions that prefigured NLRA Section 8(a)(2)-the
Federal Coordinator of Transportation explicitly contrasted communication between
1994]
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its earliest company union cases, the NLRB found that "the presence of
[Pacific Greyhound's] officers at the meetings of the Drivers' Association,
taking notes of the proceedings and joining in the discussion ... exerts a
powerful pressure upon the members and representatives." 146 The Sec-
ond Circuit, in a later case, found that management's participation in
workers' meetings denied them "the opportunity in the absence of the
employer to canvass their grievances [and] formulate their demands in
common.
" 1 4 7
c. Trasformismo, Again. - The way in which company unionism in-
strumentally bribed and threatened employee representatives to, in turn,
bribe and threaten rank and file employees was discussed above as an
instance of structural coercion or domination proper. Such intimidation
could, of course, also distort communication by chilling pro-union
speech. In addition, the Act's framers maintained that management's
use of employee representatives as a cadre of pro-company union or-
ganizers was a form of domination even when the employee representa-
tives solicited noncoercively on behalf of the company union. That is, the
use of managerial resources-including management's inherent, central-
ized capacity to overcome free-rider problems among individual work-
ers-in support of one mode of collective governance amounted to a
distortion of egalitarian deliberation among the workforce. In an opin-
ion entered into the record and discussed in the Senate Committee dur-
ing hearings on the Labor Relations bill, the old NLRB noted that B.F.
Goodrich's payments to a subgroup of employees to organize a company
union "w[ere] a form of discrimination which handicapped the efforts of
one group of employees in promoting their ideas on self-organization....
[This] involves in substance the subsidizing of an active group of propa-
gandists among the employees for the type of employee representation
the company would prefer to deal with."' 48 The view that employer-subsi-
dized persuasion and solicitation impaired workers' free collective choice
underpinned many post-Wagner Act decisions of the Board and
management and workers with communication among workers on the ground that the
former was inherently distorted by asymmetric power, while the latter could be distorted
only by misrepresentations that, unlike intimidation, could be remedied by rebuttal. See
To Amend the Railway Labor Act: Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 3266].
146. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431, 455 (1936) (internal quotations
omitted), enforced in part, 91 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd as to partial denial of
enforcement, 303 U.S. 272 (1938).
147. NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
964 (1955).
148. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1 N.L.R.B. [old] 181, 184 (1934); see also Hearings on S.
1958, supra note 95, at 570, 572-73, reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 1956,
1958-59 (incorporating Goodrich decision in records of Senate hearings); id. at 562-63,
reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 1948-49 (testimony of John D. House)
(discussing Goodrich decision in pertinent part).
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courts.149 This view rests on a conception of choice embodying the ideal
of egalitarian deliberation within the relevant demos, that is, the
workforce. 150 In contrast, under the narrower laboratory-conditions view
of free choice-as in the marketplace-of-ideas rationale for the First
Amendment-additional noncoercive persuasion and solicitation does
not impair free communication and choice, regardless of the source of
the additional solicitation. While the ideal of egalitarian deliberation
among workers casts doubt on the now-widespread and lawful managerial
practice of deploying supervisors and other managerial personnel to cam-
paign against unionization, the subsidization of employee representatives
for the same purpose can be seen as an even more severe distortion of
egalitarian deliberation. Managerial deflection of the speech of em-
ployee representatives, precisely because they are members, if not opin-
ion-leaders, within the relevant demos, 151 may have a deeper effect on
deliberative outcomes.
C. Hegemonic Consciousness152
1. Hegemony as a Consequentionalist Theory of Ideology. - The ideal of
egalitarian deliberation discussed in the previous section can be under-
stood as a standard for evaluating processes of subjective interest-forma-
tion that looks solely to the "genetic" or "epistemic" properties of
preferences or interests. 153 The deliberative procedure that generates in-
terests may be flawed from the standpoint of political or ethical rights of
equal participation in group discourse or collective choice. Alternatively,
the deliberative ideal may rest on an epistemic standard presumed to be
149. See, e.g., Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 338 (1939); Link Belt
Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 854, 866-67 (1939); J. Greenebaum Tanning Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 300, 312
(1939); Douglas Aircraft Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 242, 248, 250 (1938).
150. Note that this view stands in tension with the legalization of noncoercive
employer anti-union campaigns. The former view implicitly underpins some
commentators' argument that employers have no more right to participate in workers'
deliberations prior to NLRB representation elections than do employees in shareholder
campaigns for the election of corporate directors, or foreign citizens in American political
election campaigns. See, e.g., Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 259.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
152. A purely scholastic point: Antonio Gramsci, the seminal thinker on the theory of
hegemony, wrote ambiguously about whether "hegemony" referred only to ideological
means or to both ideological and coercive means for maintaining systems of authority or
domination. At one point, Gramsci wrote: "The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the
now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of
force and consent which balance each other in various ways .... " Antonio Gramsci, Note
Sul Machiavelli, Sulla Politica, e Sullo Stato Moderno 103 (1949), quoted and translated in
Femia, supra note 75, at 25. Nonetheless, Gramsci's dominant understanding of
"hegemony" was "the myriad ways in which the institutions of civil society operate to shape,
directly or indirectly, the cognitive and affective structures whereby men perceive and
evaluate problematic social reality." Id. at 24. I use the term in the latter sense and
distinguish it from the instrumental processes of "structural coercion" and "distorted
communication" discussed above.
153. These categories and the following analysis rely heavily on Geuss, supra note 128.
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held by the participants. The presumption is that the agents themselves
are committed to an epistemological principle of rejecting interests or
preferences that could be formed only under conditions of domination
departing from the egalitarian deliberative ideal.'54
An alternative standard for evaluating interests and preferences-
"hegemony" proper-rests on a consequentialist conception of ideology.
Under this standard, practices that have the effect of encouraging
subordinate groups to hold preferences, interests, affects, habits, or de-
scriptive maps that help sustain illegitimate relations of asymmetric power
are themselves presumptively illegitimate. In any given instance of inter-
est-formation, the three standards-genetic, epistemic, and consequen-
tialist-may be intertwined. Subjective interests that offend the genetic
and epistemic standards because formed under conditions that violate
the egalitarian deliberative ideal may also reinforce those very conditions.
Consequentially tainted ideology or hegemony, however, need not also
be genetically and epistemically illegitimate. A subordinate group's sub-
missive desires or false descriptive beliefs that reinforce its illegitimate
subordination may originate in practices other than those that violate the
ideal procedural conditions of egalitarian deliberation.
Although ideologies that help sustain illegitimate power relations
may be presumptively illegitimate, they are not necessarily so. Many nor-
mative positions agree, of course, that it is illegitimate for an actor to
encourage others to hold false descriptive beliefs that support unjust prac-
tices. The question becomes more contested when the legal regime eval-
uates practices that induce injustice-sustaining submissive or deferential
desires and interests, or that trigger neurotic compulsions or predictable
cognitive "irrationalities." Once again, the legal outcome in such cases
generally reflects variable, contextual modes of valuation and associated
understandings of the responsible choosing self.'55
2. Hegemonic Company Union Practices. - The idea of hegemony un-
derpins one of the justifications for Section 8(a) (2) most frequently
voiced by adjudicators and commentators. Company-union practices
transformed workers' consciousness-their normative interests and pref-
erences, emotional desires and dispositions, behavioral habits and com-
pulsions, and descriptive perceptions-in ways that helped sustain
management's illegitimate asymmetric power.156 Many contemporary ob-
154. The presumption may be historical-appealing to the actual norms of members
of a particular community-or quasi-transcendental-based on ostensible assumptions
that inhere in the nature of human communication. Compare Theodor W. Adorno,
Negative Dialectics (E.B. Ashton trans., 1973) (historicist position), with Habermas,
Communicative Action, supra note 121 (quasi-transcendentalist position).
155. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text; infra notes 220-231 and
accompanying text.
156. The framers of the Act clearly believed that the asymmetric power between
management and workers in the nonunionized workplace was illegitimate. Wagner and
his allies frequently denounced the nonunion workplace as a state of "despotism" and
"economic slavery." See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1445-46 & n.297, 1456. The fact
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servers condemned or praised company unionism on just this ground.
Sumner Slichter, the Harvard economist and Wagner adviser, wrote in
1929 that modem personnel methods, including company unions, were
"one of the most ambitious experiments of the age, because they aim,
among other things, to counteract the effect of modem technique upon
the mind of the worker, to prevent him from becoming class conscious
and forming trade unions."157 An economist for an employer associa-
tion, Leslie Vickers, testified approvingly in Senate hearings that "man-
agement has, through these employee-representation plans, fostered the
thought that ultimately... the interests of management and labor are
identical."158 The catch-phrase of labor reformers was that company
unionism served as a "delusion and a snare."1 59
For Wagner himself this phenomenon was at most a secondary justifi-
cation for banning company unions. His dominant view was that com-
pany unions were so structurally coercive that workers "know full well
whose union it is and in whose interests it will work."' 60 But in several
early cases, the NLRB and the courts faced specific instances in which the
workers clearly favored in-house unions. In those and other cases, the
Board and the courts sought to reconcile the company union ban and the
Act's principle of worker free choice by appealing to the idea of hege-
monic consciousness, often cast in language identical to that of the labor
reformers. 161 In fact, by the time of the 1947 hearings on the proposed
Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Wagner Act, the Board's chief argument
for continuing the ban was that workers' genuine free choice needed pro-
tection against subordinating desires, impulses, and perceptions im-
that the framers gave workers the right to choose to remain in such a state did not alter
that normative judgment, although it does generate some difficult puzzles and tensions in
interpreting the statute. See id. at 1442-55.
157. Sumner H. Slichter, The Current Labor Policies of American Industries, 43 QJ.
Econ., May 1929, at 393, 432.
158. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 680, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra
note 47, at 718. "Every advocate of employee representation lays great stress on the
'moderating' and 'educating' effects of the plans, and the facilities they offer for reaching
and directing the minds of the workers into conservative ruts." Dunn, supra note 96, at
179.
159. American Fed'n of Labor, Report of Proceedings, 39th Annual Convention 303
(1919); see also Carroll E. French, The Shop Committee in the United States 81 (1923)
(company unions "delude" workers, according to William Foster, union organizer); id. at
85 n.23, 86 (company unions are "subterfuge" that "manipulate[s] ...the wishes" of
workers).
160. He so stated in the widely circulated "Wagner Brief' attacking New York state
courts' grant of injunctions enforcing yellow-dog employment contracts. See
Interborough Rapid Transit Company Against William Green, et al., Brief for Defendants
397 (1928) [hereinafter Wagner Brief].
161. The Second and Fourth Circuits for example, called the company union a
"delusion and a snare." NLRB v. Stow Mfg Co., 217 F.2d 900,904 (2d Cir. 1954); American




planted by company unionism.162 The administrative and judicial
understanding of company unions' effect on workers' consciousness-an
understanding developed over hundreds of cases-thus represents an ex-
traordinary practical effort by the legal regime to address (if only implic-
itly) the empirical and theoretical nature of hegemonic ideology and its
relationship to the instrumental modes of domination discussed above.
The following subsections reconstruct several alternative versions of
the judicial understanding of "hegemony" in light of more theoretically
self-conscious insights drawn from the recent burgeoning studies of ideol-
ogy and interest-formation and from cognitive and depth psychology.163
The processes that sustain illegitimate power relations (in the workplace
or other settings) are better captured in categories more finely textured
than the conventional dichotomy of "coercion," on the one hand, and
"consent" or "legitimation," on the other.
a. Structural and Performative Dissemblance. - In its first decision inter-
preting Section 8(a) (2), the Supreme Court upheld a Board order re-
quiring an employer to cease recognition of a company union because
such recognition "enabl[ed] the employer to induce adherence of em-
ployees to the [company union] in the mistaken belief that it was truly
representative and afforded an agency for collective bargaining."1 64 This
language can be read as a condemnation of company unionism's encour-
agement either of false descriptive beliefs about the features of company
unions and independent unions, or of false normative understandings of
what constitutes true representation or collective agency. The former
reading seems the more natural. Although the Board and the courts saw
the creation of false descriptive beliefs as a normative impairment of free
162. Board chairman Paul Herzog conveyed several versions of the hegemony
justification for the company union ban in his Taft-Hartley testimony. See Hearings on S.
55, supra note 58, at 1901, 1911-13. For his specific statements, see infra text
accompanying notes 205-207.
163. Jon Elster declares that "[the central task of the theory of ideologies must be to
explain how ideas arise or take root in the minds of the persons holding them." Jon Elster,
Making Sense of Marx 476 (1985). A narrower definition of the theory of ideology, similar
to the use of "hegemony" in this Article, is offered byJohn Thompson-that is, the analysis
of symbolic, meaningful, and other preference- or perception-shaping phenomena that
help establish or maintain relations of asymmetric power or domination. See John B.
Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture 56-57 (1990). My definition of "hegemony"
adds an evaluative element to Thompson's definition. That is, to show an instance of
hegemony, one must offer contextual or abstract considerations why the power asymmetry
or manipulation of consciousness is illegitimate.
164. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 271 (1938). The
NLRB's first General Counsel hoped that this case would provide the first Supreme Court
test for the Act's constitutionality because the employer was clearly involved in interstate
commerce, but a slow Third Circuit panel issued its decision in the case three months after
the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act in NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937). For the full story, see Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 254-56 (1982).
In the Taft-Hartley hearings of 1947, Board Chairman Herzog restated and defended the
Pennsylvania Greyhound justification for the company union ban. See Hearings on S. 55,
supra note 58, at 1912 & n.26.
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choice akin to simple misrepresentation, they identified characteristics of
company unionism that induced such beliefs by means other than false
factual statements or deceptive non-disclosure by management. 16 5 I will
conceptualize some of those means as "structural" or "performative
dissemblance."
After an exhaustive description of the workings of the International
Harvester Company's inside union, the Board asked rhetorically, "[I]s it
anything more than an elaborate structure designed to create in the
minds of the employees the belief that they possess something of sub-
stance and value that enables them to deal with their employer on an
equal footing, so that they will be sufficiently content to resist the appeal
of an outside labor union?" 166 As one specific mechanism of such struc-
tural dissemblance, the Board maintained that the operation of inside
unions systematically distorted workers' perceptions of the relative costs
and benefits of outside versus inside unionism. By channelling all wage
and benefit gains and welfare activities through the company union,
"[t] he employees are thus led to feel that Works Councils directly bring
about reforms of such a nature and favor for the Plan is thus stimu-
lated."' 67 Concurrently, workers were led to believe that, unlike union-
ized workers, they were "getting [these benefits] for nothing" because they
made no direct payment of dues, even though the not inconsiderable
costs of running the company union in fact came out of labor and man-
agement's joint surplus. 168
The Board's decisions also found various forms of performative dis-
semblance inherent in the company unions' operation. While the estab-
lishment and operation of company unions gave a show of independent
worker action, the employer subtly orchestrated outcomes, often through
"adroit manipulation" of a small group of loyal or intimidated employee
representatives. 169 An employer "could afford to indicate outward indif-
ference and unconcern .... Its passive aloofness could at least serve to
camouflage its subtle guidance of the moves, [and its] legerdemain....
What it could not do openly and directly it could . . . accomplish
165. Raymond Geuss notes that "most of the interesting cases" of ideological delusion
are something other than simply "an empirical error.... It is, of course, an extremely
important task for empirical social research to point out how the interests of powerful
social groups cause false information to be produced and disseminated thro.ughout the
society." Geuss, supra note 128, at 12, 41-42.
166. International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 348 (1936).
167. Id. at 331.
168. See id. at 351. In Senate testimony, a Weirton Steel company union
representative maintained that company unions had the great advantage of appearing cost-
free to the workers, but acknowledged that company union expenses, like AFL dues,
ultimately came out of workers' wages. Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 95, at 412,
reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 1798.
169. See Lion Shoe Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 819, 830 (1937) ("The formation of the Lynn
Shoe Workers' Union is a clear example of how an employer, by suggestion and




clandestinely and indirectly." 17° The Supreme Court agreed that com-
pany unionism provided an employer "a device by which its power may
... be made effective unobtrusively."171 Consultants detailed the surrep-
titious steps by which management could attempt to get loyal foremen
and rank and file leaders to establish organizations that other rank and
file workers would falsely believe to be their independent creation. 172
The practices uncovered by the pre- and post-Wagner Act labor boards
ranged from the hidden subsidization of solicitation on behalf of the
company union' 73 to the staging of company union "strikes" in order "to
simulate the existence of a genuine conflict and to make it appear that
the company was forced to enter into an agreement."174
Although the Board heard much evidence of explicit managerial
statements to employees that company unionism matched outside union-
ism in the effectiveness of its representation and bargaining, managerial
strategists and the Board maintained that structural or performative dis-
semblance was inherently more effective than simple misrepresentation.
Management consultants advised employers to set up company unions
when outside unions were not on the horizon, because direct compari-
sons between the actual features of inside and outside unions would too
likely undermine the appearance that company unionism equalled collec-
tive bargaining. 75
b. False Juridico-Political Legitimation. - In liberal democracies, the
primary public mode of legitimation of authority relations is through
norms of democratic consent and the rule of law.176 The framers and
early interpreters of Section 8(a) (2) identified at least three ostensible
ways in which company unions, by wrongful means, legitimated manage-
rial authority through appeal to suchjuridico-political norms. First, com-
pany unions gained a substantial number of adherents based on a false
appearance of widespread support or majoritarian legitimation. That
170. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 125, 136 (1936); see also, e.g., J.
Greenebaum Tanning Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 300, 311 (1939) (company union practices
"clothe[d] the Association with an appearance of independence").
171. NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272, 275 (quoting NLRB
findings) (internal quotations omitted).
172. See, e.g., Julian J. Aresty & Gordon S. Miller, The Technique of Arousing and
Maintaining the Interest of Foremen and Workers in Plans of Employee Representation, 6
Personnel 115 (1930).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 88-100.
174. Standard Tailoring Co., 2 N.L.R.B. [old] 422, 424 (1935); see also, e.g., Shell Oil
Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 835, 852 (1937) (simulation of collective negotiation and agreement); Atlas
Bag & Burlap Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 292, 300 (1936) (same). Some of the other specific
mechanisms of hegemony discussed in subsequent subsections could be understood as
further instances of structural or performative dissemblance.
175. See Dunn, supra note 96, at x.
176. See Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality 62-93 (1987); Don Herzog,
Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory (1989); Carole Pateman, The Problem of
Political Obligation: A Critique of Liberal Theory 81-102 (1979); Perry Anderson, The
Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, 100 New Left Rev. 15-78 (1976-77).
[Vol. 94:753
1994] DEMOCRACY AND DOMINATION IN LABOR LAW 807
false appearance rested on two phenomena: the structural coercion that
led some workers falsely to express support for the company union, 77
and the "unwarranted prestige" and "deceptive cloak of authority" that
came with the company's automatic recognition of company unions as
majority representatives-by contrast with employers' resistance to
outside unions.178 The Board and the Supreme Court believed that such
inflated expressions of adherence and prestige "could only have the de-
sired effect of prodding those employees who had not yet expressed their
preference."1 79 Such false majoritarian legitimation would reciprocally
reinforce instrumental intimidation against outside unionization, to the
extent that many workers would only take the risk of supporting an
outside union when it had demonstrated sufficient shopfloor strength to
protect its adherents.' 80
Second, in the Board's view, the trappings of representative elections
and deliberative councils provided "the semblance, rather than the sub-
stance,"181 of democratic accountability. The employer retained unilat-
eral control over final decisions, manipulated elections to ensure
compliant employee representatives, and blocked intra-union communi-
cation by which the rank and file could form its opinions and monitor
and instruct its representatives.' 8 2
177. See supra text accompanying notes 68-100.
178. See ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Tex. Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 736 (1961)
(employer recognition afforded the union a "deceptive cloak of authority with which to
persuasively elicit additional employee support"); Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63
N.L.R.B. 1060, 1071 (1945) ("unwarranted prestige"). While these cases involved an
employer's premature recognition of a minority union or one of two rival outside unions
rather than a company union, they both rested on the proposition advanced by the
Supreme Court in its first company union case: "[ince an employer has conferred
recognition on a particular organization it has a marked advantage over any other in
securing the adherence of employees." NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303
U.S. 261, 267 (1938).
179. Federal Bearings Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 467, 482 (1937).
180. For vivid case studies of the process in which more timid workers are drawn to
support the union only after a critical mass of union adherents has demonstrated its
capacity to withstand or deter managerial reprisal, see Rick Fantasia, Cultures of Solidarity:
Consciousness, Action, and Contemporary American Workers 82-87 (1988); Friedlander,
supra note 74, at 12-36.
181. H.E. Fletcher Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 729, 736 (1938).
182. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 230 (1938) (stating that "behind
its outward semblance of democratic procedure and its announced purposes of insuring
justice and promoting the common welfare, the Plan was shrewdly designed to foreclose
genuine collective bargaining and to fix firmly in the hands of the [employer] an
indisputable control over its employees."); International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 348
(1936) ("[The] conception of the Works Council as a deliberative body possessing power is
false."). In its first decision, the Board quoted an internal company letter of Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines:
It is to our interest to pick out employes [sic] to serve on the committee who will
work for the interest of the company and will not be radical. This plan of
representation should work out very well providing the proper men are selected,
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Third, the primary benefit offered by company unionism was gener-
ally a process for addressing employee grievances. Management often in-
troduced the company union as part of a broader policy of centralizing
personnel administration and providing more uniform policies and rules
to displace the pre-existing "foremen's empires" that were a constant
source of worker charges of arbitrary treatment. 8 3 The Board thought
this effort at legitimation through the "rule of law" was a ruse because the
often complex apparatus for grievance-resolution ended with unilateral
managerial decision, not neutral arbitration. Thus, in the International
Harvester scheme, "[t] he elaborate machinery of appeal to the President,
convocation of a General Council, resort to arbitration [only] upon the
acquiescence of the management serves only further to create the illusion
of equality."184
c. Universalization.
Mr. Clement [I] officially represent all class I railroads in
the United States and am delegated by them to give you their
views [on the proposed Railway Labor Act Amendments of
1934.] I am vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co .....
At heart, I am also speaking for a million railroad employees of
the United States.
The Chairman: 185 That is an interesting statement-"at
heart." Your heart or their heart?
Mr. Clement: Both, sir.186
The most familiar ideological mechanism is "universalization," in
which practices that serve the particular interests of some group are rep-
resented as serving the interests of all. It is well capsulized by British his-
torian E.H. Carr:
The doctrine of the harmony of interests.., is the natural as-
sumption of a prosperous and privileged class, whose members
have a dominant voice in the community and are therefore nat-
urally prone to identify its interest with their own. In virtue of
this identification, any assailant of the interests of the dominant
group is made to incur the odium of assailing the alleged com-
mon interest of the whole community, and is told that in mak-
ing this assault he is attacking his own higher interests. The
doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious
and considerable thought should be given to the men placed on this responsible
Committee.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 8 (1935). On the company union's
distortion of internal communication and monitoring of representatives, see supra text
accompanying notes 134-150.
183. See Jacoby, supra note 37, at 161-63.
184. International Harvester, 2 N.L.R.B. at 348.
185. Of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, Senator Clarence C. Dill.
186. Hearings on S. 3266, supra note 145, at 55.
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moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups
in order to justify and maintain their dominant position.l8 7
"'The fundamental idea'" of company unionism, according to the
followers ofJohn D. Rockefeller, Jr., who spearheaded the movement for
such enlightened management, was "'that the only solidarity natural in
industry is the solidarity which unites all those in the same business estab-
lishment."1 8 8 Opponents of the Wagner Act testified in Congressional
hearings that company unionism "fostered the thought that ultimately...
the interests of management and labor are identical,"189 while independ-
ent unionism generated artificial grievances and antagonistic interests. 190
Independent unionism created "two armed camps," but company union-
ism produced a "single organism" based on endogenously formed senti-
ments of mutual understanding and perceived common interests in the
prosperity of the enterprise' 9 1
The Board agreed that company unionism "conditioned" workers to
feel loyalty to managerial interests and "canalized [workers'] desire" into
"the channel of an inside union" serving those interests, but found that
such ideological deflection of workers' choice away from empowerment
through independent unionization violated Congress's understanding of
187. Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, at 80 (Harper Torchbooks
1964) (1939).
188. Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker,
1920-1933, at 170 (1960) (quoting Rockefeller aide referring to solidarity notjust among
enterprise workforce, but between management and labor as well).
189. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 680, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra
note 47, at 718 (testimony of Leslie Vickers, employer association economist).
190. The president of the meat packers' trade association declared that the bill
"would substitute the principle that the interests of employers and employees are opposed
for the principle now behind employee representation plans in this industry, that the
interests of employers and employees are mutual." Id. at 1004, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist.,
supra note 47, at 1042 (brief of William Woods). A mining industry executive protested
that labor organizers threatened the harmony of company unionism by "tell[ing] our men
the troubles which they have, which they themselves have never thought about." Hearings
on S. 1958, supra note 95, at 625, reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 2011
(statement of R.C. Allen).
191. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 403, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra
note 47, at 437 (testimony of Henry Dennison, progressive manager and former NLB
member). This view was endorsed by a federal district court that refused to disestablish
Weirton Steel's company union in a significantJustice Department suit to enforce Section
7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act:
It is said that [the employment] relation involves the problem of the economic
balance of the power of labor against the power of capital. The theory of a
balance of power or of balancing opposing powers is based upon the assumption
of an inevitable and necessary diversity of interest. This is the traditional old
world theory. It is not the Twentieth Century American theory of that relation as
dependent upon mutual interest, understanding, and good will. This modem
theory is embodied in the Weirton plan of employee organization.
United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 10 F. Supp. 55, 86 (D. Del. 1935). See Irons, supra note
164, at 220 (characterizing Weirton case as labor's "most crushing defeat" under the NIRA).
1994]
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Section 8(a) (2).192 The Board, however, articulated no single well-devel-
oped theory of the process by which company unions achieved such inter-
est-transformation and of why that mechanism was illegitimate. Board
and court decisions and General Counsel arguments pointed to various
possible mechanisms.
First, the Board recurrently recounted how workers whose efforts at
outside unionization were frustrated by managerial coercion ultimately
acquiesced in, and developed loyalties and habits supporting, the com-
pany union option. The Board and the Supreme Court believed that
these new preferences persisted and normatively tainted the workers' sub-
sequent choice of inside unionism even after the coercive practices them-
selves ended. In a substantial line of cases, the Board and the Court
disestablished enterprise unions that clearly had majority support, and
excluded them from future NLRB ballots, although the employer had
wholly ceased its earlier domination of the labor organization. 193 The
Board's and Court's finding that employees' lingering preferences were
illegitimate could be explained by the idea of "adaptive preferences." Be-
cause systematic coercion by company unionism made outside unionism
seem practically unavailable to workers, their preferences and percep-
tions may have adapted through the alternative psychological mecha-
nisms of "sour grapes," "wishful thinking," or "rationalization." 194 In
order to reduce the psychic frustration of not having the independent
unionism that they initially preferred, workers' desire for, or valuation of,
the attributes of outside unions may have diminished, or their valuation
of company unionism and sense of common interest with management
may have inflated.195
192. See, e.g., American Petroleum Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 688, 703-04 (1939); Crawford
Mfg. Co., 8 N.L.RtB. 1237, 1242 (1938); see also Brief for Petitioner at 24, 32, NLRB v.
Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941) (NLRB General Counsel argues that company union
"conditioned" employees into attitudes of "loyalty" and "submission"); Brief for Petitioner
at 50, NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940) (same); Brief for Petitioner at 11, NLRB v.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939) (NLRB General Counsel
argues that the company union "canalized the desires of the men").
193. The leading case in this line is Newport News Shipbuilding, 308 U.S. at 250,
enforcing 8 N.L.RIB. 866 (1938); see also Falk, 308 U.S. at 459-61, enforcing 6 N.L.R.B.
654 (1937) (excluding enterprise union from ballot although "purged of company
influence").
194. See Elster, supra note 128, at 109-40; Elster, supra note 163, at 466-68; Leon
Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 73-74 (1957). For interesting legal
applications, see Sunstein, supra note 128, at 1146-50.
195. Following Elster's analysis, workers might have been best off, given the coercive
constraints they faced, if they engaged in Stoic or Spinozist character-planning to upgrade
their desire or interest in the positive attributes of company unionism than if they
unconsciously devalued the independent unionism that was beyond their reach. Workers'
autonomy is enhanced if they are able consciously to plan their preferences; and their
welfare increases if they inflate their desire for what they have, rather than alter their
descriptive perception of what they do not have. See Elster, supra note 128, at 119, 125.
Barrington Moore presents the phenomenon of dissonance reduction in terms not of
altered preferences or perceptions, but of legitimation: "People are evidently inclined to
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An alternative or supplement to this sour-grapes mode of overcom-
ing cognitive dissonance is wishful thinking by workers-perceptual dis-
tortions of the descriptive attributes of company unions and outside
unions. Andrew Furuseth, President of the Seaman's Union, espoused
the latter theory:
The tired and worried working man, who has nothing but his
labor with which to support himself and his family, believes the
promises [of the benefits of company unions] because he wishes
to believe them. He is tired. He does not like the struggle [for
independent unionism] . . . and so he joins the "company"
union.1 96
Such wishful thinking would also constitute a process other than struc-
tural dissemblance to underpin the Supreme Court's view that company
unionism induced false descriptive beliefs that blurred the distinction be-
tween inside and outside unions. 197 This type of rationalization might be
a particularly powerful psychological force among employee representa-
tives struggling to neutralize guilt or self-loathing over their obsequious
or ingratiating behavior toward management.198
Second, the Board occasionally suggested cruder explanations for
workers'-especially employee representatives'-interest-alignment: a
mixture of indoctrination and seduction captured in the Board's accusa-
tion of "conditioning" by the company union. Management subjected
employee representatives to barrages of company-biased information and
arguments about workers' interests in enterprise performance, while as-
suring representatives of their special, favored status in forging organiza-
tional solidarity. The Board found it "not unreasonable to believe that
many of these representatives, through constant association with manage-
ment officials, always on a most cordial basis, come to regard themselves
as part of the management and its machinery."199 What proponents of
company unions saw as legitimate "cordial" communication, the Board
viewed as manipulative exploitation of workers' vulnerability in a context
of asymmetric power and information. Recent experimental studies sug-
gest that, in situations of asymmetric information, even people who are
fully aware of their "role disadvantage" relative to another person's dis-
play of esoteric information will tend to overestimate the superiority of
the other's overall knowledge.20 0 The illegitimacy of this "conditioning"
grant legitimacy to anything that is or seems inevitable no matter how painful it may be.
Otherwise the pain might be intolerable." Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social
Bases of Obedience and Revolt 458-59 (1978).
196. Andrew Furuseth, Company Unions, Am. Federationist, May 1928, at 541, 542.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 164-175.
198. See Unger, supra note 24, at 132 (describing phenomenology of self-abasement
among subordinate individuals).
199. International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 327-28 (1936).
200. People tend to be relatively "insensitivte] to the limited inferential value of biased
data samples." Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process:
On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in Judgment Under
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of employee representatives may have been reinforced by the "addictive"
nature of their heightened status. Rank in a status hierarchy "ceases to
give satisfaction after a while because it is taken for granted, but its loss
can give much pain."201 That is, the status elevation of employee repre-
sentatives may have induced a preference-transformation further aligning
their interests with management's. The loss of the rank becomes more
painful than its initial lack.20 2
A final possible process of universalization follows from the mecha-
nisms of structural dissemblance or false democratic legitimation dis-
cussed above. Wagner believed that collective bargaining through
independent unions would in fact achieve a genuine alignment or har-
mony of workers' and management's interest.203 His normative concep-
tion was that the empowerment of unionization created the egalitarian
conditions in which genuinely reciprocal dialogue could generate legiti-
mate shared interests; or, stated alternatively, the democratic participa-
tion embodied in collective bargaining would ensure that managerial
authority operated in the interests of the citizenry of workers. 204 Ac-
cepting this statutory premise, workers who falsely believed that the com-
pany union provided full-fledged collective bargaining or industrial
democracy would, by implication, falsely believe that the company-union-
ized organization mutually served their and management's interests.
Whatever the assumed underlying mechanism, the universalization
rationale for banning company unions was the dominant theme of Board
Chairman Paul Herzog's arguments in the Taft-Hartley hearings for keep-
ing company unions-even formerly but no longer company-dominated
enterprise unions-off the NLRB representation ballot. "The theory of
the statute is that employee desire under the circumstances stems from
employer domination, and therefore is not free."20 5 The installation and
operation of the company union replaced "the employee's impulse to
seek the organization which would most effectively represent him" with
acquiescence in the inside union serving managerial interests. 20 6 Recog-
nizing that the diachronic process of preference-formation was central to
evaluating worker autonomy, Herzog declared that "[h]istory is impor-
tant" in applying the Act's "sole criterion" of free worker choice.20 7
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 129, 138 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); see also
Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgment ch. 4 (1980).
201. Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy- The Psychology of Human Satisfaction
130 (rev. ed. 1992).
202. See id.
203. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1427-30, 1478-88.
204. See id.
205. Hearings on S. 55, supra note 58, at 1912.
206. Id. at 1912 n.26 (quoting NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272,
275 (1938)).
207. Id. at 1912.
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d. Naturalization. - False legitimation and universalization are os-
tensible ideological processes that rest on agents' affirmative consent to
or normative approval of an illegitimate asymmetric relation of power.
This classic notion of ideology--as the symbolic construction of consent,
contrasted with instrumental coercion-often reflects a presumption that
a subject's compliance with authoritative directives is motivated by a sys-
tem of relatively abstract norms or principles internalized from a culture
that is disproportionately influenced by dominant groups.
The classic view requires amendment along three related lines. First,
compliance by a subordinate group need reflect neither coercion nor
normative consent. There is a range of alternative orientations that may
explain compliance to authority, including apathy, resignation, uncon-
scious habit or custom, emotional patterns of coping or compulsion, or
behavioral or psychic diversions and displacements. 20 8 Second, ideology
need not take the form of a system of descriptive and prescriptive pro-
positions embodied in a reigning, abstract "comprehensive view" such as
liberalism or socialism. It can instead inhere in more practical, action-
oriented systems of thought, feeling, and speech, in what Raymond Wil-
liams calls "structures of feeling" and Pierre Bourdieu dubs "habitus"-
the prereflective dispositions and discursive performances, the inarticu-
late, spontaneous practices and emotions that suffuse everyday experi-
ence.20 9 Third, these enriched understandings of ideology direct
attention away from global cultural systems to the local social contexts or
micro-structures that both frame daily experience and mediate the rela-
tion between such larger symbolic systems and individual mentalities.2 10
One process encompassed by this broadened understanding of ideol-
ogy is "naturalization"-when a subordinate group is motivated to comply
with a system of power by habituation to seemingly natural or inevitable
practices woven into the texture of dally life.21 ' It might seem unlikely
that a practice as novel as the company unionism of the 1930s could take
on an aura of inevitability, especially in light of the widespread challenge
from the vivid counter-model of outside unionism. Nonetheless, the
208. See, e.g., Nicholas Abercrombie et al., The Dominant Ideology Thesis 1-58,
156-86 (1980) (emphasizing resignation, apathy, rational calculation); Terry Eagleton,
Ideology- An Introduction 18-24, 156-58, 221 (1991); Thompson, supra note 163, at
59-67; TJ.Jackson Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,
90 Am. Hist. Rev. 567, 569-71 (1985).
209. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 78-87 (1977); Raymond
Williams, Marxism and Literature 110, 132 (1977); see also Louis Althusser, For Marx
233-34 (1969); Michel Pecheux, Language, Semantics and Ideology (1975) (arguing that
ideology is embedded in discursive performance); Louis Althusser, Ideology and the
Ideological State Apparatuses, in Lenin and Philosophy (Louis Althusser ed., 1971).
210. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 163, at 146-54, 313-19; Stuart Hall, Brave New
World, Socialist Rev., Jan./Mar. 1991, at 57, 63.
211. Thompson calls this phenomenon "naturalization" or "reification." Thompson,
supra note 163, at 65-66. Geuss labels it an "objectification mistake." Geuss, supra note
128, at 14.
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Board and leading management practitioners believed that company
unionism could be so routinized as to seem an unchangeable part of
workplace life. In its condemnation of International Harvester's works
councils plan, the Board detailed how the company union was made a
part of production, compensation, welfare, and social activities to such a
degree that it was regarded by employees as an integral part of the plant
life.
[Management] has carefully supplied prop after prop for its sup-
port so that today the average employee at the plant accepts the
Plan as an institution without any realization of the careful struc-
ture that has thus been built to keep the Plan alive and function-
ing . . . . [T]he effect [of the company union orientation
program] upon the normal [new] employee not too curious
about the bargaining agencies that may exist in the plant is that
the Plan is a thing to be accepted without question .... 212
A leading guide-book on managerial implementation of company union-
ism advised against efforts at overt propagandizing of workers, warning:
"The [managerial] leaders think they can substitute new ideas
for old before they have changed the action tendencies, habit
systems, of the people .... The question all leaders, all or-
ganizers, should ask is not, how can we bring about the accept-
ance of this idea, but how can we get that into the experience of
the people which will mean the construction of new habits?" 213
e. The Psychodynamics of Authority and Deference. - Certain arguments
of the Board and the Supreme Court-some of which have already been
quoted-have the flavor of a crude Freudian interpretation of workers'
psychological response to domination. The Court, adopting language of
the Board, asserted that managerial "domination" had the effect of sup-
pressing workers' "impulse" for collective action and substituting the
"compulsions" of "timorous habits" and "habitual subservience" from
which the worker would only be "released" if management not only
ceased to dominate or interfere with the inside union, but publicly dis-
closed and renounced its repressive practices and dismantled the com-
pany union.214 The Board wrote that "the praises of such business
212. International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 329, 335 (1936).
213. Ernest R. Burton, Employee Representation 187 (1926) (quoting M.P. Follett,
Creative Experience 200 (1924)) (internal quotations omitted). The primacy of the
concept of habitual behavior in interwar psychological theory, see, e.g., Dewey, supra note
24. Follett, supra, is reflected in this analysis by the Board and management progressives in
the 1920s and 1930s.
214. See NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272, 273, 274-75 (1938);
see also NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 461 (1940). The full quotation, not
unambiguous, reads:
In ordering withdrawal of recognition of the (inside union] by [the employer], the
Board pointed out that a mere order to cease the unfair labor practices "would
not set free the employee's impulse to seek the organization which would most
effectively represent him"; that continued recognition of the [inside union] would
provide [the employer] "with a device by which its power may now be made
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leaders [as International Harvester executives] at the very least are certain
to commend the [company union] Plan to many an employee and his
family-'Approbation from Sir Herbert Stanley is praise indeed'."215
In Freud's theory of ideology, the power of a dominant group may
be reinforced by outward projection of the subordinate individual's sub-
conscious masochistic love of the tyrannical superego.216 "[T]he sup-
pressed classes can be emotionally attached to their masters; in spite of
their hostility to them they may see in them their ideals," he wrote. 217
The psychological phenomenon of masochistic or self-abasing idealiza-
effective unobtrusively, almost without further action on its part. Even though he
would not have freely chosen [the inside union] as an initial proposition, the
employee, once having chosen, may by force of a timorous habit, be held firmly
to his choice. The employee must be released from these compulsions."
Pacific Greyhound, 303 U.S. at 274-75 (quoting Board decision in same case, 2 N.L.R.B. 431,
455-56 (1936)); see also Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248, 277 (1936); Ansin Shoe Mfg.
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 929, 937 (1936); Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 710 (1936);
Hearings on S. 55, supra note 58, at 1912 n.26 (testimony of Board Chairman Herzog).
The "compulsions" facing the employee could be understood to refer to either the "force
of timorous habit" or the effective, unobtrusive "power" of the employer. The former
reading-that the "compulsions" from which the worker is to be "released" are his own
psychic drives or habits-is suggested (1) by the earlier parallel language of"impulse[s]" to
be "set free," and ,(2) by the assumption of the Court that the actual ongoing domination,
coercion and interference by management was terminated. See Pacfic Greyhound, 303 U.S.
at 273. Further, in a decision two terms later, the Court affirmed a Board order denying an
inside union a place on the NLRB representation ballot even though, in addition to
ceasing its domination and support, the employer had also dismantled and ceased to
recognize the inside union prior to the election. See Falk, 308 U.S. at 453. Hence, even
though the employer's "power" could not be made effective by continued recognition of
the inside union as in Pacific Greyhound, the employees were denied the option of a newly
created, nondominated enterprise union, again on the ground that "habitual
subservience" to the employer impaired "complete freedom of choice." Id. at 461.
215. International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. at 354; cf. ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-
Altmann Tex. Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 736 (1961) (arguing that employers' recognition of a
non-majority union affords "a deceptive cloak of authority" to the recognized union)
(emphasis added); see also NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 267
(1938) (arguing that employer recognition of company union gives it "a marked advantage
over any other in securing the adherence of employees"); Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63
N.L.R.B. 1060, 1071 (1945) (arguing that recognition of one of two rival unions gives it
"unwarranted prestige") (citing Pennsylvania Greyhound) (emphasis added); M.H. Hedges,
Organizing the Hidden Men, Labor Age, Dec. 1926, at 2 (arguing that "sub-conscious"
emotion of loyalty to management drives workers to support company union against their
self-interest).
216. The Board's language, quoted supra note 214, resonates not only with
psychoanalytic theory, but also with the Deweyan pragmatist psychology of the
"suppress[ion]" of "impulse" by culturally constructed "habit." Dewey, supra note 24, at
108. Deweyan psychology was popular among interwar progressives, including Robert
Wagner and his circle. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1413-15, 1418-22, 1434-38.
217. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion 17 (James Strachey ed. & trans.,
1961). A powerful recent psychoanalytic account of domination and masochism in the
context of gender roles is presented in Benjamin, supra note 24. Applications of the
account to various other social institutions are sketched in Lynn S. Chancer,
Sadomasochism in Everyday Life (1992).
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tion of authority figures need not, of course, be cast in the concepts of
Freudian drive theory. Object-relations, intersubjectivist, and post-struc-
turalist psychological theories capture the same process. 218 These
psychological theories of ideology have the virtue of offering an interpre-
tation of the familiar experience of the irrational and tenacious hold of
ideology on individual minds:
If "disinvesting" ourselves of an ideological viewpoint is as diffi-
cult as it usually is, it is because it involves a painful "decathect-
ing" or disinvestment of fantasy-objects, and thus a
reorganization of the psychical economy of the self. Ideology
clings to its various objects with all the purblind tenacity of the
unconscious; and one important hold that it has over us is its
capacity to yield enjoyment. 21 9
The issue of whether the legal regime should or can draw a norma-
tive line between decisions that are and those that are not driven by
neurotic compulsion or unreflective habitual subservience vividly demon-
strates that the company-union question cannot avoid confronting the
legal construction of subjectivity. Libertarians, of course, see a dangerous
potential of paternalism in any legal effort to distinguish between charac-
ter traits that are integral to the "true self" and neurotic compulsions that
are understood as "false" external constraints on choices made by the
true self.220 Some legal theorists propose to draw that line based on
whether the inner drive serves the objective "best interests, '221 subjective
218. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 24, at 3-27 (presenting an intersubjectivist or
relational theory of authority); W.R. Bion, Experiences in Groups 59-75 (1961)
(presenting an object-relations theory of authority); Slavoj Zigek, The Sublime Object of
Ideology 11-53 (1989) (presenting a poststructuralist theory of authority).
219. Eagleton, supra note 208, at 184 (discussing psychoanalytic theory of ideology of
Slavoj 7i~ek, supra note 218).
220. Feinberg, supra note 81, at 162-71; Richard Posner, The Ethical Significance of
Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1431, 1446-48 (1986).
221. The psychoanalyst Karen Homey articulates this naive essentialist position:
When we call a drive compulsive we mean the opposite of spontaneous wishes or
strivings. The latter are an expression of the real self; the former are determined
by the inner necessities of the neurotic structure. The individual must abide by
them regardless of his real wishes, feelings or interests lest he incur anxiety, feel
torn by conflicts, be overwhelmed by guilt feelings, feel rejected by others, etc....
Since [the neurotic person] himself is unaware of the difference between wanting
and being driven, we must establish criteria for a distinction between the two.
The most decisive one is the fact that he is driven on the road to glory with an
utter disregard for himself, for his best interests.
Karen Homey, Neurosis and Human Growth 29 (1950). Homey, of course, is making no
claims about the implications of neurosis for legal intervention to block the neurotic
choice. Robin West argues that judicial paternalism that overrides "revealed preferences"
is justified when based on the judge's "sympathetic understanding of the parties' true
interest," but West would have judges measure such "true interests" by the parties'
anticipated or actual subjective suffering or happiness. See Robin L. West, Taking
Preferences Seriously, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 659, 680 (1990).
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well-being,222 autonomy,223 or self-realization 224 of the agent.2 2 5 Modem
skeptics, postmodern theorists of the decentered or fragmented subject,
and neo-Buddhist theorists of the "no-self' reject any notion of identify-
ing the "real self" amidst the conflicting impulses, perceptions, and causal
relations that constitute the phenomonology of personhood.22 6
In any event, as liberal, critical, and postmodern legal theorists em-
phasize, the liberal legal regime already incorporates some (contestable)
criteria for distinguishing the autonomous and nonautonomous self in
different contexts, exemplified by such familiar doctrines as duress and
incapacity.227 The Board's treatment of workers' habitual or compulsive
subservience to the company union as one element diminishing the gen-
uineness of their choice can thus be understood as an instance of unusu-
ally expansive legal inquiry into the conditions of autonomous
selfhood.228 That view embodies a widely held but contestable ascription
of irrational, non-autonomous choice to a self that is "under the sway of
opaque psychological forces."229 To the extent that individuals internal-
ize or evade that ascription, the legal regime contributes to the social
construction of subjectivity.230 The Board's law, in its internal discourse
222. See, e.g., West, supra note 221; Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice:
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner,
99 Harv. L. Rev. 384, 399-400 (1985).
223. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 128, at 1133, 1136.
224. See, e.g., Jon Ester, Self-Realisation in Work and Politics: The Marxist
Conception of the Good Life, in Alternatives to Capitalism 127 (Jon Elster & Karl 0.
Moene eds., 1989).
225. Each of these criteria, of course, becomes problematic once the existence of
multiple selves is recognized. The interests, happiness, or autonomy of which fragmentary
self is to trump? Useful essays from an analytic perspective on this point are collected in
The Multiple Self (Jon Elster ed., 1986). For poststructuralist articulations of this view, see
sources cited infra note 226.
226. On the skeptical and post-modernist view, see generally Steven Best & Douglas
Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (1991), and the essays collected in
Who Comes After The Subject? (Eduardo Cadava et al. eds., 1991). On the neo-buddhist
view, see, e.g., Steven Collins, Selfless Persons (1982); Serge-Christophe Kolm, The
Buddhist Theory of 'No-Self', in The Multiple Self, supra note 225, at 233.
227. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 65, at 127-41; Dan-Cohen, supra note 18, at 992,
999, 1003. Boyle "venture[s] to suggest" that "the definition of the subject will be one of
the most important parts of the legal consciousness of the time-although it will probably
also be seen as something that 'goes without saying.'" Boyle, supra note 18, at 511.
228. "The result of the realist revolution has been to produce not one, but a host of
legal subjects." Boyle, supra note 18, at 516.
229. Jon Elster, Introduction, in Rational Choice 1, 15 (Jon Elster ed., 1986). This
view
amounts to making autonomy part of the notion of rationality, and is thus
inconsistent with any purely welfarist conception of rational choice. Acting
rationally means more than acting in ways that are conducive to welfare: it also
implies that the beliefs and desires behind the action have a causal history with
which we can identify ourselves.
See id. (footnote omitted).
230. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 18, at 992, 999, 1003.
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and its intended though not necessarily achieved social impact, purges
the worker's identity of the deferential impulse; the latter is treated "as an
external and intrusive agency rather than a part of [the worker
herself] ."231
Of course, the Board's proposition that workers deferred to their
superiors' "approbation" of company unions does not require psychoana-
lytic underpinnings. A straightforward "cultural" explanation of workers'
deference to authority-whether based on general socialization; on what
Goffman calls "rituals of subordination";23 2 or, historically, on the still
"profoundly deferential"233 cultures of newer immigrant workers in the
interwar years-would do.234 The normative taint of workers' deference
to managerial approbation of the company union may then be captured
in Joel Feinberg's rigorously formulated concept of "exploitation" in the
form of "manipulated benevolence." That is, the employer unfairly plays
on the workers' "benevolent virtues" of loyalty and trust for its own self-
interested advantage.23 5
f. Expurgation of the Other: Emotional Splitting and Dichotomous Map-
ping. - In its General Shoe decision in 1938, the Board described at length
the employer's persistent rhetorical appeals for "loyalty" to the company
"family" in its struggle against the "outsiders" and "strangers" who sought
unionization.236 The Board concluded:
These highly inflammatory words of advice and fervent pleas for
loyalty, directed to employees who were the recipients of many
substantial benefits donated by a paternalistic employer, ignited
a flame of resentment against the Union, which unquestionably
explains the [employees'] formation of the [company union],
and the acts of violence that followed. Had the [employer] actu-
ally participated in the organization of the [company union],
231. Id. at 991.
232. Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual passim (1982).
233. Fraser, supra note 39, at 139; see also Friedlander, supra note 74, at 97.
234. Paul Veyne offers an explanation of workers' idealization of their bosses that lies
somewhere between Freud's theory of masochistic desire and the pure cultural
socialization argument. He analyzes at length the human tendency to "overshoot" in
making psychological adjustments to subordination: that is, the sour grapes phenomenon
is likely to generate excessive humility. Masochistic desire is the consequence, not the
cause, of submission. See Paul Veyne, Bread and Circuses 295-304 (Brian Pearce trans.,
1990); see also Elster, supra note 128, at 115-18.
235. Feinberg gives the following example of "manipulated benevolence":
[A] loving and devoted spouse may find no higher satisfaction than unquestioning
service to his partner. Helping the other unquestioningly is what he likes doing.
If that trait is cynically exploited by the partner, who makes ever more
unreasonable demands on him, the devoted husband may not feel ill-used in the
slightest. He has not been wronged or harmed, but his wife exploited his
disposition to the fullest for her own selfish advantage .... [T]he injustice consists
in a wrongful gain [even] in the absence of any wrongful loss.
Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing, supra note 67, at 207.
236. General Shoe Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 1005, 1008-10, 1015 (1938).
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such direct action could have had no stronger effect upon the
employees than had [the general manager's] moving address.237
A recurrent theme in the Board's company union decisions was employ-
ers' deployment of the tropes of "community," "insider," "team," "Ameri-
can," and, most frequently, "family" in connection with company unions,
in contrast to the independent unions' identification with "traitor,"
"stranger," "outsider," "alien," "anti-American," "disloyalty" and "commu-
nist."2 38 The Board believed this strategy was particularly effective at
tainting workers' free, reasoned choice by triggering the eruption of hate-
ful emotions attached to the latter signifiers. The insider/outsider sym-
bols were thought "to provoke the antagonism which is easily aroused in
many people against strangers to the community."23 9 The Board's im-
plicit normative conception of the autonomous self here may simply rest
on a categorical privileging of reason over passion. 240 Alternatively, that
conception may rest either on substantive moral distinctions among vari-
ous "irrational" desires (good coworker sympathy and solidarity versus
bad xenophobia or chauvinism), 24 1 or on some narrower sense of
"opaque," unconscious impulses that would be resisted under conditions
of calm reflection.2 42
This ideological strategy has been called "expurgation of the
other"-the identification of an external enemy against which the
group's collective identity is mobilized.243 The Board's emphasis on the
primordial, hostile emotions aroused by such a symbolic strategy reso-
nates strongly with widely accepted psychological theories traceable to
Freud but elaborated more fully by the "object-relations" school pio-
neered by Melanie Klein.244 In that theory, the infantile self develops
through a process of "splitting" the ego between "introjective identifica-
tions" with the attributes of good "others" and good experiences of the
237. Id. at 1015.
238. See, e.g., Triplex Screw Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1131 (1940); W.F. &John Barnes
Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1033, 1037 (1939); Link-Belt Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 854, 859, 865 (1939);
Servel. Inc., 11 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1310 (1939); Lane Cotton Mills, 9 N.L.R.B. 952, 961 (1938);
Revolution Cotton Mills, 9 N.L.R.B. 468, 472 (1938); American Mfg. Concern, 7 N.L.R.B.
753, 762 (1938); General Shoe, 5 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
239. American Mfg. Concern, 7 N.L.R.B. at 762.
240. See supra text accompanying note 116; infra text accompanying notes 260-261.
241. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 741
(1985) (arguing that judicial removal of racial "prejudice" from the scope of legitimate
political preferences embodies a substantive moral commitment).
242. For a recent summary of the normative view, within the liberal tradition, that
unreflective, perhaps transitory emotional impulses defeat autonomous rational choice,
see, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 81, at 40-42.
243. Thompson, supra note 163, at 65. Thompson identifies this ideological strategy,
but does not link it to psychoanalytic processes discussed in this subsection.
244. See generally the essays collected in Essential Papers on Object Relations (Peter
Buckley ed., 1986); Hannah Segal, Melanie Klein (1979); The Selected Melanie Klein
(Juliet Mitchell ed., 1986). The Kleinian tradition of psychoanalytic thought has spawned
much compelling analysis of workplace relations. See, e.g., Larry Hirschhorn, The
Workplace Within: Psychodynamics of Organizational Life (1988).
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external world and "projective identifications" with the bad. Through
projective identification, the self attempts to rid itself of unwanted, pain-
ful internal feelings by projecting them onto others "and then relating to
them, so to speak, through hatred or fear, externally and in a relatively
objectified form."245 Dichotomous descriptive categories may then come
to "function mainly not as cognitive mapping devices intended to identify
facts, but as ways of channelling and condensing basic feelings of positive
and negative identification. They are modes of mental splitting, idealiza-
tion, and denigration."246
Even leading clinical or relational psychologists who reject the
Kleinian psychoanalytic notion that emotional "splitting" originates in the
preverbal infant self conclude that it is empirically "a pervasive human
phenomen[on]" in the post-infancy mind and is "ready-made for patho-
logical elaboration" based on "symbolic transformations and condensa-
tions on an hedonic theme."247 The archetypes of this psychological
dynamic, of course, are such potent irrational forces as racist emotion
and national chauvinism. 248 In this light, it is not surprising that the
Board's analysis and language in its company union decisions prefigure
its later adoption of a rule against employers' inflammatory appeals to
racial symbols in NLRB election campaigns-a rule proscribing not "tem-
perate,... truthful and germane" racial messages, but appeals designed
to "inflame" the "powerful emotional force" of racial prejudice and to
"create an emotional atmosphere of hostility" to the union.249
Even accepting, as I do, the usefulness of the psychological model as
an interpretation of the familiar experience of the irrational force of an-
tipathies for the outsider or "other," it alone does not account for which
dichotomous "us-them" categories, if any, will become the conductors of
expurgated hateful feeling. Cultural socialization and political contesta-
245. Michael Rustin, The Good Society and the Inner World: Psychoanalysis, Politics
and Culture 64 (1991); see also Jacob A. Arlow, Object Concept and Object Choice, 49
Psychoanalytic Q. 109 (1980).
246. Rustin, supra note 245, at 66 (referring specifically to dichotomous symbols of
racial difference).
247. Daniel Stem, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from
Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology 252 (1985); see also Benjamin, supra note
24, at 63-67 (applying "splitting" concept within intersubjectivist or relational approach to
psychoanalytic theory);Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohistory 49-50 (1984) (applying
similar analysis to psychology of racism).
248. See Benedict Anderson, Communities Imagined (rev. ed. 1991) (depicting
emotional force of nationalist splitting); Rustin, supra note 245, at 66 (linking
psychological splitting and racism). The splitting dynamic is also paradigmatically at work
in the conventions of gender opposition. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 24, at 222.
249. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71-72 (1962). The Board reasoned that
inflammatory emotional appeals, as opposed to rational messages, about race violated
employees' right to "cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in an atmosphere
conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not only from
interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from other elements which
prevent or impede a reasoned choice." Id. at 71.
[Vol. 94:753
1994] DEMOCRACY AND DOMINATION IN LABOR LAW 821
tion are significant determinants of the connection between particular
symbolic dichotomies and the provocation of primordial, "split" emo-
tions. The ideological campaign (fought within both the company and
the broader polity) between proponents of company unions and support-
ers of independent unions can be seen as a contest over the perceptual
maps or templates that would serve most saliently to align us-them feel-
ings. While the company union attempted to mobilize workers' percep-
tions that the company or plant was the relevant "insider" community or
family, the independent union appealed to class or occupational group-
ing. The importance of perceptual "refraining" or "paradigm-shifts" in
organizational culture-and in political choices analogous to NLRB gov-
ernance elections-is widely documented by recent organizational and
political studies.250
g. Neutralization and Reference-Group Reframing. - The Board main-
tained that the primary substantive benefit that company unions provided
workers was machinery for resolving individual grievances. Proponents of
company unionism viewed grievance resolution as a legitimate benefit
that satisfied genuine worker preferences. The Board, to the contrary,
depicted company unions' resolution of relatively minor grievances as a
"sop" and a diversion from workers' participation in determining more
important workplace terms and conditions.25' In this, the Board echoed
the Twentieth Century Fund's report supporting the Wagner Act, which
concluded that the "real purpose" of many company unions was to serve
"as lightning rods by which the aspirations of the employees for a share in
the determination of their conditions of employment are directed from
'dangerous' to 'harmless' objects."252 Progressive managerial publicists
had commended company unions for serving a somewhat similar "safety
valve" function.253
If no means are available for bringing the [worker's complaint]
out into the open for investigation and settlement, it rankles in
the minds of those who consider themselves ill-treated, becomes
magnified as they brood over it, warps their attitude toward
other questions, and in the end may lead to an explosion out of
all proportion to the original trouble.254
250. On perceptual "reframing" in economic enterprises, see infra text accompanying
notes 762-766 and note 764; and in political elections, see Robert Westbrook, Politics as
Consumption: Managing the Modem American Election, in The Culture of Consumption:
Critical Essays In American History, 1880-1980, at 143, 170 (Richard W. Fox & TJ. Jackson
Lears eds., 1983).
251. See American Potash & Chemical Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. 140, 148 (1937).
252. Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 141, at 323-24.
253. National Industrial Conference Board, Collective Bargaining Through Employee
Representation 39 (1933) [hereinafter NICB (1933)].
254. Id.; see also French, supra note 159, at 61-62 (concluding that company unions
resolved grievances that "would have led to serious trouble or at least would have formed
the basis for secret grudges [and] ill will").
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Trade association representatives testified in Congressional hearings that
"every employer of labor knows [that] it is frequently the little things
which create friction in the ranks of the employees."255
The Board's understanding that the grievance-"neutralizing" effects
of company unions illegitimately distorted workers' autonomous choice
can be recast in the more recent theoretical terms of "relative depriva-
tion" and, again, "perceptual framing." Psychologists and sociologists
widely find that people's (and, more to the point, workers') sense of satis-
faction, deprivation, and injustice frequently depend on their treatment
relative to the baseline of a reference group or a reference state. 256 The
reference baseline itself depends on the perceptual frame through which
a person describes and evaluates outcomes. The perceptual frame is al-
terable and contingent on a "diversity of factors ... in everyday life." 257
One important regularity uncovered by experimental psychologists is that
people assign greater weight to deprivations or losses relative to the (con-
tingent) baseline than they assign to gains from that baseline.258 For ex-
ample, workers may view a wage increase of ten dollars per week as a loss
relative to the baseline of another workforce's twelve dollar increase, but
as a gain relative to their previously expected eight dollar increase. Work-
ers who internalize the former baseline experience less subjective benefit
from the same "objective" ten dollar gain than is experienced by those
who internalize the latter baseline. Shifts in the perceptual frame may
therefore alter people's choices by changing their valuation of an other-
wise identical range of real-world outcomes.
As discussed above, the Board depicted the ideological contest be-
tween company unions and independent unions as in part a battle over
perceptual framing: Would workers take a class-wide perspective that
looked to the treatment of workers at a range of other companies (some
of which would afford their workers better average conditions), or would
they confine their reference state to their own workplace? To the extent
255. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 1003, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra
note 47, at 1041 (statement of W. Woods, President, Institute of American Meat Packers).
256. Some key works on the general phenomenon include W.G. Runciman, Relative
Deprivation and Social Justice (1966); Raymond Boudon, The Logic of Relative
Frustration, in Rational Choice, supra note 229, at 171; Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness
and the Assumptions of Economics, in Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics
and Psychology 101 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, in Rational
Choice, supra note 229, at 123. As applied to workers' subjective experience, see the
overviews presented in Elster, supra note 35, at 123-25, 221-26; Robert M. Solow, The
Labor Market as a Social Institution 5-24 (1990); Lester C. Thurow, Dangerous Currents:
The State of Economics 173-215 (1983).
257. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 256, at 134. The perceived reference outcome
is "labil[e]" and "is usually a state to which one has adapted; it is sometimes set by social
norms and expectations; it sometimes corresponds to a level of aspiration, which may or
may not be realistic." Id.
258. See Robyn M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World 34-47 (1988);
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 256, at 134.
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that an individual worker looked primarily to the relative treatment of co-
workers, individual grievances that departed from the baseline of typical
treatment in the plant would become more salient 25 9 Deprivations or
injustices common to all workers in the plant would be relatively neutral-
ized by such a perceptual frame. Because workers would perceive individ-
ual grievances as deprivations or losses relative to that baseline, they
would value their resolution more highly than the kind of amelioration of
common conditions (which would be perceived as gains relative to the
baseline) that an independent union would have more power to effect.
The company union thus extinguished the sparks of salient individual
grievances and preserved the tinderbox of deeper, common subordina-
tion. At the same time, it encouraged a perceptual frame that inflated
workers' valuation of the benefits of company unionism relative to those
of outside unionism.
This reinterpretation of the "lightning rod" or "safety valve" claim
about company unions is consistent with theoretical and empirical studies
concluding that, when workers enter a given work environment, their
perceptions and aspirations are relatively fluid and subject to adaptation
to the opportunities and routines experienced there. 260 To the extent
that the salient and sanctioned channel for worker protest was the com-
pany union grievance procedure, workers' inchoate "aspirations" may
have been "directed from 'dangerous' to 'harmless' objects" that were
remediable by that readily available procedure, as the Twentieth Century
Fund report concluded. In the company union workplace, that is, the
adaptation of worker preferences may have reinforced the more direct
symbolic messages that identified the prevailing conditions of the com-
pany "family" as the baseline for perceptions of relative deprivation or
gain.
The Board did not articulate why such neutralization constituted ille-
gitimate rather than legitimate preference-satisfaction. But several of the
already-mentioned normative conceptions of the freely choosing self-
each associated with an alternative mode of valuation in the workplace-
could be invoked. Neutralization deprived the reason-giving citizens of
industrial democracy an opportunity for conscious deliberation over
259. In attributing causal relations in the world, individuals tend to attribute greater
weight to aspects of their environment that are made disproportionately "available" or
'salient" to the actor. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, in Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 200, at
163. To the extent that workers' perceptual baseline rendered individual grievances more
salient, they may have attributed more of their sense of discontent to idiosyncratic
grievances than to conditions shared with coworkers.
260. See, e.g., J. Richard Hackman & Grey R. Oldham, Work Redesign 16 (1980)
(citing empirical workplace studies); James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity,
and the Engineering of Choice, in Rational Choice, supra note 229, at 142, 154-55
(concluding that people have a tendency to formulate desires and objectives in vague
terms, especially in situations subject to manipulation by others); supra note 257 and
accompanying text; infra note 765 and accompanying text.
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group preferences formed "behind their backs." It could also be charac-
terized as exploitative manipulation among relational, trusting selves.
Or, as intimated by current cognitive psychologists, neutralization could
be seen simply as a failure of rational calculation-a kind of market fail-
ure within a purely commercial transaction.
D. Domination Under Section 8(a)(2): A Case of Legal Fiction About Subject-
Formation?
As the discussion above reveals, the proponents and early interpret-
ers of Section 8 (a) (2) detail a wide range of ostensible instrumental and
symbolic mechanisms by which company unions illegitimately affected
workers' choice over modes of workplace governance. Indeed, the analy-
sis in those decisions, viewed overall, has a somewhat indiscriminate ap-
pearance. Many imaginable modes of instrumental and symbolic
domination are canvassed and their effectiveness credited by the Board
and courts, even where, for reasons discussed presently, those mecha-
nisms seem contradictory or their plausibility seems undercut by the
Board's own factual narrative. In other words, the body of decisions has
the appearance of legal advocacy pursuing all conceivable grounds for
rationalizing the ban on company unions as a safeguard of workers' free
choice.
This is not surprising. The early NLRB officials were labor progres-
sives and aggressive missionaries against company unionism.26' More
precisely, they found themselves in the position ofjustifying a bright-line
rule against company unions even in cases where workers' revealed pref-
erences seemed to favor such inside unions. Outright paternalistic ratio-
nales seemed foreclosed by the insistent free-choice rhetoric of Wagner
Act proponents and of dominant liberal legal discourse more generally.
The Board slipped this interpretive knot by turning to justifications based
on structural coercion and illegitimate preference-transformation. 262
Precisely for that reason, the Board's decisions afford a useful descriptive
reservoir for the taxonomy of modes of domination and hegemony
presented above. But for the same reason, the Board's analysis reflects a
one-sided, decontextualized stylization of the instrumental and ideologi-
cal dynamics of company unionism and of asymmetric power relations or
"domination" more generally. At least, as the next two Parts of this Arti-
cle argue, there are good theoretical and empirical grounds for believing
that this body of decisional law embodies substantial fictionalization-
although I by no means deny that company unionism was widely marked
by coercion and psychological manipulation.
261. See, e.g., James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board
109-88 (1974); Irons, supra note 164, at 203-89; Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1401-09.
262. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1442-60.
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III. NONHEGEMONIC AND COUNTERHEGEMONIC ASPECTS OF COMPANY
UNIONISM: SoME PLAusmILE CANDIDATES FROM THE THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY
The Board's and Supreme Court's view of domination elides several
significant phenomena captured in richer, more realistic conceptions of
ideology and psychology under conditions of asymmetric power. First,
the Board portrays company union ideologies as univocally hegemonic in
their content and effect. To be effective, however, a "dominant" ideology
must appeal in some way to the extant preferences and lived experience
of the subordinate group.
[R]uling ideologies can actively shape the wants and desires of
those subjected to them; but they must also engage significantly
with the wants and desires that people already have, catching up
genuine hopes and needs, reinflecting them in their own pecu-
liar idiom, and feeding them back to their subjects in ways
which render these ideologies plausible and attractive .... In
short, successful ideologies must be more than imposed illusions
.... 263 [B]ut this is also [a dominant ideology's] Achilles heel,
forcing it to recognize an "other" to itself and inscribing this
otherness as a potentially disruptive force within its own
forms.2 6
4
That is, a dominant ideology will generally be responsive in some way-
whether "authentic" or "distorted"-to oppositional beliefs and desires.
The ideology is thus likely to contain the seeds of "Utopian longings" that
have subversive implications;2 65 it provides the resources for immanent
critique or counterhegemonic consciousness.2 66
Second, the Board and courts tend to depict a false determinism be-
tween the particular institutional practices of company unionism and
modes of worker consciousness. Even apart from the counterhegemonic
impulses or beliefs incorporated within a dominant ideology, there are
many other sources of fragmentation, contingency, and potential inco-
herence in the consciousness of a group such as a particular company
workforce. These sources include innumerable aspects of the wider cul-
ture and polity and the "local" history of labor relations in the enterprise
263. Eagleton, supra note 208, at 14-15.
264. Id. at 45; see also Veyne, supra note 234, at 379 (arguing that "[f]or an ideology
to 'take,' the facts must not contradict it too flagrantly, there must be no insuperable
credibility gap"). The anthropologist James Scott documents wide-ranging instances in
which subordinate groups make strategic use of dominant ideologies in public discourse,
but concurrently imagine and voice oppositional discourse in private communication.
Hence, observers are likely to overestimate the degree of effective ideological hegemony
and underestimate the extent of oppositional norms in the culture. See James C. Scott,
Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts passim (1990).
265. FredricJameson, The Political Unconscious 288-91 (1981); see also TJ.Jackson
Lears, Power, Culture, and Memory, 75 J. Am. Hist. 137 (1988).
266. For compelling discussions of the ubiquitous vulnerability of dominant
ideologies to internal critique, see Walzer, supra note 130, at 33-66; Michelman, Law's
Republic, supra note 118, at 1528-32.
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or community. 267 In'theoretical terms, workers' particular consciousness
may contain "residual" ideologies generated by now-defunct practices
and institutions, "spillover" ideologies from other domains of social life,
and "emergent" ideologies flowing creatively from their lived experience,
including intersubjective communication among themselves. 268 These al-
ternative ideologies may reinforce, undermine, or be wholly irrelevant to
assumed hegemonic managerial ideologies. Anthropological studies of
workplaces (and other arenas of asymmetric power) universally uncover a
"double discourse." The official or formal discourse of public organiza-
tional life is shadowed by an "informal discourse" or "hidden transcript"
that embodies various practical, sometimes counterhegemonic, ideolo-
gies of workers or other subordinate groups.26 9 Indeed, mid-level mana-
gerial groups often develop informal networks of communication and
culture that contradict or complement senior management's "official"
policies and norms.2 70
Finally, the Board and court decisions frequently tell a story of con-
current widespread instrumental coercion and ideological seduction by
company unions. There is, however, an inherent tension between coer-
cive and ideological modes of sustaining authority or power relations. A
regime that applies active coercive measures is less likely to induce in its
subjects perceptions of the legitimacy or naturalness of the regime. In-
dustrial sociologist Richard Hyman states the problem succinctly: "Shift-
267. This generalization is strongly supported in Fantasia, supra note 180, at 13-17
(detailing local contingency and path-dependency of worker sentiment and solidarity);
Sabel, supra note 35 (recounting historical, cultural, and political influences on worker
consciousness); and in innumerable works of labor history and ethnography. See, e.g.,
Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (1990);
Fraser, supra note 39; Zahavi, supra note 39.
268. The concepts of "residual" and "emergent" ideologies are developed in
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature 121-27 (1977); see also Berger & Luckmann,
supra note 52, at 166 (arguing that "[i]ncipient counter-definitions of reality and identity
are present as soon as [subordinated or marginalized] individuals congregate in socially
durable groups"); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant
Resistance 331 (1985) (concluding that "the imaginative capacity of subordinate groups to
reverse and/or negate dominant ideologies is... widespread-if not universal"). On the
clash of heterogeneous ideologies in a differentiated, plural society, see id. at 167-73.
269. For this phenomenon in the workplace, see David Halles, America's Working
Man: Work, Home and Politics Among Blue-Collar Property Owners passim (1984);
Stinchcombe, supra note 35, at 99. Similar phenomena in other social settings are
canvassed in Scott, supra note 264; Scott, supra note 268.
270.Proof that [organizations' cultural] paradigms come in pairs-professed and
operational-is found when consultants use the company credo or philosophy to
gain support for [organizational] change and get only snickers and turnoffs by
managers at the plant level. Attitudes toward the professed organizational
paradigm will range from blissful ignorance to Machiavellian cynicism.
Lyman D. Ketchum & Eric Trist, All Teams Are Not Created Equal: How Employee
Empowerment Really Works 62 (1992); see also David Krackhardt & Jeffrey R. Hanson,
Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1993, at
104, 104-11.
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ing fashions in labour management stem from this inherent
contradiction: solutions to the problem of [instrumental] discipline ag-
gravate the problem of consent, and vice versa."271 Theories of ideology
tend to divide between those that give greater weight to the effectiveness
of hegemonic ideologies and those that maintain that instrumental coer-
cion produces behavioral compliance combined with a greater measure
of covert ideological insubordination. 272 But almost all recognize the po-
tential tension between the two modes of sustaining authority relations.
The Board and court opinions failed to explore effects of company
unionism other than those feared by the Act's framers (that is, coercion
or illegitimate transformation of workers' perceptions and desires about
independent unionization), and therefore ignored the three ideological
phenomena just discussed. Contemporary observers of company union-
ism pointed to concrete instances of these ideological phenomena-in-
stances that might either constitute legitimate workplace reform or
induce worker consciousness and action opposing company unions. This
Part, applying the methodology of the previous Part, presents more elab-
orate, theoretically plausible accounts of such reform and opposition.
Part IV will then assess the empirical accuracy of the claims that company
unionism implemented specific forms of domination, reform, and oppo-
sition. The purpose of this theoretical and empirical exploration is two-
fold. At a general level, it seeks to develop a richer conceptual vocabulary
and empirical framework for legal analysis of contextual instances of
domination and resistance. At a particular level, it aims ultimately to con-
struct ajurisprudence of lawful and unlawful managerial practices that is
better tailored than the Board's one-dimensional approach to the phe-
nomenological nuances and variety of collaborative workplaces.
A. Pure Reformism
As many studies of ideology emphasize, the Achilles heel of domi-
nant ideologies-their inevitable recognition of the needs of less power-
ful groups-may take the form of pure reformism.273 In the context of
271. Richard Hyman, Flexible Specialization: Miracle or Myth?, in New Technology
and Industrial Relations 48, 52 (Richard Hyman & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1988). Herbert
Hoover cautioned employers that there was "'no surer road to radicalism than by
repression'" in industrial relations. Stephen J. Scheinberg, Employers and Reformers:
The Development of Corporation Labor Policy, 1900-1940, at 194 (1986) (quoting
Hoover).
272. For the former, see, e.g., Adorno, supra note 154, at 243; Herbert Marcuse, One-
Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society 250 (1964);
Lears, supra note 208, at 569. For the latter see, e.g., Abercrombie et al., supra note 208, at
158-59; Anthony Giddens, Central Problems In Social Theory: Action, Structure and
Contradiction in Social Analysis 148 (1979); Scott, supra note 264, at passim; Paul Willis,
Learning to Labour 175 (1977); Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology
of Law, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 379, passim.
273. See, e.g., Abercrombie et al., supra note 208, at 153; Eagleton, supra note 208, at
45-46; Gramsci, supra note 34, at 312.
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company unionism, "pure reformism" means simply that managerial
elites may achieve approbation or at least quiescence through the norma-
tively less-assailable satisfaction of workers' pre-existing preferences.274
This, unsurprisingly, was the proposition urged by managerial and com-
pany union representatives testifying against the ban on company unions.
An employee representative of Goodyear's company union, for example,
urged that NLRB representation ballots include company unions on this
ground: "Who knows better than we, the employees, what the employees
desire? Is the labor board to tell us that what we desire is not good for
us?"275 Wagner himself conceded that company unions afforded workers
some genuine benefits-although, in his view, the benefits were relatively
minor and, in any event, did not cleanse the taint of company unions'
structural coercion of workers' choice of governance modes.276 In the
Taft-Hartley hearings, congressional committees heard and rejected re-
statements of the argument that company unions belonged on NLRB bal-
lots because they could prevail over outside unions only by the legitimate
means of satisfying workers' preferences. 277
In neoclassical labor market theory, pure reformism is the only strat-
egy that management need deploy to achieve workers' approbation.
Workers move to those employers (or choose workplace governance
modes) that offer preference-maximizing packages of compensation and
working conditions. The descriptive question of legitimation or hegemony
does not arise because the employment transaction is viewed as a horizon-
tal contractual exchange, not as an administered hierarchical relation. At
the same time, workplace authority relations are necessarily legitimated
as a normative matter because workers fully consent by taking or keeping
the job.
The more sophisticated school of institutionalist economics, to the
contrary, acknowledges that employment is a vertical authority relation
with costly exit.2 78 This view, implicitly opening the door to theorization
of the full panoply of hegemonic and counterhegemonic processes, cre-
ates a frontier for fruitful engagement between economic and critical
theory.
274. This proposition, of course, pretermits normative attacks on preferences whose
source lies outside of workplace relations. My focus here is on the relative legitimacy of
alternative modes of workplace governance. Cf. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 125, at
2196 ("[T]he question of legitimacy must be a pragmatic and comparative one-a question
of institutional arrangements more or less legitimate than other alternatives that could be
constructed.").
275. Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 95, at 547, reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note
47, at 1373, 1933 (statement of A.B. Trembley, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.).
276. "The company union has improved personal relations, group welfare activities,
discipline and the other matters which may be handled on a local basis." Robert F.
Wagner, Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1934, § 9, at 1.
277. See Hearings on S. 55, supra note 58, at 98, 105 (testimony of Professor Leo
Wolman).
278. See Williamson, supra note 33, at 242-43; Goldberg, supra note 33, at 271-72.
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B. Egalitarian Communication and Trust Across Power Asymmetries
Proponents of company unionism maintained that rational persua-
sion, information exchange, and friendly interaction during the company
union's labor-management consultations guided workers legitimately to a
felt identity of interests with management.27 9 Whereas pure reformism
rests on management's provision of new net benefits to workers, these
processes purported to alter worker perceptions or preferences. The Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board concluded that
[w]orks councils provided the means of presenting the facts of
the situation before the working force and of helping employees
to understand the reason and necessity for policies that might
affect them in a serious way. To secure understanding and ac-
ceptance of such policies, there must have been built up over a
period of years a belief in fair dealing based on experience. 280
Labor-management consultation in company unions would not only en-
hance information flows for purposes of reasoned understanding, but
would also develop mutual sentiments of empathy, trust, and shared com-
mitment to enterprise success.281 Even recent theorists antagonistic to
unnecessary hierarchy recognize the possibility that egalitarian communi-
cation and trust may emerge, however ambiguously, in contexts of
nonreciprocal power.282
C. The Oz Effect: Indifference and Skepticism
There is a contradiction in many of the pronouncements of oppo-
nents of company unionism, as well as in Board and court decisions ratio-
nalizing the company union ban. Recurrently, in the same breath in
which they denounced company unions as "'delusions,"' labor reformers
condemned them as "'counterfeit[s] of the flimsiest, most transparent
character.' "283 A transparent counterfeit, of course, is not likely an effec-
tive delusion. Those who know they are being manipulated-like Doro-
thy after drawing aside the curtain concealing the lever-pulling Mighty
Oz-are hard to dupe. Indeed, what I shall call the "Oz Effect" can dis-
credit even institutions that would otherwise satisfy workers' pre-existing
preferences and interests.
In the hands of the apologist, good reasons are transformed into
tools of persuasion. The recipient is in a bind, for should he
listen to the reasons or to the tone of voice in which they are
279. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1457-58, 1460 & n.350, 1461 & n.353.
280. NIOB (1933), supra note 253, at 15-16.
281. See, e.g., Montgomery, supra note 41, at 349-50 (quoting proponents' view that
company unions induced "cordial cooperation"); see also supra note 57 and accompanying
text.
282. See, e.g., Unger, supra note 24, at 128-29.
283. Brandes, supra note 38, at 120 (quoting Samuel Gompers).
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advanced? It takes more than ordinary good faith to be suscepti-
ble to good reasons advanced in bad faith.284
Legislators, management advisers, and, implicitly, even the Board
recognized that the Oz Effect could neutralize choice-distorting delusions
otherwise attributable to company unionism. Wagner himself had writ-
ten, "The men understand thoroughly the nature of the company union
which has been wished upon them as a condition of employment. They
know full well whose union it is and in whose interests it will work."285
Management consultants universally warned that the average worker was
"quick to sense hypocrisy,"286 and that workers "lose all respect and confi-
dence" in company unions "administered insincerely."28 7 The Board
often described how employers "feared that [the] disclosure [of their ma-
nipulation of the company union] would have a disastrous effect on their
organizational activities." 288 Even though the Board recognized-in-
deed, emphasized-that employees almost always knew of the employer's
influence on the company union,28 9 the Board did not acknowledge the
significance of the resulting Oz Effect in potentially countering the pur-
ported hegemonic effect of the company union on workers' desire and
perception.
Even if the Oz Effect in fact undermined other ideological processes
by which company unions ostensibly seduced workers, those processes
might still have helped sustain asymmetric power relations by providing
the managerial corps with a rationalization for its authority. Cultural the-
orists who doubt the general effectiveness of dominant ideologies in
shaping the consciousness of subordinate groups nonetheless recognize
that tho-e ideologies may shore up the cohesion and confidence of
284. Elster, supra note 128, at 155. "[T]here would seem to be two conditions for
being a good propagandist. First, you should believe in the message you are preaching;
and secondly, your belief in the message should not too obviously correspond to your
narrow self-interest." Id. at 157 n. 42.
285. Wagner Brief, supra note 160, at 397; see also 79 Cong. Rec. 9719 (1935),
reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 3199 (statement of Rep. O'Malley) (stating
that "[t]he intelligent American worker knows well enough that any union organized by
employers is not for the benefit of the employees"); Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 95, at
656, reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 2042 (statement of Sen. Walsh) (arguing
that workers know that employers influence company union representatives and will
therefore reject them). Wagner believed that the public as well was not duped but was
"overwhelmingly conscious of the fact that the company-dominated union was a sham."
Robert Wagner, National Radio Forum, June 13, 1935, 600 SF 103, Folder 35, in The
Robert Wagner Papers, Georgetown University.
286. French, supra note 159, at 92.
287. NICB (1933), supra note 253, at 41-42.
288. Falk Corp., 6 N.L.R.B. 654, 660 (1938).
289. Recall that several of the mechanisms of domination and hegemony recognized
by the Board rested on the premise that employees were aware of the employers' control of
the company union. See supra notes 29-77, 95-101, 143-150, 177-179, 215 and
accompanying text.
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elites.290 There is no doubt that a significant bloc of enlightened in-
terwar managers believed sincerely, even fervently, that "employee repre-
sentation plans" provided democratic legitimation of managerial
authority. 291 The ideological "self-deception" or "wishful thinking"292
that may underpin such belief was conveyed in Senate hearings by an
NRA Labor Board member, who spoke of the "strange naivete and little
boy faith in miracles that prevents these employers from having any real-
istic conception of how they injure irreparably their own interests" by in-
stalling company-dominated unions.29 3
D. The Tocqueville Effects: Spurring Collective Action
The last quotation intimates that the company-dominated union may
not only have contained a built-in counter-mechanism against the diver-
sion of workers by such processes as legitimation, dissemblance, universal-
ization, and naturalization. It may have actually spurred workers in the
direction of independent unionization. Within the interwar managerial
community, many anti-union belligerents thought company unionism
was a dangerous concession to collective dealing with labor that would
only encourage workers' efforts to unionize. 294 In fact, for the same rea-
son, the AFL approved of the National War Labor Board's policy of estab-
lishing company-union-like shop committees in nonunion workplaces
during World War I-at the dawn of the company union movement.
Even after official AFL policy turned against company unionism at the
Federation's 1919 convention, AFL officers and activists and, later, CIO
organizers frequently returned to the idea that company unions could
serve as stepping stones to independent unionism.2 95 This idea can be
understood in four distinct ways, all of which fit under the rubric of"Toc-
queville Effects," a label drawn from de Tocqueville's thesis that the
French Revolution was hastened by the aristocracy's reformist conces-
sions to unrest from below.2 9 6
290. See, e.g., Abercrombie et al., supra note 208, at 35; Eagleton, supra note 208, at
26-28; Elster, supra note 163, at 484.
291. See, e.g., Scheinberg, supra note 271, at 161-89, 195-97, 214-29.
292. On the descriptive significance of self-deception and wishful thinking in
sustaining ideology, see, e.g., Elster, supra note 163, at 482-84; Elster, supra note 128, at
123-25, 148-49. On their normative significance, see Mike W. Martin, Self-Deception and
Morality 6-18, 103-08 (1986).
293. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 184, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra
note 47, at 214 (statement of Elinore M. Herrick, Acting Chairman, NRA Regional Labor
Board).
294. See, e.g., NICB (1933), supra note 253, at 9; Walter G. Merritt, Employee
Representation as a Step Toward Industrial Democracy, 90 The Annals 39, 44 (1920). This
point was made in Senate committee hearings by key Wagner adviser, William Leiserson.
See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 232, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra note 47,
at 262.
295. See infra Part V.
296. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old R6gime and the French Revolution 180-87
(Stuart Gilbert trans., 1955). For this use of the term "Tocqueville Effect," see Elster, supra
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1. Whetting the Appetite. - Classic sociological studies of "relative frus-
tration" reveal the apparent paradox that members of a group may be-
come more frustrated as their opportunities and achievement of social
betterment increase.297 This has been understood alternatively as the
product of: excessive hopes induced by the promise of betterment;298 a
one-shot surge in desire after release from preferences adapted to for-
merly constricted opportunities-that is, sour grapes in reverse;299 or the
ever-escalating desire of individuals seeking more of the pleasures of their
latest experience of desire-satisfaction. 00 The metaphor frequently
deployed by contemporaneous observers to capture this phenomenon
was that workers' "taste of power" in company unionism "whet their appe-
tites for more."301 A similar phenomenon has been widely observed in
studies of the recent revival of schemes of labor-management collabora-
tion-workers' appetite for greater participation tends to grow with the
eating 3 02
2. Group Articulation. - Contemporaries proffered an alternative ex-
planation of company unionism's enhancement of workers' desire for in-
dependent unionism. The installation of inside unions purportedly
improved, rather than worsened, the conditions for undistorted commu-
nication and interest-formation among workers. For all its restrictions on
workers' meetings and interaction, the company union at least provided
some forum within which workers could articulate, affirm, and stoke their
shared grievances. Law Professor Harold Shapiro testified in Senate hear-
ings that company unions were "excellent breeding grounds for outside
union[s]" because they furnished workers with such a "common fo-
rum."303 Again, a similar phenomenon-"the politicization of the firm's
workforce" owing to the enhancement of the means for collectively formu-
lating and voicing grievances-is captured in recent empirical studies
showing that articulated and felt grievances increase among unionized
workers relative to nonunionized workers, even as their objective condi-
note 128, at 159-60 & n.50. For classic sociological treatments of the phenomenon, see
Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier 257 (1949); sources cited infra note 297.
297. See, e.g., Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 237 (1957);
Stouffer, supra note 296, at passim. For a more recent discussion, see Boudon, supra note
256.
298. See Merton, supra note 297, at 237.
299. See Elster, supra note 128, at 124.
300. In this view, the phenomenon of the "appetite growing with the eating" is basic
to the psychology of human motivation and satisfaction. The pleasure that attends an
initial quantum of want-satisfaction generates a drive for satisfaction of greater wants in
order to experience greater pleasure. See, e.g., Scitovsky, supra note 201, at 63-70.
301. See, e.g., Brandes, supra note 38, at 142; Warren B. Catlin, The Labor Problem:
In the United States and Great Britain 325 (1926).
302. See infra notes 784-793 and accompanying text.
303. Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 95, at 699, reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note
47, at 2085.
[Vol. 94:753
1994] DEMOCRACY AND DOMINATION IN LABOR LAW 833
ions improve and their commitment to the enterprise and the union
grows.3 04
3. Runaway Legitimation. - Contemporaries also proposed a Toc-
queville Effect that operated through inflation not of workers' desires
and felt grievances, but of their sense of normative entitlement. Robert
Wagner believed that workers' commitment to democratic norms in the
workplace stemmed from the general norms of the wider political cul-
ture, from the symbolism of legislative enshrinement of entitlements to
"industrial democracy," and from workers' and organized labor's lived
experience and culture.30 5 In contrast, managerial publicists feared that
implementation of company unionism under the banner of "employee
representation," "industrial democracy," and "mutual obligations" was a
symbolic concession potentially reinforcing the legitimacy of worker enti-
tlements, the precise scope of which was subject to dispute and uncon-
trollable expansion.30 6 The bulk of interwar managers feared precisely
that any such liberalization of their "benevolent despotism" would, in the
words of one Wagner adviser, "give the workmen exaggerated notions of
their rights."30 7
This potential for "runaway legitimation" is a classic instance of the
Achilles heel of dominant ideologies-their incorporation of opposi-
tional or universalizable norms.30 8 Once a dominant group invokes
emancipatory norms, it faces the possibility of escalated demands cast in
the same norms and, for that very reason, more difficult to resist. "The
would-be manipulator of norms is also constrained by the need to be con-
sistent. Even if the norm has no grip on his mind, he must act as if it had.
Having invoked the norm ... on one occasion, I cannot just dismiss it
when [a bargaining partner] appeals to it another time."30 9 This "Pan-
dora's Box Principle"-familiar to seasoned negotiators-is effectively a
second-order social norm dictating that if a bargainer "invokes a certain
[first-order] social norm, it stays on the table forever."3 10 As discussed
above, the Board believed that the "prestige" of managerial "approba-
tion" gave company unions a normative boost in the eyes of some work-
304. See, e.g., Freeman & Medoff, supra note 7, at 137-45; George J. Borjas, Job
Satisfaction, Wages, and Unions, 14J. Hum. Resources 21, 25 (1979).
305. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1424 n.208, 1434-37, 1439 n.273.
306. The pronouncements of managerial supporters of company unionism sounded
"revolutionary" to their open-shop brethren who retained a belief in the natural right to
"the absolute authority of each employer in his plant." NICB (1933), supra note 253, at 9;
Bendix, supra note 35, at 269. Cyrus McCormick III, promoting the Harvester Company's
inside union, said in 1919, "There is a close parallel existing between the movement in
favor of employee representation and the growth of democratic government.... [U]ntil
recent years our industrial system was... a benevolent despotism." Robert Ozanne, A
Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester 119
(1967) (quoting McCormick).
307. Sumner H. Slichter, The Turnover of Factory Labor 204 (1921).
308. See supra notes 264-266 and accompanying text.
309. Elster, supra note 35, at 128.
310. Id. at 240.
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ers. The Board did not explore the possibility that a similar boost might
be given to the more general, expansive democratic norms to which man-
agement appealed in conveying that approbation.311
Such an ideological process may again feed upon the psychology of
wishful thinking, here "consist[ing] in the belief that the specific interest
of the [dominant] class can be generalized into claims that go far enough
to attract other classes and yet not so far as to render them dangerous
when the claims are fulfilled."312 Progressive managers may have self-de-
ceptively believed that they could both endorse democratic workplace
norms and maintain control of workers' definition of the institutional
fulfillment of those norms.
4. Aiding Collective Action. - A fourth possible Tocqueville Effect was
captured in management's apprehension and organized labor's hope
that company unions provided the organizational embryo that would
grow into independent unionism.313 In the early phases of the company
union movement, the AFL and other observers believed that shop com-
mittees were "educating unorganized labor" in both the benefits of and
skills necessary for collective organization.3 14 Many managers as well ex-
pressed concern that company unions might simply help workers over-
come the logistical and coordination problems of collective action. They
"feared that active union men might be elected [as company union repre-
sentatives] . . .and use [the company union] as a lever to force union
recognition," or that outside union organizers would perceive company
unions as inviting targets for appeals for affiliation.31  Union officers and
311. The potential for runaway legitimation is confirmed by managers' unwillingness
to recognize independent unions even when they believe that unions can provide a useful
disciplinary and trust-building vehicle:
If the right of a certain degree of encroachment upon managerial prerogative by
employee collectives were to be formally enshrined in the theory of the
enterprise, was there not a danger of theory being used to legitimize-indeed
even incite-a progressive encroachment far beyond the point which
management found convenient?
Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations 256-57 (1974).
312. Elster, supra note 163, at 486.
313. This is an instance of a more general phenomenon noted by Mancur Olson,
among others:
In firms that have the same employment pattern for some time, the networks for
employee interaction that the employer created to encourage effective
cooperation at work may evolve into informal collusions, or occasionally even
unions, of workers, and tacitly or openly force the employer to deal with
employees as a cartelized group .... [Tlhe employer may gain more from the
extra production that this cooperation brings about than he loses from the
informal or formal cartelization that he helps to create.
Olson, supra note 73, at 22 n*.
314. See Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 141, at 77; see also Bernstein, supra
note 188, at 172-73; French, supra note 159, at 104.
315. Paul H. Douglas, Shop Committees: Substitute For, or Supplement to, Trade-
Unions?, 29J. Pol. Econ. 89, 94-95 (1921).
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activists were not oblivious to these possibilities. 316 In fact, some AFL
craft officials feared-and industrial union proponents hoped-that
shop-wide company unions would divert the solidarities of union activists
from craft to industrial union organization.
E. Backlash Effects: Indignation and Ressentiment
The Oz Effect is a potential cognitive or "cold" psychic response by
workers to their awareness of employer manipulation and control of com-
pany unions. Emotive or "hot" responses to paternalistic or manipulative
exercises of authority, however, are more likely to provide a motor to
collective action than cooler-headed recognition of injustice.3 17 Legisla-
tors and other commentators apprehended such a hot response by work-
ers in the form of a backlash of resentment or spite toward the company
union and the employer. One employee representative claimed a linkage
of cold and hot responses:
[P]aternalistic schemes have been adopted by the management
in an endeavor to hide their real purpose, but I have never seen
an instance of this nature where the workers were not cognizant
of the true motive and realized fully that they were doing as
some one else directed. The workers are not laboring under the
delusion that they are acting on their own initiative. They ap-
preciate very keenly that they are being managed and quite nat-
urally resent it.318
Contemporaries most frequently characterized workers' emotional
reaction against company union manipulation in either of two ways. The
first saw workers' indignation as the straightforward product of self-re-
spect-the dignitary value workers placed in autonomous action, in being
treated non-paternalistically and honestly.3 19 A Rockefeller aide con-
cluded that the "psychological appeal" of independent unionism over
company unionism rested on "a sense not only of power but of dignity
and self-respect .... [Workers] want something which they themselves
have created and not something which is handed down to them."3 20
316. In 1925, AFL President William Green stated: "Wage earners will do themselves
and industries a great service when they capture company unions and convert them into
real trade unions. The machinery of the company union offers a strategic advantage for
such tactics. Use that machinery as a basis for real organization." Dunn, supra note 96, at
194 (quoting Green).
317. "No matter how careful the criticism of justifications for the non-reciprocal
exercise of power may be, it cannot become a collective force unless it is associated in the
minds of large numbers of people with resentment at being treated unfairly." Unger,
supra note 24, at 131.
318. R.L. Cornick, Why Labor Should Be Represented in Industrial Management, 90
The Annals 32, 34 (1920).
319. See French, supra note 159, at 64 (employees perceive management "welfare"
programs as an "odiou[s)" form of paternalism).
320. Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: A Portrait 177-78 (1956).
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The second-call it ressentiment32 1 -pointed toward a deeper probe
into the psychic ambiguities of the subservient mentality recognized by
the Board and the Supreme Court.3 22 Nietzsche's classic account depicts
the emotional dialectic of those who "understand[ ] how to keep silent,
... how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble," while nursing
and waiting to unleash "the submerged hatred, the vengefulness of the
impotent."3 23 A prominent managerial guide conveyed a somewhat less
caustic but similar warning of the dangers of employer "dominance" and
"manipulation" of company unions: even where workers "go through the
motions of ostensibly cooperative conferences" and "appear but indiffer-
ent," the employer "courts disaster" by creating "sharply drawn" lines of
antagonism that cause workers to "chafe" and grow "restive."324 AFL craft
union officers, perhaps reflecting their own apprehension of loss of lead-
ership over unskilled mass-production workers, played rhetorically on
managerial fears that shop-wide company unionism contained the "germ
of uncontrolled rampage."3 25
Robert Wagner's less self-serving advocacy of collective bargaining
also warned that the explosive resentments bred by company unionism
fed revolutionary unrest, which he thought could be averted only
through the institutionalized consent and disciplinary strength of in-
dependent unions.3 26 He noted the "bitterness of feeling" and likelihood
of "revolt" and "wide-spread violence" among workers subjected to com-
pany union domination 3 27 Paul Douglas, his adviser, believed that "the
minds of the workers" became "inflamed" by submission to a company
union interposed as a union substitute.3 28 The Board's company union
decisions, again without acknowledging the hegemony-undermining im-
321. After Nietzsche's analysis of the slave mentality. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the
Genealogy of Morals, First Essay § 10, at 36-39 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., Vintage
Books 1967) (1887).
322. See supra notes 214-231 and accompanying text.
323. Nietzsche, supra note 321, at 37. For two recent analyses-from, respectively,
psychoanalytic and cognitive perspectives-of the dialectic of submission and hostility in
the psyche of the subservient, see, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 24, at passim (presenting
intersubjectivist psychoanalytic model of domination and submission); Elster, supra note
128, at 119 (giving account of how cognitive dissonance created by opportunity constraints
can breed "envy, spite, [and] malice" instead of adaptive preferences).
324. See Burton, supra note 213, at 183-84.
325. Dunn, supra note 96, at 187 (quoting Matthew Woll, AFL Vice-President, 1925).
326. Wagner believed that genuine collective bargaining implemented free,
egalitarian cooperation between labor and management-a relationship purged of the
dynamics of domination, subservience, and smoldering resentment. See Barenberg, supra
note 31, at 1422-30.
327. 79 Cong. Rec. 7570 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 2334; 78
Cong. Rec. 4229, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist., supra note 47, at 25.
328. Douglas, supra note 315, at 102-03.
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plications, occasionally recounted workers' sudden behavioral swing from
outward obsequiousness to enraged rejection of the company union.3 29
V. THE HiSTORICrAL COMPLEXITY OF REFORM, DOMINATION, AND WORKER
StmJEcrIvrY UNDER COMPANY UNIONISM
This Part ventures an assessment of the empirical strength or weak-
ness of the different theoretically plausible processes, canvassed in Parts
II and III, by which company unionism assertedly affected worker con-
sciousness and choice. As longstanding debates over the nature of subjec-
tivity and the interpretation of historical mentalities highlight, such an
assessment is extremely treacherous. It requires a survey of distant
psychic terrain using contested hermeneutic and epistemological
tools.3 3 0 Section A of this Part briefly summarizes these interpretive
problems.
Turning to the substantive historical assessment, Section B empha-
sizes the contingent, local paths of worker responses to company union-
ism. Sections C through F show that the interwar evidence nonetheless
forms some more generalizable patterns that help illuminate today's de-
bate over collaborative workplaces. Two such patterns are particularly im-
portant for legal policy. First, company unions fall into two rough
categories, which I label "core" and "vulnerable." Company unions in
each group typically exhibited the full range of specific processes of dom-
ination, reform, and opposition conceptualized in Parts II and III. For
historical reasons that I shall detail, the core company unions tended dis-
proportionately to implement pure reform, egalitarian communication,
and some successful forms of hegemonic consciousness. These processes,
however, characteristically set in motion a dynamic of "contested trust,"
in which workers frequently advanced their interests through various Toc-
queville Effects, especially runaway legitimation. The vulnerable com-
pany unions, by contrast, relied disproportionately on coercive and
manipulative hegemonic processes that often triggered greater worker re-
sentment and explosive oppositional collective action.33 '
Second, the dialectics of reform/acquiescence and domination/re-
sentment within both core and vulnerable company unions had much
329. As discussed infra Part IV.F, there is no necessary contradiction between the
recognition of workers' resentment toward management and the Board's recognition that
workers deferred to and internalized management's approbation of company unionism.
The contradiction may have rested within workers' own consciousness.
330. See, e.g., Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts,
Language 13-71 (1983); Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons:
Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1216 (1990)
(describing consensus among contemporary historians and philosophers of history that
historical writing is an inherent process of imposing "narrative structures" and "cultural
conventions of interpretation on the resistant surface of accessible factual details").
331. As we shall see, however, the core company unions easily slipped into this same
pattern when firms faced economic crises or outside union threats.
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greater impact on company union representatives than on rank and file
workers. As a representative institution, the company union machinery
generally penetrated the daily experience of employee representatives,
but not that of frontline workers. Interwar workers widely experienced a
sense of betrayal and a desire to form outside unions when the Depres-
sion caused employers to breach the promises of welfare capitalism. For
the rank and file, however, employers' retraction ofjob security, material
benefits, and the expensive personnel programs that constrained the ar-
bitrariness of the "foreman's empire" was more significant than the col-
lapse or capture of employee representation plans that typically touched
their lives only tangentially.
Part V demonstrates how both of these generalizations hold impor-
tant lessons for the collaborative workplaces of the 1990s. The heralded
"workplace of the future" potentially intensifies the various specific dy-
namics of subtle domination, contested trust, and collective empower-
ment precisely because participatory structures, unlike company unions,
integrate rank and file workers into the "organized intimacy" of frontline
teams. My law reform proposals, developed in Parts VI and VII, seek to
safeguard workers against the new structures of collaboration most sus-
ceptible to domination and affirmatively to encourage those structures
that are most likely to yield egalitarian communication, continuing labor-
management trust, and cumulative increases in worker decisional author-
ity and bargaining power.
A. Some Interpretive Thickets
The "direct" evidence of interwar employees' mentality, in the form
of workers' statements expressing their own desires and perceptions
about company unionism, is scattered and hardly constitutes a reliable,
random sample of worker opinion. Most of the relevant, surviving words
of workers are selective quotations deployed in politically charged advo-
cacy by proponents and opponents of company unionism-whether in
managerial or labor publications, the writings of academic or govern-
ment analysts, or in legislative and administrative testimony.
In addition, interpreting workers' words for what they reveal about
workers' actual cognitive, affective, and perceptual inner worlds is tricky
business, to say the least. Experimental studies of people's attitudes and
judgments conclude, unsurprisingly, that individuals' articulated reasons
for reaching decisions are unreliable guides to the actual emotional stim-
uli and cognitive processes that affect their decision-making.33 2 When
describing the motives and perceptions behind their judgments, people
tend to invoke conventional cultural formulas-the very kind of formulas
332. See, e.g., Nisbett & Ross, supra note 200; Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D.
Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know. Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84
Psychol. Rev. 231, 246-49 (1977).
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about the effects of company unionism that we want to assess
empirically.333
The interpretive problem is compounded by the psychological sub-
tlety of the various choice-deflecting mechanisms attributed to company
unionism, notwithstanding how crude those mechanisms might initially
seem in the schematic formulations presented above. An empirical as-
sessment of those distinct mechanisms requires identifying workers' per-
ceptions of the descriptive attributes of company unions and outside
unions, and workers' evaluations of those attributes. It requires as well
distinguishing whether that evaluation is based on workers' first-order
preferences, emotional impulses, or desires; their habitual dispositions,
norms, or compulsions; their second-order prudential preferences or in-
terests; or their moral or political values-while recognizing that various
evaluative stances or volitional impulses may operate concurrently and
contradictorily. And it requires assessments of the causal links between
specific company union practices and alterations in these various subjec-
tive elements-while recognizing that some of the causal, intrapsychic
processes are, by hypothesis, subconscious.
Workers' actual behavior (as opposed to their words) in the face of
company unions is, of course, another important and much more widely
and reliably documented clue from which we can draw inferences about
at least some aspects of their mentality-although such inference-draw-
ing is far from unproblematic. Does workers' quiescence under a com-
pany union imply the success of instrumental coercion? Of genuine
preference-satisfaction or trust-enhancement? Of hegemonic processes?
Does workers' overt rejection of a company union imply the failure of all
three, or instead the strength of counterhegemonic processes or other
ideological or self-interested sources of workers' collective assertion?
There is a lively historiographic and social theoretic debate on the gen-
eral question of what inferences about worker consciousness can be
drawn from workers' outward behavior. Some social historians, such as
John Patrick Diggins, conclude that Lockean acquisitive "interests" have
historically driven American workers' actions, whatever their expressed
communitarian sentiments. Hence, workers' quiescence must stem from
the success of employers' instrumental incentives, while workers' asser-
tion of self-interest explains worker insubordination or rebellion.33 4 T.J.
Jackson Lears, although writing from an antipodal Gramscian perspec-
333. See Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social
Psychology (1967); Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 332, at 246-49. This problematic
dimension of oral testimony is, of course, well known to labor and other historians. See,
e.g., Friedlander, supra note 74, at xx-xxiii; David W. Sabean, Power in the Blood: Popular
Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modem Germany (1984); Barbara Allen, In the
Thick of Things: Texture in Orally Communicated History, Int'lJ. Oral Hist., June 1985,
at 92, 93-96; Nathan Wachtel, Memory and History, Introduction, 2 Hist. & Anthropology,
Oct. 1986, at 207, 207-09.
334. See John P. Diggins, Comrades and Citizens: New Mythologies in American
Historiography, 90 Am. Hist. Rev. 614, 624-29 (1985).
1994]
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five, similarly ascribes workers' failure to act militantly to the effective
domination of a possessive individualist culture.33 5
For many "new labor historians" and cultural theorists, on the other
hand, workers' relatively autonomous, communitarian culture, rather
than their internalization of the dominant culture's acquisitive individual-
ism, explains their behavioral attempts at collective resistance. The fail-
ure of those attempts is due predominantly to instrumental suppression
that may yield even greater hidden ideological insubordination. 336 While
for Diggins, workers' true preferences or deepest interests are expressed
in their (presumptively self-interested) behavior, for the new historians
and theorists, workers' true sentiments more likely lie in a resistant, some-
times collectivist oppositional ideology that belies outwardly compliant
behavior. That is, workers (as other subordinate groups) have a greater
degree of freedom in thinking oppositionally than in acting so.3 7
The problem of "reading" workers' inner impulses and thoughts
from the "text" of their external utterances and actions is an instance of a
broader post-Quinean and post-structuralist epistemological and herme-
neutic puzzle. As the work of Donald Davidson and others has shown,338
there is a double mystery in the effort to understand human speech and
gesture. First, what does a statement or act mean? The "linguistic turn"
in human sciences in the twentieth century has made commonplace the
notion that the meaning of any signifier depends on its place within a
web-like system, or unending spiral, of signifiers. That is, the meaning of
any word or statement is given by other words or statements, which must
then be defined in endless recursion or circularity. Reaching agreement
within an interpretive community about the meaning of a statement
therefore involves an inevitable degree of uncertainty because such an
335. Lears, supra note 208.
336. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 264; Leon Fink, The New Labor History and the
Powers of Historical Pessimism: Consensus, Hegemony, and the Case of the Knights of
Labor, 75 J. Am. Hist. 113 (1988). For a representative sample of the new labor history,
see, e.g., Working-Class America: Essays on Labor Community, and American Society
(Michael H. Frisch & DanielJ. Walkowitz eds., 1983) [hereinafter Working-Class America].
Such writing was often inspired by the works of E.P. Thompson and Herbert G. Gutman,
among others. See, e.g., Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing
America (Vintage Books ed., 1977) (1966); E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English
Working Class (1963).
337. My view, borne out by the experience of interwar company unions and current
collaborative workplaces presented in Part IV.F below, is that Diggins's thesis risks lapsing
into an ahistorical or essentialist approach to worker (or any human) "interests." Interests
cannot be objectively defined, and people's subjective perceptions of their interests may be
multiple, inconsistent, and change over time. Hence, concordant with the new historians,
I believe that workers' culture must be closely examined for its oppositional and non-
pecuniary possibilities. By the same token, however, one cannot presume that workers'
culture in any particular historical period will be collectivist and oppositional. Such a
presumption would replicate the fallacy of essentialist interests. See Barenberg, supra note
31, at 1431-34, 1439-42, 1459-61.
338. See Davidson, supra note 51.
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agreement can only be reached through exchanges of statements and
gestures that must themselves be recursively defined.
Second, what is the relation of a statement or act to the beliefs and
desires of the speaker/actor? That is, the problem of sincerity or authen-
ticity further clouds the attempt to reach a confident conclusion about
the meaning of particular statements: how can we know the speaker's
motives and beliefs in deploying a statement? Our knowledge of those
motives and beliefs necessarily depends on the very meaning of the utter-
ances and acts we are trying to determine, and on other beliefs already
ascribed to the speaker. Thus, not only is the relation among the mean-
ings of signifiers or statements recursive. There is a similar circular rela-
tion between meaning and internal belief or desire. Hence, Davidson's
theory of "radical interpretation": any understanding of outward mean-
ings and internal beliefs depends on a holistic mode of interpretation.3 39
The interpreter makes another person's system of meanings and beliefs
"hang together" by the (in Davidson's view, unavoidable or empirically
true) "charitable" assumption that most of what the other says is sincere
and by mutual adjustments of the interpreter's initial belief-meaning sys-
tem and the beliefs and meanings recursively attributed to the other.
We cannot, of course, escape these interpretive problems by simply
falling back on contemporary observers', the Board's, or labor historians'
interpretations of company unions' effect on worker consciousness, even
if those interpretations provide some helpful guidance. Those interpreta-
tions may reflect the same enlistment of ambiguous cultural formulas and
uncertain sincerity as do workers' and managers' own words,3 40 and may
be skewed by the interpreter's general views in the above-mentioned sub-
stantive debate over the relation between worker behavior and self-inter-
est. Equally important, even the most sophisticated and impartial
observers and historians have not examined workers' subjective experi-
ence under company unionism with an eye to the precise empirical ques-
tions that we want to assess. As disentangled and theoretically recast in
Parts II and III, the possible mechanisms by which company unions af-
fected worker choice are stated more precisely than in the Board's analy-
sis. Yet the Board's analysis, guided as it is by surgical legal criteria, is in
339. See id. at 125-39; J.E. Malpas, Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning
24-190 (1992).
340. The Board's scorched-earth descriptive and normative attack on company
unions may have been skewed not only by Board lawyers' natural tendency as legal
advocates to justify in every way plausible the statute's overriding of workers' choice of
inside unions. See supra Part III.D. In addition, much of the early Board's staff held
allegiances aligned with the same progressive and radical political movements that had
generated the array of rhetorical slogans and arguments against company unionism. See,
e.g., Gross, supra note 261; Irons, supra note 164. This is not to say that the "result-
oriented" genesis of those arguments per se invalidates them. It does, however, call for
careful assessment of the arguments, especially since there are apparent tensions, if not
contradictions, among them. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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turn more precise in its empirical focus than are contemporaries' and
historians' descriptions.
Even while recognizing these acute interpretive difficulties, we can
nonetheless venture interpretations of the words and actions of employ-
ees under company unionism-just as we must inevitably do in every in-
terchange with others, as both analytic philosophers such as Davidson,
and critical theorists such as Dominick LaCapra, propose.3 41 Adapting
Davidson's notion of "radical interpretation" among contemporaneous
discussants, we can attempt to converge on an interpretation of the con-
sciousness of interwar workers through recursive confrontations and re-
adjustments between our initial belief-meaning system and the beliefs
and meanings we charitably but skeptically attribute to historical sub-
jects.3 42 In this task, we are aided by the many contemporaneous and
recent narratives that offer the most subtle, finely textured accounts of
workers' experience.
B. Workplace Micropolitics and Local Contingencies
Many economic, sociological, and anthropological studies-concor-
dant with much contemporary social theorizing and historiography-
conclude that modes of consciousness within organizations are influ-
enced by a contextual mix of "local" and "global" institutional and cul-
tural patterns; 343 that there is no inevitable, one-to-one correspondence
between particular organizational structures and organizational cultures
or consciousness;344 and that variations in such consciousness are highly
path-dependent.3 45 The best case studies-ethnographic and histori-
cal-of the contest between company and independent unions in the
1920s and 1930s confirm these conclusions. That contest played out
amidst many large and small scale economic and cultural forces that con-
tingently deflected the impact of company unionism on worker con-
sciousness and choice in particular workplaces.
341. See Davidson, supra note 51; Lacapra, supra note 21, at 6-8. On the
methodology of such "pragmatic hermeneutics," see generally Hansioas, Pragmatism and
Social Theory (1993).
342. See James T. Kloppenberg, The Theory and Practice of American Legal History,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1335-36 (1993) (reviewing Morton Horwitz, The Transformation
of American Law, 1870-1960 (1992)); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer'Statutory
Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1990) (presenting analogous model for
interpreting the meaning of statutes).
343. See Sabel, supra note 35, at 78-126; Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (1983);
Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modem Age
10-35 (1991).
344. See Hirschhorn, supra note 244; Roberto M. Unger, False Necessity (1987).
345. See Fantasia, supra note 180; Richard A. Guzzo & Raymond A. Katzell, Effects of
Economic Incentives on Productivity- A Psychological View, in Incentives, Cooperation,
and Risk Sharing 107 (Haig R. Nalbantian ed., 1987) (presenting survey of empirical
studies stressing great contextual variability of psychological effects of specific
organizational incentive schemes); Edward H. Lorenz, Trust and the Flexible Firm:
International Comparisons, 31 Indus. Rel. 455 (1992).
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At the local level, the particular matrix of ethnic cultures and polit-
ical divisions in a given workplace and its surrounding community often
affected the capacity of workers to form coalitions of sufficient solidarity
to undergird an independent union offensive against a company union.
For example, in organizing the predominantly Irish workforce of the New
York City transit system, the Transport Workers Union faced a company
union actively supported by the Catholic Church and by prominent Irish
community organizations whose leadership was predominantly middle
class or managerial. 346 The TWU triumphed through a quirky alliance of
Communist Party activists and Irish Republican Army emigrants culturally
hostile "to paternalistic systems of social control."347 These allies won de-
spite disagreement between themselves about the proper strategy for
combating the well-entrenched company union. While the CP advocated
an effort to bore from within the company union, the Irish republicans
adhered to "the deep-rooted Irish tradition of boycotting institutions
viewed as illegitimate."3 48
Another interesting case is A. Phillip Randolph's guidance of the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters through difficult racial and ideolog-
ical shoals en route to defeating Pullman's company union.3 49 In the
1920s, significant African-American community and religious organiza-
tions encouraged black workers to support their paternalistic employer
rather than heed Randolph's call to join the traditionally racist organized
labor movement. When the Brotherhood became a real threat to the
company union in the 1930s, Randolph won the backing of such impor-
tant groups as the NAACP and the Urban League-and of white progres-
sives-although Pullman's patronage sustained both substantial worker
loyalty to the company union and anti-union activity in the outside Afri-
can-American community. To cut a deal to win the inclusion of the por-
ters in the crucial ban on company unions imposed by the 1934 Railway
Labor Act amendments,3 50 Randolph betrayed his anti-racist principles
and supported Senate committee chair Clarence Dill's campaign to ban
Filipinos from railroad work. Meanwhile, depending on their shifting
political interests, white labor leaders oscillated between supporting and
opposing the Brotherhood. A key moment of interracial political coali-
tion, however, arose precisely from the unions' common interest in win-
ning the legislative ban on company unions in 1934. Similar adventitious
divisions, alliances, and strategies-among ethnic, political, racial, gen-
346. See, e.g., Joshua B. Freeman, Catholics, Communists, and Republicans: Irish
Workers and the Organization of the Transport Workers Union, in Working-Class
America, supra note 336, at 256, 265, 274.
347. Id. at 264.
348. Id. at 270.
349. The story is best told in William H. Harris, Keeping the Faith: A. Philip
Randolph, Milton P. Webster, and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 1925-37, at
20-21, 184-86, 204-18 (1977).
350. See Railway Labor Act Amendments of 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185, 1187
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (1988)).
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der, and occupational groups-played out in kaleidoscopic permuta-
tions, often contributing to success or failure, in the battles between
independent and company unions in particular companies and
localities.351
As is familiar to students and practitioners of union organizing, the
particular technological, spatial, and social organization of a workplace
often affects the formation, cohesion, and allegiances of work groups.
Among such relevant workplace micro-structures in the 1920s and 1930s
were the idiosyncratic features and practices of company unions them-
selves. A company union that permitted employee representatives to cast
secret votes in joint labor-management councils, for example, allowed
delegitimating displays of worker dissent in ways that open voting would
not.352 Employers that guarded less rigorously against meetings among
workers in the absence of management representatives opened the door
to more independent collective action. 353 Company unions that assem-
bled representatives from across plants encouraged more encompassing
networks of oppositional employee action. 354
In addition to such microstructural features, the personal exper-
iences and personalities of key workplace actors-ranging from upper
management to strategically positioned supervisors and rank and file
leaders-often shaped workplace governance outcomes.3 55 Those actors'
unpredictable strategic and tactical choices, particularly in moments of
crisis or heightened confrontation, could make the difference between a
fatally demoralizing setback to union activists' efforts to project a critical
mass of pro-union strength, on the one hand, or a snowballing delegiti-
351. See, e.g.,John Bodnar, Workers' World: Kinship, Community, and Protest in an
Industrial Society, 1900-1940 (1982) (recounting complex alliances forged by ethnic
activists in coal and steel industries); Friedlander, supra note 74 (recounting second-
generation Polish workers' alliance with older ethnic immigrant groups); Gary Gerstle,
Working-Class Americanism (1989) (recounting alliance of French-Canadian skilled
workers and radical Franco-Belgians that overcame traditional anti-union Catholicism).
352. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 96, at 79-80.
353. See Ozanne, supra note 306, at 139; John N. Schacht, Toward Industrial
Unionism: Bell Telephone Workers and Company Unions, 1919-1937, 16 Lab. Hist. 5,
19-22 (1975) (discussing intermingling and grievance-articulation by committees of
employee representatives).
354. See id.; infra notes 491-507 and accompanying text.
355. Clarence Hicks, the leading personnel manager and pioneer of company
unionism of the interwar years, wrote:
In no area of management is the character and personality of the controlling
executive or group more clearly reflected than in policies dealing with labor
relations. Two companies may use similar techniques or policies in production,
sales and finance, but still be at opposite poles in the way in which they deal with
the human beings they employ.
Clarence Hicks, My Life In Industrial Relations: Fifty Years in the Growth of a Profession
111 (1941). Hicks was the personnel manager of three company union pioneers-
International Harvester, Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, and Standard Oil of New
Jersey-and the first president of Rockefeller's Special Conference Committee of leading
progressive firms. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1433-34.
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mation of managerial authority (a lapse of worker "confidence" in the
company union's "prestige," in the personnel-administration jargon of
the day) on the other. In light of such local, path-dependent, cultural
and psychological environments, identical symbols and concepts-
"Americanism," "loyalty," and the like-became favorably associated in
one community, workforce, or informal work group with a company
union and in another with an outside union.35 6 Compounding such local
variation and unpredictability is the fact that most company unions con-
currently implemented instrumental, potentially coercive incentives and
a variety of ideological, symbolic strategies-which, as discussed above,
could promote contradictory worker responses.
Although the evidence reveals that one historical "regularity" of com-
pany unionism is precisely its local variability, there are some more gener-
alizable regularities that have significant implications for the current
debate over the effects of today's collaborative workplaces on worker sub-
jectivity. As seen below, the variegated historiographic interpretation of
company unions' effects is explained to some extent by broader eco-
nomic, cultural, and political trends, by structural differences among cat-
egories of company unions, and by the differential impact of company
unions on specifiable groups of workers.
C. Some Broader Historical Viewpoints and Trends
The historical writing on company unions tends to divide between
broad "traditional" and "revisionist" views. The traditional view-
espoused by postwar historians generally supportive of organized labor-
concludes that company unions were doomed to fail in the face of work-
ers' presumed overwhelming interest in fuller forms of collective bargain-
ing. The traditionalists, however, do not always clearly specify whether
that inevitable failure was due to the insufficiency of company unions'
genuine benefits, coerciveness, or hegemony; to company unions' exces-
sive coerciveness and consequent counterhegemonic backlash; to the un-
anticipated aiding of workers' intragroup communication and collective
action; or to other factors.3 57 The revisionists, by contrast, conclude that
interwar welfare capitalism, including company unions, constituted a sta-
ble and effective collaborative mode of workplace governance.35 8 The
356. This is well recounted in Cohen, supra note 267, and Gerstle, supra note 351.
357. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 188, at 187 (concluding that "the company union
... had an inherent propensity to disintegrate"); 6 Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor
Movement in the United States: On the Eve of America's Entrance into World War I,
1915-1916, at 84-102 (1982); Harry A. Millis & Royal E. Montgomery, Organized Labor
passim (1945).
358. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 38, at 48-81; Piore & Sabel, supra note 109, at
124-32; Daniel Nelson, The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination,
56 Bus. Hist. Rev. 335, 335-57 (1982); cf. Sanford M. Jacoby & Anil Verma, Enterprise
Unions in the United States, 31 Indus. Rel. 137, 139-43 (1992) (extending revisionist
claim to post-Wagner Act enterprise unionism).
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fortuitous shock of the Great Depression, however, undercut employers'
capacity paternalistically to sustain workers' trust and ultimately led to the
statutory ban on company-dominated unions. The revisionists, however,
do not always explicitly distinguish the particular effect of company un-
ions from the overall impact of interwar employer welfarism. Further,
when they do examine company unionism proper, the revisionists do not
always address precisely the extent to which company unions' effective-
ness was due to instrumental incentives or psychic transformations, nor
whether those incentives or transformations were of the kind that would
be deemed legitimate or illegitimate under the NLRA's (or some altema-
tive) normative standards. Nonetheless, the historiographic interpreta-
tions and contemporaneous evidence allow some generalizations-useful
to current legal-policy concems-about these more finely tuned ques-
tions. Before setting forth those generalizations, I sketch the broader
context of four interrelated historical trends that affected managerial
strategy, company union structure, and worker responses and initiatives.
First, the interwar period was punctured by two severe economic
slumps-the sharp recession of 1920-21 and the Great Depression. The
timing of company union formation relative to fluctuations in
macroeconomic (or sectoral and enterprise) performance could dramati-
cally affect workers' response to company unions. Economic slumps
threatened workers' loyalty to recently formed company unions, either
because the company union was discredited when it "consented" to dra-
matic wage or employment cuts or because workers felt that management
had betrayed newly trumpeted norms of paternalistic protection. Com-
pany unions that had germinated during longer periods of relative pros-
perity were more apt to survive such downward shocks.3 59 For similar
reasons, company unionism took deeper root in prosperous sectors than
in the chronically "sick industries" of the 1920s. 3 60
359. The number of companies with company unions fell from 432 in 1926 to 313 in
1932. See NICB (1933), supra note 253, at 16. In describing the response of company
unions to the Great Depression, the National Industrial Conference Board, a leading
managerial proponent of company unions, put the point delicately:
Problems of the most difficult character have been laid before works councils
during the depression. First, when it was necessary to lay off substantial numbers
of employees, again, when reductions in wage rates became unavoidable, and still
again, when a widespread adoption of the policy of work-sharing raised questions
as to the basis on which work should be distributed, the works council shared with
management the task of carrying out necessary policies in the most equitable
manner possible .... Works councils provided the means of presenting the facts
of the situation before the working force and of helping employees to understand
the reason and necessity for policies that might affect them in a serious way. To
secure understanding and acceptance of such policies, there must have been built up
over a period of years a belief in fair dealing based on experience.... Naturally, the
stronger and better managed [works councils] ... survived, and the weaker and
less resourceful ... succumbed.
Id. at 15-17 (emphasis added).
360. See Nelson, supra note 358, at 339-45.
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Second, as I have detailed elsewhere, shifts in national political cul-
ture and legislative symbols could galvanize workers' sense of entitlement
to outside unions and could to some degree delegitimate company un-
ions.361 The political elite endorsed and legitimated "industrial democ-
racy" and collective bargaining to an unprecedented degree under the
National War Labor Board and the Industrial Conferences of the World
War I years. Public political and legal affirmation of workers' right to
independent collective bargaining was even more salient between 1933
and 1937, as a result of the "Blue Eagle" campaign promoting Section
7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, the high visibility of
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and such well-publicized polit-
ical spectacles as the 1935-37 LaFollette Committee hearings on employer
anti-union practices.
Third, such shifts in political culture and legal symbolism generally
coincided with (and mutually reinforced) widespread labor unrest and
union organizing campaigns that, like downward economic shocks, con-
stituted more treacherous psychological terrain for cultivating company
union loyalties. The failed, but explosive, effort to organize industrial
unions in 1919362 and the ultimately more successful eruptions after 1933
registered in part the secular emergence of more homogeneous indus-
trial workforces during the consolidation of a mass production econ-
omy.3 63 Company unions were less likely to take root in those industries
with traditions of independent union activism and in older firms that had
developed autonomous workforce cultures of solidarity. At the same
time, as detailed below, managers established company unions in greater
numbers and with greater powers in the face of threats from organized
labor and political elites.
Finally, the ethno-demographic composition and wider cultural loy-
alties of the workforce affected workers' response to company unions.
Compared to their parents who had been reared in traditional agrarian
communities, the growing pool of second-generation immigrant workers
in the interwar years generally displayed diminishing deference to pater-
nalistic authority.3 64 The grip of patriarchal ethnic cultures was weak-
ened by a combination of forces, including the Americanization
campaigns of the post-World War I years;3 65 the accelerating encroach-
ment of mass, trans-ethnic, urban culture and consumption in the 1920s
361. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1434-39.
362. 1919 saw the greatest American strike wave to that date, involving four million
workers, or one-fifth of the labor force. Massive strikes occurred in the steel, coal, railroad,
and meat-packing industries. See Robert H. Zieger, American Workers, American Unions,
1920-1985, at 5-6 (1986).
363. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 324-55; David M. Gordon et al., Segmented Work,
Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States 100-64
(1982).
364. See Fraser, supra note 39, at 337, 340; see also Cohen, supra note 267, at 54-158.
365. See Gerstle, supra note 351, at 5-15; John Higham, Strangers in the Land:
Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925, at 242-324 (1981).
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and 1930s;366 the expansion of secondary public education among the
children of blue-collar workers;367 the unanticipated shopwide bonds that
gradually developed across ethnic groups whom employers of the 1920s
had deliberately intermixed in the hope of weakening workforce solidar-
ity;3 68 and, particularly, the dramatically new sense of mass political enti-
tlement and national citizenship begun in the Democratic Party's "Al
Smith Revolution" and consolidated by the New Deal. 369
D. The "Core" Company Unions
In light of these broader trends, the revisionist historians' thesis that
company unions represented progressive, viable modes of personnel
management applies disproportionately (although by no means exclu-
sively) to the group of employee representation schemes cultivated by
certain large, profitable firms generally in newer industries-electrical
and other machinery, chemicals and oil refining, scientific instruments,
public utilities, mass food processing, some sectors of the metal trades,
and others-during the long prosperity of the 1920s.370 These were firms
that chose to make strong organizational commitments to welfarism and
rationalized personnel administration and that typically had no substan-
tial history of outside unionism. Initiated for many reasons-to end
strikes, preempt future unionization, comply with War Labor Board de-
crees, reduce labor turnover, and boost employee morale and productiv-
ity-these "core" company unions reached maturity by 1924.371 Firms
with company unions lasting the decade numbered less than 320 and
were never more than a small percentage of all firms before 1933.372 Ap-
366. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 99-158; Gary Cross, Time and Money: The
Making of Consumer Culture 46-98, 128-53 (1993).
367. As the Lynds found in their pioneering study of Muncie, Indiana, the children of
blue-collar workers widely expected to ascend into white-collar careers through their access
to the newly expanded system of secondary education. See Robert S. Lynd & Helen M.
Lynd, Middletown 51, 68, 80-81 (1929).
368. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 267, at 163-67. Employers' deliberate effort to
break down ethnic cohesion by creating heterogeneous workforces (in which worker
communication was impeded by linguistic differences) is a reminder that not all workplace
dynamics are explained by the axiom of surplus-maximization invoked by some legal
economists. In his recent attack on antidiscrimination laws, Richard Epstein, for example
presumes that employers hire homogeneous workforces to promote productivity-
enhancing cohesion. See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against
Employment Discrimination Laws (1992). The interwar story-in which employers sought
heterogeneous workforces (presumptively) less able to work well interdependently-shows
that distributional struggle can complicate matters.
369. See the discussion and references in Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1399-1401,
1437 n.264, 1439 n.273.
370. See Harris, supra note 36, at 17; Nelson, supra note 358, at 341-57.
371. See Nelson, supra note 358, at 346.
372. Of the 421 firms with company unions in 1924, between 246 and 313 retained
company unions in 1932. These numbers are based on calculations from surveys by the
National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) in 1933 and 1925. See NICB (1933), supra
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proximately forty large firms employed eighty percent of the 1.5 million
workers in company unions that survived the 1920s.3 73
In the vanguard of core company unionism were the firms affiliated
with the secretive Special Conference Committee (SCC) assembled by as-
sociates of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in 1919.374 The ten firms of the
SCC-including such showcases of company unionism as Standard Oil of
NewJersey, Goodyear, International Harvester, General Electric, Westing-
house, and Bethlehem Steel-met monthly to discuss industrial relations
strategy. Along with Industrial Relations Counselors (the public arm of
Rockefeller's labor relations campaign), the National Industrial Confer-
ence Board (NICB), the American Management Association, and (espe-
cially after the enactment of the NIRA) the National Association of
Manufacturers, the SCC was the vehicle for disseminating the model of
company unionism pioneered by Mackenzie King, Clarence Hicks, and
Arthur Young at the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Mining and Fuel Com-
pany and Jersey Standard Oil. 75 The core company unions displayed
certain characteristic patterns in workers' subjective experience.
1. Pure Reformism. - There is ample evidence that at least the van-
guard of the core company unions provided genuine benefits, in the
sense of satisfying worker preferences that pre-existed company-union or
other company-welfare programs (the "pure reform" mechanism dis-
cussed in section IIIA). These inside unions resolved many (albeit gen-
erally minor) worker grievances, opened channels of communication and
information previously unavailable to labor and management, and, less
frequently, implemented collaborative problem-solving in work organiza-
tion and technique. The benefits were exaggerated by managerial propo-
nents of company unionism, such as the NICB,37 6 but were grudgingly
acknowledged even by its staunchest opponents,3 77 and have been con-
firmed by several careful historical case studies.
note 253, at 16; National Industrial Conference Board, The Growth of Works Councils in
the United States 10 (1925) [hereinafter NICB (1925)].
373. See Brody, supra note 38, at 60.
374. SeeJacoby, supra note 37, at 180-81; Thomas Ferguson, From Normalcy to New
Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great
Depression, 38 Int'l Org. 41, 50-64 (1984).
375. See Howard M. Gitelman, Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre: A Chapter in
American Industrial Relations 332-38 (1988); Scheinberg, supra note 271, at 214-34
(recounting role of SCC, IRC, and AMA); Ben M. Selekman & Mary Van Kleeck,
Employees' Representation in Coal Mines 9-37 (1924) (describing Colorado Coal's
prototype company union). By the end of the decade, eight of the ten SCC firms had
company unions. See Jacoby, supra note 37, at 181. The Rockefeller plan was also the
model for the more than 100 shop committees established in 1918 and 1919 by the war
labor boards. See Scheinberg, supra note 271, at 165, 178.
376. See NICB (1933), supra note 253, at 18, 40.
377. The best-documented, albeit highly anecdotal, attack on the company unions of
the 1920s conceded "the success of the companies in winning workers to the company
unions," particularly the unskilled workers abandoned by AFL craft unionism. See Dunn,
supra note 96, at 191. Similarly, even the most pro-labor, traditionalist historians of
1994]
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Daniel Nelson's study of the Goodyear Industrial Assembly and the
Leeds & Northup Cooperative Association documents how they "fulfilled
the promise of the company union movement" by, among other things,
"enlisting lower echelon employees in the operation of the finm... [,]
resolv[ing] disputes, encourag[ing] suggestions for technical improve-
ments, promot[ing] safety, and provid[ing] other concrete services."378 In-
deed, workers who later became active in the CIO acknowledged that
thousands of Goodyear workers had found the Industrial Assembly a ben-
eficial organization. 379 A case study based in part on oral histories of
Jersey Standard workers concludes that the company union there "un-
doubtedly influenced" management's understanding of worker prefer-
ences and deserved credit for increased wages and benefits,
improvements in working conditions, and grievance resolutions.380 The
inside unions at Armour and Swift gained the support of "some" substan-
tial fraction of the meatpacking workforce, which won more than half of
the grievances processed by the new entities in the early 1920s.381 After
interviewing workers at General Electric's Lynn plant in 1926, labor pro-
gressive Robert Bruere concluded that many appreciated the Works
Council's exchange of information and adjustment of grievances. 382
Oral histories indicated that Bell Telephone's company unions "held gen-
uine attractions for workers," affording them a "means of collective ex-
pression, usually on minor matters but sometimes on major ones."383
The employee representation plan at the Bethlehem Steel Pueblo Works
gained the eight-hour day several years before a large-scale public cam-
paign and unrelenting White House pressure forced the rest of the open-
shop industry to give up the twelve-hour day.38 4 Howell Harris concludes
that the progressive core of "the employee representation movement es-
company unions acknowledged their genuine benefits. See infra note 386 and
accompanying text.
378. Nelson, supra note 358, at 352; see also Daniel Nelson, American Rubber
Workers & Organized Labor, 1900-1941, at 104-10 (1988) [hereinafter Nelson, American
Rubber Workers].
379. See Nelson, American Rubber Workers, supra note 378, at 107-08; Nelson, supra
note 358, at 354 n.38.
380. Edmund R. Gray & C. Ray Gullett, Employee Representation at Standard Oil of
New Jersey: A Case Study 29 (Louisiana State Univ., College of Business Admin., Div. of
Research, Occasional Paper No. 11, 1973).
381. See James R. Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago's
Packinghouse Workers, 1894-1922, at 252-53 (1987).
382. See Robert W. Bruere, "West Lynn," Survey, Apr. 1, 1926, at 21, 21-27, 49. For a
portrait of the dark side of G.E.'s Lynn company union, see Louis Francis Budenz, Wife in
Name Only: The "Generous Electric" Drama of "East Lynn, West Lynn," Lab. Age, Jan.
1927, at 2, 2-3; Louis Francis Budenz, Genesis at West Lynn, Lab. Age, Feb. 1927, at 15,
15-17. A nuanced overall assessment of the General Electric and Westinghouse company
unions is offered in Ronald W. Schatz, The Electrical Workers: A History of Labor at
General Electric and Westinghouse 1923-60, at 41-42, 67-91 (1983).
383. John N. Schacht, The Making of Telephone Unionism 1920-1947, at 43 (1985).
384. See David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era 234, 271-75
(1960).
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tablished a justifiable reputation for offering their workers good condi-
tions, especially in terms of fringe (nonwage) benefits and the physical
work environment .... in response to workers' expressed desires."385
Even the leading traditionalist historian, Irving Bernstein, acknowledges
that benefits in grievance-handling and safety made "the company union
with all its inadequacies preferable to nothing" for many of those un-
skilled, black, or new immigrant workers "beyond the pale of the labor
movement."
3 8 6
2. Contested Trust. - There is compelling evidence that the effects of
these progressive managerial practices went beyond "pure reformism"-
that is, beyond satisfaction of workers' pre-existing preferences. Such
practices also often transformed workers' emotional and normative orien-
tation to the firm in ways that blended the various processes of hegemony
and counterhegemony conceptualized above.38 7 The Goodyear CIO ac-
tivists recalled, for example, that the Industrial Assembly generated a cul-
ture of "institutional loyalty" among thousands of company employees.3 88
"[T] he loyalty of workers to the company unions" was a "major factor" in
the steel industry's tenacious resistance to the CIO, especially among the
"Little Steel" enterprises, even after the enactment of the NLRA.38 9 In
concluding that collaborative welfare capitalism took "deep root in the
American industrial order" in the 1920s, David Brody, the foremost revi-
sionist historian, writes that those practices successfully "persuaded work-
ingmen that they were best off as wards of the employer."39 0
The effectiveness of such company-union symbols as "family factory
relations," "factory solidarity," "the Big Family,"3 91 and the "company
385. Harris, supra note 36, at 18. Sanford Jacoby's important history of personnel
policy warns against the revisionists' exaggeration of company union and welfare benefits,
see Jacoby, supra note 36, at 188-89, 198, but his subsequent case study concludes that
TRW's company union was "quite popular" at the company's main plant, despite workers'
annoyance at managerial manipulation. See Sanford M.Jacoby, Reckoning with Company
Unions: The Case of Thompson Products, 1934-1964, 43 Indus. Lab. Rel. Rev. 19, 28
(1989) [hereinafterjacoby, Thompson Products].
386. Bernstein, supra note 188, at 172-173. Other noted academic friends of
organized labor voiced similar views. A leading institutionalist labor economist, Harry
Millis, conceded that "most company unions" were not "merely obstructive organizations"
but had "positive or constructive functions of one kind or another." Millis & Montgomery,
supra note 357, at 873.
387. See supra Parts II-III.
388. Nelson, American Rubber Workers, supra note 378, at 109-10.
389. Ronald L. Filippelli, The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial Relations, in
U.S. Labor Relations, 1945-1989: Accommodation and Conflict 137, 154 (Bruce Nissen
ed., 1990); see John Bodnar, Immigration and Industrialization: Ethnicity in an American
Mill Town, 1870-1940, at 140-41 (1977); Millis & Montgomery, supra note 357, at 886 n.4
(citing the "influence and prestige achieved by employee-representation plans" as an
obstacle to CIO organizing in the steel industry).
390. Brody, supra note 38, at 78.
391. Dunn, supra note 96, at 15, 21.
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community"3 92 is explained in part by the emerging solidarities of indus-
trial workforces that AFL craft unions failed to exploit. Workers' actual
experience in the industrial workplace had begun to generate bonds of
sentiment that extended factory-wide. The insider/outsider symbolism of
company unionism appealed to those bonds, while AFL unions sought to
carve workforce sentiments into separate craft or occupational solidari-
ties. Contemporary labor progressives and other supporters of industrial
unionism expressed anguish over the emotive opening that the anachro-
nistic AFL strategy gave to the company union movement's call for "shop
solidarity" over "union solidarity."3 93 But the company union philosophy
did not just play off of existing plant-wide sentiments. The progressive
managerial strategy often aimed to win worker loyalty (and dependence)
away not only from trade unionism, but from ethnic, mass-culture, and
governmental institutions that challenged corporate paternalism and
control in the Progressive Era.3 94 A careful city-wide study documents
that interwar Chicago employers deliberately encouraged factory-wide
sentiments as a substitute for the ethnic loyalties that had underpinned
earlier union militance. Chicago employers concurrently attempted to
subordinate the newly unified workforce to the employers' authority
through the uniquely appropriate, paternalistic ideal of the "happy
family."3 95
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to say that the material benefits, rep-
resentative voice, and collaborative symbols of company unionism simply
aligned workers' interests with management-in the forms, discussed in
Parts II and III, of either legitimate "trust-building"3 96 or hegemonic
"universalization," "false legitimation," or "perceptual reframing" 397
-
392. A study of efforts by communists and civil libertarians to organize Appalachian
miners in the 1930s demonstrated the effectiveness of the deployment by coal operators of
insider/outsider symbols that blended appeals to "local blood," anti-communism, and
religious community. See John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and
Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley 110 (1980).
The Communists assumed that the militant response of the miners to economic
conditions implied an equally vehement rejection of their fundamentalist
Protestant culture. But for miners, religion was not an opiate; it was the only
form of collective organization they had been allowed for decades. Communists
were fixated on economic issues, liberals on civil liberties. Both groups held the
miners' culture in contempt. Local elites realized that the miners' interests
involved more than free speech and economic redistribution; in combatting the
outsiders, they could address local pride, fears of communism, longings for a
righteous community. The hegemony of Appalachian elites involved an appeal to
resonant cultural symbols.
Lears, supra note 208, at 585 (summarizing Gaventa).
393. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 96, at 188; Fraser, supra note 39, at 275.
394. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 162-83. Paternalistic managers consciously
designed their loyalty-promoting welfare works and social activities to undercut ethnic
community organizations and preempt government programs. See id. at 176-81.
395. Id. at 176-79.
396. See supra Part 1V.B.
397. See supra Part II.C.2.c.
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even in the vanguard firms. Brody concedes-as did company union pro-
ponents themselves, at least out of workers' earshot 398-that company
unionism in no way diminished management's formal rights of ultimate
workplace control.3 9 9 Closer examination shows the complex nature of
worker trust and ostensible interest-realignment under such paternalist
hierarchy. That complexity belies both the Board's stylized thesis of false
legitimation and the revisionist historians' claim that workers were con-
tented wards of company unions. It also reflects, more generally, the con-
tradictory and protean quality of ostensibly hegemonic ideologies.
In turning to a strategy of company unionism, a minority of progres-
sive interwar managers appealed to norms of democracy, legality, and
community precisely because those norms were entrenched in the wider
political culture and, more important, had penetrated deeply into work-
ers' and labor reformers' oppositional culture through the pervasive war-
time rhetoric of "industrial democracy."400 Management's perceived
need to deploy communitarian and democratic norms reflects the ero-
sion of the discursive and emotional force of the managerial community's
preferred mode of legitimating its own authority: appeals to market con-
sent or natural right.40 ' The belief that labor market transactions were
pervasively tainted by duress and injustice-and that workers were willing
to act militantly on such emotionally charged beliefs, particularly during
the tight wartime labor market-had spread widely enough among the
public and political elites to induce this shift in strategy.402
In 1922, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. publicly condemned the Consoli-
dated Coal Company's managers for denying
their employees all voice and share in determining their work-
ing conditions and any adequate machinery for the uncovering
and adjustment of grievances. The day has passed when such a
position can justly be maintained... in a country like ours ....
Employees in every industrial unit [have] a fundamental right,
namely, the right to representation in the determination of
those matters which affect their own interests.
40 3
398. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 213, at 73.
399. See Brody, supra note 38, at 58.
400. See generally Milton Derber, The American Idea of Industrial Democracy,
1865-1965, at 111-95 (1970); Daniel T. Rodgers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America
1850-1920, at 57-61 (1978). In 1919, Cyrus McCormick, vice-president of the Harvester
Company, wrote that
the most significant feature in labor conditions of the day is the expressed desire
of labor to share in the management of business. There is a close parallel existing
between the movement in favor of employee representation and the growth of
democratic government.... [U]ntil recent years our industrial system was ... a
benevolent despotism.
See Ozanne, supra note 306, at 119 (quoting McCormick).
401. See Bendix, supra note 35, at 267-74, 287-308.
402. See supra notes 361-362 and accompanying text.
403. Brody, supra note 38, at 55-56 (quoting Rockefeller).
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Interwar managers saw collective dealing even in the limited form of com-
pany unionism as a radical departure from a regime of absolute manage-
rial authority. They fully understood they were "engaged in a complex
struggle for moral authority, notjust a contest for power."404 Forjust that
reason, most managers angrily rejected Rockefeller's enlightened lec-
tures. They feared that even limited liberalization of the drive system
would, in the words of one Wagner adviser, "give the workmen exagger-
ated notions... of their rights."40 5 The incorporation of workers' and
reformers' oppositional norms within company union ideology is a prime
illustration of the cultural resources for immanent critique latent in os-
tensibly hegemonic ideologies.
Vividly reflecting the Pandora's Box Effect discussed above,40 6 com-
panies that invoked norms of democracy and community often found it
difficult to resist workers' escalating demands armored in those very
norms. Judge Elbert Gary of U.S. Steel blamed his own workers' 1919
strike for independent unionism on the unsettling effect of Rockefeller's
widely publicized policies.40 7 Workers could brandish managerially en-
dorsed democratic or communitarian norms in both "wars of maneuver"
aimed at achieving independent unionization and (sometimes concur-
rently) in "wars of position" aimed at incremental expansions of benefits
within the company union structure. 408 In the latter instance, workers
deployed managerial norms primarily in bargaining directed against
management itself. In the former, workers drew on those norms to rein-
force oppositional solidarity among themselves as more robust "citizens"
of the enterprise polity.
One workforce's cultural "war of position" is recounted in Gerald
Zahavi's finely textured study of the welfare capitalist program of the
Endicott Johnson shoe company.409 Zahavi shows convincingly that
Endicott workers internalized management's assiduously-promoted,
perceptual maps of the company as a "family" and participatory "commu-
nity," in which management and labor had reciprocal obligations of fair
dealing. But the company's proclaimed commitment to reciprocity and
participation enabled workers to press for expanded rights and benefits
under the banner of those newly legitimated (but vaguely defined) per-
ceptions and norms. The company feared charges of betrayal-and
worker demoralization, unrest, and independent unionization-if it vio-
404. Harris, supra note 36, at 10.
405. Sumner H. Slichter, The Turnover of Factory Labor 204 (1921).
406. See supra Part III.D.3.
407. See Scheinberg, supra note 271, at 189.
408. These categories of political combat are, of course, Gramsci's. See Gramsci,
supra note 34, at 238-39.
409. See Zahavi, supra note 39, at 99-125. Although EndicottJohnson did not have a
full-fledged employee representation plan, its panoply of welfare works included the kind
of grievance system that was the core of most company unions.
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lated its own norms; and workers knew it. Hence, the shift in normative
terrain itself altered relative bargaining power.
This well-documented example of "runaway legitimation" 4 10 is cor-
roborated by many other instances of company unionism. At Interna-
tional Harvester, employee representatives warned company officials that
if their demands were not granted, the Works Council would lose "pres-
tige" because the rank and file would feel the Council was not "worth half
what it was cracked up to be" by management.411 Harvester management
relented.412 The Goodyear Industrial Assembly surprised management
by generating an escalating number of grievances and protests. 413 Em-
ployee representatives, knowing that Goodyear management felt the
need to "keep the good will of the assembly"414 and to maintain workers'
"confidence in the organization," successfully forced management to
make concessions. 415 The president of another company was taken aback
when his own appointee's recurrent "Wilsonian speeches" to the com-
pany union set off "a number of requests for raises in wages and rather
upsetting socialistic debates."416 Such instances, of course, may also re-
flect the closely related phenomena of "whetting the appetite," "griev-
ance articulation," or "aiding collective action."417 The historical
evidence is too coarse to distinguish confidently the relative significance
of "runaway legitimation" and these other Tocqueville Effects. 418
The fluid fight between company and independent unions for the
mantle of legitimacy reflects a widespread cultural contest in the interwar
workplace-and in ideological contests more generally, as Eagleton has
articulated well: "Ideology is a realm of contestation and negotiation, in
which there is a constant busy traffic: meanings and values are stolen,
transformed, appropriated across the frontiers of different classes and
groups, surrendered, repossessed, reinflected."419 The compelling in-
sight implicit in the work of the revisionist historians is that the outcome
of neither the ideological nor instrumental interwar labor battles was pre-
determined. The symbols of an organic corporate family or democratic
410. See supra Part III.D.3.
411. Ozanne, supra note 306, at 148 (quoting employee representative).
412. See id.
413. "... Goodyear executives learned more about 'what's on the worker's mind' than
they wanted to know." Nelson, American Rubber Workers, supra note 378, at 106.
414. Id. at 107.
415. Nelson, supra note 358, at 353-54.
416. NICB (1933), supra note 253, at 26-27 (quoting unidentified company
president).
417. One careful survey, not otherwise sympathetic to company unionism, described
the multifaceted "Tocqueville Effects" of inside unions: "[T]he [grievance] machinery
established, the right specifically accorded to use it, and the assistance given by the
workers' representative have multiplied the number of grievances brought into the open-
frequently to the surprise of alert and well-disposed management." Millis & Montgomery,
supra note 357, at 877.
418. See supra Part III.D.
419. Eagleton, supra note 208, at 101.
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community were potentially powerful managerial weapons. The New
York Times, for example, was able publicly to denounce transport work-
ers who struck the Interborough Rapid Transit Company of New York
City as "outlaws" violating the "self-govemment" implemented by the
company union.420 Claims of democratic or communitarian legitimacy
pervaded the arguments of proponents of both company unionism and
independent unionism in the public media, in congressional hearings,
and in direct appeals for the loyalty of rank and file workers.42' Impor-
tant segments of the political elite-including Franklin Roosevelt, and
officials of the National Recovery Administration and the Labor Depart-
ment-assimilated the rhetoric of company union advocates. 422
Of course, the eventual legal and discursive equation of outside
unionism and "industrial democracy," and the triumph of the pejorative
term "company-dominated union" over management's preferred "em-
ployee representation plan" register the ultimate outcome in 1935 of the
ideological and political contest among political elites, workers, unions,
and employers. 423 That managerial norms of fair treatment and mutual
loyalty meant something real to workers, however, is shown by their disap-
pointment at the limits of 1920s welfare benefits, 424 and even more by
their bitter sense of betrayal by Depression-era wage and employment
cuts. 425 Indeed, the interwar cycle of trust-building and betrayal among
core firms is a paradigmatic instance of the possibility and fragility of la-
bor-management "gift-exchange," a concept I have examined else-
where.42 6 As Brody writes, "Welfare capitalism rested ultimately on
confidence in the strength of the big employers. They guaranteed the
wellbeing of their workmen, and in turn received loyalty and goodwill.
But the guarantee had not been honored."427 After the experience of
the 1930s, the empowerment of outside unionism was often necessary to
restore workers' trust that management would honor norms of fair ex-
change. 428 Ironically, the interwar norms of gift-exchange also account
in part for workers' predominant unwillingness to reject the capitalist
420. Dunn, supra note 96, at vii (quoting the New York Times).
421. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1402-03, 1412-15, 1450-61.
422. See id. at 1452-53.
423. See id.
424. See infra notes 443-446 and accompanying text.
425. Note the interrelation among "internal" affect and cognition, and "external" (i.e.
intersubjective) cultural and political contests. Workers' emotional resentment depended
on particular cognitive conceptions of just and unjust work relations, conceptions that
flowed from social discourse and practice. On the socio-cultural element in such emotions
as outrage, resentment, and indignation (if not all emotions) see Justin Oakley, Morality
and the Emotions 22-37 (1992) and the various essays collected in The Social
Construction of Emotions (Rom Harr6 ed., 1986).
426. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1485-87.
427. Brody, supra note 38, at 77.
428. See William Lazonick, Competitive Advantage On The Shop Floor 270-77
(1990); Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1491. The exceptions confirm the rule. The large
companies that remained securely nonunion after the 1935 enactment of the NLRA and
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model even during capitalism's worst crisis. Workers had seen, and still
believed, albeit ambivalently, that capitalism could have a human face.4 29
3. Hegemonic Processes to Bolster Insufficient Reform. - The core com-
pany unions therefore widely exhibited both the material incentives of
"pure reformism" and the contested trust reflected in various "Toc-
queville Effects." They also sporadically displayed other specific mecha-
nisms of hegemony, structural coercion, and resistance-often because
material reform proved insufficient or the trajectory of contested trust
spun out of control.
By far the primary material benefit that company unions provided
workers was machinery for grievance adjustment.430 Even though man-
agement, rather than third-party arbitrators, retained final "appellate" au-
thority, workers in core firms typically pressed and won a substantial
volume of individual complaints before joint labor-management bod-
ies.431 Indeed, the aggressiveness with which employee representatives in
some firms pursued individual grievances in part reflected management's
unwillingness to yield its prerogatives over larger matters of wages and
conditions.432
While management generally conceded only on minor grievances,
there is much evidence that workers often believed they had gained
something of value.43 3 The company union was in effect a mechanism by
which upper management could rein in the despotism of the "foreman's
the rise of industrial unionism were those, such as Eastman Kodak and Sears Roebuck,
which
took special pains to maintain their [elaborately paternalistic) personnel
programs during the early 1930s, that is, when unionism was in decline and other
firms at the time were cutting back in this area and weakening the authority of
their personnel departments, action that came to be resented by employees who
felt that their employers had reneged on the implicit contract inherent in the
nonunion model of the 1920s.
Sanford M.Jacoby, Norms and Cycles: The Dynamics of Nonunion Industrial Relations in
the United States, 1897-1987, in New Developments in the Labor Market 19, 34-35
(Katharine G. Abraham & Robert B. McKersie eds., 1990). Brody believes that welfare
capitalism rather than industrial unionism would have prevailed if the Depression had
ended by the winter of 1932-33 because many large paternalistic firms successfully
struggled to maintain their welfare programs until then. See Brody, supra note 38, at 71.
429. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 206-09.
430. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 43, at 70; Millis & Montgomery, supra
note 357, at 876, 881 (stating that "the settlement of grievances has been the most
generally performed function of those company unions that have really done anything").
431. In its first five years, the Bethlehem Steel company union processed almost 2,400
cases, 70% of which were decided in favor of worker grievants. See Raymond L. Hogler,
Worker Participation, Employer Anti-Unionism, and Labor Law: The Case of the Steel
Industry, 1918-1937, 7 Hofstra Lab. LJ. 1, 22 (1989) (citing John Calder, Five Years of
Employee Representation Under "The Bethlehem Plan," The Iron Age, June 14, 1923, at
1690, 1694). Similar data is provided for several other works councils in NICB (1933),
supra note 253, at 80-85; Barrett, supra note 381, at 252-53.
432. See Ozanne, supra note 306, at 132.
433. See supra notes 377-86 and accompanying text.
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empire."43 4 If management's motive in part was to check the "subop-
timizing" autonomy of the firm's lower echelons, workers were nonethe-
less beneficiaries of even incremental limits on the notoriously despised
arbitrariness and favoritism of the old "drive" system. Did this entail false
"rule of law" legitimation of managerial authority, in the sense of Thur-
man Arnold's famous broadside?
Though the notion of a "rule of law" may be the moral back-
ground of revolt, it ordinarily operates to induce acceptance of
things as they are .... From a practical point of view it is the
greatest instrument of social stability because it recognizes every
one of the yearnings of the underprivileged, and gives them a
forum in which those yearnings can achieve approval without
involving any particular action which might joggle the existing
pyramid of power.435
The Board believed that core company-union grievance procedures,
such as those of International Harvester, fit Arnold's analysis snugly:
"The elaborate machinery of appeal to the President, convocation of a
General Council, and resort to arbitration [only] upon the acquiescence
of the management serves only further to create the illusion of equality
[between workers and management]."436 Much empirical evidence-re-
cent and historical-suggests that relatively minor grievances do often act
as the trigger of union organizing drives. Interwar management's fre-
quent claim43 7 that company unions' grievance machinery served a
"safety valve" function may well be accurate to some (indeterminate) ex-
tent-particularly in light of the partial success of management's refram-
ing of workers' perceptual map of the company as a family or community,
an element of the hegemonic process of "neutralization."438
But neutralization is different from the kind of false juridico-political
legitimation 43 9 described by Arnold and the Board. That is, even if com-
pany unionism extinguished the immediate flashpoints of unionization,
there is little evidence that workers at International Harvester or else-
where mistook minor grievance resolution for either democratic legiti-
macy or substantive equality. 440 The same workers who were grateful for
434. SeeJacoby, supra note 37, at 158-61, 188-89, 244-51.
435. Thurman W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government 34-35 (1935). The view
espoused by the Board and by Arnold, of course, conveys one relatively simplistic position
in a multi-faceted debate on the cross-cutting effects of the ideology of the rule of law. For
other views, see infra note 440.
436. International Harvester, 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 348 (1936) (citation omitted).
437. See French, supra note 159, at 61-62; Jacoby, supra note 37, at 225; NICB
(1933), supra note 253, at 39; Ozanne, supra note 306, at 148.
438. See supra Part II.C.2.g.
439. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
440. The impact of the "private law" of company unionism is thus more consistent
with Mark Kelman's analysis of "rule of law" legitimation than with Arnold's and the
Board's. Kelman argues that legal formality per se is unlikely to induce a false normative
belief in the fairness or justice of substantive rules and policies, although it may induce a
false belief that rules and policies can be applied impersonally and objectively and may
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the incremental limits on foremen's discretion understood that the sup-
posed "democracy" of the Industrial Assembly, whose agenda and larger
policy decisions were fully controlled by management, was largely
hollow.4 41 They also expressed chronic dissatisfaction at their substantive
wages, conditions, and weak bargaining power.442
Indeed, the latter iron reality-the continued grinding work condi-
tions, poor wages, and job insecurity of the interwar years-posed the
greatest challenge to management's implantation of company unions.443
The modest material benefits provided by company unionism paled in
an era of heavy seasonal unemployment in many industries," 4 of slow
wage growth that lagged far behind productivity increases and behind the
wage hikes of pre-War industrial surges,445 and of foremen's persistent
resistance to the wavering constraints of rationalized personnel
management. 446
It is not surprising, therefore, that even those core firms sincerely
committed to progressive management engaged widely in "performative
dissemblance" 44 7 designed to inflate workers' perceptions of the net ben-
efits of company unionism. As virtually every historical case study and
contemporaneous management guidebook shows, employers channelled
wage increases, welfare benefits, and social activities through the com-
pany union deliberately to generate the appearance that employee repre-
sentation had achieved these gains, which management would have
granted in any event.4 48 Such dissemblance was aided by "distorted com-
convey cognitive maps that limit people's capacity to criticize legal policy. See Kelman,
supra note 65, at 262-63, 273-74, 294-95. Others, of course, in both liberal and critical
traditions, have emphasized the liberating potential of the norms embodied in the rule of
law. See, e.g., E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act 263-66
(1975). But cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86
Yale LJ. 561, 566 (1977) (reviewing E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (1975)) (denying
that the rule of law is "an unqualified human good").
441. See Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace
in the Twentieth Century 107-09 (1979); Ozanne, supra note 306, at 135-39, 142-45.
442. See Ozanne, supra note 306, at 135-39, 142-45.
443. This is not to deny that the modest material gains of the 1920s helped contain or
preempt workers' mobilization for independent unionism, even if the gains left workers
quietly dissatisfied. In part, workers' quiescence may be due to qualitative, rather than
quantitative, gains in consumption. During the 1920s, important segments of blue-collar
workers entered the mass-consumption era of indoor plumbing and electricity, home
appliances, radios and phonographs, and even automobiles. See Brody, supra note 38, at
63-64; Cohen, supra note 267, at 99-158.
444. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 185-86, 197.
445. See Brody, supra note 38, at 62-63.
446. See Jacoby, supra note 37, at 173-74, 193-95.
447. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
448. See Millis & Montgomery, supra note 357, at 881; C. Ray Gullett & Edmund R.
Gray, The Impact of Employee Representation Upon the Development of Management-
Worker Relationships in the United States, 20 Marq. Bus. Rev. 95, 97 (1976) (surveying
nine leading company unions). As discussed supra Part II.C.2.a, this dissemblance was
sometimes accompanied by elaborate shows of feigned bargaining and even strikes. Often,
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munication"449-particularly the informational asymmetry between man-
agement and employment representatives in company union meetings,
and the incentive and interaction cleavages between employee represent-
atives and the rank and file.450 By creating the appearance, especially
among new workers, that the company union was woven into the fabric of
company welfare and social activities,451 this mode of performative dis-
semblance also concorded with managements' widespread goal of "natu-
ralizing" the company union, in the sense discussed above.452
While the absolute benefits of company unionism were thus exagger-
ated, their (often quite high) 453 costs could be hidden in invisible down-
ward adjustments of the wage term. Managers, workers, and even union
advocates pervasively stated that company unions had a built-in advantage
over independent unions because workers bore no dues or other ex-
penses to gain the benefits of the inside, as opposed to outside, unions.454
Only rarely did contemporaries point out the obfuscation stemming from
the likelihood that company unions passed costs through to workers. 455
4. From Contested Trust to Structural Coercion. - Even if the perceived
net benefits achieved by company unions proper (as distinguished from
the net benefits of firms' overall welfare programs) were inflated, the to-
tal package of benefits and working conditions under welfare capitalism
generally did not satisfy the desires encouraged, in part, by the newly
trumpeted managerial norms and practices. The insufficiency of pure
reformism and the tendencies toward "runaway legitimation" and "whet-
ting the appetite" had a corrosive effect on workers' loyalty even toward
the core company unions. That corrosion was compounded, as progres-
the company unions' publications and spokespersons simply claimed credit for the
material gains.
449. See supra Part II.B.
450. See, e.g., Robert R.1L Brooks, As Steel Goes_... at 93 (1940) (recounting U.S.
Steel management's control of company union communications with rank and file, and
the increases in worker leverage that followed the opening of informational channels
between employee representatives and rank and file).
451. See International Harvester, 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 348 (1936).
452. See supra Part II.C.2.d.
453. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 358, at 352-55 (discussing high costs of maintaining
company unionism).
454. See Hearings on S. 55, supra note 58, at 27-10; Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra
note 43, at 195; Dunn, supra note 96, at 200 (concluding "it is an easy matter for the
employer to entice [the worker] with a plan whereby he is offered certain superficial
advantages without any charges or dues payments"); Schatz, supra note 382, at 40;
Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 141, at 327 ("There is a strong inducement for
employees to favor company plans because they involve little or no cost."); Note, Collective
Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section
8(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1662, 1679 (1983).
455. Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 95, at 412, reprinted in 2 Legis. Hist., supra note
47, at 1798 (testimony ofJack Larkin, employee representative in Weirton Steel company
union); Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 135, at 676, reprinted in I Legis. Hist., supra note
47, at 715 (testimony of G.L. Fullmer, employee representative in AT&T company union).
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sive managers knew,456 by the reputational spillover effects of brute coer-
cion and manipulation among the much larger group of ephemeral
company unions discussed below. A leading managerial authority and
proponent of company unionism warned, "Coercion and dominance
have no place in the inauguration or development of employee represen-
tation; and the employer who resorts to manipulation, be it ever so subtle,
not only courts disaster but helps discredit the whole movement."457
Notwithstanding such pronouncements, even "enlightened" firms re-
sorted to more blatant ideological manipulation and open intimidation
or "bribes" of representatives and the rank and file when crises erupted
from the failure of pure reformism or from setbacks in the contest for
worker trust. Indeed, the core firms expended great effort in the mid-
1920s merely overcoming the ill-will and distrust left by the employment
and wage cuts of the 1920-21 recession.458 In 1922, the NICB declared
the strategy of enlightened management vindicated, on the ground that
the rank and file were soothed by their representatives' "endorsement" of
the cuts in all but two of three hundred company unions surveyed. 459
Although inside unions' disclosure of companies' dire financial informa-
tion did mitigate workers' discontent over cuts, 460 managers nonetheless
learned to rue the delegitimating effects of such forced consent by em-
ployee representatives. 46 1 Experts thereafter advised management to fun-
nel some wage or benefit increase quickly through any newly established
company union in order to win workers' "confidence" in the organiza-
tion.462 Indeed, many firms simply abolished their inside unions after
the 1929 crash "rather than again go through the expensive and unpleas-
ant sham of getting employees to approve wage cuts." 463
More damaging perhaps than the use of company unions to "sell"
unpleasant wage and employment policies during economic downturns
was their use against strikes or threats of independent unionism. During
such confrontations, management readily reinflected the company
union's symbols of family or community to demonize the outside union
and its supporters. Those trust-building symbols-like symbols of com-
456. See Jacoby, supra note 37, at 227.
457. Burton, supra note 213, at 184.
458. See Barrett, supra note 381, at 256-57 (meatpacking); National Industrial
Conference Board, Experience with Works Councils in the United States 86 (1922)
[hereinafter NICB (1922)]; Ozanne, supra note 306, at 132-36 (farm equipment).
459. See NICB (1922), supra note 458, at 86, 99.
460. See id. at 86-101.
461. See Burton, supra note 213, at 189; Brandes, supra note 38, at 132-33. At
Harvester, employee representatives were "humiliated" by their endorsement of wage cuts
in the 1921 recession. Many were voted out in the subsequent company union election-a
'grave slap at the entire council system." Ozanne, supra note 306, at 132-36.
462. See Julian J. Aresty & Gordon S. Miller, The Technique of Arousing and
Maintaining the Interest of Foremen and Workers in Plans of Employee Representation, 6
Personnel 115, 120-21, 125 (1930); Burton, supra note 213, at 189.
463. Ozanne, supra note 306, at 145.
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munitarian loyalty in general464-were intrinsically well-suited to manage-
ment's new purpose of playing on the psychological "expurgation of the
other."465 Benign loyalty to "us" readily turned to malignant hostility to-
ward "them." The price of routinely branding independent union sup-
porters as anti-American, traitors, or communists, however, was not only
the risk of intensified polarization and turbulence in the workplace.
Again, in the fluid contest over symbols, and with the help of the New
Deal's endorsement of collective bargaining as national legislative policy,
workers were often able to realign "community" and "Americanism" with
independent-union solidarity.466
More important than management's manipulation of communitar-
ian symbols, however, was its instrumental use of the company-union in-
frastructure as the intimidating spearhead of back-to-work or anti-union
campaigns. At Harvester, for example, management required company
union representatives to go door-to-door to urge workers to break their
1919 strike, while vesting in those representatives authority to decide
which workers would get their jobs back when production resumed. 467
Management's use of the company union as a coercive apparatus gener-
ally dissipated, at least for a time, whatever fragile sentiments of trust or
approbation were previously evoked in the workers who now faced intimi-
dation. The national industrial climate of open-shop campaigns, the Red
Scare, and the "American plan" was marked by widespread employer co-
ercion-including blacklists, large corporate "security" forces and muni-
tions caches, routine use of "labor spies" planted in workforces to identify
and chill pro-union sentiment, and police enforcement of increasing
numbers of court injunctions against collective activity in the 1920s.468 In
this broader context, even management's infrequent use of a company
union as an instrument of intimidation could more than suffice to con-
firm workers' widespread initial skepticism about an "enlightened" em-
ployer's professions of mutual trust.4 69
E. The "Vulnerable" Company Unions
If workers' trust in the core company unions was fragile and often
broken, their loyalty to company unions that were formed in less propi-
tious economic and political climates was even more vulnerable. Ironi-
464. See generally Anderson, supra note 248, at 9-36, 141-54.
465. See supra Part II.C.2.f.
466. See Gerstle, supra note 351, at passim.
467. See Ozanne, supra note 306, at 124-30.
468. See Bernstein, supra note 188, at passim; William E. Forbath, Law and the
Shaping of the American Labor Movement 37-39, 59-66, 105-18 (1991); Howard
Gitelman, Perspectives on American Industrial Violence, Bus. Hist. Rev., Spring 1973, at 1,
1-23.
469. Managers almost universally reported the necessity of a gradual process of
"selling" the idea of company unionism to workers initially distrustful of managerial
motives. See NICB (1922), supra note 458, at 150-55; Aresty & Miller, supra note 462, at
118-23, 126-31.
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cally, circumstances that exacerbated workers' doubts about employers'
commitment to genuine reform often simultaneously induced manage-
ment to establish company unions that were structurally more suited to
capture by, or evolution into, independent unions. The bulk of such
"vulnerable" company unions were those established either during World
War I or after the 1933 enactment of Section 7(a) of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act.4 70 The various wartime labor boards, generally
prompted by labor unrest that threatened military production, ordered
over 150 employers to initiate shop committees.4 7 1 Employers erased al-
most all of them after the government dismantled wartime labor regula-
tion, and after organized labor suffered decisive setbacks in the 1919
strike wave and the 1920-21 recession.472
Of the company unions subsequently formed voluntarily by manage-
ment in the 1920s, many were disbanded during the first few years of the
Great Depression.473 But the passage of Section 7 (a) and the renewal of
worker militancy triggered a massive resurgence between 1933 and 1935.
The terms of Section 7 (a) broadly prohibited employer coercion and in-
terference with workers' newly declared right to collective organization.
The National Recovery Administration and the White House sided with
employers who claimed that company unionism satisfied that mandate.
In contrast, the labor boards with primary authority to interpret Section
7(a) declared a ban on-company unions that failed to show majority sup-
port in government-approved elections. The boards, however, lacked the
power to enforce that interpretation. 474 The number of workers in com-
pany unions doubled to reach roughly three million, compared with
about four-and-a-half million in autonomous unions.4 75 The Bureau of
Labor Statistics reported that company unions and outside unions to-
gether covered about half of the workforce in a survey of 15,000 firms.4 76
Some two-thirds of the company unions extant in 1935 were established
after the NIRA's passage.477
In establishing both the wartime shop committees and the NRA com-
pany unions, therefore, employers acted under the combined pressure of
government decrees and threats of independent unionism. Such histori-
cal pressures differentiated these inside entities (which traditionalist his-
torians took as their paradigm of company unionism) from the
470. 15 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1933). Section 7(a) forbade employers from interfering with
workers' rights to organize unions and engage in collective bargaining, although Congress
established no effective enforcement mechanism.
471. See NICB (1922), supra note 458, at 7, 10;John A. Fitch, Survey, May 3, 1919, at
192, 192-95.
472. See French, supra note 159, at 27; NIB (1922), supra note 458, at 5-24.
473. See supra note 463 and accompanying text.
474. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1402.
475. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 43, at 37-50;Jacoby, supra note 37, at
224, 227.
476. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 43, at 37.
477. See id. at 50.
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revisionists' core company unions in several ways.478 First, workers were
more inclined to doubt the sincerity of management's commitment to
inside unions that were established patently to avert independent unions
or government orders.4 79 Because the success of the company union ide-
ology depended so heavily on evoking a sense of mutual obligation and
trust, workers' reading of management's initial motive was crucial. Imme-
diate external pressures not only implied the untrustworthiness of man-
agement's motives, but also prevented management from gradually
"preparing" or "educating" workers to accept the company union-a pro-
cess that even progressive proponents dubbed a necessary "sell" job.4 80
Workers generally distrusted a company union when not given the oppor-
tunity to feel that they had participated in fashioning or at least endors-
ing it. 4 81
Second, in an environment where the perceived catastrophe of in-
dependent unionism loomed large, where workers were widely militant,
and where genuine material reforms were foreclosed by economic con-
straints, management was much more prone to install and operate com-
pany unions through outright intimidation and bribes.4 82 Employers
gradually standardized such structural coercion in what Remington
Rand's president called the "Mohawk Valley Formula."483 That formula
set out nine steps for defeating strikes and outside unionization. A key
step was the mobilization of loyal company union members, together with
local "Citizens' Committees," to act as the vanguard of back-to-work and
anti-union movements, as even the core company unions had done in
sporadic crises of the 1920s. Even if coercion further subverted many
workers' trust in the inside union, management hoped simultaneously to
chill open support for independent unionism and to drive an organiza-
tional wedge through its workforce.
Equally important, management hoped to gain legitimacy in arenas
outside the workplace, particularly among political elites-both to justify
the aid of state and national troops and to fend off legislative support for
478. The revisionist historians do not ignore the vulnerable company unions, but
rather emphasize the potential long-term viability of the core company unions. See, e.g.,
Nelson, supra note 358.
479. See infra notes 456-461 and accompanying text.
480. See NICB (1925), supra note 372, at 24, 170-79.
481. See generally Ordway Tead & Henry C. Metcalf, Labor Relations Under the
Recovery Act 108 (1933).
482. See, e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 43, at 78-84; Bernstein, supra
note 77, at 39-40, 101-05, 175-78, 455-68, 612-14, 740. A sample of industry studies
includes Brooks, supra note 450, at 75 (steel); Robert H. Zieger, Rebuilding the Pulp and
Paper Workers' Union, 1933-1941, at 79-80 (1984); Steve Jefferys, "Matters of Mutual
Interest": The Unionization Process at Dodge Main, 1933-1939, in On the Line: Essays in
the History of Auto Work 100, 100-128 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Stephen Meyer eds., 1989).
483. See Bernstein, supra note 77, at 478-81; Brooks, supra note 450, at 138;
Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626 (1937).
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independent unionism.484 The strategy nearly achieved the latter goal.
As already noted, even progressive elites as pivotal as top NRA and Labor
Department administrators and FDR himself were inclined to accept the
company union as part of an adequate solution to the labor question. If
not for the fervent commitment to independent unionism on the part of
Senator Wagner and the NRA labor boards, there likely would have been
no legislative ban on company unions.485 While management's strategy
of coercively deploying company unions barely misfired at the heights of
political ideology and contest, it often caused a backlash of resentment in
shopfloor culture.486 Workers felt legally and morally entitled to in-
dependent unionism after enactment of section 7(a) and the NLRA.
Managerial obstruction in the face of public ratification of their sense of
injustice fed their outrage and militance.48 7
Third, external government and union pressures forced manage-
ment to implement company unions that looked and were more like in-
dependent unions. The War Labor Board authorized shop committees
to engage in full-fledged collective bargaining during World War J.488 As
mentioned above, the AFL initially approved of this brand of company
unionism as a way-station to independent unionism.48 9 Similar expecta-
tions explain employers' rush to jettison the committees as soon as post-
war political and economic conditions permitted.490 During the struggle
for control of NRA-era company unions, the broader climate was not as
favorable to management. Mass-production workers achieved a greater
capacity for sustained militance in the 1930s and government more ag-
gressively supported the right of independent unionism. Hence, as some
managers had feared, employers' installation of more "advanced" inside
organizations often handed a logistical gift to supporters of outside un-
ions. To forestall independent unionization and palliate NRA adminis-
trators, management increasingly gave the post-1933 company unions
permission to collect dues to achieve some financial independence from
484. This motive also in part animated the core welfare-capitalist firms of the 1920s.
See NeilJ. Mitchell, The Generous Corporation: A Political Analysis of Economic Power 7
(1989) (arguing that welfare capitalists' motive in part was to gain legitimacy in
government circles).
485. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1401-03, 1410-12.
486. For example, after company unions grew "like mushrooms" in the paper
industry, a Central Labor Union organizer reported inJuly 1933 that employers' coercive
tactics "ha[d] set [the workers] on fire" and created good "morale" for outside organizing.
Zieger, supra note 482, at 79-80 & n.25.
487. On the relation between socially shaped, cognitive notions of justice and the
emotional feeling and intensity of outrage, see supra note 425.
488. See French, supra note 159, at 21, 25.
489. See supra Part III.D. The AFL's approval was also due to the government's
wartime resistance to new organizing by independent unions. Shop committees that might
later be captured by union supporters seemed a second best. Also, the AFL had not yet
experienced employers' use of shop committees as anti-union devices. See French, supra
note 159, at 27, 78-79.
490. See French, supra note 159, at 27.
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management, to hold formal membership meetings apart from joint la-
bor-management meetings, and to enroll members voluntarily rather
than as a mandatory condition of employment. 49 1
Union supporters often effectively exploited these management-cre-
ated structures, whether by progressively building them from the ground
up into more autonomous unions, by capturing them for top-down affilia-
tion with already established CIO or AFL unions, or by some combination
of the two. The potential for such conversions of NRA-era inside unions
had been twice foreshadowed. First, before employers dismantled the
wartime shop committees, workers widely elected representatives sympa-
thetic to outside unionism.492 Second, among shop crafts, telegraphers,
and clerks of the 1920s, the railroads found themselves in sporadic strug-
gles to contain rebellious company unions-tellingly, in an industry with
longstanding beachheads of independent unionism, unlike other indus-
tries of that relatively quiet decade.493 The AFL's 1919 Convention, in a
change of policy, had adopted a resolution denouncing shop committees,
at the urging of organizers who had been foiled by steel companies' effec-
tive use of inside unions.494 AFL officials nonetheless continued
throughout the 1920s to encourage activists to capture company unions
where possible. 495 Widespread attempts to convert or capture company
unions-fueled in part by Tocqueville Effects or ressentiment-began in
1933 and continued well after enactment of the NLRA in 1935, for many
employers still sought to maintain loyal enterprise unions, albeit with a
greater semblance of autonomy.49 6
Developments in bellwether industries and enterprises show that par-
ticular company-union characteristics and contingent strategies of man-
agement and workers significantly shaped the kind of independent
unionism and labor relations climate that emerged from the conversion
process. The different industrial-relations paths of major firms in the
auto industry, which had no company unions before 1933, are illustrative.
Under the spur of Section 7(a), a secret referendum among Chrysler's
employees overwhelmingly endorsed a Joint Council of fifty-three em-
ployee representatives and fifty-three managerial representatives in the
491. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 43, at 108-19, 203-04.
492. See NICB (1922), supra note 458, at 15-24.
493. See Dunn, supra note 96, at 121-49; Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 141, at
331.
494. See Resolution No. 201, Report of Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual
Convention of the American Federation of Labor (Atlantic City, 1919).
495. AFL President William Green wrote in October 1925: "Wage earners will do
themselves and industries a great service when they capture company unions and convert
them into real trade unions. The machinery of the company union offers a strategic
advantage for such tactics. Use that machinery as a basis of a real organization." William
Green, Editorial, Am. Federationist, Oct. 1925.
496. See David J. Saposs, Organizational and Procedural Changes in Employee
Representation Plans, 44J. Pol. Econ. 803 (1936).
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Dodge Main plant, which employed half of the company's 60,000
workforce.
The Joint Council helped to identify and then bring together a
sizable element of the Dodge Main plant's more articulate work-
ers. Meetings of the fifty-three elected workers' representatives
gave the different areas of the highly concentrated plant a unity
they might otherwise have had considerable difficulty establish-
ing. And in what was to serve as a model for the rights of shop
stewards, the scheme also gave the representatives time off their
work .... [and] allowed them to meet independently .... At
such a meeting the first major step to a full union organization
of the plant was taken.
... Instead of being a forum for management-labor togeth-
erness, the Chrysler works councils fostered antimanagement re-
sentment among those most actively involved .... The works
councils legitimized the articulation of collective demands, but
Chrysler management continued to deny the right to collective
bargaining.497
With the active encouragement of Father Charles E. Coughlin, the em-
ployee representatives of the Joint Council converted their organization
into an independent union, the Automobile Industrial Workers' Associa-
tion, which soon merged with the UAW.
By contrast, GM installed a weaker company union structure, with
six or seven employee representatives and no employee referendum.
GM's resistance to worker unrest remained hardnosed, whereas Chrysler
management in 1936 legitimized the dense network of shop stewards by
yielding to their strike demands. A much larger fraction of workers par-
ticipated in the factory takeovers of 1936-37 at Chrysler than at GM; and,
even against UAW urgings, the Chrysler sit-downers successfully held out
for a better deal than GM workers won. Until the late 1950s, Chrysler
workers retained much greater power than their GM counterparts in set-
ting production standards, through the strong shopfloor organization
born from the Dodge Main company union.498
497. Jefferys, supra note 482, at 108-09. The path of company and independent
unionism is described at id. and in Steve Jefferys, Management and Managed: Fifty Years
of Crisis at Chrysler (1986); Sidney Fine, The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle (1963);
Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (1969); David Gartman,
Auto Slavery- The Labor Process in the American Automobile Industry, 1897-1950 (1986);
William Serrin, The Company and the Union: The "Civilized Relationship" of the General
Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers (1973).
498. Ford did not implement company unions until 1937, after independent unions
had gained recognition at GM and Chrysler. By 1941, the now-active NLRB ruled that
Ford's imposition of company unions and other pervasive coercive activities were unfair
labor practices, and the UAW finally won representation rights in an NLRB election. See
Bernstein, supra note 77, at 740-46.
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In the steel industry prior to 1933, only Bethlehem Steel had a com-
pany union with any substantial legitimacy among its workforce.499 In the
year after the enactment of Section 7(a), under the guidance of Arthur
Young the number of steel company unions grew from seven, covering
twenty percent of the industry's workforce, to ninety-three, covering
ninety percent.500 In 1936, the CIO's newly formed Steel Workers Or-
ganizing Committee (SWOC) focused its campaign on the United States
Steel Corporation, in part because the latter employed half the industry's
workforce. Equally important, U.S. Steel's company union representa-
tives had already formed rebellious central councils in Pittsburgh,
Youngstown, Chicago, and elsewhere. In December, 1936, those councils
amalgamated into a "CIO Representatives Council" pledged to work
within the company unions to bring steelworkers into the SWOC. Phillip
Murray, chairman of the SWOC, agreed fully with a CIO field report that
concluded: "Electing real union men to the job of [company union] rep-
resentative, agitating and activising the workers to use the company
union rather than ignoring it will bring much better results. In many
cases, as shown, such tactics will result in genuine union activity."501 In
early 1937, to the astonishment of "Little Steel" executives, U.S. Steel
chairman Myron Taylor proffered his historic grant of recognition to the
CIO leadership-in part to avoid having to deal with the destabilizing
force of local bodies that had emerged from the company union re-
volt.50 2 One lasting organizational consequence of this top-down deal
was the relatively centralized, bureaucratic structure of the United Steel
Workers union.503 By contrast, the longstanding company union at Beth-
lehem Steel retained enough support to lead a successful back-to-work-
movement that helped break the SWOC campaign among "Little Steel"
in the summer of 1937-a historic setback in the CIO's fortunes. 50 4
Although the transformation to independent unionism occurred dis-
proportionately in those company unions established after the NIRA,505
499. See Bernstein, supra note 77, at 455, 479. For the contest between company
unions and the CIO in the steel industry, see generally id. at 432-98; Brooks, supra note
450, at 75-109, 130-52; Hogler, supra note 431, at 22-86.
500. See Brooks, supra note 450, at 79.
501. Bernstein, supra note 77, at 457 (quoting report of Hyman Schneid to Sidney
Hillman).
502. See id. at 468; David Brody, The Origins of Modem Steel Unionism: The SWOC
Era, in Forging a Union of Steel: Philip Murray, SWOC, and the United Steelworkers 13,
21-22 (Paul F. Clark et al. eds., 1987).
503. See Brody, supra note 502, at 21-29.
504. Bethlehem Steel was the leader of the antiunion holdouts. See Bernstein, supra
note 77, at 493-94; Brooks, supra note 450, at 134, 188, 147.
505. See Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 141, at 82. The rubber industry
provides another good illustration. Substantial, if not majority blocs of Goodyear's and
U.S. Rubber's workforces remained loyal to longstanding "core" company unions even
after enactment of the NLRA. By contrast, Firestone's company union, jerry-built in 1933,
collapsed after one year and was soon replaced by a local of the United Rubber Workers.
See Daniel Nelson, Managers and Nonunion Workers in the Rubber Industry: Union
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some of the core company unions of the 1920s also evolved into in-
dependent unions that bore the stamp of their distinctive origins. In the
early twenties, the Bell System consolidated a relatively dense pyramid of
committees and employee representatives-one for every twenty-five to
fifty members-who were elected upwards from departments, plants, and
regions.50 6 AT&T embedded this company union structure in a corpo-
rate culture saturated with symbols of company-wide worker "interdepen-
dence" and elite "public service" status. After the Supreme Court's
validation of the Wagner Act in 1937, the Bell System successfully kept
out CIO and AFL unions while granting marginally greater autonomy to
its inside committees. But Bell's company union and culture had edu-
cated workers in the need (and skills) for still greater autonomy and com-
pany-wide unity across an otherwise geographically dispersed workforce.
And Bell workers' sense of themselves as an exclusive elite fit well with
their ultimately successful strategy of building the company unions into
an aggressive, nationwide, but unaffiliated, independent union.50 7
Not all of the interwar enterprise unions ended in failure, conver-
sion, or capture after the validation of the NLRA regime. Even the NRA-
era inside unions won the support of a significant minority of workers.50 8
In NRA labor board elections of 1933-35, some twenty-five to thirty-five
percent of workers voted for company union representation-perhaps an
underestimate because outside unions were more likely to seek elections
where company unions were weaker.50 9 While Depression-era employers
were constrained in granting monetary benefits, the same "advanced"
company union structures that made tempting targets for union activists
also afforded workers greater reformist gains in grievance settlement and
Avoidance Strategies in the 1930s, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 41, 44-48 (1989). Ironically,
but consistent with the gift-exchange theory discussed supra note 428, management's
acceptance of union workplaces at Firestone and (in 1937) U.S. Rubber generated greater
labor peace and cooperation than the divisive wedge of company unionism at Goodyear.
See id. at 45, 47-48, 49.
506. For the story of Bell System labor relations, see generally Schacht, supra note
383, at passim; Schacht, supra note 353, at 5-19.
507. The Communication Workers of America, successor to the National Federation
of Telephone Workers that grew from the unification of local company unions, did not
affiliate with the CIO until 1949.
508. See Ronald L. Filippelli, The History is Missing, Almost: Phillip Murray, the
Steelworkers, and the Historians, in Forging a Union of Steel, supra note 502, at 1, 8
(noting "loyalty of a large number of steelworkers to their company unions").
509. See Emily C. Brown, Selection of Employees' Representatives, 40 Monthly Lab.
Rev. 1, 5 (1935); George S. Wheeler, Employee Elections Conducted by the NLRB, 40
Monthly Lab. Rev. 1149 (1935). Of course, the data on employees' votes for company
unions does not bear any straightforward relation to the debate over the relative force of
legitimate and illegitimate effects of company unionism. In theory, workers could have
voted for company unions by reason of either pure reform and trust-building, or
illegitimate hegemony.
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working conditions.510 Indeed some enterprise unions, although of dubi-
ous independence from management, survived against challenges by the
NLRB and by outside unions into the post-World War II period.511 These
apparently anomalous organizations-at such firms as TRW, DuPont, and
Weirton Steel-evolved quietly into one of the "union-free," collaborative
models that came to dominate the sophisticated human-resources strate-
gies of United States corporations after the 1960s.5 12
F. Some Historical and Theoretical Regularities Relevant to the New
Cooperative Workplaces
The historical accounts of company unionism reveal at least three
regularities relevant to the legal debate over current forms of workplace
collaboration.
1. The Fluidity of Workers' Subjective Experience. - The more acute his-
torians and contemporaneous analysts recognize that interwar workers'
desires, interests, and perceptions were highly plastic and multivalent.
Even apart from the kaleidoscopic "socializing" forces outside the world
of work proper-such as ethnicity, generational influences, family status,
economic well-being, religious and civic institutions, popular culture,
mass media and advertising, and political ideology--the instrumental in-
centives, communicational structures, and symbols shaped by the "private
law" of workplace rules and by the "public" regime of labor law were key
sites of contest over workers' mentality and behavior. On this general
point, the revisionist and traditionalist labor historians, as well as the pre-
and post-NLRA labor boards, agree. Workers' group "opinion," "desire,"
and "will" often appeared inchoate, tentative, and subject to sudden shifts
and cross-currents. Many close observers maintained that a given
workforce simply had nothing that could be called collective perceptions
and motivations when workplace institutions failed to afford social inter-
action and communication among workers.513 Individual workers often
exhibited multiple, seemingly inconsistent allegiances-to company
union, outside union, and employer-or suspended any commitment in
a chaotic, uncertain environment.
510. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 450, at 82 (noting that in 1934 steelworkers won
70% of grievances-41% of which addressed working conditions-processed by new
company unions).
511. See, e.g., Sanford M. Jacoby & Anil Verma, Enterprise Unions in the United
States, 31 Indus. Rel. 137, 139-43 (1992); Sanford M. Jacoby, Norms and Cycles: The
Dynamics of Nonunion Industrial Relations in the United States, 1897-1987 [hereinafter
Jacoby, Norms and Cycles], in New Developments in the Labor Market 19, 39 (Katharine
G. Abraham & Robert B. McKersie eds., 1990); Sanford M. Jacoby, Reckoning with
Company Unions: The Case of Thompson Products, 1934-1964, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 19, 19-34 (1989).
512. SeeJacoby, Norms and Cycles, supra note 511, at 39, 43-44.
513. See Millis & Montgomery, supra note 357, at 884 (concluding that workers who
meet irregularly "have developed no general view of what they really wanted"); Dunn,
supra note 96, at 180 (same); sources cited supra notes 140-41.
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Such mentalities might appear as states of irrationality, arationality,
or indifference from the point of view of a narrow rational-decision the-
ory that assumes complete and consistent preference-ordering. Workers'
subjectivity might, however, be understood in other ways. At a general
level, empirical study and everyday experience suggest that
human beings recognize in their behavior that there are limits
to personal and institutional integration in tastes. They know
that no matter how much they may be pressured both by their
own prejudices for integration and by the demands of others,
they will be left with contradictory and intermittent desires par-
tially ordered but imperfectly reconciled .... Human beings
are both proponents for preferences and observers of the pro-
cess by which their preferences are developed and acted upon.
As. observers of the process by which their beliefs have been
formed and consulted, they recognize the good sense in percep-
tual and moral modesty .... IT] hey appear to be comfortable
with an extraordinary array of unreconciled sources of legiti-
mate wants. They maintain a lack of coherence both within and
among personal desires, social demands, and moral codes.
Though they seek some consistency, they appear to see inconsis-
tency as a normal, and necessary, aspect of the development and
clarification of tastes.5 14
This abstract characteristic of human subjectivity is reflected in the many
recent ethnographies showing that individuals' expectations may be quite
unformed upon entering a new work environment and quite volatile
afterwards.515
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that people's capacity for
ambiguity and inconsistency may be especially marked in a setting of
asymmetric power and information, such as a workplace. Members of less
powerful groups may deliberately (or unconsciously) maintain ambigu-
ous preferences and perceptions as a psychological defense against those
with the apparent incentive and communicational resources to manipu-
late subordinates' preferences and perceptions.5 16 The phenomenon of
"double discourses" within hierarchies may reinforce such ambiguous
mentalities:
[A] manservant might swing with such bewildering rapidity be-
tween admiring his master and betraying withering contempt
for him that we might conclude that he held, in effect, two mu-
tually contradictory beliefs at one and the same time. The admi-
514. James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of
Choice, in Rational Choice 142, 156-57 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (citations omitted).
515. See, e.g., Fantasia, supra note 180, at 11-24, 232-33; Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories About Women and Work, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 1816-38 (1990) (amassing
empirical references on this point).
516. Cf. March, supra note 514, at 157-58 (making analogous point with respect to
asymmetries of cleverness).
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ration no doubt belongs to his "official" ideology, whereas the
contempt arises from his "practical consciousness."5 17
These are plausible grounds for Amartya Sen's proposition that the prob-
lem of inconsistent and incomplete value orderings is "particularly impor-
tant" in matters of union organizing, wage bargaining, and worker
productivity.518
One can imagine instrumental-rationalist grounds for workers' ap-
parent inchoate or inconsistent preferences. Self-interested prudence
and information-gathering may have dictated, for example, that individ-
ual workers suspend judgment or expectations-or play both sides-until
either a company union or an outside union proved its capacity both to
achieve workplace gains and to protect the workers from reprisal for their
organizational allegiance.519 But, ultimately, a parsimonious (and mani-
festly fictive) rationalist psychology seems unable to do justice to the vast
weight of reliable "thick" accounts of company union participants' subjec-
tive experience. One charismatic U.S. Steel worker, "Colonel" Fred
Bohne, was a "cantankerous old Socialist" who, according to a keen inter-
viewer, passionately believed that his support for an industry-wide com-
pany union and compulsory arbitration was equivalent to supporting the
SWOC brand of industrial unionism-even while he led the prominent
"Defense Committee" of company union loyalists against the SWOC.5 20
Many other accounts depict workers whose obsequious acquiescence in
company union activities appears just as "sincere" as their concurrent vol-
atile resentment and participation in independent unionization.521 Even
the well-documented culture of seemingly unshakable prudence and con-
servatism among immigrant steelworker communities522 did not preclude
emotive "outbursts of rebellion" in the wake of Section 7(a)'s symbolism
and of heady partial strike victories-leading occasionally to such "irra-
tional" undertakings as the doomed Little Steel strike.5 23
This historical regularity is important, at a very general theoretical
level, in legal analysis. The great potential for inconsistency, volatility,
and malleability of actors' consciousness suggests that analysts must give
careful attention to context and history in advancing propositions about
517. Eagleton, supra note 208, at 54.
518. See Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics 70 (1987).
519. In 1937, an SWOC organizer reported that the workers "give us plenty of
encouragement, but hedge onjoining .... They hesitate to stick out their necks. 'Wait till
you win the [CIO-led] auto strike. Then we'll join.'" Brooks, supra note 450, at 120.
520. See Bernstein, supra note 77, at 460-65; Brooks, supra note 450, at 91-92;
Hogler, supra note 431, at 32-33.
521. See Brooks, supra note 450, at 107; Ozanne, supra note 306, at 154; Dunn, supra
note 96, at passim.
522. See generally John Bodnar, Immigration and Industrialization: Ethnicity in an
American Mill Town, 1870-1940 (1977); Clinton Golden & Harold Ruttenberg, The
Dynamics of Industrial Democracy (1942); Charles Walker, Steeltown: An Industrial Case
History of the Conflict Between Progress and Security (1950).
523. See Brody, supra note 502, at 18.
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the impact of legal rules and institutions on subjective experience and
behavior. The economists' assumption that actors' response to legal rules
is governed by instrumental rationality, by stable, consistent, and pecuni-
ary preference rankings, and by freedom from power-based manipulation
of perception and desire is likely to be problematic in many settings.
As to the particular issue of the appropriate legal policy toward la-
bor-management cooperation, the interwar experience suggests that ana-
lysts must examine the fine-grained context and structure of the new
collaborative workplaces rather than rest on monolithic assumptions
about their wholly benign 524 or malignant 525 effect on worker subjectiv-
ity. Parts V and VII undertake such a close analysis and show that legal
rules must be finely tuned to match the nuances of alternative collabora-
tive structures in the 1990s.
2. Company Unions and Worker Subjectivity: Some General Patterns.
Against this backdrop of fluid preferences and perceptions, however, the
historical survey in sections IV.D and IV.E reveals some more concrete
regularities in the mentality of workers living through the contest be-
tween company and outside unions. Many of the processes of reform,
trust, domination, hegemony, and counterhegemony were in play among
both core and vulnerable company unions. At the very least, then, the
historical evidence contradicts the early NLRB's view that company un-
ions were monolithically hegemonic and coercive. The evidence also
reveals characteristic alignments among broad managerial strategies and
workers' cognitive or affective responses, represented in the pairings
presented in Figure 1 on the following page. The arrows in that Figure
indicate potential lines of causation or explanation among (A) broader
social forces, (B) company union practices, and (C) worker activity.
Under Interaction 1, company unions that afforded pure reforms,
egalitarian communication, and some successful forms of hegemony were
more likely to yield workers' trust, even if that trust were susceptible to
contestation, runaway legitimation, and inflamed desires that escaped
managerial control.526 Interaction 2 represents the range of worker re-
sponses to company unions that operated repressively or through forms
of hegemony likelier to provoke destabilizing perceptions and emo-
tions.527 The third Interaction captures the pattern by which company
524. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Employee Voice in Competitive Markets, Am.
Prospect, Summer 1993, at 48, 55; Charles C. Jackson, An Alternative to Unionization and
the Wholly Unorganized Shop: A Legal Basis for Sanctioning Joint Employer-Employee
Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 Syracuse L. Rev. 809, 845 (1977).
525. See, e.g., Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain
Significance of Section 8(a) (2), 27 B.C. L. Rev. 499, 515-16 (1986); Note, An Argument
AgainstJudicial Revision of Section 8(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 1662, 1679 (1980) (arguing that workers will always falsely believe that inside
entities provide something for nothing by contrast with outside unions that require dues
payments).
526. See supra notes 396-429 and accompanying text.
527. See supra notes 456-91 and accompanying text.
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unions' communicational and grievance apparatus-whether more or
less subject to managerial manipulation-could promote workers' collec-
tive action and felt grievances. The historical accounts permit at least the
broad generalization that core company unions disproportionately exhib-
ited Interaction 1, whereas vulnerable company unions disproportion-
ately displayed Interactions 2 and 3. The debate among revisionist and
traditionalist historians is fuelled to a large degree by this categorical dif-
ference, as well as by the high general degree of heterogeneity of worker
subjectivity that overlay this difference.
FIGURE 1
A. Propulsive or Mediating Historical Forces:
9 Degree of Labor Unrest and Independent Organizing
* Cultural Ascendency of Employer Legitimacy or
"Industry Democracy" among Public and Elites
* Legal and Political Decrees and Symbols
* Myriad Other Economic, Political, and Cultural Forces
B. Company Union Strategies: C. Potential Worker Responses:
1. a. pure reform > satisfaction - >
b. egalitarian communication deference
c. hegemony (+) contested trust
successful dissemblance runaway legitimation
universalization whetting the appetite




2. a. structural coercion > resignation >
b. hegemony (-): indifference/skepticism
unsuccessful dissemblance indignation
expurgation of other ressentiment
subservience polarized loyalty/disloyalty
3. a. egalitarian communication > aiding collective action
b. distorted communication grievence articulation
Like the contextual contingency of worker consciousness, these
broad dialectics suggest avenues for careful exploration of current collab-
orative workplaces. Part V shows that the new team-based workplaces rep-
licate these general patterns of authoritarianism and backlash, seduction
and acquiescence-albeit with new inflections stemming from different
contextual labor-management structures, strategies, and cultures.
3. Manipulated Representation and the Failure of Naturalization. - A
third historical regularity-providing perhaps the most important lesson
for present policy debates-lies in the difference between the rank and
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file's and employee representatives' experience under company union-
ism. Within both core and vulnerable company unions, the intensity of
all three interactional patterns depicted in Figure 1 was greater among
employee representatives than among the rank and file. This reflects the
fact that the paradigmatic company union of the interwar period was, of
course, a representational structure-unlike the widespread participatory
nature of current schemes of workplace collaboration.
Perhaps the most common finding in historical and contemporane-
ous accounts of company unions is that rank and file workers widely
exhibited indifference, resignation, quiet indignation, or simmering re-
sentment that rarely reached boiling point in the face of patently weak
and management-controlled representational schemes.5 28 Generally, in-
terwar representation plans simply had minor effects on the everyday life
of most workers-at least in the absence of exogenous crises reflected in
significant worker mobilization for independent unionism. The interwar
managerial community quickly learned that constant attention and re-
sources were often required merely to keep a representation plan
alive.529 The NICB estimated that while some 570 firms launched new
company unions between 1922 and 1932, about 390 discontinued
theirs.530 A 1923 survey concluded that because of "lack of sufficient in-
terest on the part of the employees," the "ease of [the shop committee's]
installation is equalled only by the ease of its rejection."53' A Sage Foun-
dation field study found that most of the mineworkers interviewed ex-
pressed apathy toward employee representatives they knew to be
intimidated and powerless.532 One Goodyear worker wrote that most
workers believed "the plan is of benefit only to the company, that its pur-
pose is to prevent organization, that it is partly a company advertising
stunt, and that it is intended to keep the workers satisfied as to trivialities
so they will work for less wages."535
The NLRB's assessment of the International Harvester company
union is telling. The Board, after finding that Harvester implemented
every mechanism of domination and hegemony canvassed in Part II, con-
cluded that Harvester's representation plan "create [d] in the minds of the
employees" the false belief that they were empowered "to deal with their
employer on an equal footing" and were "sufficiently content to resist the
528. See Brandes, supra note 38, at 129; Brody, supra note 38, at 60.
529. See French, supra note 159, at 55;Jacoby, supra note 37, at 187 (concluding that
personnel departments had to carefully ensure that company unions "did not fade out for
lack of interest"); NICB (1922), supra note 458, at 26-28; Aresty & Miller, supra note 172,
at 115-32.
530. See NIGB (1933), supra note 253, at 13. The failure rate was particularly high
between 1922 and 1924, when both the threat of organized labor and the "industrial
democracy" fad of the post-war years receded. See Nelson, supra note 358, at 337-38.
531. French, supra note 159, at 55.
532. See Selekman & Van Kleeck, supra note 375, at 188-94.
533. Dunn, supra note 96, at 28 (quoting letter by anonymous worker).
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appeal of an outside labor union."53 4 Yet, the Board's lengthy fact-find-
ing, confirmed by later historical research,5 35 notes that "the sum total of
the [rank and file] employees' participation in the plan" was casting a vote
for an employee representative.53 6 The election was seen either as a
'Joke" or as a "social" event because representatives presented no policy
positions and, in any event, would be allowed no contact with their
constituents after the vote.5 7 "The role of the employees as a group in
the workings of the Plan [was] thus negligible," and workers took "very
little interest in the Plan." 538 Even the leading revisionist historian con-
cludes that "[t] he vaunted employee representation plans ... were too
transparently management's creation to gain much standing in the shop
. Employee representation rarely, if ever, developed much real
meaning."53 9
I want to emphasize, nonetheless, that the various hegemonic and
counterhegemonic processes of company unionism did play out to vary-
ing degrees under varying identifiable circumstances-as presented in
the historical survey above. The overarching interwar cycle of rank and
file workers' contested trust and quiescence in the 1920s, and their felt
betrayal and explosion in the 1930s, however, owes relatively more to the
general paternalistic promises and norms of welfare capitalism, the swing
from relative prosperity to depression, and seismic political and demo-
graphic shifts, than to the effects of the representation plans per se.
If rank and file workers' attitude toward company unions proper
often tended toward chronic indifference or contained resentment, em-
ployee representatives, to the contrary, were more actively integrated into
the structure of managerial incentives and culture. They bore the brunt
and the benefits of managerial patronage, intimidation, seduction, and
informational barrages. During periods of wider militancy such as World
War I and the post-1933 years, as already noted, independent union activ-
ists frequently captured employee representative posts. But absent such
takeovers, company union representatives were drawn disproportionately
from the older, more conservative, native-born segment of the
workforce.540 The typical plan required that representatives be either
American citizens or literate in English, and that they be veteran work-
ers.541 In addition, management often used "more or less covert pres-
sure" to defeat radicals and encourage the election of loyal workers. 542
534. International Harvester, 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 348 (1936).
535. See Ozanne, supra note 306, at 156 (concluding that Harvester workers
developed a "calloused apathy, generally tinged with the bitterness of frustration, toward
the representation plans").
536. International Harvester, 2 N.L.R.B. at 328.
537. See id.
* 538. Id. at 327, 334, 348.
539. Brody, supra note 38, at 60.
540. See Brandes, supra note 38, at 133.
541. See French, supra note 159, at 40-41;Jacoby, supra note 37, at 188.
542. See Douglas, supra note 96, at 94.
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Managers and workers also widely reported that even militant work-
ers tended to become quiescent or acquiescent while serving as represent-
atives.5 43 The company union served in part as "a sort of selection agency
through which those representatives who serve the company with un-
swerving loyalty are promoted to higher positions."544 Much evidence
confirms that representatives knew they stood to gain foremen or supervi-
sory positions as a reward for being good "company men."5 45 Particularly
in the quiet 1920s, the route of individual upward mobility seemed more
promising to many ambitious shopfloor leaders than the risks of collec-
tive action.546 The seductions of promotional opportunities, status, per-
quisites, and constant "education" in management's viewpoint generally
succeeded in aggregating a loyalist cadre with which any independent
union campaign would have to contend.547
Managers understood the advantages-and workers apprehended
the consequences-of creating a workfloor leadership structure that by-
passed both the foreman's empire and the independent union activists
on the shopfloor. Direct access to workers' grievances, without the inter-
mediation of powerful foremen, helped management rationalize person-
nel administration and dampen workers' resentments against arbitrary
treatment 548 One steel industry executive, after implanting an employee
representation plan, said:
[jlust because the employee representation plans were put in to
protect us from outside unions, don't make the mistake of
thinking that that's their only value to us. We've gotten a real
education .... We ... knew nothing of the men's feeling and
grievances. The foremen would often be hardboiled with them
and pay no attention to their complaints, because the foremen
were afraid of being criticized by the superintendents and
higher executives. 549
At the same time, employee representation afforded a surveillance mech-
anism that substituted for the less effective corps of "spies" provided by
outside agencies.550 "Professional" labor spies lacked the social imbrica-
tion of longstanding shopfloor leaders and, for self-justifying motives,
543. Dunn, supra note 96, at 190; French, supra note 159, at 68; Montgomery, supra
note 41, at 456.
544. Dunn, supra note 96, at 148.
545. Accounts of company unions at Armour, Swift, International Harvester, General
Electric, Goodyear, Amoskeag Manufacturing, Lackawana Railroad, Thompson Products,
and elsewhere confirm this point. See Barrett, supra note 381, at 250-52 (meatpackers);
Ozanne, supra note 306, at 131, 151-52 (Int'l Harvester); Schatz, supra note 382, at 22 (GE
and Westinghouse); Jacoby, Thompson Products, supra note 385, at 21 (Thompson);
Dunn, supra note 96, at 26, 57, 148 (Goodyear, Amonskeag, Lackawana).
546. See Brody, supra note 38, at 57.
547. See Schatz, supra note 382, at 41-42.
548. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 172.
549. 2 Carroll R. Daugherty et al., The Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry
989-90 (1937) (quoting steel executive).
550. See Jacoby, Thompson Products, supra note 385, at 21.
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sometimes created real or fictive workforce demons.5 51 Another steel
executive reported: "There's a good chance that these employee repre-
sentation plans, if they continue to work out so well, will do away with
most or all of the necessity for [espionage], at least inside the plants."55 2
Hence, the trasformismo and infrastructural-coercion modes of domina-
tion-transmitted by the company unions through employee representa-
tives-were quite real. In addition, employee representatives
experienced, relatively more than did the rank and file, the processes of
pure reform, trust-enhancing consultation, communicational distortions,
and various modes of hegemony, including universalization, subservi-
ence, and perceptual reframing.553
Again, however, the instrumental and symbolic inducements that
were targeted at employee representatives succeeded in varying degrees,
and could misfire in all the ways already discussed-accounting for the
frequent reports of the best "company men" suddenly appearing as in-
dependent union activists and officers, or for outwardly loyal representa-
tives casting secret ballots against management positions.5 54 The most
potent form of managerial influence over representatives, after all, re-
mained the coercive threat of discharge.555 Representatives, perhaps
more than the rank and file, directly experienced the limits of company
union power, and learned the advantages of shopwide (industrial) over
craft organization.55 6 For this reason, one of the first tasks of union activ-
ists seeking to convert a company union was to become an employee rep-
resentative and publicize to the wider workforce the details of
management's manipulation and vetoes in joint committee meetings.5 57
To the extent, however, that employee representatives did "come to
regard themselves as a part of the management and its machinery,"558
rank and file employees looked on them with a mixture of respect, yearn-
ing, fear, and resentment similar to workers' feelings about management
in general.559 As discussed above, however, that mixture contained a dis-
proportionate dose of skepticism and indifference, in light of employee
representatives' relative lack of power and presence in workers' daily ex-
perience. The NLRB believed that International Harvester had success-
fully "supplied prop after prop for [its company union's] support so that
today the average employee at the plant accepts the Plan as an institution
551. One steel industry vice-president said that spies provided by "outside agencies"
were "too dumb and in order to hold their jobs usually cook up a lot of stuff.... But
you've just got to have some way to learn what's going on among the men." Brooks, supra
note 450, at 77-78 (quoting steel executive).
552. Id. at 79 (quoting steel executive).
553. See supra Parts II-III.
554. See Ozanne, supra note 306, at 135.
555. See Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 141, at 326.
556. See Schatz, supra note 382, at 85; Schacht, supra note 353.
557. See Brooks, supra note 450, at 93.
558. International Harvester, 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 327-28 (1936).
559. See Barrett, supra note 381, at 250-52.
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without any realization of the careful structure that has thus been built
.... [T]he Plan is a thing to be accepted without question."560 Even if
the Board accurately concluded that the company union was "regarded
by the employees as an integral part of plant life,"56 1 however, this would
not necessarily indicate the success of the "naturalization" mode of ideo-
logical hegemony. If workers did not question the company union,
neither did they embrace it. Effective naturalization rests on weaving rou-
tines of feeling, thought, and behavior into the texture of everyday life.
The more sophisticated proponents of company unionism realized that
occasional speeches, threats, or voting rituals would not significantly af-
fect workers' mentality. The question, rather, was how to build collabora-
tive norms "into the experience of the people which will mean the
construction of new habits ....-"5 6 2 The company union, with its weak
representative structure, did not deeply infiltrate the collective social life
of workers on the shopfloor or in their communities outside the work-
place. It was that dense collective experience "that sustained the Ameri-
can workers through the 1920's and the Depression and became a basis
for the powerful new union movement of the 1930's."5 63
The collaborative schemes of the 1980s and 1990s go beyond the
representative joint committees of interwar company unionism. The
most advanced of the new cooperative workplaces organize frontline
workers into participatory teams that penetrate, indeed constitute, both
the work process and workplace social interaction-in an era when work-
ers' community life off the job is no longer congruent with their work-
place groupings.56 Participatory team structures concurrently intensify
and qualitatively reinflect the various potential experiences of rank-and-
file domination and empowerment identified in the interwar debate over
collaborative work relations. The next Part examines this contextual
transfiguration of the specific modes of deploying and resisting work-
place power that I conceptualized in Parts II and III.
V. FLExmLE WoRK ORGANIzATIONS iN THE 1990s: NEw PossiBrrmEs FOR
PRODUcTIVrIY, DEMOCRACY, AND DOMINATION
By the 1950s, the NLRB's vigorous enforcement of Section 8(a) (2)
erased company unionism as a salient model of workplace control-and
as a central issue in labor law. Some collaborative enterprise unions in
560. International Harvester, 2 N.L.R.B. at 329, 335.
561. Id. at 329.
562. Burton, supra note 213, at 187.
563. James IR Green, The World of the Worker 102 (1980); see also David
Montgomery, Workers' Control In America 163-64 (1979) (stressing the "inextinguishable
small-group resistance of workers" in the mass unionization of 1936-37).
564. See, e.g., Ira Katznelson, City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of
Class in the United States 6-7, 193-215 (1981); Sar A. Levitan & Clifford M.Johnson, The
Changing Work Place, 473 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 116, 127 (1984).
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fact quietly survived 565 as virtually unnoticed deviants from the dominant
post-War model of adversarial collective bargaining and rule-bound, hier-
archical "internal labor markets."566 By the late 1960s, however, dra-
matic changes in the global economy began to undermine the
competitiveness of the bureaucratic systems of mass production that con-
corded with the dominant model of labor relations. The concurrent revi-
talization of the pre-existing, nonunion collaborative models and the
emergence of new forms of flexible, team-based cooperative work systems
gradually moved Section 8(a) (2) back to the center of labor law atten-
tion-so much so that the Presidential Commission on labor law reform,
appointed in 1993, is focusing much of its inquiry on that provision.
As discussed above,567 the NLRB recently reconfirmed that the
broad language of the ban on company unions covers the joint labor-
management committees and, quite possibly, many of the team structures
that are integral to the most advanced forms of the new cooperative work-
place models. In a (not necessarily self-conscious) display of "dynamic"
statutory interpretation, several circuit courts have radically reinterpreted
the language and legislative history of Section 8(a) (2) to allow such com-
mittees and teams on the ground that they represent laudable, if not in-
exorable, gains in workplace cooperation and productivity.568
Commentators widely call for the repeal of Section 8(a) (2), either out-
right or in conjunction with wider reforms aimed to restore workers' rep-
resentation in enterprise decision-making after years of declining union
density.5 69
In Parts VI and VII, I propose more thoroughgoing reform of the law
of workplace cooperation than the predominant recent proposals. My
proposals aim both to protect workers against the all-too-readily dismissed
potential for domination latent in the new cooperative workplaces, and
affirmatively to encourage the diffusion of high-productivity collaborative
models that are most likely to heighten workers' egalitarian communica-
tion and capacity for individual and group self-revision. As I argued in
Part IV, this exercise in legal revision requires a close, contextual analysis
of the interplay between particular collaborative workplace institutions
and worker subjectivity and behavior. This Part undertakes such an anal-
ysis of the emergent collaborative organizations of the 1990s.
565. See supra notes 508-12 and accompanying text.
566. The "internal labor market" is economists' oxymoronic term denoting the non-
market, management- or union-administered job classifications and promotion ladders
that spread widely in United States workplaces as a result of union and government
pressure after the 1930s. See, e.g.,Jacoby, supra note 37, at 207-85; Barenberg, supra note
31, at 1461-65.
567. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
568. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.
1982); NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1968).
569. See infra notes 832-35 and accompanying text.
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Section A surveys the recent transformations in economic enterprises
and work processes-changes that register the crisis of bureaucratic mass
production and the uneven emergence of various forms of organizational
flexibility and collaboration. The remaining sections of this Part examine
how the emergent organizational forms give new inflections to the vari-
ous specific processes of reform, domination, and opposition conceptual-
ized above in the context of the interwar youth of mass production.
Section B presents the theoretical and empirical case that self-managing
teams of fronfline workers promise potential gains in egalitarian commu-
nication and radical democracy-as well as productive efficiency and in-
novative capacity-within enterprises. Section C examines flexible team
organizations' contrary potential to exacerbate the pathologies (concep-
tualized at length in Parts II-lV) of structural coercion, distorted commu-
nication, and psychological manipulation within collaborative yet
inegalitarian work relations. Section D shows that, similar to the com-
plexities of interwar collaborative schemes analyzed above,7 0 the new co-
operative workplaces concurrently generate idiosyncratic possibilities for
heightened employee bargaining power and cultural assertion. Section E
then adduces recent compelling evidence that employees' nonpathologi-
cal team participation and their meaningful representation in higher-
level strategic decision-making are mutually reinforcing. Hence, this
Part's examination of the economic sociology and social psychology of
the new forms of workplace participation points to the broader legal pol-
icy goal of enhancing worker representation and sets the stage for my
analysis of comprehensive labor law reform in Parts VI and VII. Through-
out this Part, I indicate the political, cultural, and collective-action road-
blocks that impede diffusion of desirable workplace innovations in the
absence of robust legal revision of current market structures.
A. The Economics and Sociology of New Collaborative Work Relations
1. The Economic Context of the Emerging Flexible Organization. - The
emergence of collaborative work arrangements is one of a set of broad
changes in the international and domestic economies since the 1960s.
First, the United States has faced stiffer competition and greater volatility
in international product markets spurred by the successful export strate-
gies of Japan; the "newly industrializing countries" (NICs) of South Ko-
rea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil, and Mexico; certain sectors
in northern Italy, West Germany, and Scandinavia; and, increasingly, mul-
tinationalized enterprises throughout the industrial economies.57 ' The
challenge of new economic competitors and faster-changing markets is
intensified by decreases in the mobility-costs of goods and capital stem-
570. See supra Parts III-IV.
571. See Peter Dicken, Global Shift- The Internationalization of Economic Activity
19-43,51-58, 162-88 (2d ed. 1992); Lowell Turner, Democracy atWork: Changing World
Markets and the Future of Labor Unions 9 (1991); David B. Yoffie, Preface, in Beyond Free
Trade: Firms, Governments, and Global Competition xi-xii (David B. Yoffie ed., 1993).
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ming from advances in informational and transportation technologies
and reductions in international trade-barriers.5 72 It is true that the lion's
share of increased trade and capital flows occurs among already industri-
alized economies. Nonetheless, although labor remains relatively immo-
bile across national boundaries, the not insubstantial increment of
imports produced by workers in lower-wage countries amounts to dis-
placement or "movement" of higher-paid United States jobs within an
effectively transnational labor market.5 73
Second, new microelectronic technologies enhance the economic
feasibility of smaller-batch production runs, quicker development of new
products, and shortened product life-cycles. 574 Compared with sunk cap-
ital equipment dedicated to the large-batch output of single products in
classic mass production, programmable machinery and "snap-on" capital
goods allow more rapid changes in product design and production.575
Such "non-dedicated" technology has mutually reinforced the increasing
fragmentation of product and intermediate markets since the 1970s-
that is, markets for final goods or inputs aimed at specialty or niche
purchasers.5 76
Third, the new technologies have developed concurrently, although
not always in conjunction, with innovations in organizational design. The
trumpeted Toyota system of "lean production," for example, incorporates
flattened managerial hierarchies, just-in-time inventory systems, multi-
skilled work teams, "continuous-improvement" and zero-slack production
norms, statistical process control to ensure quality, and collaborative net-
works of input suppliers and dealers.577 That system has diffused over-
seas from its Japanese origins in the 1950s, albeit unevenly in the face of
the managerial conformism characteristic of mass production bureaucra-
cies, the inertia of political institutions sustained by constituents of the
old economic order, and various other cultural and collective-action im-
pediments discussed below.5 78 As a result of the spread of lean produc-
572. See David E. Bloom & Adi Brender, Labor and the Emerging World Economy
1-2 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4266, 1993).
573. See id. at 3-4.
574. "[S]hortening product-development cycles" was the top priority given in a poll of
approximately 400 CEOs in 1990. See N.R. Kleinfield, How 'Strykeforce' Beat the Clock,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1990, at D1, D6.
575. See Jill Rubery et al., Flexibility, Marketing and the Organisation of Production,
12 Lab. & Soc'y 131, 141 (1987); Charles Sabel, Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open
Labor Markets: Some Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in
a Volatile Economy, in Social Theory for a Changing Society 23, 35-36 (Pierre Bourdieu &
James S. Coleman eds., 1991).
576. See Piore & Sabel, supra note 109, at 184-90.
577. See Michael A. Cusumano, TheJapanese Automobile Industry: Technology and
Management at Nissan and Toyota 262-384 (1985); Yasuhiro Monden, Toyota Production
System (1983);James P. Womack et al., The Machine That Changed the World (1990).
578. On managerial conformism in hierarchical enterprises, see Larry Hirschhorn,
Managing in the New Team Environment 7-13 (1991); Howard Schwartz, On the
Psychodynamics of Organizational Totalitarianism, 42 J. Mgmt. 24, 24-28 (1987). For a
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tion, well-specified job classifications and seniority-based career ladders-
so-called internal labor markets 57 9-are crumbling at an accelerating
rate.5
80
Increasingly blurred boundaries within and between firms reinforce
the gutting of internal labor markets. A recent MIT study concludes that
fluid networks of simultaneously competitive and collaborative enter-
prises are "spreading rapidly."58 ' Such networks are better able than rig-
idly bounded individual firms to nurture and redeploy the versatile know-
how necessary to respond quickly to volatile markets.5 8 2 Enterprises that
may appear externally to be consolidated organizational behemoths are
increasingly composed internally of networks of decentralized business
units and teams. While advanced information technology allows enter-
prise networks to take geographically far-flung "virtual" forms, there are
many instances of regional industrial districts in which local public and
private institutions provide various tangible and intangible public goods
that nurture agglomerated networks of firms.58 3 As discussed below,58 4
although the empirical magnitude of these changes to date is difficult to
assess, they have penetrated a wide range of blue and white collar occupa-
tions; manufacturing, service, and transportation enterprises; assembly,
continuous-process, and small-batch technologies; and private and public
sector workplaces.
survey of the influence of differing political institutions on the spread of new
organizational forms, see the essays in Bargaining For Change: Union Politics in North
America and Europe (Miriam Golden &Jonas Pontusson eds., 1992).
579. The dissolution of such hierarchically administered bureaucratic career ladders
highlights the oxymoronic quality of the economists' phrase "internal labor market,"
discussed supra note 566.
580. See Peter B. Doeringer et al., Turbulence in the American Workplace 15-102
(1991); Texas Interfaith Educ. Fund, Every Step Seems Down: The Chaos of Labor Market
Entry and Promotion 20-60 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
581. See Michael L. Gerlach & James R. Lincoln, The Organization of Business
Networks in the United States andJapan, in Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form,
and Action 491, 495-96 (Nitin Nohria & Robert G. Eccles eds., 1992); Martin Kenney &
Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production: Production and the Labor Process inJapan, 16
Pol. & Soc'y 121, 135-38 (1988); Michael S. S. Morton, Introduction, in The Corporation
of the 1 990s: Information Technology and Organizational Transformation 3, 14 (Michael
S. S. Morton ed., 1991).
582. See Giovanna Ricoveri et al., Labour and Social Conditions in Italian Industrial
Districts, 16 Lab. & Soc'y 57, 57-86 (1991);JulioJ. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, Interfirm
Competition and Collaboration, in The Corporation of the 1990s: Information
Technology and Organizational Transformation, supra note 581, at 95, 95-120; Charles F.
Sabel, Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies, in Reversing
Industrial Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and Her Competitors 17,
passim (Paul Hirst &Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1989).
583. See Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring
17-19, 236-50 (1990); Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 154-57
(1990); Kenney & Florida, supra note 581, at 145; Sabel, supra note 582.
584. See infta Parts V.E, VII.C.5.b.
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For purposes of labor law reform, it is useful to distinguish four fac-
ets of the generic "flexibility" attributed to the emergent organizational
paradigm: (1) flexible boundaries of firms and networks of firms; (2)
flexible technology, product design, and production set-up; (3) flexible
"external" labor markets reflecting weakened centralized union bargain-
ing, dissolution of internal job ladders, and increased mobility of employ-
ees across firms as a result of downsizing, the removal of layers of
organizational hierarchy, and the fluidity of enterprise boundaries; and
(4) flexible "internal" work arrangements on the factory or office floor
(or, increasingly, "on" the intra- or inter-firm electronic network)-that
is, the displacement of job classifications and work rules by an "ad-
hocracy" of teamwork assignments for day-to-day production, design,
purchasing, marketing, and special projects.
Labor law commentators have tended to focus on the jurisprudence
directly bearing on the fourth form of flexibility-collaboration in work
relations and organizational decision-making. This is understandable in
light of the glaring statutory blockage to unilateral managerial implemen-
tation of such relations-NLRA Section 8(a) (2)-and the tempting ease
of its surgical excision. Although I shall argue in Parts VI and VII that all
four forms of flexibility are directly relevant to the design of a desirable
new labor law regime, my inquiry in this Part begins with the immediate
problem raised by Section 8(a) (2). In turning to the economics and soci-
ology of collaborative work relations, my primary focus is on their most
advanced form-workplaces based on self-managing work teams, which
are often combined with joint labor-management representative commit-
tees. These workplaces hold the greatest promise and peril to which legal
reformers should attend.
2. From Mass-Production Work Groups to Flexible Teams.
If there is one undisputed finding of industrial sociology, it is
this: In every known society in which the division of labor is not
fixed by custom, workers doing related tasks attempt to gain
control over their workplace. This struggle for autonomy con-
cerns every aspect of productive activity .... The written and
unwritten rules of the contest for power between, on the one
hand, the work group and, on the other, its superiors, subordi-
nates, and confederates at other work sites constitute a system of
shop-floor control.58 5
The empirical literature on interwar workplaces canvassed in Part IV
supports the general proposition that subordinate groups-in workplaces
and other authority relations-typically develop "unofficial," often oppo-
sitional, cultures that deviate from the "official" norms pronounced by
managers or other elite groups. A primary source of such unofficial cul-
ture in the workplace is the interaction within and among informal work
585. Piore & Sabel, supra note 109, at 111.
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groups.586 Such groups, we have seen, were key intersubjective building
blocks for the mass unionization of the 1930s and 1940s. 58 7 Whether or
not they erupted in such formal collective organizing, informal work
groups historically played a critical regulative role at the base of mass-
production (or, for that matter, small-batch-production) pyramids.
Workplace ethnographies almost universally uncover the web of work
groups' informal norms and sanctions developed to influence the pace
and manner of work.58 8 The father of "scientific management" at the
turn of the century, Frederick Winslow Taylor, and many production en-
gineers after him, believed that management, by diminishing workers'
skills and decomposing job tasks, could weaken work groups' cohesion
and powers of resistance. 58 9 Interwar managers found, however, that the
homogenization of semiskilled mass-production workers created new
commonalities of interest around which irrepressible work-group social
life coalesced.59 0
After the 1930s, the "human relations" school led by Elton Mayo and
his colleagues sought strategies not to extinguish work-group life but to
align group sentiment with managerial goals.-5 9 As labor relations hard-
ened into shopfloor adversarialism after World War II, industrial sociolo-
gists attempted to "predict and control" workforce volatility through
study of the technological, organizational, and intra-group factors that
accounted for the behavioral patterns of different work groups.592
Whereas some radical students of labor process in the 1970s sought to
document a continued managerial-control strategy of "deskilling" factory
586. For studies confirming this proposition across a wide range of social science
methodologies, see sources cited in Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1467 n.375. Other legal
scholars have noted the importance of informal work groups in other jurisprudential
contexts. See, e.g., James B. Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The
Causes and Functions of Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 751, 776-92 (1973)
(examining implications of work groups for law of unauthorized strikes); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale LJ. 1509, 1567-68
(1981) (arguing that law of grievance arbitration aimed to weaken workplace groups).
587. See supra note 563 and accompanying text.
588. A seminal study is Stanley B. Mathewson, Restriction of Output Among
Unorganized Workers (1931).
589. See Curt Tausky, Work Organizations 184 (1978).
590. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 291-368; Gordon et al., supra note 363, at 112-62.
591. See Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization passim
(1933); Fritz Jules Roethlisberger & William J. Dickson, Management and the Worker
passim (1939); T. North Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society 80 (1936).
592. Leonard Sayles' classic study, whose sub-title suggests its managerial viewpoint,
attempted to identify social and technological variables accounting for the behavior of four
different types of work groups: "apathetic," "erratic," "strategic," and "conservative."
Leonard R. Sayles, Behavior of Industrial Work Groups: Prediction and Control 7-118
(1958). In tune with post-structuralist theory, more recent ethnographies stress the local
contingency and path-dependence of work-group culture and action-but still weave more
generalizable aspects of work process and structure into the idiosyncratic narratives of
group history. See, e.g., Fantasia, supra note 180, at 3-24, 180-225.
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and office labor,593 other radical sociologists believed that the "rank and
file rebellion" of the 1960s and early 1970s rested in part on the reconsti-
tution of informal work communities after their disruption by World War
II and the Korean War.594 Indeed, the most careful ethnographies of
that time showed that the culture of workplace social groups frequently
retained sufficient resilience to override even deep-rooted ethnic, racial,
and neighborhood affiliations formed outside the workplace.5 95 Some
left scholars celebrated the "spontaneism" of work-group militance
outside the bounds of "bureaucratic" arbitral procedure, although recent
historical studies show convincingly that the protective umbrella of con-
tractual arbitration actually expanded the space for workers' shopfloor
activism 596 -an important lesson influencing my labor law reform pro-
posals in Part VII. In any event, the tenacity of relatively autonomous
work-floor communities is a testament-in the terminology, if not the
substantive conclusions, of the Frankfurt School-to the persistence of
centers of "lifeworlds" of egalitarian communication even within the
quintessential "instrumental-rationality" of bureaucratic mass
production. 597
At the same time, beginning in the 1950s, organizational experi-
ments in deliberately designed, formal work teams emerged out of the
human relations tradition. Mayo had earlier sought to achieve work-
group commitment to organizational goals without substantial redistribu-
tion of authority in the enterprise, through such means as personal coun-
593. The most celebrated such study is Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly
Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (1974). See also the papers
collected in Case Studies on the Labor Process (Andrew Zimbalist ed., 1979) (developing
Braverman's thesis in empirical case studies of several jobs and industries).
594. See Stan Weir, The Informal Work Group, in Rank and File: Personal Histories
by Working-Class Organizers 177, 177-200 (Alice Lynd & Staughton Lynd eds., 1973).
Although there was much academic debate over whether Braverman's deskilling thesis
adequately captured ongoing workplace trends in the 1970s, his thesis did not necessarily
contradict the claim about work group revival, as the interwar experience of deskilled but
militant work groups shows. Of course, as in the 1930s, political, cultural, and
demographic forces outside the workplace in the early 1970s galvanized work groups on
the shop floor. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1434-39 & n.273; infra notes 638-644
and accompanying text.
595. See, e.g., William Kornblum, Blue Collar Community 43-47, 57-59 (1974)
(exploring relation between workplace and nonworkplace cultures in case study of
Chicago steel plant).
596. See Steven Tolliday & Jonathan Zeitlin, Shop-Floor Bargaining, Contract
Unionism and Job Control: An Anglo-American Comparison, in Between Fordism and
Flexibility: The Automobile Industry and Its Workers 99, 99-113 (Steven Tolliday &
Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1992); cf. Jefferys, supra note 482, at 120-21 (reaching same
conclusion in study of Chrysler in 1940s and 1950s). In this respect, the new historical
research confirms sociological studies of post-war shopfloor politics. See Neil W.
Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control 89-128 (1948); James W.
Kuhn, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement: The Power of Industrial Work Groups 174-76
(1961).
597. See Habermas, Communicative Action, supra note 121, at 13, 72, 339-65.
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selling and increased personal contact between superiors and
subordinates.598 The progenitors of the most notable early experiments
in self-managing teams-at several British collieries between 1949 and
1958,599 at a General Foods plant in Topeka beginning in 1968,600 and at
Volvo's Kalmar facility in 19746 01-had more democratic and empower-
ing aspirations. Two pioneering schools of group psychology converged
in this new "sociotechnical" model-the Gestalt "group dynamics" of Kurt
Lewin,60 2 and the object-relations approach to psychoanalysis based at
London's Tavistock Institute of Human Relations.6 03
These isolated experiments in team-based workplaces were eclipsed
in the United States by less dramatic forms of "employee involvement"
within the "Quality of Work Life" (QWL) movement of the 1970s and
early 1980s. Management and government launched that movement in
response to the employee unrest of the early 1970s and to the by-then
undeniable challenge of high-performance international competitors,
particularly Japan. The most widespread innovations weakly emulated
the Japanese through "parallel" personnel practices that required no fun-
damental organizational redesign: "quality circles" which typically
brought together work groups for weekly one-hour discussion sessions;
ad hoc "cross-functional" groups to address specific problems; and
worker survey or suggestion campaigns.60 4 After the severe recession of
1979-82, however, United States management and unions in core indus-
tries increasingly turned to deeper organizational reforms, including the
various Japanese "lean" production methods noted above; "Total Quality
Management" programs (reimported from the Japanese, who had them-
selves adapted the quality systems of United States production practices
598. See Bendix, supra note 35, at 317-25.
599. See E.L. Trist et al., Organizational Choice (1963).
600. See Richard E. Walton, Work Innovations at Topeka: After Six Years, 13 J.
Applied Behav. Sci. 422, 422-33 (1977).
601. See Christian Berggren, Alternatives To Lean Production: Work Organization in
the Swedish Auto Industry 118-29 (1992).
602. See Kurt Lewin, Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in
Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change, 1 Hum. Relations 5 (1947); Kurt
Lewin, Frontiers in Group Dynamics: II. Channels of Group Life; Social Planning and
Action Research, 1 Hum. Relations 143 (1947). Lewin's original democratic vision was
deflected toward the less worker-empowering "theory Y" model of positive managerial
motivation developed by his influential student Douglas McGregor. See generally Douglas
McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (1960).
603. See generally W.R. Bion, Experiences in Groups (1961); Fred E. Emery, The
Emergence of a New Paradigm of Work (1978); Eric Trist, The Evolution of Socio-
Technical Systems: A Conceptual Framework and an Action Research Program (1981).
604. See Robert E. Cole, Strategies For Learning- Small-Group Activities in American,
Japanese, and Swedish Industry 85-86, 100-79 (1989); Edward E. Lawler III et al.,
Employee Involvement in America: A Study of Contemporary Practice (1989).
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in World War II); and self-managing teams embedded in organizations
designed and run by joint labor-management committees. 60 5
General Motors had implemented operating teams in nonunion
plants during its "southern strategy" in the 1960s and 1970s.60 6 By 1982,
the UAW won representation rights at those plants; and, a year later, ten
GM plants were unionized, team-based organizations.607 The perceived
breakthrough, however, was the economic success of the joint GM-Toyota
NUMMI plant-New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.-which opened
in 1984 in Fremont, California.60 8 In 1982, GM had closed the Fremont
assembly facility, an exemplar of adversarial, mass production labor rela-
tions. The plant was a model of authoritarian supervision, hundreds of
narrowjob classifications, a militant workforce performing at perfunctory
levels, and high rates of absenteeism, drug and alcohol abuse, and griev-
ance-filing.609 By 1986-after two years of operation with a multi-skilled
team structure, one job classification for production workers and two for
skilled workers, just-in-time inventory, and intensive training in kaizen
(the Japanese term for continuous improvement in production meth-
ods) -the still-unionized plant virtually matched Japanese efficiency and
quality standards.610 Elected team leaders and union coordinators used a
problem-solving system that encouraged shopfloor consultation and con-
sensus-building. As a result, grievance and absentee rates plummeted.
Significantly, this high-visibility success in flexible team reorganization oc-
curred at a relatively low-tech facility employing workers reared in the old
'Job control" unionism. 611 Meanwhile, the productivity of GM's new
highly automated, capital-intensive showcase plants, which failed cleanly
to break with the old organizational paradigm, was very poor by compari-
son-a result consistent with econometric analysis of a large, interna-
tional sample of auto plants.612
605. See Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, High-Performance Work Systems:
American Models of Workplace Transformation 12-17 (1993); Stephen Hill, Why Quality
Circles Failed but Total Quality Management Might Succeed, 29 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 541
(1991).
606. See Harry C. Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S.
Automobile Industry 88-89 (1985).
607. See id. at 88-90.
608. See Toshihiro Nishiguchi, Good Management Is Good Management-The
Japanization of the U.S. Auto Industry, JAMA F., Apr. 1989, at 3, 3-7.
609. See Turner, supra note 571, at 54.
610. See Womack et al., supra note 577, at 83.
611. With the same plant, technology, workforce, and union, the reorganized
NUMMI reduced labor hours per vehicle produced by 40%. See Clair Brown & Michael
Reich, When Does Union-Management Cooperation Work? A Look at NUMMI and GM-
Van Nuys, Cal. Mgmt. Rev., Summer 1989, at 26, 26-37.
612. See Turner, supra note 571, at 70-71; Paul Osterman, Impact of IT on jobs and
Skills, in The Corporation of the 1990s, supra note 581, at 220, 224-26. Other recent
empirical studies confirm that the success of firms today generally turns more on purely
organizational routines and innovations than on technology and capital investment. See,
e.g., Kim B. Clark & Takahiro Fujimoto, Product Development Performance: Strategy,
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The culmination of the team model in the auto industry is the GM-
UAW Saturn plant that began production in Tennessee in 1991. A large
"diagonal slice" team-about a hundred labor and management repre-
sentatives selected from across organizational levels at existing plants-
designed Saturn's social and technological system. The plant is operated
by self-managing shopfloor teams and joint union-management commit-
tees at all levels, including the highest level of strategic financial and tech-
nological planning.613
Concurrently, other organizations that similarly combine par-
ticipatory production teams and representative labor-management strate-
gic committees have flourished in both manufacturing and service
enterprises and across a range of technologies-from assembly line, con-
tinuous-process, and small-batch production, to customer- and human-
services provision-in both the private and public sectors. 614 Prominent
examples include Xerox's complex in Webster, New York;6 15 Corning's
catalytic converter plant in West Virginia and its specialty ceramics plant
and white-collar Administrative Center in New York;616 Ford's new engine
plant in Romeo, Michigan;6 17 LTV'S electro-galvanizing facility in Cleve-
land;6 18 and the Bureau of Motor Equipment in New York City's Sanita-
tion Department. 619 As discussed below, it is no accident that the most
effective team plants are typically unionized operations.620
Organization and Management in the World Auto Industry (1991); David A.- Garvin,
Managing Quality: The Strategic and Competitive Edge (1988) (comparing air-
conditioner manufacturers).
613. See Richard G. Lefauve & Arnoldo C. Hax, Managerial and Technological
Innovations at Saturn Corporation 8, 8-19 (Sloan Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper No. 3418-
92B5, 1992); Saul Rubinstein et al., The Saturn Partnership: Co-Management and the
Reinvention of the Local Union, in Employee Representation: Alternatives and Future
Directions 339 passim (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
614. Case studies of self-managing teams in human services, customer services, and
manufacturing are collected in Groups That Work (and Those That Don't) 289-478 (J.
Richard Hackman ed., 1990); see alsoJon R. Katzenbach & Douglas K. Smith, The Wisdom
of Teams: Creating the High-Performance Organization (1993) (examining self-managing
teams in 53 different organizational settings).
615. See A Fighting Chance: New Strategies to Save Jobs and Reduce Costs 13-32
(Sally Klingel & Ann Martin eds., 1988); Peter Lazes et al., Xerox and the ACTWU: Using
Labor-Management Teams to Remain Competitive, 10 Nat'l Productivity Rev. 339 (1991).
616. See Barry Bluestone & Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future: A Labor
Perspective on American Business 175 (1992); Barbara P. Noble, Getting a Grip on Paper
Pushing, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1993, § 3, at 25.
617. See Bluestone & Bluestone, supra note 616, at 176-77.
618. See Frank 0. Altimore et al., LS Electro-Galvanizing Company, Cleveland, Ohio,
in The Future of Labor-Management Innovation in the United States 68 (James A.
Auerbach &Jerome T. Barrett eds., 1993).
619. See David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector 250-67 (1992); Ronald Contino,
N.Y. Sanitation Shops Rival Private-Firm Performance, 12 Work in Am. 1, passim (1987);
Ronald Contino, Employee Participation: The Blue Collar Edge, Pub. Works,June 1987, at
81, 81-109.
620. See infra Part V.E.
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There are no hard figures on the number of enterprises using decen-
tralized team/joint committee systems. A 1990 survey of Fortune 1000
firms found that forty-seven percent used self-managing teams-a sixty-
eight percent increase in only three years-but only ten percent applied
them to more than twenty percent of their workforce. 621 Later surveys
reach varying results. One concludes that forty-one percent of firms
make "extensive" use of teams;622 another that only thirteen percent of
U.S. employers use "high-performance work systems that deemphasize hi-
erarchy and emphasize collaboration and teamwork." 623 Although there
is uncertainty about the number of formalized team organizations, firm
evidence confirms the widespread, continuing breakdown of the internal,
bureaucratic job ladders which much recent legal commentary has as-
sumed to be the stable paradigm of workplace relations.624
Management's articulated economic purpose for the new work teams
is remarkably similar to the aspirations of the human-relations and,
indeed, the company-union movements of the interwar years: to align
work-group sentiment with managerial goals. At the same time, the al-
tered structure and norms of the teams within a decentralized and con-
sultative organization promise a greater measure of worker participation
in setting those goals. These concurrent aspirations for team-based orga-
nizations account for the controversy over whether they manipulate or
empower workers. That controversy, I shall argue, is realistically rooted
in the varying practical implementations of the team ideal and should be.
taken seriously in designing a revamped legal regime.
B. The Promise of Self-Managing Teams
1. The Instrumental Economic Advantages of Team Organization. - The
theoretical and empirical case for the instrumental efficiency of team-
based, flexible organizations in the current economic environment is
strong. The volatility of markets and attendant premium on rapid prod-
uct development encourage an integration of design and production en-
gineering. Multi-skilled work teams are efficiency-enhancing for the
same reasons. First, the blurring of product design and production en-
tails the integration of significant "residual industrial engineering tasks"
into the work process itself.625 The classic Taylorist division of labor-in
621. See Edward E. Lawler III et al., Employee Involvement and Total Quality
Management: Practices and Results in Fortune 1000 Companies 28-29 (1992).
622. See Paul Osterman, How Common is Workplace Transformation? (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
623. See Anthony P. Carnevale, What Training Means in an Election Year, Training &
Dev., Oct. 1992, at 45, 48.
624. On the dissolution of internal labor markets, see supra notes 579-584 and
accompanying text. For a summary of the legal commentary that sees such internal
markets as the Darwinian victor in the struggle for survival among workplace governance
modes, see Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1462-65.
625. Sabel, supra note 575, at 29; see also Janice A. Klein, The Human Costs of
Manufacturing Reform, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 60, 65 (describing how
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which management conceives the production process and workers
mechanically execute it-hinders shortened product life-cycles and quick
product development. Flexible work teams, as repositories of both a mul-
tiplicity of production skills and a wider knowledge of the entire techno-
organizational system,6 26 are the human capital equivalent of non-
dedicated physical capital.
Second, the flexible team enables the firm to shed specialized lateral
support staff (so-called "indirect" labor) because work-flow design, set-up,
task assignment, training, inventory control, maintenance, and, espe-
cially, quality control-are built into team responsibilities. 627 In its fullest
forms, the self-managing team takes on personnel selection, discipline,
and compensation, as well as budgeting, purchasing, and customer-rela-
tions tasks. Because these functions are at least to some degree interre-
lated with (or "joint outputs" of) basic production activities, folding them
into team responsibilities represents a net savings, not simply a rearrange-
ment, of labor inputs. And because task assignment among workers is
not constrained by narrow job classification, work allocation can more
flexibly adapt to changing production needs.6 28
Indeed, the de-Taylorization of teamwork has similar consequences
for vertical staff requirements. In a sense, the Taylorist decomposition of
the work process into small tasks in part creates the need for a distinct
supervisory agent to coordinate, monitor, and sanction task perform-
ance.6 29 Thus, just as quality control becomes ajoint output of the flexi-
ble teams' simultaneous work-design, production, and self-feedback
functions, so too does supervision and monitoring.6 30 So-called "mutual
monitoring" among team members, all of whom are jointly responsible
shopfloor workers "essentially become industrial engineers" in team planning of work
processes at joint GM-Toyota venture); Benjamin Whipple, Organizing for Team-Based
Manufacturing: Information, Technology, and Organizational Learning (1993)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, MIT Sloan School of Management).
626. See, e.g., Kenney & Florida, supra note 581, at 121, 133.
627. See Knuth Dohse et al., From "Fordism" to "Toyotism"? The Social Organization
of the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 14 Pol. & Soc'y 115, 120, 130
(1985).
628. See Turner, supra note 571, at 44, 58.
629. This is the case at least when workers can effectively (and more cheaply)
mutually monitor one another in interdependent, high-discretion work processes, or when
workers can individually internalize work discipline.
630. For a theoretical statement of the idea of mutual monitoring as ajoint output of
work activity, see Louis Putterman, On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires
Labor, 22 Econ. Inquiry 171, 173-74 (1984). The joint-output phenomenon helps to
combat the problem, identified by collective-action theory, of recursion in overcoming
free-riding by individuals. That is, the individual members of a group can "solve" the free-
rider problem of individual shirking by monitoring and sanctioning each other. But this
creates a "second-order" free-rider problem: why should individual members absorb the
potentially high social and psychic costs of sanctioning their peers? That mutual
monitoring is a low-cost or costiess by-product of work activity is a possible answer. SeeJon




for output and quality, is reinforced by the combination of group-based
and individual merit pay incentives implemented widely in team
plants. 63 1 Indeed, such monitoring not only replaces, but may be more
effective than, supervisory monitoring. Subtle information about poten-
tial work effort is unknown to supervisors who do not themselves do the
work and whose sporadic observations of work performance are distorted
by workers' awareness of surveillance. 63 2
Finally, by formalizing work-team communication and rewarding in-
dividuals' and teams' "continuous improvement" and cooperation in pro-
duction methods, the team organization induces front-line workers to
reveal the idiosyncratic know-how traditionally hidden from supervisors.
In authoritarian workplaces, information-hoarding by informal work
groups is a crucial element both of resistance to managerial attempts to
intensify work pace and erode piece-work rates and of workers' general
capacity to withhold cooperation in skirmishes with supervisors over
shopfloor grievances. 633 The team organization (with appropriate com-
pensation incentives and employment security assurances) 63 4 tends to di-
minish the incentive for value-adding information to remain "impacted"
in groups.63 5 The team organization's combination of broadened worker
knowledge and diminished information-impacting may be particularly
significant in continuous-process technologies that are "robust" in terms
of throughput but "fragile" in terms of the catastrophic safety or eco-
631. See David I. Levine and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and
the Firm's Environment, in Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence 183, 187,
209-11 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990); Dohse et al., supra note 627, at 136-37; Louis
Putterman, Some Behavioral Perspectives on the Dominance of Hierarchical Over
Democratic Forms of Enterprise, 3J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 139, 146 (1982). Compensation
systems in team workplaces also often have a pay-for-knowledge component to encourage
the multiplication of team member skills and broader organizational know-how. See
Edward E. Lawler III, The Ultimate Advantage: Creating the High-Involvement
Organization 161-71 (1992).
632. See William G. Ouchi, Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 Admin. Sci. Q. 129,
136-37 (1980) (noting that subtle understandings among interdependent workteam
performance are difficult to translate into verifiable performance measures); Putterman,
supra note 98, at 174 & n.5 (noting that supervisors' observations of work performance are
non-random samples).
633. See, e.g., Victor G. Devinatz, Rationalizing the Irrationality of the Shopfloor,
Lab. Stud. J., Spring 1993, at 3.
634. See Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese
Economy 49-85 (1988). Note that the individual firm need not be the guarantor of the
employment security that encourages individual initiative and information-disclosure.
Indeed, precisely because of the erosion of internal career ladders in the new flexible labor
market, transenterprise institutions may be better suited and more vital to serve that
function. See infra Part VII.C.7.
635. Compare Putterman, supra note 631, at 146 (recognizing that hierarchical
monitoring may have perverse effect of exacerbating information-impacting) with Oliver
E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 32-34, 43,
54-55 (1975) (recognizing problem of "information impactedness" among frontline
workers and peer groups' resentment at hierarchical monitoring, but asserting that
supervisors' "auditing serves to overcome information impactedness").
[Vol. 94:753
1994 DEMOCRACY AND DOMINATION IN LABOR LAW 893
nomic consequences of system breakdown-as in nuclear power or chem-
ical-processing plants, for example.63 6 The cumulative development and
mutual sharing of workers' explicit and tacit knowledge of work and orga-
nizational process sits comfortably with managerial theories of competi-
tive advantage that identify firm-specific capacities for organizational
learning as the key "dynamic capability" of enterprises. 637
2. The Noninstrumental Economic Advantages of Team Organization. -
The economic advantages discussed in the preceding section are all in-
strumental, in the sense that they increase productivity through realigned
material incentives, reduced net labor inputs, or reduced transaction, lo-
gistical, or monitoring costs. Proponents of "high-involvement" organiza-
tion often assert its potential for noninstrumental enhancement of labor
productivity and innovation-reflecting in part the psychological disci-
plines from which work-group theory emerged decades ago. In light of
cultural changes since then, the noninstrumental argument can now
begin with a strong negative claim: United States workers of the 1990s
are much more likely to resent authoritarian or overtly inegalitarian man-
agement styles than their forerunners of the interwar years. Several
forces-in part endogenous to the political economy of mass consump-
tion-account for a deep cultural shift toward "a general expectation of
justice ... in contrast to the attitudes prevalent in the past: resigned
fatalism, diffuse rage, sullen apathy, or passive contentment."638
Those forces include the revolution in political attitudes induced by
the New Deal itself. Working class ethnic communities in that period
developed, for the first time, a sense of political citizenship and demo-
cratic entitlement.L6 39 More specifically, the New Deal labor policy itself
dramatically legitimated norms of fair workplace treatment;640 and subse-
quent mass-unionization raised workers' standards of just working condi-
tions, to which even nonunion employers responded under the threat of
unionization.64 1 The post-war economic boom consolidated the cultural
sea-change in many ways: by giving employers the economic leeway to
636. See Osterman, supra note 612, at 234; see also Larry Hirschhorn, Beyond
Mechanization: Work and Technology in a Postindustrial Age 61-109 (1984).
637. See, e.g., DavidJ. Teece et al., Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management,
(forthcoming in Strategic Mgmt. J.) (manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Alfred Chandler offers historical support for the conclusion that actual firm economies
and competitiveness principally "depend on [organizational] knowledge, skill, experience,
and teamwork." Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism 24 (1990).
638. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority, and
Culture 60 (1990).
639. See Cohen, supra note 267, at 285, 289; Fraser, supra note 39, at 329; Gerstle,
supra note 351, at 179.
640. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1434-39.
641. See Thomas A. Kochan et al., The Transformation of American Industrial
Relations 47-80 (1986).
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provide improved employment practices;6 2 by accelerating a media-
driven culture of hedonic, market-dependent leisure activities that fur-
ther eroded traditional patriarchal cultures; 643 and by helping fuel the
anti-authoritarian, participatory norms of the new workplace and
counterculture movements of the 1960s and 1970s.64 But whatever the
source of workers' greater sense of egalitarian entitlement, present-day
managers who adhere to traditional authoritarian structures and to sym-
bols of status hierarchy face a greater probability of perfunctory perform-
ance born of employee resentment.
Proponents identify more affirmative psychological consequences of
participatory workplaces as well. A central claim-which has much em-
pirical and common-sense backing-remains the core Gestalt principle
developed by Kurt Lewin and his followers as early as the 1920s and
1930s: work groups are likelier to feel committed and driven successfully
to complete a project if they have participated in its conception.6 5 A
corollary of that principle is the proposition that work-motivation is en-
hanced if workers understand how their (self-designed) projects help
complete the whole mission of the organization. 6
A second set of psychological claims rests not on the idea of commit-
ment born of self-governance but on the related concept of trust. A
number of institutional features counteract the "low-trust syndrome" be-
tween labor and management that I have summarized elsewhere.647 The
delegation of high-discretion responsibilities to work teams is a powerful
symbol of managerial trust to which workers typically respond in kind.648
That management "gets the worker attitudes it deserves" is an axiom end-
lessly rediscovered by managers and administrators from the 1930s to the
642. See Charles Craypo, The Decline in Union Bargaining Power, in U.S. Labor
Relations, 1945-1989: Accommodation and Conflict 3, 13-16 (Bruce Nissen ed., 1990).
643. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 366, at 99-212; Juliet B. Schor, The Overworked
American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure 107-38 (1991).
644. See Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class
Consciousness 51-134 (1973) (discussing relation among affluence, counterculture
movements, and workplace dissatisfaction); Barbara R. Bergmann, The Economic
Emergence of Women 3-39 (1986) (discussing relation between women's labor market
participation and women's movement); James Miller, Democracy Is in the Streets: From
Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (1987) (recounting anti-war movement's cultural
impact); William L. Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and
American Culture, 1965-1975, at 92-97 (1992) (recounting African-American militancy in
workplaces).
645. See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of
Organization, 12 Res. Org. Behav. 295, 319 (1990).
646. See, e.g., Hirschhorn, supra note 636, at 113-51; Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of
the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power 391-92 (1988); Elster, supra note 224,
at 152.
647. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1478-88.
648. See Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations 102-14
(1974).
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1990s. 649 The experience at NUMMI is a textbook instance. A workforce
known for its adversarial militance under drill-sergeant supervisors en-
tered the revamped collaborative organization with (again typical) 650
skepticism, but unmistakably developed cooperative "quality conscious-
ness" and "newfound plant loyalty" when management's commitment to
participatory practices proved real.65 1 The structural transition from low-
trust authoritarianism to high-trust delegation is generally reinforced by a
panoply of status-equalizing symbols popularized by Japanese managers
(egalitarian styles of dress, common dining and parking facilities, manag-
ers' presence on the shopfloor, and the like). More important perhaps-
both in the theory and practice of "trust-building'-are the continuous
occasions for consultative discussion between workers and management
in successful high-involvement workplaces. Clinical and field studies
show that face-to-face dialogue-especially when governed by problem-
solving methods of the kind inculcated in joint training sessions con-
ducted widely in participatory workplaces-is a potent enabling condi-
tion for trust-enhancement. 652
Self-managed teams also promise efficiency gains from trust-building
among team members. The parallel often drawn between the camarade-
rie among military squad members and among work-team peers is not
entirely hyperbolic. Workers often experience greater motivation when
their lapses may be understood as "letting down" their coworkers-or
their achievements as cause for praise and recognition from peers-in
tasks for which the team is jointly responsible. 655 This is especially true
among teams that have emerged successfully from the often emotionally
turbulent but psychologically "binding" experience of working out their
own project methods, social processes, and conflict-resolutions. Such
binding sentiments do not necessarily entail conscious intimacy or friend-
ship; a sense of mutual commitment or reciprocal obligation may be the
649. In 1938, the progressive industrial relations director of U.S. Rubber, Cyrus
Ching, wrote that labor's mentality would respond in kind to managers animated by "fair"
and "friendly" attitudes, on the one hand, or "militant" and "underhanded" tactics, on the
other. See Cyrus Ching, Problems in Collective Bargaining, 11J. Bus. 33, 40 (1938). Fifty
years later, a Chrysler vice-president echoed less delicately. "[W]hen you see a militant
workforce, usually it's because you've had knucklehead types on the management side."
Lowell Turner &Jana Gold, Perceptions of Work Reorganization: Interviews with Business
and Labor Leaders in Four Industries 23 (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l Economy
Working Paper 34, 1988) (quoting executive).
650. See, e.g., Donald M. Wells, Empty Promises: Quality of Working Life Programs
and the Labor Movement 26 (1987) (describing workers' skepticism about managerial
claims of organizational change).
651. See Turner, supra note 571, at 57-58.
652. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1481-82 (summarizing and citing empirical
studies showing that face-to-face consultation breeds sentiments of trust).
653. See Hirschhorn, supra note 578, at 43.
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more accurate characterization of the felt experience. 65 4 In addition to
building the affirmative group sentiments that heighten "intrinsic" work
motivation, team responsibility and discretion counter the corrosion of
constructive cooperation among coworkers that occurs in standard work
systems premised on competitive "tournaments" among individuals-at
least those tournaments that do not incorporate criteria of cooperation
among the measures of individual performance. The latter systems em-
body disincentives for workers to reveal information and otherwise help
improve the performance of peers.655 In this light, the instrumental ad-
vantage of mutual monitoring in work teams is matched by the noninstru-
mental gain from mutual commitment.
3. Beyond Productivity: From Autonomy and Self-Realization to Intersubjec-
tive Modernism and Radical Democracy. - The phenomena that account for
the productivity-improving possibilities of participatory work also have
the potential to enhance the moral texture and political vigor of workers'
lives. One of the most acute legal analysts of workplace governance writes
that "the nature or source of th[e] value [of workplace democracy and
participation] is seldom spelled out explicitly"65 6 by its legal-policy propo-
nents. There are at least four rich normative traditions that support the
proposition that Robert Wagner and other Progressive Era and New Deal
advocates of industrial democracy took as axiomatic: that workers' right
to participate in workplace governance is as compelling as their right to
participate in political governance. Because these (sometimes overlap-
ping) traditions have been elaborated at such length by some of moder-
nity's most eminent thinkers-and because they have already been
endorsed in our labor law policy and in international legal norms-I shall
merely capsulize them.
At a minimum, these traditions provide prima facie justifications for
legal regimes that secure workers' capacity to play a more substantial role
in choosing their workplace governance modes than is afforded by indi-
vidual market exit and entry. They also support the stronger prima facie
claim that workers and legislators should make the substantive choice of
654. See Hirschhorn, supra note 578, at 7-13; Jonathon Gillette, Intimacy in Work
Groups: Looking from the Inside Out, in Groups in Context: A New Perspective on
Group Dynamics 86, 100 (Jonathon Gillette & Marion McCollom eds., 1990).
655. See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 634, at 32-43, 81-82, 90; Dean Tjosvold, Effects of
Cooperative and Competitive Interdependence and Task Complexity on Subordinates'
Productivity, Perception of Leader, and Group Development, 14 Can. J. Behav. Sci. 24,
24-32 (1982).
656. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1749, 1769 (1990). Hansmann
briefly canvasses four exclusively utilitarian grounds for workplace participation. Three are
purely hedonic-workers gain pleasure from communal activity, from less adversarial
relations, and from greater sense of control. The fourth is also consequentialist but seems
ultimately to turn on whether "society" subjectively "values" the training for political
democracy that industrial democracy ostensibly yields. See id. at 1769-70. By my lights,
the most powerful arguments for workplace democracy rest on the values of self-
governance, self-realization, and radical modernism, not preference-satisfaction.
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high-participation workplaces. The four arguments can be understood as
successively heightened (although not simply cumulative) understand-
ings of self-governance. The first-arguments from autonomy-stress
the individual's right to register her interests in collective decision-mak-
ing. The second-the neo-Aristotelian argument from self-realization-
recognizes that the development and affirmation of individual capacities
require "mutual recognition" among individuals. The third and fourth-
arguments from radical pragmatism and democracy-combine a rela-
tional conception of subjectivity with a reflexive, dynamic understanding
of the self and social contexts. That is, intersubjective communication
and interaction concurrently transform individual and community
desires, interests, knowledge, and self-definition. Although I find the lat-
ter, heightened understanding most appealing and not reducible to a
syncretic blend of the first two, 6 5 7 it is significant, nonetheless, that four
important traditions converge on similar conclusions.
a. Two Arguments from Autonomy. - Workplace democracy is, of
course, at the center of democratic-socialist and social-democratic ambi-
tions.658 But many avatars of Anglo-American liberal individualism as
well-from John Stuart Mill, to Abraham Lincoln, Bertrand Russell,
Louis Brandeis, Woodrow Wilson, and some compelling interpreters of
John Rawls's theory of justice-advance the proposition that meaningful
autonomy irresistibly encompasses workers' participation in enterprise
decision-making.659 The nub of this familiar argument can be put in
either pragmatist (culturally immanent) or universalistic (transcendental
or naturalist) terms.
The pragmatist argument begins with our shared cultural commit-
ment to self-governance. 660 That commitment entails the principle that
each member of a collective enterprise has an equal right to the greatest
feasible participation in binding decisions that affect her vital interests.
Because one's vital interests are affected as much by the dally decisions
implemented in one's workplace institutions as by those implemented
657. Conversations with Chuck Sabel helped clarify my thinking on this question.
658. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism 64-91
(1986); Andrew Levine, Arguing for Socialism: Theoretical Considerations 32-98 (Verso
1988) (1984).
659. See Louis D. Brandeis, How Far Have We Come on the Road to Industrial
Democracy?-An Interview, in The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers of Louis D.
Brandeis 43, 43-47 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934); Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on Free
Labor, in 3 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 462 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953-55); 1
id. at 412; 1 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 763-92 (7th ed. 1965);
Bertrand Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom at xi-xii, 211-12 (1919); 2 Woodrow Wilson,
Message to the Sixty-Sixth Congress Assembled in Special Session, in The Messages and
Papers of Woodrow Wilson 671, 673-74 (Albert Shaw ed., 1924); Cohen, Democratic
Legitimacy, supra note 119, at 18-20 (interpreting Rawls).
660. Recent arguments taking roughly this tack include Robert A. Dahl, A Preface To
Economic Democracy 111-35 (1985); Walzer, supra note 84, at 98-103; Cohen, Economic
Basis, supra note 119, at 25-50.
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through one's political collectivities, democratic participation is as war-
ranted in the former as in the latter.
There are two unstated-though to my mind, well-grounded-prem-
ises in this argument first, that exit from hierarchical workplaces is not
costless (otherwise, by definition, one's interests would suffer no impair-
ment by authoritarian intra-enterprise decisions); 66 1 second, that one's
substantive autonomy is insufficiently secured by participation in the cen-
tralized political institutions that choose to permit authoritarian decision-
making in decentralized economic enterprises. The first premise is
borne out by much empirical evidence of the financial, somatic, and psy-
chological costs of job loss and transitions among jobs.6 2 The second
premise raises a more difficult problem of democratic theory often ig-
nored by those who simply posit a goal of "maximum workplace democ-
racy"-namely, the "federalist" question of which demos or stakeholder
constituency (local or central, functional or territorial) is most affected
by, and therefore entitled either in the first or final instance to make,
particular categories of social decisions.663 Nonetheless, a strong prima
facie ground for the second premise is implicit in the basic principle of
self-governance. 66 4 Participation rights in decentralized institutions pro-
vide a greater (and hence more just) degree of self-determination for the
members whose daily interests are directly affected by those institutions'
decisions. 665
661. Cf. John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 233, 242 (1989) (principles of "political" justice apply to institutions
characterized by costly exit and by binding coercive decisions).
662. See, e.g., Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of
America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic
Industry 49-81 (1982); Grand Designs: The Impact of Corporate Strategies on Workers,
Unions, and Communities (Charles Craypo & Bruce Nissen eds., 1993).
663. For discussions of this intractable issue, see John Burnheim, Is Democracy
Possible? 4-9 (1985); Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society
64-67, 88-98 (1970); Frederick G. Whelan, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the
Boundary Problem, in XXV NOMOS: Liberal Democracy 13, 13-42 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1983).
664. This is not to deny that there may be tradeoffs between this greater degree of
justice in the workplace and other valued ends, such as welfare-enhancing efficiency. The
relevant evidence, although by no means conclusive, nonetheless suffices to have shifted
the burden of proof to defenders of traditional hierarchical workplaces even as to the
question of efficiency. See supra Part V.B and infra notes 826-30 and accompanying text.
665. Of course, this claim itself slides over major questions for those who reject
essentialist or objectivist accounts of what constitutes a human "interest" and of how to
compare the weight of such interests. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1431-32.
Nonetheless, our shared contemporary understanding that peoples' vital interests are
affected by the decisions made in their workplaces may suffice at this stage of immanent-
pragmatist argument. The problem of whether the externalities (that is, the spillover
effects on non-members' interests) created by those decisions should, for reasons of
democratic justice or welfare, be internalized in more encompassing democratic
institutions nevertheless remains. See infra notes 692-694 and accompanying text, and
infra Part VII.C.5.c.
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The second premise of the immanent argument is also redolent of
the universalistic argument-from-autonomy for workplace democracy--
that one relinquishes one's essential humanity and dignity by subordinat-
ing one's daily practical activity to the fiat of another.666 In other words,
workplace participation rights are akin to inalienable aspects of per-
sonhood, like the right to vote or to be free of slavery.667 This proposi-
tion may seem like a stretch to some United States readers.668 However,
"[o]utside of North America the general attitude toward freedom of asso-
ciation [through unionization] is similar to the attitude of North Ameri-
cans toward the right to vote. Any tampering with it is unacceptable and
subject to moral condemnation." 669 Article 23 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights codifies the "right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of [each person's] interests."67 °
b. An Argument from Self-Realization. - An attractive neo-Aristotelian
argument for workplace participation combines a reformulated concept
of "self-realization"671 with the vast psychological literature on the condi-
tions for human gratification and "optimal experience."672 The empiri-
cal evidence overwhelmingly confirms the unstartling hypothesis that
people engaged in highly skilled execution of high-challenge activities
experience greater motivation, activation, concentration, creativity, and
gratification than people engaged in routinized or passive practices. 673
The psychological catch is that myopia, weakness of will (akrasia), or a
culture of immediate preference-satisfaction may preempt people from
undertaking the often high start-up costs of developing skills or talents
that yield such experiences in the long term. 674 The economic catch, of
666. See Robert P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism passim (1970).
667. See Putterman, supra note 98, at 184 n.22.
668. However, in a 1988 Gallup Poll, 90% of a sample of the United States public
agreed that employees should have "an organization of co-workers" to press grievances
with their employer; and in a 1991 Fingerhut/Powers poll, 79% of nonunion employees
favored stronger legal protections of the right to unionize. See Gallup Poll, Study of Public
Knowledge and Opinion Concerning the Labor Movement (1988); Fingerhut/Powers,
National Labor Poll (1991).
669. RoyJ. Adams, UniversalJoint Regulation: A Moral Imperative, in Proceedings of
the 43d Meeting of the Indus. Rel. Res. Ass'n, Dec. 28-30, 1990, at 319, 322 (John F.
Burton, Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Proceedings of the 43d Meeting].
670. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23(4), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71, 74 (1948).
671. See Elster, supra note 224, at 127-58; Jon Elster, Is There (Or Should There Be)
a Right To Work?, in Democracy and the Welfare State 53, 64-67 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1988).
672. For theory and evidence on "optimal experience," see the papers collected in
Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness (Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi & Isabella Selega Csikszentmihalyi eds., 1988) and the studies surveyed in
Scitovsky, supra note 201, at 15-148.
673. See, e.g., Judith Lefevre, Flow and the Quality of Experience During Work and
Leisure, in Optimal Experience, supra note 672, at 307, 316-18.
674. For the economically inclined, this can be understood as a problem of "collective
action" among the "multiple selves" of one individual across time.
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course, is that economic and social institutions may not afford sufficient
opportunities and resources for those experiences.
Consistent with these empirical studies, the normative commitment
to "self-realization" places high value on opportunities for both "self-actu-
alization"-freedom to develop and exercise any of one's powers and
abilities-and "self-externalization"-freedom to develop self-esteem (the
precondition of any sense of well-being) through others' evaluation and
affirmation of one's personal abilities. 675 The requirement of "self-exter-
nalization" diminishes the possibility that self-realization can be fulfilled
by the pleasures of consumption detached from interaction with
others.676 Productive activity, on the other hand, provides great opportu-
nities for joint self-realization, in which, like members of an orchestra or
of a genuinely deliberative legislature, "the free development of each is
the condition for the free development of all."677
Jon Elster identifies two distinct modes of self-realization in the work-
place. First, workers may develop, deploy, and evaluate one another's
performance in the activity of collaborative work itself. Second, they may
do the same in the process of decision-making about the organization of
work and other enterprise functions. Elster insists that, in either case, the
joint activity or deliberation is a meaningful vehicle for self-realization if
it is driven by purposes subject to external evaluation. That is, the value
of engaging in joint activity or deliberation per se can be garnered not if
sought as an end in itself, but only as a by-product of seeking other val-
ued, practical goals. In any event, for purposes of labor law reform, it is
significant that the two workplace modes of joint self-realization that El-
ster distinguishes have become mutually dependent, synergistic, and
blurred in the successful high-involvement organization.6 7 8
The concept of self-realization emphasizes the development and af-
firmation of an individual's capacities. It therefore gives greater weight
than does the argument from autonomy to the individual's opportunities
675. See Elster, supra note 224, at 134-35; Anne J. Wells, Self-Esteem and Optimal
Experience, in Optimal Experience, supra note 672, at 327, 340 (reporting experimental
evidence indicating that feeling appreciated in high-challenge work yields higher self-
esteem as well as greater motivation, interest, concentration, and gratification).
676. Jon Elster'sjustification for this requirement is basically that the net attraction of
consumption declines with repeated consumption; indeed, rather than achieve positive
pleasure one experiences an increased need for repeated consumption simply to avoid
unpleasant "withdrawal" symptoms. By contrast, the net gratification from developing
one's socially recognized powers rises in quantity and profundity over time. See Elster,
note 224, at 134-35; see also Scitovsky, supra note 201, at 15-145 (surveying empirical
studies of diminishing satisfactions from consumption); Lefevre, supra note 673, at 307,
316-18 (reporting empirical study showing greater motivation, activation, concentration,
creativity, and satisfaction during highly skilled execution of high challenge work
activities).
677. Elster, supra note 224, at 152 (quoting Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto
of the Communist Party (1948)).
678. See infra Part V.E.
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for self-transformation and intersubjective recognition by others. Radical
pragmatism carries these themes further still.
c. An Argument from Radical Pragmatism or Intersubjective Modernism. -
The radical pragmatist argument subsumes the first two arguments, and
embeds them in appealing understandings of the texture and transforma-
tive power of intersubjective experience. 679 Both descriptively and nor-
matively, radical pragmatism affirms the inevitably relational and
changeable social contexts on which individual self-realization and auton-
omy depend.680 One's sense of autonomous selfhood-and therefore
one's capacity for experiences of genuine self-revision-necessarily de-
pends on recognition and affirmation offered freely by others. But only
an "other" who is herself autonomous can effectively give such affirma-
tion. "Affirmation" that is the product of the other's domination or sub-
mission cannot validate one's sense of authentic self. Hence, the capacity
for individual self-revision requires mutual affirmation of autonomy
among individuals.
But such mutual affirmation cannot occur outside of ongoing rela-
tionships, which presuppose mutual dependency and vulnerability. Inter-
dependency, mutual vulnerability, and ongoing communication among
individuals inhere not only in intimate relationships but also in collective
practical activity, such as workplace relations. The radical pragmatist ar-
gument thus has a communitarian or cooperationist inflection because
an irreducible minimum of solidarity or trust is necessary to collective
enterprises-if only to permit sufficient linguistic commonality among in-
dividuals for even non-reciprocal, meaningful activities to proceed.681
Even institutionalist economists implicitly adopt this view. They now gen-
erally acknowledge that most economic activity entails mutual vulnerabil-
ity among parties who make investments specific to their relationship-
and that parties will make themselves vulnerable in this way only if they
share (or can create and continuously sustain) at least weak solidaristic
norms.
6 8 2
The concurrent modernist inflection of radical pragmatism rests on
its heightened notion of autonomy as the simultaneous revisability of in-
679. This argument has been powerfully made in various ways by Dewey, Unger, and
Giddens. SeeJohn Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 143-84 (1927); Unger, supra note
24, at passim; Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late
Modern Age passim (1991).
680. For accounts of personality within developmental and psychoanalytic traditions
that lend powerful support to this view, see Benjamin, supra note 24; Stern, supra note 247;
and the essays collected in Relational Perspectives in Psychoanalysis (Neil J. Skolnick &
Susan C. Warsaw eds., 1992).
681. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 51, at 15-39, 124-40 (1984); Charles F. Sabel,
Learning by Monitoring- The Institutions of Economic Development in Handbook of
Economic Sociology (Neil Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds.) (forthcoming 1994)
(manuscript at 44-52) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
682. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1461-89.
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dividual identity and social context.6 3 That is, ongoing experiences of
interdependency and self-assertion may continually transform both the
social contexts and individual personalities of parties to collective ac-
tion.68 4 Significantly, such transformation can take the form of deliber-
ately nurtured and warily monitored enhancement of trust and
commitment.68 5 Highly productive, innovative economic enterprises and
networks today generally embody such dual capacities for sustained trust
and institutional self-revisability.686
This view feeds strongly into appeals for both enhanced responsibil-
ity and flexibility in work roles. Its normative dimension calls for mini-
mizing vertical rigidities (that is, substantive inequalities, power
asymmetries, or domination) and horizontal hypostatization of roles (that
is, inflexible, ascribed task structures). The value it places in both delib-
erative interaction and potentially conflictual self-assertion (rather than
self-effacing submission) is served by work team structures that encourage
consultation, commitment, and trust but avoid either managerial pater-
nalism or intragroup conformism. As discussed below, these are precisely
the qualities of the self-managing teams that have been found most effec-
tive and resilient.
The various modes of domination and hegemony conceptualized in
Parts II and III of this Article can be understood as practices that under-
mine the preconditions for autonomous revisions of self and context.
Such practices transform individual and group identities through power-
propelled imposition and manipulation rather than through conscious
self-reflection, egalitarian group deliberation, and affective mutual affir-
mations of individuals' unique identities.
d. Arguments from Political Democracy. - The Tocquevillian argument
that workplace participation, like participation in other intermediate as-
sociations, affords both a school for political democracy and an organiza-
tional counterweight to state and corporate power, is too familiar to
683. The concepts of identity and social context are defined supra notes 25-26.
684. This is an especially central theme for Unger. See Unger, supra note 24;
Roberto M. Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of
Radical Democracy (1987). Social contexts are, in part, shared or divergent intersubjec-
tive understandings and expectations about the roles that individuals may reenact or
transform. Thus, social interaction that changes individuals' identities-that is, that
alters their self-identification with a repertoire of potential role enactments and
transformations-concurrently changes the social context constituted by such
intersubjective understandings.
685. See Charles F. Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a
Volatile Economy, in Explorations in Economic Sociology 104, 138-39 (Richard Swedberg
ed., 1993) [hereinafter Sabel, Studied Trust]; Sabel, supra note 681, at 20-37.
686. See Sabel, supra note 681, at 20-37. For some speculation about the range of
institutional forms that can embody these two capacities in various economic and
technological environments, see Paul Robertson & Richard Langlois, Innovation,
Networks, and Vertical Integration 8-34 (Mar. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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belabor.68 7 Robert Wagner and other labor progressives advanced this
defense of industrial democracy repeatedly.688 Skeptics about workplace
participation point to a small number of longitudinal case studies in
which workers did not demonstrate greater political interest or activism
after experiencing some period of formal workplace participation
(although there are case studies finding the reverse). 689 Industrial psy-
chologists, however, have amassed overwhelming statistical evidence of
causation between peoples' experience of increased discretion and re-
sponsibility in their individual jobs and their increased valuation of (and
participation in) intellectually challenging activity outside the job.690
This intuitively plausible conclusion suggests that a high-involvement
economy affording substantially more training and jobs in high-discre-
tion, collegial work might encourage the positive externality of more in-
formed, assertive citizenship. But whether such a conjectured tendency
would do much to overcome the deep popular attachment to superficial,
visual media of political information-dissemination is doubly conjec-
tural-and dependent on unpredictable developments in education, so-
cialization, and culture.691
A positive political spillover for which we have firmer historical and
comparative evidence would occur if high-participation workplaces en-
couraged a rejuvenated movement of internally democratic and "encom-
passing" unions or some new form of nationwide employee
associations.6 92 That is, the democratizing political mobilization of such
larger organizations-whether in the full-blown corporatism of post-War
Western and Northern European political economies693 or the liberal
687. The best short summary of the convergence of Mill, Rousseau, and Tocqueville
on this argument remains Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970).
688. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1425-27.
689. See Hansmann, supra note 656, at 1770 n.72. Hansmann cites the mixed
evidence on the relation between workplace and political participation presented in Dahli,
supra note 660, at 96-98, which, in turn, relies heavily on a study of workers who had
experienced fourteen months of workplace involvement activities. See John F. Witte,
Democracy, Authority, and Alienation in Work: Workers' Participation in an American
Corporation (1980).
690. For a comprehensive survey, see Melvin L. Kohn, Unresolved Issues in the
Relationship Between Work and Personality, in The Nature of Work: Sociological
Perspectives 36, 36-62 (Kai Erikson & Steven P. Vallas eds., 1990); see also supra notes 673,
676 (citing studies).
691. See Teun A. van Dijk, News as Discourse (1988) (finding that people who depend
on print sources are better informed than people who rely on television news). Alex S.
Jones, Study Finds Americans Want News but Aren't Well Informed, N.Y. Times, July 15,
1990, § 1, at 13.
692. For discussions of how "encompassing" economic negotiations, such as industry-
or nation-wide collective bargaining, promote effective macroeconomic outcomes, see
Olson, supra note 73, at 90;Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer. Further "Reflections on the
Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws," 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1.
693. See the essays collected in Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Gerhard
Lehmbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1982) and Structuring Politics: Historical
Institutionalism In Comparative Analysis (Sven Steinmo et al. eds., 1992).
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"informal" corporatism of United State unionism at its height 694-is well-
documented and predictable. Legal reforms designed to encourage such
democratizing gains are discussed below in Part VII.
C. The Perils of the Team Workplace: New Processes of Domination
The very features of team-based organization that promise to en-
hance efficiency and self-govemance also generate new potential for
management illegitimately to coerce workers, distort their communica-
tion, and manipulate their subjective experience. Before examining this
potential, it is useful to identify the social and psychological dynamics of
self-managing teams that distinguish them from work groups under mass
production.
1. Social and Psychological Dynamics of Self-Managing Teams. - Mem-
bers of a self-managing team would face hierarchical constraints even in
the most democratic imaginable enterprise. The firm's organizational
chart may accurately depict a "web" or "network" of teams aligned in hori-
zontal equality, but overall organizational goals still constrain team auton-
omy in an effectively "hierarchical" way. This remains true even if
assemblies-of-the-whole or strategic committees elected by work teams
democratically determine those goals. Those who promote the "team as
hero" and oppose multi-level "command and control" management ac-
knowledge, of course, the continued need for organizational
"[c]oordination and communication." 695 The team is dependent on the
wider organization for many kinds of tangible and intangible resources
and answerable to the organization for its performance. The role of
elected, rotating, or organizationally appointed team leader or
"facilitator" is the institutional manifestation of the team's dependence
and accountability. A key challenge-and focus of conflict-for partici-
pants in the team organization is the definition and implementation of
the optimal role of the team leader/facilitator. 696
As the next section explores, many of the conflicts between informal
work groups and mass production employers are reenacted in team-based
workplaces-including contests over work process, pacejob security, and
reward. Nonetheless, organizational hierarchy has a different effect on
self-managing teams than on work groups and company unions in the
traditional bureaucratic workplace. The difference stems from four fea-
694. Contrary to current widespread views of organized labor as a narrow "interest-
group," the role of the AFL-CIO in its post-war heyday as an interest-aggregating
movement for broader public-regarding legislation is convincingly documented inJ. David
Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (1977).
695. Robert B. Reich, Entrepreneurship Reconsidered: The Team as Hero, Harv.
Bus. Rev., May-June 1987, at 77, 81, 82.
696. Hence, the outpouring of academic and popular writing on the matter. See,
e.g., Kimball Fisher, Leading Self-Directed Work Teams (1993); RobertJohansen et al.,
Leading Business Teams 101-58 (1991);John H. Zenger et al., Leading Teams: Mastering
the New Role (1994).
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tures of self-managing teams: their high discretion and responsibility in
designing and performing work; the emotional intensity of their intra-
group interpersonal process; the greater formalization of team structure
and process; and teams' enhanced role in horizontally coordinating orga-
nizational activity with each other.
Work teams' greater discretion and responsibility systematically pro-
duce a higher level (or, perhaps more accurately, a different kind)69 7 of
anxiety than that experienced by workers doing routinized tasks.698 In-
deed, as the economist and psychoanalyst Menzies Lyth's classic studies of
high-stress hospital nursing demonstrated, rigid bureaucratic rules and
procedures may arise in organizations precisely as a means to diminish
the anxiety of personal decision-making when the stakes are high.699 The
greater fragility of just-in-time production-flow that is typical of team
workplaces only compounds the anxiety created by role-uncertainty and
accountability in the de-bureaucratized enterprise. Workers thus bear
heavier burdens of creative problem-solving precisely in settings in which
mistakes or bottlenecks may cause cascading damage across the entire
organization. 70 0
Team responsibilities not only enhance stress, but also place great
interpersonal emotional demands on team members. Self-managing
teams generally fulfill their productive and self-governance potential only
if they are more than an interdependent work group anointed with a
"team" label. Unlocking that potential generally requires the formal de-
velopment of deliberative and problem-solving skills, including the capac-
ity for ongoing reflexive learning and improvement of team processes. 70 1
One of the team facilitator's key tasks is to help the team become increas-
ingly self-evaluating and self-revising-a difficult task made only incre-
mentally easier when workplace information-technology provides
automatic feedback on team performance. Management wraps much
team-building activity in the rhetoric of "trust" and "consensus." But
team meetings and problem-solving can easily become ineffective, demor-
alizing exercises if members are not also trained to voice disagreement
697. The high levels of stress and related health impairments experienced by workers
responsible for nondiscretionary routinized work is well-documented.
698. The following discussion is an extremely schematic summary of the very rich
literature on group psychodynamics developed primarily, although not exclusively, within
the Gestalt and object-relations traditions. That literature, unlike much deductive
organizational and institutional theory, is based on inductive "action research" in
thousands of actual organizations and work groups. In addition to the other works cited
below, an excellent synthesis and elaboration is found in Hirschhorn, supra note 244.
699. The research is collected in Isabel Menzies Lyth, Containing Anxiety In
Institutions (1988). For a more recent survey of the literature confirming Menzies Lyth's
findings, see, e.g., Michael A. Diamond, Stresses of Group Membership: Balancing the
Needs for Independence and Belonging, in Organizations on the Couch: Clinical
Perspectives on Organizational Behavior and Change 191, 191-212 (Manfred F.R. Kets de
Vries et al. eds., 1991).
700. See Hirschhorn, supra note 636, at 61-109; Osterman, supra note 612, at 234.
701. See Hirschhorn, supra note 578, at 44, 74, 82-85.
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and frustration over perceived obstacles to fulfilling (or effectively defin-
ing) team goals and strategies.70 2 That is, work teams' effectiveness often
turns on their members' development of interpersonal skills in self-asser-
tion-in overcoming the (further) anxiety that many experience in con-
frontations within small face-to-face groups. If the well-functioning self-
managing team is a cell of deliberative democracy, that deliberation does
not take the form of a communitarian convergence of opinion and feel-
ing.70 3 Such convergence is too frequently a recipe for suppression of
disagreement, confusion, or anger that impedes both self-development
and effective collaborative work. Participants in team workplaces widely
observe that interpersonal skill-development in self-managing teams
heightens their intersubjective attunement and effectiveness in their non-
work lives as well. 704
At the same time, the vocalization of anger and conflict can also take
destructive forms that disserve teams' work goals and undermine vulnera-
ble individuals' attempts at self-revision-especially against the backdrop
of heightened group anxiety. The most acute students of group dynam-
ics-many working within the object-relations school of psychoanalysis-
identify several recurrent regressive patterns in the subtle balance be-
tween self-assertion and group collaboration. Perhaps the most familiar
is what Irving Janis dubbed "groupthink."705 Work-team deliberation
may reach premature closure and commitment to decisions which even
members themselves in retrospect (and third parties at the time) recog-
nize as highly impractical if not illusory.70 6 The psychological dynamic at
work is an irrational flight from the anxiety of responsibility to the com-
fort of conformist commitment.
In light of the persistent phenomenon of emotional "splitting" dis-
cussed above,70 7 such group "flight" often combines with the scapegoat-
ing of some external group or individual-other work teams or
departments, suppliers, managers, and the like.708 Team members
702. See Hirschhorn, supra note 244, at 40-56; Kathleen D. Ryan & Daniel K
Oestreich, Driving Fear Out of the Workplace 55-70, 117-130, 185-198 (1991).
703. The point, consistent with Elster's notion that realizing the value of joint self-
realization depends on effective achievement of practical goals, see supra note 224, is to
enhance "people's ability to form serious work groups committed to the performance of
clearly defined tasks," even if this requires periods of conflict and absence of the "warm
glow of togetherness." MargaretJ. Rioch, Group Relations: Rationale and Technique, in I
Group Relations Reader 3, 9 (Arthur D. Colman & W. Harold Bexton eds., 1975)
(discussing general goal of object-relations study and participation in group dynamics).
704. See sources cited supra notes 244, 578, 672-76, 690.
705. See Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and
Fiascos (1982).
706. The case studies demonstrating this point in Janis, supra note 705; Hirschhorn,
supra note 636; and Hirschhorn, supra note 244, are quite compelling.
707. See supra Part II.C.2.f.
708. See, e.g., Joseph J. Fucini & Suzy Fucini, Working for the Japanese: Inside
Mazda's American Auto Plant 197 (1990); Wells, supra note 650, at 84, 118. The
widespread mutual hostilities between production and sales departments in traditional
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psychically regress by condensing their fears and uncertainties and dis-
placing or attaching them to personal or organizational "objects." Some-
times, more insidiously, the "enemy" is found within the team-in the
guise of an individual or (often, as it happens, and for plausible psycho-
logical reasons) 709 a pair of allies who dare alert the team to its denial of
serious problems in the team's consensus strategy. Alternatively, the
team may close ranks and evade the anxiety of problem-solving by blam-
ing the team leader or facilitator, who is caught between the group and
the wider organization in her role of ensuring that team resources are
commensurate with team responsibilities.7 10
Another recurrent pattern is the reverse: team members flee respon-
sibility by becoming dependent on a charismatic or domineering team
member or leader.7 11 Such regressive cathexis blocks open exchange by
investing disagreement with the emotional valence of disloyalty or trea-
son. The pleasures of idealization and recognition may blind the unre-
flective team facilitator to this occlusion in team deliberation. In
psychoanalytic terms, of course, "[t]his is what transference is all
about."712
enterprises is a similar phenomenon that prefigures the perhaps more intense
scapegoating among small face-to-face groups.
709. See Otto Kernberg, Internal World and External Reality 308 (1980); Gillette,
supra note 654, at 86, 95-98.
710. See Hirschhorn, supra note 578, at 18-19, 63.
711. See W.R. Bion, Experiences in Groups and Other Papers 78-86, 99-100, 119-22
(1961); Manfred F.R Kets de Vries, On Becoming a CEO: Transference and the
Addictiveness of Power, in Organizations on the Couch: Clinical Perspectives on
Organizational Behavior and Change, supra note 699, at 120, 125.
712. Kets de Vries, supra note 711, at 124. For those unfamiliar with this central
concept of psychoanalysis, de Vries gives a capsule definition of "transference" as:
the process by which one person displaces onto another thoughts, feelings, ideas,
or fantasies that originate with figures of authority encountered very early in an
individual's life.
Through interactions with parents, other family members, teachers,
doctors, and other authority figures we encounter, we develop repetitive, well-
rehearsed behavior patterns that become the basis of specific cognitive and
affective "maps." These "maps" are decisive in creating a certain amount of
consistency in our dealings with others; the various "scripts" that can be drawn
from them are activated by particular cues and become operative, usually without
our being aware of it, when we meet other people.
... The basis for th[e] particular process [of the "idealizing transference
reaction"] is the illusory wish (as a way of coping with childlike feelings of
helplessness) to "merge" with someone who is perceived as an omnipotent and
perfect other person (originally the parent) and thus acquire some of his or her
power.
... In this manner, followers extend their own sense of grandiosity through
identification with their leader. And some leaders like that kind of admiration,
especially if it feeds an unfulfilled hunger for recognition. The end result is a
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The community of organizational-development teachers and consul-
tants-whether they rely on such psychoanalytic formulations or on man-
agerial "folk wisdom"713-has widely incorporated the symptoms and
antidotes of such "stuck" team patterns into its training programs for
team members and facilitators.714 Part of a team's "maturation" is its
members' capacity to recognize and overcome psychologically regressive
diversions from the gratifying process of working self-assertively and col-
laboratively-without self-deception, dependency, or authoritarianism-
toward a challenging task that meets human needs.715 The subtleties of
team process, however, are all too often turned toward less benign ends.
2. Structural Coercion: The Instrumental Abuse of Team Relations. - The
team system has the potential concurrently to intensify structural coer-
cion of workers and to make that coercion more subtle and covert com-
pared to old-style company unionism. 7 16 Enough reliable case studies in
North America, Japan, and elsewhere have documented such heightened
coercion-undermining both workers' free choice of governance modes
and their self-transformative work activity-to warrant legal attention.
a. The Team Leader Turned Intimidator. - As the above discussion of
team psychodynamics shows, the team facilitator/leader plays a poten-
tially powerful role in the work lives of team members-more powerful
than the role of employee representative in the lives of a company-union-
ized workforce. Three features of work teams-their heightened formali-
zation, discretion, and interpersonal exposure-account for the team
leader's greater instrumental power.717 These features give the team
leader access to more information about team members' work perform-
ance and union sympathies. That greater access has several sources: the
probing discussions that the team leader orchestrates in team meetings;
the leader's presence in (or rotation through) the work process itself;718
mutually reinforced pattern of interaction whereby idealizing and mirror
transference reactions become complementary.
Id. at 124-26.
713. Lee G. Bolman & Terrence E. Deal, Refraining Organizations: Artistry, Choice,
and Leadership 134 (1991).
714. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 696.
715. Cf. Rioch, supra note 703, at 9 (discussing such gratification in work groups).
716. On the concept of structural coercion, see supra Part 1I.A.
717. The team facilitator's greater opportunities for psychological manipulation,
which may mutually reinforce his instrumental powers, are discussed in the next section.
718. As Victor Reuther points out, this aspect of the team workplace resembles the
role of the "straw boss" who worked within the informal work groups of mass production
and was therefore able to divulge to foremen information otherwise impacted in the
group. See Victor Reuther, A Foreword from Victor Reuther, in Choosing Sides, supra
note 39, at v, v. Dismantling the straw boss system was thus one of the first demands of the
CIO's job control unionism after the 1930s. See Nelson Lichtenstein, "The Man in the
Middle": A Social History of Automobile Industry Foremen, in On the Line: Essays in the
History of Auto Work, supra note 482, at 153, 157-58, 164-65; Nelson Lichtenstein, The
Union's Early Days: Shop Stewards and Seniority Rights, in Choosing Sides, supra note 39,
at 65, 68.
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and the enhanced opportunity, discussed presently, for "cronyism" that
allows team leaders to use some team members as informants.719
In addition to greater information-extraction, the team leader may
have a larger arsenal of instrumental incentives with which to threaten or
bribe individual team members. If the authority "flexibly" to allocate
tasks and rewards is vested in the team leader, the team system recreates
the potential for the kind of abuse of discretion that was rampant in the
"foremen's empire" of the era before industrial unionism.720 Upper
management's failure to retrain or replace command-and-control super-
visors for the new role of consultative team facilitators is widespread in
team organizations. 72' The rule-bound systems of job classification and
assignment that hinder work redesign and technological change in tradi-
tional mass production concurrently afford workers protection against
cronyism and intimidation on the shop or office floor.7 22 If those rules
are contained in a collective agreement, they may also enhance workers'
short-term bargaining power by legally protecting them from discharge
for engaging in work-to-rule slowdowns in some circumstances.7 23
b. From Mutual Learning to Mutual Coercion in the Panoptic Workplace.
- Whereas the informal sanctions within shopfloor groups may restrict
work pace under mass production, and the collaborative camaraderie of
self-managing teams may yield as a byproduct (or render unnecessary)
719. See Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708, at 141.
720. See Steve Babson, Lean or Mean: The MIT Model and Lean Production at
Mazda, Lab. Stud. J., Summer 1993, at 3, 15. Berggren, supra note 601, at 32; Fucini &
Fucini, supra note 708, at 140-41, 194; Choosing Sides, supra note 39, at 74-87; David
Robertson et al., Team Concept and Kaizen: Japanese Production Management in a
Unionized Canadian Auto Plant, 39 Stud. Pol. Econ., Autumn 1992, at 77, 77-104.
721. See Janice A. Klein, Why Supervisors Resist Employee Involvement, Harv. Bus.
Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 87, 90; Lorenz, supra note 345, at 457; Turner, supra note 571, at
31-90; cf. William N. Cooke, Labor-Management Cooperation 104-05, 139-40
(1990) (management generally reluctant to share authority with workforce in absence of
external constraints).
722. Critics of team workplaces are therefore right to see "job-control unionism" as a
means for protecting workers against certain forms of arbitrary treatment. They are
mistaken, however, in identifying such work rules as an instrumental source of long-term
worker empowerment. Those rules are contained in short-term collective contracts.
Workers' bargaining power at the time of contract renegotiation may determine whether
protective work rules persist for the next contract term, but the rules do not instrumentally
enhance such power. The work rules may afford workers a short-term bargaining weapon
during the contract term, in the form of work-to-rule slowdowns. The fact that the rules
are encased in a contract may protect the workers from discharge, to which they are
otherwise subject under the NLRA for engaging in slowdowns, see Elk Lumber Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 333, 336, 338-39 (1950), or in mid-term concerted activity in violation of the no-
strike clause contained in most collective agreements. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). But even this source of short-term bargaining power can be
exaggerated. Technically, employers can lawfully fire workers for using such otherwise
lawful concerted activity if, as is likely, the workers' purpose is to gain a mid-term contract
modification or circumvent contractual grievance-resolution procedures. See NLRA
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
723. See supra note 722.
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mutual monitoring in textbook flexible organizations, the peer pressure
within pathological teams may reach the unmistakable pitch of coer-
cion.724 A team facilitator/leader determined to use the team apparatus
as an anti-union tool can deploy discretionary incentives not only directly
to penalize pro-union workers, but to turn his loyal favorites against their
pro-union peers. The instrumental pressures available to team members
include, at a minimum, the withholding of daily cooperation and social
recognition. When the organization authorizes team members (under
the guidance of team leaders) to evaluate, reward, and discipline peers,
instrumental anti-unionism among team members can be devastating. 725
Three broader features of "lean" organizations-in which teams are
generally embedded-encourage such mutual coercion in the work pro-
cess itself and further detract from the goals of self-governance in team
decision-making. First, the norm of no-slack production removes certain
buffers that otherwise enable workers to vary their pace of work to satisfy
their individual needs or preferences. 726 Such buffers include informal
stockpiles of finished work; backup workers to fill the temporary gaps left
by sick, injured, or exhausted workers; easier jobs into which older work-
ers can transfer or younger workers can rotate for breathing spells; and
the informational buffer of shopfloor know-how that the team structure
disimpacts. The logic of lean production is to allocate tasks in order to
strive for sixty minutes of high-effort work per hour by all workers with
zero buffers of back-up workers, intermediate or final output, or
inventory.
Second, lean organization relies heavily on the "principle of visuali-
zation."727 Workers' performance data is publicly displayed and formally
discussed. Spatial layout leaves work stations open to the view of cowork-
ers and managers. 728 A more novel feature of the new "panoptic" work-
place729 is the so-called andon board. It displays the rate of production-
724. See Robert R. Rehder, Japanese Transplants: After the Honeymoon, Bus.
Horizons, Jan.-Feb. 1990.
725. See Guillermo J. Grenier, Inhuman Relations: Quality Circles and Anti-
Unionism in American Industry 61-138 (1988);JohnJunkerman, Nissan: Teams Without
Unions, in Choosing Sides, supra note 39, at 219, 223.
726. See RichardJ. SchonbergerJapanese Manufacturing Techniques: Nine Hidden
Lessons in Simplicity 31-33 (1982); Klein, supra note 625, at 60-66 (recounting case study
of U.S. team-based engine plant).
727. Dohse et al., supra note 627, at 130; see also Berggren, supra note 601, at 46-47
(explaining that "visualization" is an effective instrument of control); Choosing Sides,
supra note 39, at 16-18.
728. See Grenier, supra note 725, at 44-45.
729. Shoshana Zuboff adapted this term from Bentham via Foucault. See Zuboff,
supra note 646, at 319-24. Bentham conceived the "Panopticon"-a prison designed so
that guards could always see inmates, who were unable to know when they were being
watched. See Ross Harrison, Bentham 127-31 (1983). Foucault views the Panopticon as
an exemplar of modem "disciplinary society" whose public and private institutions
pervasively surveil and shape individual minds and bodies. See Michel Foucault, Discipline
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 201-02 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979); Michel
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often using red, yellow, and green lights-at each stage in the work flow
among teams. Management seeks organizational design that achieves
neither red, indicating that an emergency stop or slowdown in produc-
tion is required, nor green, indicating smooth flow, but yellow lights. Yel-
low lights warn of production stress and therefore, unlike green lights,
ensure the absence of buffers or slack time.730
Third, team organizations generally base pay and nonpecuniary rec-
ognition in large part on group performance. These three features to-
gether create strong incentives-internalized by individual workers or
conveyed through peer pressure-for team members to work even when
sick or injured in order not to overload peers or diminish group perform-
ance.731 There is substantial evidence that systemic speed-up--"explor-
ing the limits of human capacity" 732-itself enhances the likelihood of
physical injury, stress, or debilitating work pace.733 There is also a ten-
dency for team workplaces gradually to reduce the time devoted to delib-
erative problem-solving as the stress of lean production cumulates.734 As
discussed in the next section, team workplaces may even mutate into a
kind of super-Taylorism, utterly undermining opportunities for joint self-
realization and self-revision in the work process and in organizational de-
cision-making.
c. Team Taylorism. - Much of the advantage of self-managing
teams-for productivity, high-challenge self-realization, and meaningful
deliberative self-governance-presumes the integration of conception
and execution in high discretion, multiskilled, self-redesigning work. Its
proponents and practitioners frequently describe the team workplace as a
non-Taylorized organization. 73 5 The reality is frequently otherwise when
teams are embedded in excessively lean organizations. Central features
of the "Toyota System," in fact, are the use of classic Taylorist time-and-
motion study to standardize job tasks and the requirement that employ-
Foucault, supra note 34, at 104-05. Zuboff applies the "panoptic" concept not so much to
the social structure of team workplaces but to the feedback-generating nature of
information technology. See Zuboff, supra note 646, at 315-86.
730. See Choosing Sides, supra note 39, at 16-18; Schonberger, supra note 726, at 91.
731. See Choosing Sides, supra note 39, at 16-29. The personnel director of a Nissan
transplant put the norm bluntly: "commitment-not sickness-determines attendance."
Peter Wickens, The Road to Nissan: Flexibility, Quality, Teamwork 96-110 (1987).
732. Berggren, supra note 601, at 51 (quoting observer of Mazda's U.S. transplant).
733. See id. at 52-53; Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708, at 172-91; Satoshi Kamata,
Japan in the Passing Lane: An Insider's Account of Life in ajapanese Auto Factory 95-113
(Tatsuru Akimoto ed. & trans., 1982); Babson, supra note 720, at 12-14; Klein, supra note
625, at 64.
734. See Babson, supra note 720, at 6-9; Klein, supra note 625, at 61.
735. See Mike Parker &Jane Slaughter, Behind the Scenes at NUMMI Motors, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1988, at F2 (quoting former labor secretary Ray Marshall to the effect that
team organization had "done away with Taylorism").
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ees adhere strictly to formally specified motions.7 6 This rigid standardi-
zation meshes with the no-slack principle of lean production. That is,
assignments must be rigorously specified to achieve the sixty-seconds-per-
minute load for all workers.737 Team facilitators and members are often
trained in time-and-motion engineering; and team members may partici-
pate in the routinizing and speeding of their own jobs under the induce-
ments for "continuous improvement" and high team performance.7 38
Job rotation and multiskilling within teams may therefore amount to little
more than switching among easily learned, short-cycle tasks.739
In this light, it is not surprising that some scholars and workers refer
to team organizations as "team Taylorism"740 or "management by
stress." 741 A leading academic study of the Toyota system concludes that
"the Japanese out-Taylor us all."742 When lean production takes this rou-
tinized form, "team" is hardly more than a label for an administrative
unit.743 Recognizing this potential, the German labor movement, draw-
ing on the Swedish Metalworkers' program,744 carefully conceived its
model of Grauppenarbeit (group work) as a prophylactic against managerial
Teamarbeit.745 In some North American plants as well, workers and local
unions counterpose a model of "group structure"-detailed below in Part
VII-to the "team concept" which they perceive as little more than a 'Jap-
anese-style productivity drive" fully subordinated to managerial needs.746
This issue was central to the rise of the oppositional "New Directions"
movement within the UAW and is the subject of much strategic debate
across the labor movement.747
736. See Berggren, supra note 601, at 29-32; Schonberger, supra note 726, at 193;
Shigeo Shingo, Study of 'Toyota' Production System from Industrial Engineering
Viewpoint (1981); Klein, supra note 625, at 61, 64.
737. See Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708, at 150-51.
738. See Babson, supra note 720, at 7-9; Robertson et al., supra note 720, at 103.
739. See Berggren, supra note 601, at 30; Parker & Slaughter, supra note 39, at 80-82;
Babson, supra note 720, at 9-12; Klein, supra note 625, at 61, 64.
740. Stephen Wood, The Cooperative Labour Strategy in the US Auto Industry, 7
Econ. & Indus. Democracy 415 (1986).
741. Choosing Sides, supra note 39, at 16-29.
742. Schonberger, supra note 726, at 193.
743. The leading guide-book to lean production, Yasuhiro Monden's Toyota
Production System: Practical Approach To Production Management (1983), does not
mention "teams" at all. See Parker & Slaughter, supra note 39, at 27.
744. See Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany 205
n.5 (1991).
745. See Turner, supra note 571, at 111 & n.27. Specific elements of Gruppenarbeit are
discussed infra Part VII.C.5.a.
746. Turner, supra note 571, at 80 & n.44.
747. For useful exchanges among labor officials, activists, and academics, see the
papers collected in Dep't of Econ. Res. AFL-CIO, Worker Participation, Workplace Topics,
Dec. 1991; Participating in Management: Union Organizing on a New Terrain, Lab. Res.
Rev., Fall 1989 (Midwest Center for Labor Research) [hereinafter Participating in
Management].
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It is not inconceivable that workers afforded self-government in orga-
nizational redesign would freely choose to implement Taylorized work
processes74 8-to opt, in Elster's distinction, forjoint self-realization in de-
cision-making over self-realization in work activity. The degree to which
product and labor market pressures and technological constraints facing
individual enterprises would encourage such collective self-discipline re-
mains an open empirical question. At the very least, however, labor law
reform proposals should learn from the lean-production model's fre-
quent failure to achieve either the predicate of self-governance at the or-
ganizational level or other safeguards against the new forms of structural
coercion at the team level.
3. Distorted Deliberation: The Manipulation of Team Communication. -
The potential for instrumental distortion of communication in the team
system can be summarized briefly.7 49 If management is committed to
avoiding unionization or undermining an existing union, team
facilitators/leaders play the central role traditionally assigned to supervi-
sors in anti-union campaigns. Upper management, human-resource staff,
and experienced anti-union consultants coach leaders on day-to-day strat-
egies for small-group or one-on-one solicitation against unionization. 75 0
The leaders may control the agenda and procedure of team meetings in a
way that subtly or overtly diverts the substance and outcomes of group
discussion. Managers instruct leaders to raise topics and guide discus-
sions to flush out and isolate pro-union workers, and to signal to unde-
cided workers that the leader considers complainers and malcontents to
be misfits or "losers" who are disloyal to both team and organization.
Leaders may enlist team-member loyalists in turn to convey the same
message.75 ' While these practices amount to the direct structural coer-
cion discussed above, they also have distinctly deliberation-distorting ef-
fects. They chill pro-union speech and concurrently amplify anti-union
viewpoints expressed through formal organizational channels and re-
sources of communication.
Although the potential for such distortion of ideal deliberation is
already latent in the supervisory structure of traditional enterprises, it is
greater in team workplaces. As already explained, the team structure
gives heightened intensity to interpersonal exchanges, especially when
teams have elicited the kind of emotional exposure and vulnerability that
the typical battery of training programs in trust-building and problem-
solving encourages. 75 2 The importance of social recognition and accept-
748. Paul Adler, The "Learning Bureaucracy": New United Motor Manufacturing,
Inc. 63-64 (1991) (unpublished paper, School of Business Administration, University of
Southern California).
749. On the concept of distorted communication, see supra Part II.B.
750. See, e.g., Grenier, supra note 725, at 61-115.
751. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 650, at 122.
752. See Wickens, supra note 731, at 75-95; supra notes 669-686 and accompanying
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ance by the facilitator or the group may increase both the chilling effect
on pro-union speech and the cohesion of team loyalists who now have an
obvious common focus for their anger or anxiety: "divisive" union activ-
ists. Indeed, the industrial psychologist at one nonunion plant coached
facilitators to intensify latent intra-group conflicts and anxiety in order to
bolster management's campaign theme that the union's intrusion dam-
aged the plant's collaborative culture. 753
At the same time, the formalization of channels of plant communica-
tion-"organized intimacy" to use an apt phrase of German research-
ers754-- may displace informal networks for discussion among workers. 755
Whether workers have sufficient alternative opportunities to talk-while
working together, during breaks, or before or after the workday-de-
pends, of course, on many variables. But the presence of team leaders
and loyalists in collaborative work processes, and the panoptic spatial
layout and information technology of many team organizations may con-
strict the opportunity for worksite discussion free of chilling surveil-
lance.756 The facilitator and higher management may also simply
rearrange team boundaries or membership, or dismantle teams alto-
gether, in order to impede pro-union solicitation.757
The flexible organization has arisen concurrently with a secular so-
cial trend in the United States toward the separation of residential from
workplace communities.758 That separation increases the "transaction
costs" of face-to-face persuasion outside the workplace. 759 In addition, as
the workday grows longer and more taxing, the worker's marginal disutil-
ity of giving up leisure to engage in stressful talk about unionization in-
creases-particularly among those young parents, mainly women, with
child-care responsibilities who are an increasing proportion of the
workforce. Pressure to work long unpaid hours to meet high-perform-
ance goals often characterizes lean organizations that award merit pay
based on organizational commitment and that have no rule-bound con-
753. See Grenier, supra note 725, at 16, 48, 108-13.
754. See Berggren, supra note 601, at 54 (citing Christoph Deutschmann & Claudia
Weber, DasJapanische "Arbeitsbienen"-Syndrom, 66 Prokla 31, 31-53 (1987)).
755. See GerardJ. Grzyb, Decollectivization and Recollectivization in the Workplace:
The Impact of Technology on Informal Work Groups and Work Culture, 2 Econ. & Indus.
Democracy 455, 472-73 (1981) (discussing formalization and displacement of informal
work groups).
756. See Grenier, supra note 725, at 44-45; Zuboff, supra note 646, at 315-86; cf.
Dohse et al., supra note 627, at 139-40.
757. See, e.g., Grenier, supra note 725, at 86.
758. The long-term trend line is punctuated by spikes registering the erasure of entire
working class communities during the waves of manufacturing plant-shutdowns in the
1970s and 1980s. See Bluestone & Harrison, supra note 662, at 49-85; Katznelson, supra
note 564, at 6-7, 193-215; Levitan & Johnson, supra note 564, at 127.
759. See, e.g.,James A. Craft, The Community as a Source of Union Power, 11J. Lab.
Res. 145, 153-57 (1990) (discussing importance in union organizing of opportunities for
extra-workplace communication).
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straints on worktime. 760 Hence, diminished opportunities for low-cost
communication outside work may compound restrictions on open delib-
eration at the worksite.
4. Hegemony: The Psychological Abuse of Team Process. - At a general
level, the modes of potential ideological transformation in the team or-
ganization are similar to those under company unionism. 76 The broad
premise-that worker-management consultation in collaborative bodies
generates mutual understanding and convergence of perceived inter-
ests-is the same. Critics of the legitimacy of such ostensible subjective
transformation often explicitly equate the team workplace and old-style
company unionism. The specific processes of hegemony, however, have
somewhat different psychological inflections in the two organizations
because of changes in institutional forms and their distinct historical eco-
nomic and cultural environments. I shall discuss the potential hege-
monic team processes of greatest concern from the standpoint of legal
reform.
a. Naturalization and Universalization. - My historical survey of com-
pany unions in Part IV concluded that they generally did not weave them-
selves tightly into the daily experience of the worker on the shop or office
floor. The team workplace, on the other hand, has greater potential to
integrate workers' daily activity-in work processes, social interaction,
and organizational decision-making-into the formal structure of organi-
zational control. Such "organized intimacy" is swathed in a thick blanket
of organizational culture emphasizing labor's and management's com-
monality of interests in enterprise performance. That culture is reen-
acted daily in (1) the visibility of physical symbols conveying equality of
status and respect, such as common dress, eating and parking facilities,
common forms of address, management's shop-floor presence, and open-
door spatial layouts; (2) the pervasive verbalization of such intangible con-
cepts as trust, commitment, consultation, jointness, coordination, facilita-
tion, and teamwork (as opposed to supervision, orders, and obedience);
(3) the continual performance of a repertoire of stylized joint-deliberative
activities-brainstorming, nominalizing, total quality management, con-
sultative problem-solving (as opposed to adversarial grievance-arbitra-
tion), and the like; and (4) the enactment of the group's interdependent
work process itself, often with the direct participation of the team
facilitator, who embodies the team's ostensible "horizontal" collaboration
with (rather than vertical subordination to) the organization as a whole.
This daily ensemble of "cooperative" actions and meanings is inter-
nalized in three key ways. First, pecuniary and social rewards based on
team performance and on evaluations of individuals' commitment to col-
laboration encourage workers' habituation into that ensemble. 762 Sec-
760. See Berggren, supra note 601, at 34-35; Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708, at 154.
761. See supra Part 1V.F.3.
762. See supra note 631 and accompanying text.
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ond, direct training or "indoctrination" into these cooperative routines
occurs intermittently throughout the employment relation. 763 As early as
the application stage, which may extend over several days in high-involve-
ment workplaces, job candidates enter a series of group role-playing exer-
cises, psychological tests, and problem-solving scenarios-all of which
signal the traits and behaviors expected by management in the team cul-
ture. Upon hiring, the new employee typically undergoes explicit inten-
sive training in collaborative rather than conflictual interpersonal and
problem-solving skills, kaizen methodologies, and statistical process con-
trol for quality management. During their tenure, employees periodi-
cally engage in further refresher rounds of such "process" training.
Third, and perhaps most important, workers internalize collabora-
tive routines and orientations by adaptation to the given, "natural" envi-
ronment seemingly built on "we" rather than "us versus them"
principles.764 Individual workers typically have inchoate and mixed ex-
pectations when they first enter the confusing and somewhat mythicized
environment of the "workplace of the future."765 The elaborate frame-
work of routines, symbols, technology, and broad organizational design is
not theirs to create-even if they are encouraged to offer constant incre-
mental improvements and to exercise wide discretion within the scope of
their team's responsibilities and resources. Recall the remarkable trans-
formation in behavior and attitudes among the NUMMI workforce trans-
ferred from a bureaucratic, adversarial institution and culture into a
cooperationist organization. The potential potency of naturalization and
763. See, e.g., Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708, at 49-121; Mike Parker, Inside the
Circle: A Union Guide to QWL 9-14, 15-21 (1985); Joop Swieringa & Andr6 Wierdsma,
Becoming a Learning Organization: Beyond the Learning Curve 71-86, 89-124 (1992).
764. The endogenous adaptation of worker commitment to and behavior within
institutional structures and culture is captured in the following summary by leading
academics who have studied and advised hundreds of team organizations:
In the successful new plants the designers took great care to create the
conditions-the anatomy of self-reglation-that must be established if "good"
work and the resulting commitment are to be attained. New hires were not
special people; for the most part they came from old-paradigm plants in which
their jobs were narrow in scope, repetitive, they got too little information, they
had no latitude for decision making, all psychological requirements to be met if
one is to have an enriching work experience. In the radically different conditions
in the new plant an enriching work experience was available at once and,
discovering this, the new hires bought-in, took initiatives, and behaved in ways
expected of those in a state-of-the-art organization. Commitment was
immediately forthcoming. The supervisor, now called something else, could and
did behave in a new way because people on the team were committed. The newly
hired employees experienced a discontinuity in their work life in that they had
gone from the "old" in their former employment to the intensely different "new"
instantaneously.
Lyman D. Ketchum & Eric Trist, All Teams Are Not Created Equal: How Employee
Empowerment Really Works 86-87 (1992).
765. See supra notes 513-15 and accompanying text.
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universalization 766 in paternalistic team arrangements animates my legal
proposals, discussed in Part VII, to facilitate workers' proactive delibera-
tion and participation in broader organizational and technological de-
sign and redesign.
b. The Psychodynamics of Authority and Expurgation of the Other. - The
new forms that the ideological processes of subservience and expurga-
tion 767 may take in the team workplace are implicit in much of the discus-
sion above. Although important for legal-institutional design, these
processes can therefore be described briefly. Many workers in the mass
production era supported the company union out of deference to the
paternalistic authority of management. Although the wider egalitarian
culture today poses greater obstacles to the success of authoritarian or
overtly paternalistic management styles, 768 two aspects of team work-
places have well-documented psychological consequences that enhance
the possibility of successful paternalism: their constant occasions for di-
rect face-to-face encounters between workers and an ostensibly or actually
benign authority figure (the team facilitator); and their formal, intense
small-group interactions. 769 Team members' orientation to authority is
not the same as the individual mass production workers' subservience to,
or resentment of, distant corporate figureheads. Within the intimate
group, the team member is vulnerable to the more subtle but emotionally
charged regressions toward sibling/peer and parental/authority-figure
reenactments described above.770 Such regressions include both the
flight to dependency on the team leader and the bitter "nonrecognition"
or expurgation of disloyal, nonconforming members. This is demon-
strated vividly by the psychology of "dependency" among some Japanese
workers, whose employers have effectively "mobiliz[ed] and penetrat[ed]"
the "primary group relationships among workers."771 In this light, the
need for legal safeguards against paternalistic manipulation by team lead-
ers acting at management's behest is great.
c. Performative and Structural Dissemblance, False Legitimation, and Neu-
tralization. - The team context also gives an idiosyncratic inflection to
the ideological processes of performative and structural dissemblance,
766. See supra notes 185-213 and accompanying text.
767. See supra notes 236-50 and accompanying text.
768. See supra notes 638-40 and accompanying text.
769. See, e.g., Kenwyn K. Smith & David N. Berg, Paradoxes of Group Life:
Understanding Conflict, Paralysis, and Movement in Group Dynamics 109-51 (1987)
(discussing importance of group size and intimacy in group psychodynamics).
770. See id.; Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 62, 69-70
(James Strachey trans. & ed., 1959); Gillette, supra note 654, at 56-60, 117-18. Ouchi's
conceptualization of collaborative groups within organizations as "clans" implicitly conveys
this psychological reality. See Ouchi, supra note 632, at 132. Of course, managers of team
workplaces widely deploy the metaphor of "family."
771. Robert E. Cole, Work, Mobility, & Participation: A Comparative Study of
American and Japanese Industry 250 (1979).
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false legitimation, and neutralization. 772 The discussion above touched
on the potential for potent modes of performative and structural dissem-
blance. Team members may well be unaware of the degree to which
team leaders are subtly enacting strategies dictated by upper manage-
ment rather than facilitating team members to reach self-governing deci-
sions. Team members may therefore exaggerate the legitimacy of
"participatory" team decisions and grievance resolutions. 73 Similarly,
team members may interpret their horizontal coordination of activities
with other teams and their redesign of intra-team work tasks as par-
ticipatory experiences even though their decisions are effectively dictated
by the just-in-time work flow or zero-slack norms built into the organiza-
tional structure. One analyst sensitive to these subtleties recommends
that workers use the more "participatory" kanban method of personal-
ized, rather than computerized, requests for inventory or parts among
lateral work teams-a pale humanization of structural constraints." 4
Grievance resolutions may also more readily "neutralize" worker dis-
content to the extent that naturalization and universalization encourage
members to internalize subjective interests that tilt more toward common
goals of productivity growth and less toward distributive contests between
labor and management. That is, the team organization's reframing of
workers' baseline expectations affects the weight they give to the costs
and benefits of substantive decisions775-in a way that serves manage-
ment's distributive interests. Workers motivated to cut labor costs, for
example, may do so at the expense of employment or by working longer
or more intensively: a possible win-lose rather than win-win outcome, de-
pending on how the fruits of such cost-cutting are distributed. The art of
managerial "reframing-a concept used anachronistically above to de-
scribe interwar company-union dynamics-has become quite explicit
among today's managers. 776
D. New Forms of Cultural Contest and Resistance in the Team Organization
In light of the concurrent potential for greater self-governance and
domination in the team organization, it is not surprising that the dialectic
of contested commitment and trust,7 7 7 in both its instrumental and cul-
tural forms, is also intensified.
772. See supra notes 164-84, 251-60 and accompanying text.
773. See Wells, supra note 650, at 89-91.
774. See Klein, supra note 625, at 65.
775. For an explanation of how perceptual reframing of baseline expectations can
affect workers' valuations of grievance resolutions, see supra Part II.C.2.g.
776. See, e.g., Lee G. Bolman & Terrence E. Deal, Reftaiing Organizations: Artistry,
Choice, and Leadership 3-19, 243-71, 385-402 (1991); Ketchum & Trist, supra note 764,
at 38-49 (discussing organizational paradigm shifts); Susan A. Mohrman & Thomas G.
Cummings, Self-Designing Organizations: Learning How To Create High Performance
157-80 (1989).
777. See supra notes 396-429 and accompanying text.
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1. The Intensified Cultural Contest Over Delegated Trust. - The high-
involvement workplace is much more vulnerable than the company-
union workplace to the backlash of worker indifference and resentment,
or to runaway legitimation and whetted appetite.778 Workers feel be-
trayed and demoralized if the barrage of participatory training and rheto-
ric meets the reality of authoritarian team facilitators or other retractions
of team autonomy when management faces production crises.779 In orga-
nizations that have presented the team leader as a working "peer," team
members may feel special resentment when in fact superior authority and
status attach to "one of us." Again, such a backlash is bolstered by the
post-War cultural shift to more generalized egalitarian expectations.
High-involvement management not only promises greater participa-
tion, but frequently articulates a principle of cumulative delegation of
responsibility-promising that the "facilitated" team will mature into a
fully acephalous self-managing team.780 In other words, the organization
not only legitimates participatory norms; it explicitly legitimates runaway
legitimation itself and encourages whetted appetites for participation.
Managers are highly aware, whether apprehensively or hopefully, of this
cultural spiral. As one skeptical auto executive wrote, "[Alfter participa-
tion has become a conscious, officially sponsored activity, . . .manage-
ment's present monopoly [on decision-making authority] ... can in itself
easily become a source of contention."78 1 A senior executive at Petro-Tex
Chemical, more enthusiastic about the payoff from workers' intrinsic mo-
tivation, said:
I don't know how we've been able to keep [workers] from doing
[production problem-solving] for so long. It seems like there is
an insatiable desire for information .... I think it's univer-
sal.... [Workers] want to know how things are going, first off
with the unit, and secondly with the company as a whole.78 2
Workers' demoralization-stemming from resentment, runaway le-
gitimation, or whetted desire in the face of continued drill-sergeant
"facilitators" and middle management-is one of the most frequent
sources of failure in team organizations 783 Consultants now widely warn
778. See supra notes 283-329 and accompanying text.
779. See, e.g., Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708, at 138-39, 149; Grenier, supra note
725, at 91, 97, 195-98; William F. Whyte, Value of Joint Programs Underestimated, in
Participating in Management, supra note 747, at 87, 91.
780. See Ketchum & Trist, supra note 764, at 87.
781. Thomas H. Fitzgerald, Why Motivation Theory Doesn't Work, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
July-Aug. 1971, at 42.
782. John Simmons & William Mares, Working Together: Employee Participation in
Action 110 (1982) (quoting executive).
783. See Turner, supra note 571, at 31-90; William N. Cooke, Product Quality
Improvement Through Employee Participation: The Effects of Unionization and Joint
Union-Management Administration, 46 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 119, 124-25, 132 (1992);
Lorenz, supra note 345, at 457.
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managers and unions against raising workers' expectations excessively. 78 4
But management can also dispel workers' discontent over continued au-
thoritarianism by affording fuller self-governance. In response to such
discontent, for example, the Shelby Die Casting Company in Mississippi
simply eliminated team facilitators (former supervisors) and let work
teams ran themselves-followed by large savings in supervisory salaries, a
50 percent increase in productivity, and a doubling of profits.78 5 By the
same token, as in the company-union era, workers' bargaining power is
enhanced by the very fact that management has put the norm of auton-
omy and information-sharing on the table-the Pandora's Box Effect. s6
For example, the management of the Philadelphia Transit System
(SEPTA), "[t]rapped by their own rhetoric of cooperation and common
interest,.., could not refuse to discuss [with labor] nonmandatory sub-
jects of bargaining like frequency and routing of service."78 7
2. New Instrumental and Noninstrumental Capacities for Worker Resist-
ance. - Apart from workers' capacity to appeal to management's own
norm of worker empowerment, the team organization generates several
new potential sources of enhanced worker bargaining power. Although
many managers may attempt instrumentally and psychologically to ma-
nipulate team processes, the heightened communication and collabora-
tion among team workers may instead build peer solidarity that increases
the team's muscle in workplace politics. 78 8 Again, successful intra-team
deliberation that voices and resolves, rather than suppresses, disagree-
ment may enhance such emotional bonds and camaraderie.
Several instrumental features of high-performance workplaces may
reinforce these communicative and affective ties. First, for reasons al-
ready discussed, a single team may have the power to disrupt extended
production flows in just-in-time organizations that lack buffers of interme-
diate products between teams.78 9 Second, as team design approaches
more closely the ideal of high-learning, discretionary work, workers' bar-
gaining power grows, for the familiar reason that idiosyncratically skilled
workers are harder to replace than unskilled.790 Third, workers have
found that their training in problem-solving and interactive techniques
for purposes of team process is also applicable to building independent col-
lective organizations and strategies.791 Finally, in some high-involvement
784. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 625, at 66.
785. See Aimee L. Stem, Managing by Team Is Not Always as Easy as It Looks, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1993, at F5.
786. See supra Part III.D.3.
787. See Roger Tauss, Participating in Managing the Philadelphia Transit System,
Lab. Res. Rev., Fall 1989, at 80, 84.
788. See Grenier, supra note 725, at 87; Choosing Sides, supra note 39, at 28.
789. See Kenney & Florida, supra note 581, at 136-37; Choosing Sides, supra note 39,
at 28, 45-46; supra note 606 and accompanying text.
790. See Charles Craypo, The Economics of Collective Bargaining 21 (1986).
791. See Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708, at 194.
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workplaces, teams have plant-wide breadth;792 in others, individuals' rota-
tion among teams parlays team sentiments into plant-wide solidarity.793
Many have pointed out the danger of a race-to-the-bottom among enter-
prise unions, as the spread of flexible organization encourages the decen-
tralization of collective bargaining. Nonetheless, plant- or enterprise-
wide solidarity can in some economic circumstances7 94 afford workers
great bargaining power because enterprise-level strikes or slowdowns in-
flict large costs on individual firms whose competitors continue opera-
tion. Indeed, for this reason, in post-WarJapan militant unionists unable
to achieve industry-wide bargaining made highly effective use of in-
dependent enterprise unions, although they were counterposed and fi-
nally defeated by managerially controlled enterprise unions.795
These are yet further examples of how workers' bargaining power
and ultimate distributive share are endogenous to organizational design
and ideology. An apparently neutral matter of organizational design may
in fact cloak a contest over ultimate bargaining power, distribution, and
control. This is the key reason why management may resist productivity-
enhancing reorganization-giving strong grounds for policy concern
over the legal institutions that shape control over larger organizational
design.
E. The Emerging Consensus: Effective Team Participation and Strategic Labor
Representation Are Mutually Reinforcing
Which features of enterprise institutions determine whether the
democratic and empowering promise of self-managing teams (discussed
in Sections B and D) or the pathologies of domination (discussed in Sec-
tion C) are likelier to prevail? Part VII presents some specific structural
indicia that the legal system can deploy in order to distinguish demo-
cratic from dominated teams and joint committees. This Section de-
scribes a broader institutional feature-which labor law reform can also
encourage-of organizations that tend to sustain teams that are relatively
free of structural coercion, distorted communication, and psychological
manipulation.
Over the last decade, the evidence has mounted that neither
frontline workers' participation in teams nor employee representation
(via unionization, sufficiently empowered joint committees, or employee
ownership) in strategic organizational decision-making alone is likely to
792. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rankin, New Forms of Work Organization: The Challenge
for North American Unions 69-72 (1990) (describing plant-wide teams that run Shell
Sarnia chemical processing plant).
793. See Aoki, supra note 634, at 40, 45-46.
794. This occurs, for example, when an enterprise operating in relatively competitive
markets cannot credibly threaten to move the work because of sunk capital or lack of allied
facilities.
795. See Andrew Gordon, The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy
Industry, 1853-1955, at 341-45 (1985); Kenney & Florida, supra note 581, at 128.
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achieve the full productivity-enhancing and democratic promise of the
high-involvement workplace. The two processes, rather, are mutually de-
pendent and synergistic. Worker representatives, if afforded meaningful
power, can ensure the organization's delegation of wide authority to self-
managing teams. High-discretion teams, in turn, may provide rank and
file workers with the countervailing power and information necessary to
ensure that their representatives are accountable and able to convey to
management at least the latent threat of employee mobilization, such as
strike action. This thesis, advanced by a prominent Sloan School empiri-
cal study in the mid-1980s,7 96 is supported by a wave of sophisticated
large-sample and case studies still swelling in the last year.797 There are
several interrelated explanations for this finding.
1. Credible Managerial Commitment to the Fair Distribution of Costs, Re-
wards, and Risks. - As we have seen, flexible teams systematically expose
employees to predictable vulnerabilities in the distribution of instrumen-
tal costs and benefits. Work teams that dispense with traditional job-clas-
sification and assignment rules expose workers to two increased input
costs: intensified work effort (through either speed-up or task-loading)
and the disutility of super-Taylorized, routinized work.798 Work teams
that implement a "salaried" model of noncontractual work-schedules ex-
pose workers to the additional input cost of longer hours.799 Organiza-
tions that reward workers according to competitive team and individual
performance-rather than predetermined formulas for gain-sharing or
the traditional tying of wages to job classification or seniority-reinforce
these vulnerabilities to increased labor extraction.
As for the distribution of enterprise risks and revenue, the flexible
organization potentially exposes workers to greater employment insecu-
rity. Relaxed seniority protections and more flexible enterprise and job
boundaries may enhance the risk ofjob loss for the median worker (while
potentially lowering the risk for young workers or for core workers who
are still yielding their productive return on the firm's investment in
human capital).800 Workers' vulnerability to management's discretionary
796. See Kochan et al., supra note 641, at 146-205.
797. See, e.g., Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, The New American Workplace:
Transforming Work Systems in the U.S. (1994); Edward E. Lawler III, The Ultimate
Advantage: Creating The High-Involvement Organization 307-22 (1992); Michael A.
Conte &Jan Svejnar, The Performance Effects of Employee Ownership Plans, in Paying for
Productivity, supra note 631, at 143; Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions,
Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in Unions and Economic
Competitiveness 247, 276-77 (Lawrence R. Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992)
(conclusions of study of 1000 union and nonunion plants); Levine & Tyson, supra note
631.
798. See supra notes 726-747 and accompaning text.
799. See supra note 731 and accompanying text.
800. See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of
Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 1355-64 (1988)
(explaining why employers have incentive opportunistically to fire older, less productive
922 [Vol. 94:753
1994] DEMOCRACY AND DOMINATION IN LABOR LAW 923
allocation of work is enhanced by the lapse both of the direct constraints
of seniority rules, and of the large indirect disruption costs imposed by
the cascading of workers who exercise their "bumping" rights when man-
agement reallocates work under seniority systems.8 0 ' Further, to the ex-
tent that the flexible organization succeeds in enhancing output per
worker-either through more intense or longer labor per worker or
through heightened intrinsic motivation or kaizen improvements-the
fruits may be lost to workers who are casualties of consequent downsizing.
At the same time, the power of the remaining workforce to bargain for a
share of such increased value-added may diminish due to management's
enhanced instrumental and noninstrumental opportunities for dominat-
ing teams and for weakening the union threat.
Workers will more willingly expose themselves to these hazards if
they are entitled to information and meaningful representation at the
enterprise levels that decide how the costs and benefits of increased flexi-
bility are distributed.8 0 2 Such information and representation rights-if
sufficiently secured by union bargaining power, law, entrenched norms,
or trust-enable management credibly to commit to safeguarding work-
ers against super-Taylorism, speed-up, forced overtime, and unfair em-
ployment insecurity and distributive shares. Management's credible
commitment, in turn, frees workers to contribute continuous improve-
ments and creative initiative with the assurance that the costs and benefits
will be fairly distributed among stakeholders.
2. Credible Managerial Commitment to the Cumulative Delegation of Au-
thority. - We have also seen that management can undermine the prom-
ise of flexible teams by retaining or readily restoring authoritarian
shopfloor practices that belie the rhetoric of worker participation. "At
plant after plant, workers have proven willing to give up job classifications
in return for promises of new participation-only to return from training
programs to the shop floor, where their raised expectations are dashed by
old-fashioned.., authoritarian shopfloor approaches and a broader pat-
tem of adversarial management."8 0 3
There are several explanations for management's unwillingness to
relinquish its command-and-control authority. The first is simple cultural
lag among managers socialized in bureaucratic folkways. The cognitive
leap to uncertain paradigms of fluid organizational structure and new
understandings of individual motivation-especially when those para-
workers from whom firm has already recouped its match-specific human capital
investment).
801. See MichaelJ. Piore, A Critique of Reagan's Labor Policy, Challenge, Mar.-Apr.
1986, at 48, 48-49.
802. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations
in Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in Unions and
Economic Competitiveness, supra note 797, at 173, 176, 199-201; Levine & Tyson, supra
note 631, at 209.
803. Turner, supra note 571, at 22 n.15; see also Fucini & Fucini, supra note 708;
Babson, supra note 720, at 8.
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digms entail dramatically new roles for managers themselves-is diffi-
cult.8 0 4 Those managers who have been rewarded for successfully
enacting the social routines and professional techniques for climbing the
traditional bureaucratic hierarchy may also feel a self-justifying commit-
ment to their reenactment. One perhaps surprisingly widespread aspect
of contemporary bureaucratic managerial culture-which bears the
traces of the harsh belief of interwar management that mass-production
workers were a dim and untrustworthy subspecies 805 -is a self-fulfilling
devaluation of the knowledge and initiative of the average employee. 0 6
Second, what economists widely recognize as management's "taste"
for power is well-confirmed in the clinical and theoretical study of the
psychology of authority. To speak of the "addictiveness" of power is
barely hyperbolic-especially for those managers whose weak self-esteem
or domineering ego feeds on subordinates' idealizing adulation or abase-
ment.8 0 7 It is not surprising, then, to hear old-style managers concede
that their unilateral delegation of responsibility to the lower echelons of
enterprises is as improbable as an oligarchy's voluntary relinquishment of
political power.8 08
Third, management's cultural and psychological inertia is built atop
a solid foundation of apprehension about the distributional conse-
quences of dramatically delegating authority. For reasons discussed
above, management may plausibly fear that reorganization will legitimate
and whet workers' appetite for cumulative empowerment, and will en-
hance workers' instrumental bargaining power by creating skilled teams
capable of crippling zero-slack production processes.809 Managers, even
if convinced that a decentralized organization will raise productivity, may
anticipate that the redistributional consequences will dominate the
surplus-enhancing effects.810 For similar motives, management may re-
tain excessive hierarchical control of teams in order to implement the
various coercive or paternalistic means of deflecting workers' choice of
governance modes.811 That is, management may want to maintain, if
only in reserve, the capacity to use the team infrastructure as an anti-
union political machine-to preempt redistribution of bargaining power
in labor's favor.
Finally, building a "learning organization" may have high up-front
costs and backloaded benefits. Those benefits may be the "public
804. See Ketchum & Trist, supra note 764, at 38-52; Lawler, supra note 797, at
323-24, 328-32; see also William G. Dyer, Team Building: Issues and Alternatives 9-20,
52-53, 155-58 (2d ed. 1987).
805. See Bendix, supra note 35.
806. See Fox, supra note 648, at 102-14; Simmons & Mares, supra note 782, at 110.
807. See Kets de Vries, supra note 711, at 123-27.
808. See infra note 926.
809. See supra Part V.D.
810. See supra Part V.D.
811. See supra Part V.C.2-3.
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goods"8 12 of returns on non-firm-specific human capital that fluid enter-
prises cannot capture and therefore undersupply. At the same time, indi-
vidual employees may be reluctant to invest in high-discretion work and
organizational skills until firms are widely designed to reward them.8 13
The typical start-up costs include not only intensive training programs in
problem-solving techniques, statistical process control, social interaction,
and substantive skills, but also the impasses and trial-and-error that char-
acterize the infancy of self-designing teams.8 1 4 Indeed, management's
premature intervention into substantive team decision-making and aban-
donment of (or incompetence in)8 15 its difficult new role as process-
facilitator recurrently spell the early demise of high-performance experi-
ments.8 16 When managerial performance is evaluated by indices that em-
phasize short term results, the tripwire for premature intervention is even
more sensitive.
As with assuring management's credible commitment to fair distribu-
tion of costs and benefits, so with its commitment to decentralization of
authority: employees must be entitled to a meaningful role in organiza-
tional decisions over delegation and retraction of responsibility to
frontline teams. Employees' strategic representatives, if sufficiently em-
powered, can ensure that unexpected or unfair retraction does not oc-
cur-as the exercise of the union's bargaining power at Saturn has
exemplified.8 1 7 Continued delegation of responsibility also often de-
pends on elements of technological and organizational design that con-
strain the scope of discretion and skill in the team's work process.8 18 This
is yet another reason that worker representatives must have the proactive
capacity influentially to participate in the most basic decisions over tech-
nological and organizational design and redesign.
3. Promoting Employees' Capacity to Monitor and Empower Their Represent-
atives. - If employees' meaningful representation in strategic decision-
making encourages their robust participation in high-discretion frontline
teams, the reverse also holds. Employee representatives are more likely
to be held accountable by rank and file employees who have broad knowl-
edge of the sociotechnical system and who feel challenged to participate
812. I use "public goods" in the economist's sense of goods that are inefficiently
undersupplied by competitive markets.
813. Cf. Putterman, supra note 631 (noting similar collective-action problems in
transition to worker-managed enterprises).
814. See Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 605, at 48 (showing high training costs);
Mohrman & Cummings, supra note 776, at 105-54 (detailing complex learning curve in
high-performance organizations).
815. Paradoxically, such incompetence may take the form of management's failure to
intervene sufficiently to support team processes with necessary resources and goal-
clarification. See Hirschhorn, supra note 578, at 9-75.
816. See sources cited supra notes 776, 780-785, 803-806.
817. See Rubinstein et al., supra note 613, at 356-57.
818. See Berggren, supra note 601, at 232-56.
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actively in workplace problem-solving.8 19 At the same time, skilled, cohe-
sive teams are likelier to have the bargaining muscle to back up repre-
sentatives' influence in joint committees at higher organizational
levels.8 20 These propositions, of course, are similar to the premises of the
"mobilizing" model of democratic unionism that has long been practiced
and urged by union activists. 82 1 That model sees the constant nurturing
of participatory, face-to-face groups of union members and elected shop-
floor stewards as the foundation both of unions' bargaining power
against management and of unions' democratic responsiveness to the
membership.8 22 Recently, labor movement activists and officers have at-
tempted to weave together the mobilizing model of unionism and the
participatory approach to empowering employee representatives on joint
strategic committees.8 23 The shopfloor mobilization program of the
Communication Workers of America is one of the most successful and
highly visible exemplars of such creative efforts. 824
Hence, strategic democratic representation and active shopfloor par-
ticipation are mutually dependent. If work team practices and culture
are coercively or paternalistically integrated into managerial structures,
employee representatives are likelier to be weak and ineffective protec-
tors of frontline workers' responsibility and autonomy, risks and rewards.
Witness Japanese lean production and consultative committees, or North
American instances of lean production coupled with anti-unionism.825
F. Summary
There is more than a whiff of self-promotion and faddishness in the
current avalanche of managerial writing (both academic and practical)
extolling team and joint-committee work-systems. Nonetheless, the in-
strumental and noninstrumental grounds for efficiency gains canvassed
in Sections B and C are now supported by a stock of quantitative analyses,
case studies, and qualitative management surveys showing improved pro-
819. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 571, at 80-81 (describing link between shopfloor
group structures and active representation in strategic decision at auto plant).
820. See supra notes 777-95 and accompanying text. A good example is team
members' shopfloor action-in the form of slowdowns and various symbolic protests-
against perceived product quality deterioration at the Saturn plant in 1991. See
Rubinstein et al., supra note 613, at 354-55.
821. The "mobilizing" or "continuous organizing" model contrasts with the "service"
or "business" model under which unions are relatively nonparticipatory entities that
provide services to individual employees.
822. See the papers collected in An Organizing Model of Unionism, Lab. Res. Rev.,
Spring 1991 (Midwest Center for Labor Research).
823. See Andy Banks & Jack Metzgar, Participating in Management: Union
Organizing on a New Terrain, Lab. Res. Rev., Fall 1989, at 1, 24-58 (recounting several
case studies and proposing general model); Tauss, supra note 787, at 80-86 (describing
such efforts by a Transport Workers local).
824. See Morton Bahr, Mobilizing for the '90s, Lab. Res. Rev., Fall 1989, at 59, 59-65.
825. See supra Part V.C.2-4.
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ductivity, quality, and innovation from enhanced employee involve-
ment.826 At the very least, the empirical evidence allows the conclusion
that properly designed team-based organizations equal, and likely ex-
ceed, traditional organizations' capacity to develop and exploit new tech-
nologies and products across a broad range of fast-changing sectors.8 27
The most comprehensive cross-national industrial study ever undertaken
(MIT's worldwide auto study) predicts confidently that the Japanese
model of team production is applicable to every industry in all countries
and is destined to "become the standard global production system of the
twenty-first century."8 28 Although this universalist claim is dubious, 829
the burden of proof as to the inherent inefficiency of dramatically de-
bureaucratized production now rests with defenders of traditional hierar-
chical management.8 30
Section E showed, nonetheless, that team production is much like-
lier to achieve lasting and significant efficiency gains when embedded in
comprehensively reorganized, high-involvement firms and networks-
and that there is substantial institutional and cultural resistance to diffu-
sion of such firms via market forces.83 ' More important, however, for
those, like myself, who put greater weight on the democratic governance
and radical pragmatist goals of labor law, flexible team production has
misfired badly in certain recurrent institutional, cultural, and strategic
contexts, as discussed in Sections C and D.
The remainder of this Article prescribes a reconstructive legal pro-
gram designed simultaneously to diminish the potential pathologies and
to overcome the obstructions to the diffusion of high-learning, demo-
cratic enterprises. First, the law should develop indicia that distinguish
dominated from democratic self-managing teams and joint committees.
Such indicia should include the responsibilities and selection-process of
team and committee facilitators, the availability of specific human-capital
resources for team and committee members, and the appropriate incen-
tive structures and informational flows that influence the relative deci-
sion-making authority of the team or committee vis-i-vis the larger
organization. Second, legal policy should encourage the structural syner-
gies between employees' strategic representation and their
nondominated team participation. Third, legal reform should facilitate
826. See Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 605, at 27-41 (reviewing case studies); see
Bluestone & Bluestone, supra note 616, at 174-79 (reviewing case studies); Lawler et al.,
supra note 604, at 57-59 (surveying management views); Levine & Tyson, supra note 631,
at 183-204.
827. Robert B. McKersie & Richard E. Walton, Organizational Change, in The
Corporation of the 1990s, supra note 581, at 244, 244-76; see also supra Part V.B.
828. Womack et al., supra note 577, at 8, 256, 278.
829. See supra notes 744-745 and accompanying text.
830. See Osterman, supra note 612, at 232.
831. The vast empirical literature demonstrating that tenacious sociological and
psychological forces generally cause labor markets to deviate from the neoclassical ideal of
competitive markets is cited and summarized in Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1475-89.
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proactive employee participation in the most basic aspects of organiza-
tional and technological design to ensure that structural coercion, dis-
torted communication, and psychological manipulation are not
"naturalized" in the enterprise structure.
Fourth, the traditional function of labor law-protecting workers'
choice of collective empowerment-should be fortified, in part by linking
that function with the provision of the public goods of worker and mana-
gerial resources and skills to enable nondominated participation in newly
flexible labor markets and high-learning, rapidly reconfiguring organiza-
tions and networks. Fifth, both the new rules of workplace governance
and the administrative regime that implements them should affirmatively
encourage-through instrumental and cultural means-high-trust, con-
sultative modes of workplace problem-solving and grievance resolution.
Such consultative processes reinforce the cumulative erosion of the
boundary between managerial conception and employee execution of or-
ganizational tasks. Finally, the new administrative regime should be suffi-
ciently flexible and decentralized to accommodate wide variance,
experimentation, and temporal change among the nondominated par-
ticipatory institutions that are most appropriate to different economic
sectors and enterprises.
Before presenting my reform proposals in Part VII, Part VI explains
why the leading recent proposals for even far-reaching reform are un-
likely substantially to achieve these programmatic goals.
VI. THE PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS OF LEADING PROPOSALs FOR LABOR
LAw REFORM
The analysis thus far suggests that, in order to spur the diffusion of
nondominated, participatory innovations in flexible work relations, legal
policy should be attentive both to filling the employee "representation
gap" in workplaces and to preventing pathologies in shopfloor control.
The emerging, rough consensus among many of the foremost United
States labor law scholars concords with half of this diagnosis. The aca-
demic response to the crisis of labor law has focused on ways to restore
union representation to wider sectors of the national workforce, to ex-
tend the scope of bargainable topics to include strategic corporate mat-
ters, to ease unions' or other employee agents' legal capacity to play
representative roles in strategic corporate echelons, or to mandate repre-
sentative committees or works councils in all workplaces. At the same
time, many of the scholars most concerned about worker empowerment
and democracy have registered their support for deregulation of manage-
ment-implemented participation and representation schemes-that is,
for repealing Section 8(a) (2).
The arguments offered by those who favor repeal of Section 8(a) (2)
fall into two categories. Some commentators and judges assert that the
collaborative workplaces of the 1990s simply have positive economic and
psychological consequences for workers and firms, or at least no substan-
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tial illegitimate consequences.83 2 The circuit courts that have freed man-
agement unilaterally to implement collaborative schemes effectively
adopt a strong presumption that employees favor such schemes and often
state explicitly that labor-management cooperation makes economic
sense.833 The analysis in Part V above of the potential for domination in
team workplaces challenges these assertions and assumptions.
Others favor repeal of Section 8(a) (2) as part of a package of legal
reforms aimed at easing workers' choice of unionization or at mandating
other forms of employee representation along the lines of European
works councils.834 These reforms, the argument goes, would legitimate a
legal presumption that workers who decline to adopt unions or partici-
pate in independent works councils are content with any extant manage-
ment-established collaborative scheme.835 Repeal of Section 8(a) (2)
would also provide a political bargaining chip to induce employer lobby-
ists to acquiesce in these concurrent pro-labor reforms.8 36 Assessment of
this argument for repeal of Section 8(a) (2) turns on at least three issues.
The first is the likely effectiveness of the proposed revisions in the regime
that regulates the conditions within which workers choose among work-
place governance modes, and in the choice-set of modes of employee
representation legally available to workers. This Part measures the likely
effectiveness of these policies by their proponents' own goals: namely,
safeguarding workers' free association and encouraging the adoption of
representative institutions with greater bargaining power and with the ca-
832. See Estreicher, supra note 524, at 55; Samuel Estreicher, Some Reflections on
the Future Development of Collective Representation and Individual Rights in the
Workplace, in Proceedings of N.Y.U. 45th Ann. Nat'l Conf. on Lab. 163, 172-73 (Bruno
Stein ed., 1993); Jackson, supra note 524, at 845; Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest
Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 Yale LJ. 2767, 2805 n.169 (1991)
(reviewing Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3); Theodore J. St. Antoine, The
Legal and Economic Implications of Union-Management Cooperation: The Case of GM
and the UAW, in Proc. of N.Y.U. 41st Ann. Nat'l Conf. on Lab. § 8-1 (Bruno Stein ed.,
1988).
833. See cases cited supra note 568. The strength of the presumption is clear in these
courts' case-by-case inquiries into whether workers have shown dissatisfaction with
management-implanted cooperative schemes. The courts simply credit workers'
compliance in the face of management requirements of participation, or workers'
approbation proffered publicly in the presence of managerial representatives eager to
install the schemes. These are precisely the contexts that Wagner and the early
interpreters of Section 8(a) (2) found objectively unsuited to free expression of worker
preferences. Indeed, in one leading circuit decision, the court failed to mention evidence
credited by the Board that, shortly before employees "approved" a cooperative scheme in
managers' presence, a senior manager threatened and even physically assaulted an
employee who supported outside unionism. Compare Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503
F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974) with Hertzka & Knowles, 206 N.L.R.B. 191, 193 (1973).
834. See Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 225-306; Karl E. Klare,
The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 39, 51 n.33 (1988).
835. See Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 218.
836. See id. at 215.
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pacity to influence strategic corporate decisions. A second issue is
whether the proposed reforms embody the expanded normative standard
of "egalitarian deliberation," which, as I argued above, is more appealing
as the legal measure of free group choice-and more concordant with
Wagner's own progressive pragmatism-than is the Board's longstanding
concept of "laboratory conditions." 37 The third question is the extent to
which proposed wider reforms may facilitate not only freer worker choice
and more empowered representation, but also the sorts of qualitative
transformations in work relations summarized at the end of Part V-that
is, legal revisions that would encourage the spread of high-learning, col-
laborative workplaces but minimize their potential for structural coer-
cion, distorted communication, and psychological manipulation.
Hence, in order to evaluate the particular question of the most desir-
able regulation or deregulation of workplace cooperation schemes, I must
intervene in the wider debate over comprehensive reforms for fortifying the
central functions of the New Deal labor law policy-the functions of en-
hancing worker representation and protecting workers' group choice of
workplace governance modes. We shall see that the conceptual nuances
of domination and opposition, and the detailed analysis of current collab-
orative organizations, discussed above in Parts II-V, have important impli-
cations for this more comprehensive debate.
Section A offers a quick theoretical overview of how the legal regime
currently influences workers' communication and choice over workplace
governance modes. Section B then enumerates the widespread propos-
als, which I generally support as minimal or second-best reforms, for fill-
ing the representation gap. Section C explains why I believe that these
proposals are insufficient to accomplish their end fully-why, that is, even
more robust legal reform is necessary merely to provide workers adequate
freedom to choose representational structures. I further explain why my
diagnosis of the problem of domination through management-created
collaborative structures likewise requires comprehensive labor law reforms
that differ from those proposed by other labor law commentators. In
Part VII, I outline my more robust reform proposals for securing workers'
egalitarian deliberation and empowered representation. I also offer an
alternative to simple repeal of Section 8(a) (2) that is designed to discour-
age dominated cooperative schemes and encourage nondominated
participation.
A. The Legally Constructed Context of Workers' Collective Communication and
Action
There is a lively, long-running debate over whether employer unfair
labor practices-particularly violations of Section 8(a) (3) by discharges
of union supporters-bear much responsibility for the decline in the per-
centage of private-sector workers who are unionized (so-called "union
837. See supra Part II.B.1.
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density") from about thirty-seven percent to less than twelve percent
between 1953 and 1993, and for the attendant dramatic drop in the rate
at which unions win NLRB elections.838 In my view, the available
econometric and qualitative evidence supports Professor Weiler's recent
reaffirmation that "the rise of employer reprisals-particularly discrimi-
natory discharges-against union supporters is one of the important rea-
sons why private sector union representation has declined so sharply over
the last three decades."839 Indeed, about eighty percent of the public
838. A recent volley includes: RobertJ. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times
for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
953 (1991); Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1015 (1991); Leo Troy, Market Forces and Union Decline: A Response to Paul
Weiler, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1992).
839. Weiler, supra note 838, at 1030. Several econometric studies show that, contrary
to widespread belief, structural and demographic changes account for only a small fraction
of the decline in unionization rates. See Henry S. Farber, The Decline of Unionization in
the United States: What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience?, 8 J. Lab. Econ. S75
(1990); Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union
Organizing Drives, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 351, 351 (1990). At the same time, highly
conservative data show that today one employer out of three fires pro-union workers in the
union election campaigns that precede NLRB elections, and that one out of every thirty-six
pro-union voters can expect to be fired. In the late 1960s, already a decade after the sharp
increase in employer illegalities began, the rates were one employer out of twelve and one
voter out of two hundred. See Weiler, supra note 838, at 1027. It is thus not surprising
that 70% of nonunion workers believe that some, and 40% believe that their own,
employers would fire or otherwise penalize pro-union workers. See id. Meanwhile, pro-
union ballots in NLRB elections dropped from 75% of eligible voters in the late 1950s to
less than 40% today. See id. at 1018. Unions generally begin election campaigns with a
"showing of interest" (i.e., employee-signed cards authorizing union representation) of
well over 50% of workers. But, for every additional week that (now routinely retained)
legal consultants are able to stretch out an employer's anti-union campaign, employers
succeed in lowering union win rates by predictable margins. See Weiler, Promises to Keep,
supra note 3, at 1777 n.24. Almost 60% of the difference between Canadian and United
States union densities is explained by such "supply-side" factors as employer resistance and
other collective organizing costs, rather than by lack of employee interest in unionization.
See Henry S. Farber & Alan B. Krueger, Union Membership in the United States: The
Decline Continues 31 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4216,
1992).
While private sector unionization has plunged, public sector workers, who do not face
aggressive anti-union campaigns, have unionized at "European" rates-increasing to
approximately 37% in 1991. See id. at 1. This difference is unlikely explained by the
hypothesis that workers believe that unions can gain less from private employers because
their product and capital market constraints are tighter than public employers' budget
constraints. In fact, the public-sector union wage premium is less than that in the private
sector. See H. Gregg Lewis, Union/Nonunion Wage Gaps in the Public Sector, in When
Public Sector Workers Unionize 169, 169-94 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski
eds., 1988). In any event, although popular belief may not match the latest counter-
intuitive econometric findings, the latter show that the degree of employer resistance to
collective bargaining is not inversely correlated with industry levels of economic rents
available to share with workers. See John M. Abowd & Henry S. Farber, Product Market
Competition, Union Organizing Activity, and Employer Resistance (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 3353, 1990). That is, public sector workers could
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believes employers are likely to fire workers for engaging in union activ-
ity, even though between seventy-five percent and eighty-two percent be-
lieve that unions remain "the best instrument" for improving wages, job
security, and grievance-resolution. 840 Neither the leading reform propos-
als nor my more expansive program, however, turns on this contested
issue. At the very least, such outright employer coercion is but one mani-
festation of the legal regime's woeful failure to protect workers' freedom
of association. Far from creating "laboratory conditions" for free worker
deliberation and choice, the legal system constructs an almost tragicomic
antithesis of the ideal of egalitarian communication. The long doctrinal
story is so familiar to students of labor law that I will present here only its
skeletal theoretical structure. 841
The law's default position in the employment contract is nonunion
governance-from the employees' point of view, that is, authoritarian
governance. This has two fundamental consequences. First, union den-
sity tends toward "natural" decline, as old enterprises close and new ones
open. Some of the former are unionized; all of the latter are not.8 42 This
not accurately anticipate less employer resistance to union gains by reason solely of softer
budget or market constraints.
Although a (fairly crude) survey has shown a decline in the percentage of nonunion
workers who say they would vote.for unionization, see Farber & Krueger, supra, at 8, this is
consistent with the pervasive climate of fear-over "hardball" bargaining, turmoil, and
individual or mass job loss-that employers cumulatively convey in their anti-union
campaigns and that the mass media tend to reinforce. See William J. Puette, Through
Jaundiced Eyes: How the Media View Organized Labor 32-45 (1992); Douglas L. Leslie,
Comment, Retelling the International Paper Story, 102 Yale LJ. 1897, 1906 (1993). It is
also consistent with endogenous preference transformations-or genuine preference-
satisfaction-by the sophisticated nonunion human-resource models discussed supra note
512 and accompanying text and infra notes 888-892 and accompanying text. In any event,
as of the late 1980s, a Gallup survey showed that 75% of workers still thought unions were
the best instrument with which to increase wages and job security, 82% thought the same
about complaint- and grievance-resolution, 69% agreed that "labor unions are good for the
nation as a whole," and 81% supported workers' right to unionize. Gallup Poll, Public
Opinion and Knowledge Concerning the Labor Movement (1988); accord Fingerhut/
Powers, National Labor Poll (1991). Workers themselves, therefore, do not seem to share
the widespread view among even liberal opinion-making elites that unions per se are an
obsolete or retrograde social force, even if they are aware of unions' decreasing actual
effectiveness in the current economic climate. See infra notes 840, 905-906 and
accompanying text. Indeed, workers mistakenly believe that 45% of the workforce remains
unionized. See Gallup Poll, supra.
840. See Fingerhut/Powers, supra note 839.
841. For the longer story, see, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Agenda for Reform: The
Future of Employment Relationships and the Law (1993); Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra
note 3; Robert E. Williams, NLRB Regulation of Election Conduct (rev. ed. 1985). A
colorful recent expos6 is offered in Martin Jay Levitt, Confessions of a Union Buster
(1993); see also Alfred T. DeMaria, How Management Wins Union Organizing Campaigns
(1980).
842. See Michael Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States
79-81 (1987). This simple model, of course, ignores many variables that might counter
the tendency toward union attrition. That tendency might be reversed, for example, if
nonunion firms close at a greater rate than they open as a result of competition by existing
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natural decline is reinforced by various legal doctrines. The law of suc-
cessorship embodies easily satisfied standards that allow purchasers of un-
ionized enterprises to operate nonunion.843 Unfair labor practice rules
allow employers to shift capital out of unionized plants to reap lower la-
bor costs at nonunion operations so long as the employer is not moti-
vated by hostility to unionism per se.84
Second, employees have to overcome the free-rider problems and
bear the other transaction costs of collective action if they wish to union-
ize, whether by contractual consent of the employer or by NLRB election
procedures. The principle of free association does not mandate this
structure. As Weiler has noted, workers' "freedom of choice" would be
just as well secured if the default position-what he calls the "natural"
state-were unionization.8 45 Workers would then have to bear the trans-
action costs of collective action if they wanted to choose the authoritarian
nonunion state; and the tendency toward attrition in union density as
enterprises closed and opened in a growing economy would diminish.8 46
The background legal regime not only determines that employees
bear the costs of the unceasing collective organizing necessary merely to
maintain a constant level of union density, but also pervasively influences
the magnitude of those costs. First, the law constructs an intertemporal
market failure. Employees who, as union pioneers and activists, risk their
careers and bear other material and psychic costs cannot generally cap-
ture the stream of benefits flowing to workers who subsequently enter the
already unionized workplace.8 47 Second, the employer initially creates
unionized firms. The empirical evidence suggests, however, that unionization raises labor
costs more than it raises productivity. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 7, at 162-90; cf.
Barry T. Hirsch, Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Firms 35-66, 91-111,
115-25 (1991) (arguing that unions cause lower profits and have inconclusive effects on
productivity). Hence, nonunion firms will tend to out-compete unionized firms in product
markets, and capital suppliers have incentives to escape the unionized sector to avoid a
diminished absolute distributive share even if the joint surplus available to labor and
capital is maximized under unionization.
843. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (clarifying
that successor can escape union by not retaining a majority of predecessor's workforce or
by implementing other substantial discontinuity in operations).
844. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg., 380 U.S. 263 (1965)
(holding that the closing of a plant is an unfair labor practice only if intended to chill
unionism); NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324, 327-28 (6th Cir. 1955) (holding
that the closing of a unionized department is not an unfair labor practice if the motive is
purely economic).
845. See Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 114-15. Indeed, as
discussed infra notes 954-957 and accompanying text, a unionized setting is likely to
afford greater protection of worker choice over governance modes than a nonunionized
setting.
846. Again, this would hold true under very simplified assumptions. See supra note
842.
847. See Farber, supra note 839, at S80. Union dues and fees generally cannot
capitalize the benefit stream from union employment. SeeJohn Raisian, Union Dues and
Wage Premiums, 4J. Lab. Res. 1, 1-18 (1983).
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the collective environment into which individual employees (generally, to
repeat, having fluid expectations) enter, adapt, and are socialized. In-
deed, by reason of background property rights and endowments en-
forced by the legal regime, employers typically have sufficient bargaining
power vis-a-vis individual workers to impose application, screening, and
training/socializing requirements. Thus, the workplace "sovereign" often
has some latitude to choose the kinds of "subjects" it wants, and the pro-
fession of industrial psychology aids the employer in attempting to assem-
ble a compliant complement of subordinates.8 48
Third, the legal regime vests employers with sufficient bargaining
power to control the physical and communicational life of the workplace.
The employer has access to workers throughout their working hours for
mandatory one-on-one, small-group, or mass-assembly transmission of
anti-union messages.8 49 The hierarchy of supervisors-who can be pe-
remptorily fired if they fail to implement the anti-union campaign to up-
per management's satisfaction 850-affords a ready-made political
machine for this purpose. The employer may ban all other speech about
workplace governance except during work breaks,851 and may spatially
arrange the work process to limit employee interaction. Because back-
ground legal entitlements and endowments also enable employers to con-
trol enterprise information and strategic decision-making authority,85 2
employees are unable to evaluate fully an employers' prediction or inti-
mation of the dire consequences of unionization.353 Against this back-
drop of asymmetric information, the law frees employers even to make
egregious, deliberate factual misrepresentions at the eleventh hour of the
union campaign.854
Employees may confidentially communicate among themselves and
with union organizers outside the workplace and on their own time, but
they nonetheless run the risk that management will ascertain who the
union activists are. Aside from possible retribution, the transaction costs
of identifying,855 contacting, assembling, and intruding on the leisure (or
848. See, e.g., Gordon F. Shea, The New Employee: Developing a Productive Human
Resource (1981); John P. Wanous, Organizational Entry: Recruitment, Selection, and
Socialization of Newcomers (1980).
849. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) (requiring that Board allow
employers to ban union organizers' access even to employer-owned parking lots otherwise
open to the public); NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958) (affirming Board's
denial of union access to company property to reply to employers' captive-audience
speech).
850. See Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402 (1982).
851. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945).
852. See Putterman, supra note 98, at 172-86.
853. The Board permits such predictions, so long as the employer dresses them not as
willful retribution but as the employer's "belief as to demonstrably probable consequences
beyond his control." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
854. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982).
855. The law affords unions lists of employee names and addresses only after the
NLRB has directed an election. See Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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domestic work) time of employees may be large if not prohibitive-espe-
cially, as noted above, in a historical period when work and residential
communities are not congruent and when the workforce includes many
parents with child-care responsibilities. Employees attempting to mobil-
ize collective action have no equivalent to management's power to man-
date employees' attendance at repeated captive-audience speeches.85 6
The legal regime's construction of employers' and employees' com-
municational opportunities may also convey important symbolic
messages. Employees may perceive the union organizer-relegated by
law to meet furtively with employees at local watering holes, to intrude on
workers' non-work lives, to stand on the shoulders of public highways at-
tempting to hand leaflets to cars as they exit employee parking lots-as a
subversive, unauthoritative character compared with the well-oiled, le-
gally sanctioned campaign machinery of the employer. Even the Board
has recognized that its legal regime is grossly skewed against pro-union
employee communication.8 57
Finally, the employer controls many aspects of the individual em-
ployee's short- or long-term fate. A union activist may discount an em-
ployer's capacity for future retribution by the possibility of recourse to
(exceptionally weak)85 8 NLRB remedies or to (stronger, but at the time
of organizing, only probable) union protection. But employees reason-
ably fear the subtle damage to their careers caused by "disloyalty" to man-
agement even if the union wins.8 59 Employees' apprehension may be
even deeper if they anticipate a flexible model of collaborative unionism
which affords management-controlled facilitators much discretion in task
assignment and reward. Indeed, unionized workers historically de-
Union supporters therefore lack such a list during the period when they must engage in
face-to-face contact and communication to obtain the "showing of interest" required to
petition for an election. (As already noted, unions generally seek an election only if they
obtain card authorizations from well over a majority, even though the law requires cards
from only 30%.) This puts union supporters in the position of furtively recording license
plate numbers in employee parking lots or using other catch-as-catch-can means of
assembling a voter list.
856. The seminal study by Julius Getman and associates concluded that unions'
capacity to address workers was one of the most important campaign variables in NLRB
election outcomes. SeeJulius G. Getman et al., Union Representation Elections: Law and
Reality 156-57 (1976).
857. Personal solicitation on plant premises by employee supporters of the
union, while vastly more satisfactory than [the difficult methods of
communication outside the workplace], suffers from the limited periods of
nonworking time available for solicitation.., and, in a large plant, the sheer
physical problems involved in communicating with fellow employees.
Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1241 n.10 (1966).
858. See Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 3, at 1776-81.
859. Apart from the public's overwhelming belief that workers risk job loss for
organizing or striking, 59% of workers believe that they would also "lose favor" in such
matters as promotion if they were union supporters. See Fingerhut/Powers, supra note
839.
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manded that task allocation and pay be tied to seniority in part as a safe-
guard against employers' rampant anti-union discrimination. 860
B. Leading Legal Reform Strategies
1. Proposals for Reducing the Costs of Workers' Free Association. - The
reform proposals that many have endorsed to ease workers' exercise of
the rights of free association and choice fit into three categories. The
first-call it the "samizdat" approach-attempts to preempt the em-
ployer's use of its machinery of communication and incentives by al-
lowing workers to organize unions secretly through whatever
underground or external communication network they currently can
muster. The law would require an employer to recognize a union as an
exclusive bargaining agent if a majority of workers signed cards authoriz-
ing the union to represent them. The NLRB would conduct no election
or, at most, an instant election-unlike the current regime under which
NLRB elections are preceded by weeks of campaigning.8 61 The employer
would therefore have no opportunity to interfere with the workers' col-
lective organizing-unless it got wind of the underground card solicita-
tions. Another variant of the samizdat approach would require that, in
the absence of a majority representative, the employer bargain with a
union over the terms and conditions of any minority group of workers,
and only of those workers, who had authorized such representation-by
contrast with the prevailing model in which the majority agent represents
all workers in the bargaining unit. 62 There is, indeed, a strong case that
the law already permits such voluntary minority unionization, notwith-
standing organized labor's failure all these years to pursue this
strategy.8 63
The second category-call it the "fumigation" approach-favors
maintaining NLRB elections of majority representatives but would pro-
vide disinfected "laboratory conditions" for free choice.8 64 This ap-
proach, embodied in the defeated Labor Law Reform Bill of 1978,865
includes a battery of doctrinal reforms designed to deter employer repri-
sals and afford greater equality of communicative opportunities for pro-
860. See Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy, supra note 37, at 244.
861. See Bluestone & Bluestone, supra note 616, at 260; Gould, supra note 841, at
163; Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 253-61.
862. See Gould, supra note 841, at 165.
863. See Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions that Represent
Less than a Majority, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 637 (1993); Clyde Summers, Unions Without
Majoity-A Black Hole?, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 531 (1990).
864. See supra Part II. B.1.
865. For background information on the bill, see Barbara Townley, Labor Law
Reform in U.S. Industrial Relations 31-44, 91-97, 129-36 (1986) (recounting the
substance, and political and legislative history, of the Reform bill's provisions on NLRB
election campaigns).
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union speech. 66 These include: stronger and quicker monetary and in-
junctive remedies for anti-union firings; affording union organizers ac-
cess to areas of company property already open to the public, such as
parking lots, lobbies, and cafeterias; granting union supporters a right to
captive-audience replies to any captive-audience speeches by manage-
ment; giving union organizers early access to names and addresses of em-
ployees; and prohibiting employer misrepresentation.
The third approach-call it "micro-corporatism"8 6 7 -would simply
mandate that each workforce elect representatives for consultation with
management or to serve other functions. The various proposals for such
European-style "works councils" differ along several dimensions: the sub-
jects of consultation; the amount and source of resources available to em-
ployee representatives; the scope of representatives' informational rights;
and, most important, the extent of decision-making power vested in the
representatives-ranging from mere consultation, to the power to bring
enforcement suits on behalf of individual employees, authority to enter
into contracts with management, rights to demand third-party arbitration
of unresolved matters, and veto power or unilateral control over desig-
nated issues.868
2. Proposals for Strengthening the Strategic Role of Employee Representatives.
Whereas the free-association reforms discussed in the previous subsec-
tion aim to ease, if not mandate, the establishment of collective agents,
the proposals discussed in this subsection aspire concurrently to fortify
unions once formed and to ease employee representatives' access to stra-
tegic levels of managerial decision-making. (Such fortification, by en-
hancing the benefits of unionization, would also indirectly reinforce the
incentives for union formation.) Achieving these ends requires legal re-
form in three doctrinal steps.
866. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, Can Unions Survive? The Rejuvenation of the
American Labor Movement 141-43 (1993); Gould, supra note 841, at 157-67; Weiler,
Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 253 (noting that these reforms do not
contradict, but rather complement, the first category of reforms); Estreicher, supra note
524, at 54-55.
867. The neologism is an extension of political theorists' recent examination of
decentralized, "meso-corporatist" institutions of "concertation" among labor,
management, and government at subnational (generally regional) levels in various
European settings. See, e.g., the essays collected in Organized Interests and the State:
Studies in Meso-Corporatism (Alan Cawson ed., 1985).
868. See, e.g, Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 282-95 (arguing for
joint employee-employer-funded council with information and consultation rights and
power to implement and enforce certain individual employment statutes); RoyJ. Adams,
Universal Joint Regulation: A Moral Imperative, in Proceedings of the 43d Meeting, supra
note 669, at 319, 324 (supporting councils' right to force arbitration over technological
and training issues); Gottesman, supra note 832, at 2808 (arguing for rights solely to
enforce statutory and contractual claims, and funding from general federal treasury);
Clyde W. Summers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker
Participation, 8 Comp. Lab. L.J. 333, 338 (supporting mandatory councils, but expressing
doubt about arbitral enforcement).
1994]
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The first step focuses on new legal doctrines to facilitate representa-
fives' access to enterprises' strategic echelons. The proposals would re-
vise rules of labor and corporate law that directly or indirectly impede
employee representatives from (1) bargaining with managers over corpo-
rate strategic decisions either at arms' length or within joint strategic
committees,8 69 and (2) serving as consultative or voting members of cor-
porate boards supervising management.87 0 There is widespread agree-
ment that the law should assure workers that their enhanced
representation or participation at strategic levels-at least short of major-
ity board control by employees-will not convert them into "managerial
employees" excluded from the collective-bargaining rights of the
NLRA.871 There remains a contested question whether refined rules of
corporate or labor law are desirable to avoid conflicts of interest or coop-
tation among union officers who simultaneously represent their bargain-
ing unit members and serve on supervisory boards that represent a
broader set of employee or nonemployee stakeholders.87 2 A similar legal
question-which has not drawn as close academic analysis 87 -applies to
union officials' participation in the variety of ad hoc and strategic joint
labor-management committees that have proliferated across all enter-
prise levels with the spread of flexible organization. Part VII takes up this
question.
The second reform for expanding representatives' strategic influ-
ence would widen the scope of subjects of mandatory bargaining between
union and management to include strategic corporate decisions. Having
won institutional access to strategic echelons, labor representatives must
be entitled to exert their bargaining power over corporate investment
decisions that determine both long-term employment security and the
869. See Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda
for Legal Reform, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 54 (1988); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and
the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 73, 126-31, 149 (1988).
870. See Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee
Supervision of Management, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 76-95 (1988); Stone, supra note 869, at
120-73.
871. The assurance is made necessary by uncertainty over the scope of the Board's
ruling in College of Osteopathic Medicine, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982). There the Board
found that employees took themselves out of NLRA coverage by successfully bargaining
collectively for participatory rights in workplace "managerial" decision-making. The
Board's holding was explicitly "dependent on the particular facts of the current situation."
Id. at 298.
872. Compare Stone, supra note 869, at 130-31, 139, 147-48 (expressing skepticism
that union officials experience subjective conflict or cooptation when sharing power on
Board) with Harper, supra note 870, at 18-28 (proposing bright-line legal rules, in light of
potential conflict and cooptation, to ensure that union officers retain functions and
constituents that are distinct from Board representatives of other employees or
stakeholders).
873. Michael Harper recognizes, and briefly discusses, this "perplexing" matter in his
comprehensive treatment of union officers' role vis-A-vis Board representation. See
Harper, supra note 870, at 64.
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organizational and technological design in which the work process is em-
bedded. The crucial consequence of designating strategic decisions as
"mandatory" rather than "permissive" subjects is that the union could
then lawfully threaten or resort to strikes and other economic weaponry
during negotiations over those decisions.8 74 That is, the NLRB would not
prohibit unions from launching such strikes and would prohibit employ-
ers from firing employees who engage in them. Whether this practical
result is achieved doctrinally by expanding the scope of mandatory sub-
jects875 or by abolishing any bargaining "requirement" beyond what un-
ions can gain by putting strike power behind any lawful demand 76 may
be of minimal consequence.
Finally, employee representatives' capacity actually to influence such
strategic matters depends on the relative bargaining power of labor and
management.8 77 For this reason-and to assure generally that unions
can achieve meaningful first (and subsequent) contracts against resistant
employers8 7 8-reformers offer a menu of changes in the law governing
concerted activity. Leading proposals include the total or partial repeal
874. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
875. Those who have proposed this doctrinal route include Craver, supra note 866, at
148; Estreicher, supra note 524, at 56; and Stone, supra note 869, at 86-96.
876. See Gould, supra note 841, at 173, 178; Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra
note 3, at 379 n.92. In other words, if the scope of mandatory subjects is expanded to
encompass all lawful subjects, the practical consequence is the same as eliminating the
permissive\mandatory distinction altogether- unions may lawfully strike over any lawful
demand.
877. Except, perhaps, where employee representatives hold a voting majority on the
Board of Directors. This Article does not address the relation between worker ownership
or majority control of corporate boards and proposals to fortify workers' choice of other
workplace governance options. For those questions see, e.g., Harper, supra note 870, at
38-75, 82-95 (discussing role of union officers in employee-controlled firm); Alan Hyde,
In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 159 (1991) (defending employee
ownership). Nonetheless, the general discussion supra Part V.E of the mutual
reinforcement of strategic representation and shopfloor participation is fully applicable
even to workplaces with employee-majority-controlled Boards. That is, substantial
empirical evidence confirms that employee ownership yields high performance and
representative accountability only when rank and file workers are mobilized through
empowering shopfloor participation. See, e.g., Corey Rosen, Employee Ownership:
Performance, Prospects, and Promise, in Understanding Employee Ownership 1, 31
(Corey Rosen & Karen M. Young eds., 1991). I am thus inclined to think that the high-
participation labor law scheme outlined infra Part VII.C, with appropriate refinement, is
applicable to employee-owned enterprises.
878. Of the 40% of unions that retain majority support after employers' anti-union
campaigns, 25-30% have insufficient bargaining power to achieve first contracts and
actually establish lasting collective bargaining relationships. See generally William N.
Cooke, Union Organizing and Public Policy: Failure to Secure First Contracts (1985). To
the extent that unions have greater power to achieve bargaining gains, of course, workers
are likelier to support them and unions are likelier to invest resources in organizing
campaigns. Hence, labor law reformers' longstanding concern about union's success rate
in achieving meaningful first contracts. See, e.g., Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra
note 3, at 354-57.
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of the ban on secondary boycotts and strikes;8 79 the reversal of the Mackay
Radio doctrine that technically prohibits employers from discharging
striking workers but allows them to hire permanent replacements;880 the
mandating or permitting of contract arbitration in lieu of strikes against
resistant employers, especially at early stages of a collective bargaining
relationship;88' and the tightening of successorship standards and curb-
ing of "double-breasted" nonunion subsidiaries in order to weaken man-
agement's threat to escape the union's reach.88 2
C. Why Leading Reform Proposals Are Unlikely to Achieve Their Goals Fully
Unhappily, this worthwhile reform package-as far-reaching as it
may be8 83-is unlikely dramatically to encourage (1) the rejuvenation of
the labor movement, (2) the diffusion of high-wage, high-performance
work organization, or (3) the growth of deliberative democracy and self-
transformation in the daily lives of workers. The most important reason
is the metastasis of anti-union sentiment and strategy in the United States
management community. One "social constant" in American life is "an
employing class that has always been hostile to organized labor, regard-
less of specific economic conditions."884 In the market for managers, an
executive's reputation suffers deeply if his or her workforce unionizes.88 5
And the means for maintaining a "union-free" environment are ready-at-
hand and well-honed-even if legal reform eliminates the formal election
879. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 866, at 145-47 (advocating unions' right to induce
employees at non-struck firms to refuse to handle products destined for or coming from
struck firm); Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 269-73 (advocating
unions' right to boycott struck product).
880. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
Permanently replaced workers, unlike dischargees, are legally entitled to re-employment
after a strike if jobs come open and they have not taken work elsewhere. See Laidlaw
Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1366, 1368 (1968).
881. See Gould, supra note 841, at 169-70; see also Estreicher, supra note 524, at 55
(proposing that mandatory bargaining include the subject of interest arbitration); Weiler,
Striking a New Balance, supra note 3, at 407-08 (proposing interest arbitration as remedy
for employer's bad faith bargaining over first contracts). But see Weiler, Governing the
Workplace, supra note 3, at 249-51 (expressing deeper reservations about such
arbitration).
882. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 841, at 174; Estreicher, supra note 524, at 56; Stone,
supra note 869, at 102-11.
883. But see Matthew W. Finkin, Back to the Future of Labor Law, 32 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1005, 1006 (1991) (characterizing such reform proposals as disappointingly tepid)
(reviewing Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3).
884. Jacoby, supra note 428, at 26. Jacoby writes that United States managers' anti-
unionism, "as expressed in unitarian managerial philosophies, derives from a set of
beliefs... rather than from a careful weighing of the actual costs and benefits of unionism."
Id. The exceptional ferocity of United States managers' anti-unionism is widely
acknowledged and documented. See sources cited in Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1495
nn.490-95.
885. See Kochan et al., supra note 641, at 14-15, 52-53, 67, 70, 80; Hoyt N. Wheeler,
Industrial Conflict: An Integrative Theory 78 (1985).
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campaign preceding NLRB balloting. If denied the opportunity aggres-
sively to oppose unions once they have surfaced, employers have the very
same financial and cultural incentive to weave a lawful "anti-union cam-
paign" into the organizational warp and woof of the enterprise-to pre-
vent a critical mass of underground card-signers from ever coalescing.8 8 6
Indeed, that incentive is heightened by the shift toward enterprise-level
unionism encouraged by flexible organization. A newly unionized enter-
prise in an otherwise nonunion industry faces greater competitive disad-
vantage than under the industry-wide- or pattern-bargaining of the post-
War mass-production era.8 8 7
Showcase employers-such as IBM, Kodak, DuPont, Eli Lilly, North-
rop, TRW, Texas Instruments, and Proctor and Gamble-have already
spent decades developing such sophisticated models of unshakably non-
union organizational structures and cultures.8 88 One such nonunion
model-call it the "Baldridge Award" organization 8 89-is lean, human-
resource-intensive, and often has teams or weak representative commit-
tees (company unions, effectively) tightly integrated into the managerial
structure. 890 Another longstanding nonunion variant is the "elite bureau-
cratic" model, again human-resource-intensive, which treats individual
workers as salaried careerists whose future depends on their commitment
886. Others have made the different argument that, if the law permitted unionization
via card-signing or instant elections, employers would simply begin their anti-union
campaigns when they first learned of the organizing drive rather than wait until the union
filed an election petition. Proponents of the reform respond that in many workplaces,
employers do not learn of the underground card-signing drive until it achieves its majority
goal, and thus NLRB resources would be freed to focus on deterrence of illegalities by
those larger employers that are more likely to learn of the underground drive. See Weiler,
Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 256. My argument is that managers will
counter-respond-as they have always done, and have the continued financial and
personal incentive to do-by adopting one of the proven human-resources strategies for
building nonunionism into the organizational design.
887. See Craypo, supra note 642, at 12-20.
888. See Kochan et al., supra note 641, at 47-81; Jacoby, Norms and Cycles, supra
note 428, at 34-44.
889. The federal government's Malcolm Baldridge Award, begun in 1988, sets high-
performance benchmarks that thousands of firms now use. See, e.g., Christopher W.L.
Hart & Christopher E. Bogan, The Baldridge 23-39 (1992); David A. Garvin, How the
Baldridge Award Really Works, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 80, 80-95; Jeremy
Main, Is the Baldridge Overblown? Fortune, July 1, 1991, at 63, 63-65. Indeed, one
employer called the process of application and consultation with the Baldridge staff "'the
best consulting bargain around.'" Guillermo Gomez del Campo, TQM Implementation in
the U.S. and Japan: Lessons from Baldridge and Deming Prize Winners (1993)
(unpublished M.S. Thesis, MIT, Sloan School of Management) (quoting employer).
Although I use the term as a shorthand for a certain nonunion model, not all actual
Baldridge Award winners or mimics are nonunion.
890. For example, Dupont, TRW, and Marlow Industries. See Appelbaum & Batt,
supra note 605, at 132-33 (describing Mariow);Jacoby, Norms and Cycles, supra note 428,
at 39 (describing Dupont and TRW).
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to pervasive, management-defined principles and routines.89' Among
such "union avoidance" firms, the rates of union organizing drives and
union victories are a small fraction of even the declining rates in other
firms.
8 9 2
Proponents of the repeal of Section 8 (a) (2) generally agree that the
law should still police employers who implement team orjoint-committee
arrangements for anti-union motives after organizing drives have be-
gun-just as Section 8(a) (1) already prohibits any other similarly moti-
vated grant of benefits during organizing campaigns.893 I believe this
proposal has it backwards. It is precisely during union drives that workers
most readily perceive such employer gambits for what they are-by rea-
son of the "Oz Effect" discussed above.894 On the other hand, workers
are less likely to perceive fully the anti-union motivation or effect of pater-
nalistic structures "naturalized" in the everyday life of the organization
long before union talk is in the air. This is especially true of elite-bureau-
cratic and participatoy schemes that, unlike old-style company unions and
new-style joint strategic committees, are not patent competitors of union
agents that act as representatives of worker interests.
The French industrial relations experience of the 1980s is instruc-
tive. 895 The Auroux Laws of 1982 mandated the establishment of
participatory "expression groups" and gave only "consultative" rights to
worker-elected enterprise committees. The Conseil National du Patronat
Francais (CNPF) urged its member employers to train supervisors to con-
trol discussion in expression groups and to either ignore hostile commit-
tees or capture employee representatives with management's
overwhelming resources and information. The result was the rapid
spread of a new model of management-dominated, collaborative work sys-
tem, concurrent with a full halving of French union membership.
891. For example, IBM, Eastman Kodak, and Sears Roebuck. See Richard Edwards,
Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century
130-62 (1979) (analyzing the bureaucratic, nonunion model);Jacoby, Norms and Cycles,
supra note 428, at 34-44. Although the internal labor markets at the core of the elite
bureaucratic models are widely crumbling, see supra notes 579-80, 624 and accompanying
text, I believe that these organizations are sufficiently capable of adapting their union-
avoidance strategies to ongoing volatile environments even if they do not reconstitute their
old salaried ladders in the same form after the current period of turbulence.
892. See Kochan et al., supra note 641, at 78.
893. See Gould, supra note 841, at 140-41; Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra
note 3, at 214; Estreicher, supra note 524, at 55; Klare, supra note 834, at 51 n.33. Other
prominent proponents of repeal of Section 8(a) (2) include Theodore St. Antoine, supra
note 832, §§ 8-1 to 8-23, and Michael Gottesman, supra note 832, at 2805 n.169.
894. See supra Part III.C.
895. The following discussion relies primarily on Bernard E. Brown, Worker
Democracy in Socialist France, in Economic Restructuring and Emerging Patterns of
Industrial Relations 67, 67-77 (Stephen R. Sleigh ed., 1993); Bernard E. Brown, The Rise
and Fall of Autogestion in France, in Managing Modem Capitalism 195, 203-08 (M. Donald
Hancock et al. eds., 1991); W. Rand Smith, Towards Autogestion in Socialist France? The
Impact of Industrial Relations Reform, 10 W. Eur. Pol. 46, 46-62 (1987).
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A second ground for pessimism about the ultimate success of the
proposed reform package is the undeniable loss of vitality in popular cul-
tural perceptions of organized labor. Henry Farber and Alan Krueger's
recent econometric analysis, based on new (albeit crude) survey evi-
dence, concludes that the entire drop in unionization in the last fifteen
years is explained by nonunion workers' diminished desire to union-
ize.896 That preference change may well be explained in large part by the
cumulative "endogenous" effects of aggressive anti-union campaigning
and of the sophisticated nonunion modelsjust mentioned.8 97 This expla-
nation is concordant with the fact that private-sector nonunion workers
expressed increasing satisfaction with their employment conditions even
as their real wages deteriorated in the late 1970s and 1980s,8
9 8 while
workers who actually experienced unionized employment expressed
greater preference for unions.8 99 The concurrent greater preference for
unionization among nonunion workers in the public (compared with the
private) sector900 is consistent with the relative dearth of both anti-union
campaigns and sophisticated anti-union human-resource models in the
public sector. Labor reform must be attentive to the widespread percep-
tion, by no means fictive, among private-sector nonunion employees that
many unions have become ineffective, ossified bureaucracies unrespon-
sive to their members.9
0
'
It is unlikely that private-sector employees' preference for unioniza-
tion would be significantly increased by the foreknowledge that they
could resort to secondary boycotts or strikes (during which they can be
temporarily but not permanently replaced) to back up union demands
over strategic corporate decisions. First, the recent cultural legitimation
of employers' hiring of strike replacements entails managements' capac-
ity to continue operations even with temporary replacements902-espe-
cially in light of the long-term upward creep in unemployment rates.
Second, the current technical classification of strategic subjects as "per-
missive" rather than "mandatory" need not decisively affect actual bar-
gaining outcomes. Unions, by striking lawfully over some mandatory
subject, may already effectively induce management to relent to union
896. See Farber & Krueger, supra note 839, at 32.
897. Another explanation is the systematic negative tilt in mass-media portrayals of
organized labor. See supra note 839.
898. See Farber & Krueger, supra note 839, at 19-20.
899. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 7, at 145 (comparing perceptions of union power
among union members and nonmembers). Three-quarters of unionists express
satisfaction with their unions. See id. at 143.
900. See Farber & Krueger, supra note 839, at 5.
901. The point is well made in Alan Hyde, Endangered Species, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
456, 469-72 (1991) (reviewing Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3).
902. See, e.g., Kim Moody, An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unionism
140-41, 346 (1988).
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desires over permissive strategic subjects. 903 In any event, it seems un-
likely that workers' knowledge of incremental gains in union bargaining
power from legalizing secondary boycotts, or even from protecting work-
ers against permanent replacement, would do much to outweigh the now-
entrenched cultural perception that unions are powerless in the face of
employers' threatened or actual plant closings, mass layoffs, or simple in-
ability to pay higher wages in a globalized economy.90 4 Hence, notwith-
standing the public's general belief in the economic and social potential
of a democratic labor movement,90 5 most nonunion employees hold the
more specific belief that unions currently lack the power to protect their
members.906
This is not the 1930s and 1940s, the only era in United States history
to witness a sustained leap in private-sector mass unionization. That era
was marked by grinding labor conditions and poverty; workers' experi-
ence or recent memory of economic desperation and felt betrayal by em-
ployers in the aftermath of the Great Depression; the homogenization of
mass production workforces; a general cultural milieu still in transition
from "producerist" and work-ethic values to "consumerist" and hedonic
norms; volcanic labor unrest and populist political movements; lower
levels of product-market competition and capital mobility than today; a
rising, progressive political-intellectual elite that was zealously committed
to building a labor-corporatist society and that controlled decisive levers
of state power; and the crucial clinching effect of a superheated labor
market caused by state mobilization for all-out war. It took the conver-
gence of these conditions to overcome the abiding anti-unionism of
United States employers.90 7
If the prominent reform proposals would likely not substantially re-
suscitate the labor movement, they would also probably not fulfill either
the ideals of egalitarian deliberation in workers' choice of workplace
governance modes or of participation and self-transformation in work
processes. 908 Under the samizdat variant of the free-association propos-
903. See Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 3, at 379 n.92; The Supreme
Court, 1980 Term-Leading Cases, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 93, 333 (1981) (scope of mandatory
bargaining under the NLRA).
904. See Craypo & Nissen, supra note 662, at 3-17; Puette, supra note 839, at 154.
905. See supra notes 839-840 and accompanying text.
906. See FingerhutPowers, supra note 839; Gallup Poll, supra note 839.
907. See Fraser, supra note 39, at 259-494; Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1392-1412;
Jacoby, supra note 428, at 21-22.
908. Professor Gottesman rightly emphasizes that among the fastest growing
occupations recently are fast-food workers, dishwashers,janitors, and other unskilled, non-
careerist jobs. See Gottesman, supra note 832, at 2788. He may also be right to predict
that "vast numbers" of these workers would unionize "overnight" under the minimal
reform proposals, see id. at 2804, although many of them work in isolated or tiny
aggregations for staunchly anti-union employers. Surely the labor law regime should seek
concurrently to counter the deterioration of the United States job structure that this data
manifests. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Rising Wage Inequality: The
United States vs. Other Advanced Countries (May 7, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on
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als, worker communication is (in theory) freed of intimidating employer
campaigns, but workers still face the high-transaction costs and fragmen-
tary opportunities for persuasion afforded by underground communica-
tion. Under the fumigation proposals, employers' highly asymmetric
control of communicational channels and resources in election cam-
paigns is only slightly diminished.90 9 In any event, for the reasons just
offered, employers have every incentive to circumvent these attempts to
strengthen worker deliberation by building distorted communication
into the organizational structure and culture itself. As detailed in Part V,
such structure and culture tend not only to deflect governance choices,
but also to undermine self-realizing, discretionary work processes and au-
tonomous, egalitarian decision-making within frontline work groups.
The samizdat and fumigation strategies also leave in place a mode of
labor-market collectivization that does nothing to discourage low-trust ad-
versarial collective bargaining even if unionization occurs. To the con-
trary, management's extant distrust of unions is likely to be reinforced
under the samizdat proposals by the sudden surfacing of an underground
network of manifestly distrustful employees, or, under the fumigation
proposals, by an NLRB election campaign premised at best on adversarial
debate, and likely in practice to generate feelings of intimidation and
apprehension even with the most rigorous sanctions against coercion and
interference. 9 10
file with the Columbia Law Review). I do not underestimate the dignitary and due process
protections unionization would afford workers in "secondary market" jobs. But what sort
of bargaining power and autonomy can they achieve within the very labor-market regime
that disproportionately spawns such jobs-a regime of secularly rising unemployment,
chronically slow productivity growth, and an increasing race-to-the-bottom with other
contingent and low-skill workers?
909. Under these proposals, union organizers' access to workers-during work breaks
in public areas, and in rare, brief captive-audience reply speeches-remains negligible
compared to supervisors' constant, captive-audience access. And "disloyal" workers'
apprehension of an employer's power over their future careers cannot be expunged by
incrementally strengthened sanctions against employer coercion during the election
campaign.
910. Such deepened distrust can be reversed, but exceptional efforts and individuals
are usually necessary. After a hard-fought election campaign between Harvard University
and union supporters, a trusting, collaborative relationship was restored through the
extraordinary efforts of Kristine Rondeau and other leaders of the Harvard Union of
Clerical and Technical Workers, and John Dunlop representing the University. See John
Hoerr, Solidaritas at Harvard, Am. Prospect, Summer 1993, at 67, 67-82.
Although I have noted that the NLRB's adversarial election process may reinforce the
adversarial culture of United States labor relations, it bears mentioning that political
economists and legal policy-makers often overestimate the importance of the labor law
regime in affirmatively encouraging an adversarial mode of collective bargaining. In fact, the
labor law regime freely permits willing managers and unions to establish flexible,
collaborative relations, including full codetermination of strategic technological and
organizational design issues. Witness recent labor-relations developments in the auto,
steel, and communication industries. See supra notes 608-620 and accompanying text
and infra notes 932-935 and accompanying text. The problem, rather, is that managers
(and all too often unions) have been unwilling to enter into such perfectly lawful
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The final Part outlines an alternative labor law regime designed af-
firmatively to encourage open, robust egalitarian deliberation over
modes of workplace governance; to allow workers free choice of a wide
range of governance options without government imposition; to support
trust-building consultative relations between labor, management, and
other community stakeholders; to promote the diffusion of the types of
high-performance, participatory workplaces with the least potential for
paternalistic domination in the specific forms discussed at length in Part
V; and to provide incentives that proactively counter management's cul-
ture of adversarial anti-unionism and encourage the revitalization of
broadly encompassing democratic unions or wholly new forms of em-
ployee association. The proposals embody an approach to legal regula-
tion based on decentralized, facilitative public entities that are capable of
continuous self-revision through experimentation and consultation with
enterprise and community stakeholders.
VII. A LABOR LAW REGIME FOR DELIBERATiVE DEMOCRACY AND HIGH
PERFORMANCE ENTERPRISFS AND NETWORKS
A. The Basic Principles and Purposes of Deeper Refom
The regime I propose takes the two key principles embodied in the
original Wagner Act scheme, drastically expands their implementation,
relationships, and unions have not had the bargaining power to secure the strategic
safeguards that would permit more flexible shopfloor collaboration. That is, management
generally refuses to negotiate over (and reach agreement on) the permissive subject of
substituting such joint determination for its unilateral prerogatives on strategic and other
matters. Likewise, there is no legal restriction against unions and managers agreeing to
resolve disputes and solve substantive production problems through non-adversarial
consultative means rather than through arbitral orjudicial elaboration and enforcement of
densely specified workplace rules (including a contractual rule under which management
retains unilateral power over many aspects of workplace life). The problem again is that
management has proved unwilling, first, to give up its prerogatives on substantive decision-
making, and, second, to guarantee the kind of job security, distributional share, and
information disclosure that would make it sensible for workers to enter into such flexible
workplace relations. It is true that the Taft-Hartley Amendments symbolized, and to some
degree thereby reciprocally reinforced, the actual adversarialism in early post-war labor
relations. But the key provisions of Taft-Hartley that codified this symbolism-the strict
exclusion of supervisors from collective bargaining protections and from participation in
nonsupervisory unions-did not instrumentally prohibit unions and management from
establishing joint teams and committees or collaborative workplace problem-solving.
Indeed, more than half of unionized firms recently surveyed included some form of labor-
management cooperative committee or other joint program. See William N. Cooke,
Labor-Management Cooperation: New Partnerships or Going in Circles? 62 (1990).
But if the law already permits mutually willing managers and unions to establish
collaborative workplace institutions, it remains true that the legal regime does not
sufficiently counteract the social and economic reality of managers' persistent anti-
unionism and reluctance to give up their command-and-control prerogatives. The
proposals in the next section are designed to encourage affirmatively collaborative labor
relations, even if the current labor law regime does not affirmatively encourage (although
it allows) adversarial relations.
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and adapts them in order to accelerate the spread of those variants of
flexible enterprises and networks that hold the least danger of domina-
tion and the greatest promise of democratic deliberation.9 11 The first
principle is that the government's primary role should be to facilitate the
decentralized, private ordering of the workplace-particularly, to safe-
guard workers' free communication and choice over modes of workplace
governance. The second is that the legal regime should concurrently en-
courage, through instrumental incentives and normative symbols, the
emergence of democratic, labor-empowering forms of workplace govern-
ance-both to serve the ideals of undominated self-governance and to
enhance consultative trust and collaboration in productive efficiency.
9 12
In addition to expanding these two principles, my proposals add a third.
The law should build capacities for local variation and self-revision into
public institutions-capacities that mesh with the needs of the flexible
firms and networks with which the public entities collaborate. This addi-
tional principle itself adapts to present circumstances Robert Wagner's
general commitments to pragmatic experimentalism and to blurring the
line between the public and private spheres.
9 13
The slow demise of the Wagner Act scheme demonstrates that pres-
ent legal institutions that embody the two New Deal principles must be
radically fortified. The weak facilitative rules designed to ensure "labora-
tory conditions" for "free choice" should be replaced by more robust, gov-
ernmentally protected fora for well-informed, egalitarian deliberation
and choice. At the same time, in the era of flexible organization, work-
ers' choice-set should include not only unions for full-fledged collective
bargaining, but also self-managing shopfloor teams and joint strategic
committees at departmental, plant, divisional, enterprise, or multi-enter-
prise network levels. That is, unlike the current regime (specifically, Sec-
tion 8(a) (2)), my proposals allow those options; but unlike the minimum
reform proposals, my proposals enable workers affirmatively to choose
among them, and do not allow management or government to impose
participatory or representative schemes unilaterally.
The point of allowing and requiring workers to choose among these
widened options is threefold: first, to serve the ideal of collective self-
governance; second, to enhance the likelihood that workers will be com-
911. These proposals do not assume that the various elements of flexible organization
are singly orjointly appropriate or emergent in every firm or sector. Because the proposals
are built on the principles of facilitative regulation and private ordering, they do not
impede more traditional workplace relations even though they encourage flexible
organization.
912. The tension, but non-contradiction, between these two principles is explained in
Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1451 n.310.
913. See Senator Robert Wagner, Speech at the National Conference of Catholic
Charities 3-4 (Oct. 3, 1933) (transcript available in Robert Wagner Papers, Georgetown
University); Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1412-22.
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mitted to the design that they have chosen;914 and third, by requiring
unions' ongoing competition for workers' allegiance with alternative
modes of worker representation and participation, to encourage unions'
responsiveness to, and continuing mobilization of, their members. At the
same time, my proposals affirmatively support the capacity of unions, or
alternative emergent forms of independent employee associations, so to
compete by affording them a preferential role in the transmission of
training, technological, and organizational-design resources to workers.
As for the "encouragement" function of labor law, the times require
a more drastic legal shock-effect than the New Deal's normative legitima-
tion of workers' right to collective organization. In the midst of the De-
pression and the growing pains of mass-production, such symbolic
legitimation sufficed to electrify workers' subjective sense of entitlement
and their behavior.915 Given the labor movement's cultural stagnation
and employers' heightened incentives and means to maintain union-free
workplaces today, state intervention must be much more catalytic. My
proposals include government provision of direct economic incentives
for worker participation and representation, and face-to-face education
about the advantages of high-involvement work systems-an amplifica-
tion and decentralization of the New Deal's long-distance transmission of
the symbols and slogans of industrial democracy. As specialists in organi-
zational design widely report, comprehensive "paradigm-shifts" or "re-
framing" in enterprises generally require some highly committed
"change agent."91 6 In light of the public-good dilemmas of such change,
the government should assume the role of affirmatively nurturing the
emergence of change agents from among enterprise stakeholders-while
leaving the particular organizational design to private ordering. At the
914. The latter goal is disserved by proposals to allow management to impose team or
representative structures on workers (i.e. proposals simply to repeal Section 8(a) (2)), or to
mandate government imposition of works councils or other forms of codetermination.
915. Numerous historical case studies and surveys documenting this vivid instance of
the symbolic effect of law on non-legal actors are cited in Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1436
n.261. A Pittsburgh journalist described the effect of the government's declaration, in
Section 7(a) of the NIRA of 1933, of workers' right to organize, even though no
instrumental sanctions backed up that declaration:
Along came the New Deal, and then came the NRA, and the effect was electric all
up and down those valleys.... [T]he steelworkers read in the newspapers about
this NRA Section 7A that guaranteed you the right to organize. All over the steel
country union locals sprang up spontaneously. Not by virtue of the Amalgamated
Association [of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers, AFL]; they couldn't have cared less
.... You name the mill town and there was a local there, carrying a name like the
"Blue Eagle" or the "New Deal" local. These people had never had any
experience in unionism. All they knew was that, by golly, the time had come
when they could organize and the Government guaranteed them the right to
organize!
Staughton Lynd, The Possibility of Radicalism in the Early 1930s: The Case of Steel, in
Workers' Struggles, Past and Present 190, 191 (James Green ed., 1983) (quoting Harvey
O'Connor).
916. See supra Part V.C.
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same time, my proposals include minumum conditions that participatory
and representative options must meet to protect employees against orga-
nizational domination-that is, against institutional arrangements that
preempt their ongoing individual and collective capacity freely to rede-
sign workplace governance. 917 Those statutory minima-incorporated in
a revised Section 8(a) (2) jurisprudence of "domination"-would also
likely have even stronger symbolic benchmarking value than the potent
Baldridge Award criteria, 918 but would incorporate the ideals of high-
challenge, self-transformative work processes.
Section B reviews some historical and contemporary institutional ex-
periences that might give my proposals more plausibility and appeal. Sec-
tion C, finally, outlines those proposals.
B. Institutional Precursors, Imaginary and Real
First, I engage in a thought experiment about the institutions that
might have emerged in late 1933 if not for employers' scorched-earth
anti-unionism. Then, I survey some actual institutions, overseas and in
our states' "laboratories of democracy," that embody elements of my pro-
posed regime.
1. A Path Not Taken in the Autumn of 1933. - In August of 1933,
Franklin Roosevelt cabled Robert Wagner to cut short his European vaca-
tion and return to chair the newly established National Labor Board.919
The President hoped that the Senator's prestige might enhance the
Board's only "sanction" to enforce Section 7(a) of the Recovery Act-its
appeal to public opinion.920 The Board's original expectation was that
workers, by whatever means they themselves saw fit, would deliberate and
choose whether to form collective representatives for purposes of bar-
gaining with employers. 921 Employers quickly squelched such expecta-
tions by launching coercive campaigns against supporters of independent
unions, by imposing management-manipulated employee representation
plans (company unions), and by refusing to acknowledge workers'
outside unions as genuine representatives. In response, the NLB and its
1934-35 successor, the "old" NLRB, sought settlements or issued (unen-
forceable) orders requiring elections in order to "demonstrate" to em-
ployers that workers genuinely sought independent representation.
917. That the dangers of various specific forms of domination in the new flexible
workplaces are potentially more insidious than under old-style company unionism was
discussed at length in Part V.
918. See supra note 889.
919. See J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban
Liberalism 153 (1968).
920. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal 147 (American
Heritage Library ed., 1988).




Employers' continuing resistance drew the Boards more deeply into fram-
ing and supervising the election process.
Whether employee representation should be proportional or
majoritarian, and whether employer-controlled organizations should ap-
pear on the ballot, were utterly contingent political questions that sharply
divided key federal policymakers. From 1933 to 1935, in fact, workers
were permitted the choice of company unions, and in some sectors (most
notably, the auto industry) proportional representation prevailed over
majority rule. In 1935, Senator Wagner's legislation-which codified ex-
clusive representation by the majority-supported union and prohibited
employer-dominated organizations-triumphed over Roosevelt's oppo-
site but weaker preferences on both issues. Wagner's program of govern-
ment-supervised elections of exclusive representatives, in turn, required
that the NLRB define the "bargaining unit" of employees whose majority
would count. The bargaining-unit issue was insignificant before 1935 be-
cause the old Boards generally intervened in crises where workers' strikes
had already defined de facto election units.
Now imagine that the NLB's naive expectations of August 1933 had
been fulfilled-that is, that employers in no way interfered with workers'
self-structured process of communication and choice over workplace gov-
ernance modes. Workers would aggregate in "units" and deliberate
among themselves as they desired. Perhaps they would consult local no-
tables, specialists, union officials, and even their (by hypothesis, wholly
benign) employers about optimal workplace arrangements. 922 Indeed, in
a world in which employers did not interpose management-supported
participatory or representative structures to "divide and conquer," some
workers might well choose such workplace arrangements in addition to
or apart from independent unionization. (Even during the general la-
bor-management combat of 1933-35, the Boards ruled that some com-
pany unions were freely elected.923) The legal regime could leave to
unionized workers themselves the decision whether to present a united
front and iron out their subgroup differences within a single union, or
instead to play coalition politics among separate agents in a system of
proportional representation. Alternatively, in light of the free-rider
problems of workers' collective action, the law might grant exclusive bar-
gaining rights-displacing proportional, minority, or individual bargain-
ing-to a representative that achieved majority support in some
reasonably bounded (but still initially worker-defined) bargaining unit.
Workers might well choose units larger than a single enterprise.
My reform proposal attempts in some ways to simulate this imaginary
path, but in a world of entrenched anti-union managerial norms and
922. Indeed, legislators expected that workers would engage in such consultations
among themselves, with community leaders, and with employers, once protected against
coercion under the NLRA.
923. See Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1451-52.
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emerging flexible enterprises and networks. The next subsection surveys
some real-life institutions that point the way.
2. Institutional Forerunners. - My proposals draw on elements of do-
mestic institutional innovations by state and local governments and by
joint union-management entities, and on foreign legal institutions, some
of which, in turn, were forerunners of the domestic innovations.
a. Homegrown Decentralized Concertation. - A variety of promising pro-
grams have emerged under the aegis of state and local governments' eco-
nomic-development efforts, of joint union-management councils, or of
some blend of the two. These wide-ranging programs channel such re-
sources as advanced technological know-how, organizational-design serv-
ices, worker training, marketing support, and capital through
decentralized councils, conferences, or consortia. The collective partici-
pants in these decentralized entities include representatives of employers
(often including several horizontally or vertically connected small and
medium-sized enterprises), unions, nonunion workforces, state or local
technical agencies, private consultants, or public and private educational
and research institutions. For our purposes, an important element of
some of these meso- and micro-corporatist initiatives is that they condi-
tion grants of their various resources on (1) partnerships between unions
and management in deploying the resources, (2) management's creation
of new worker participation or representation structures, or (3) invest-
ment in workers' and unions' long-term "proactive capacity" to engage in
major organizational and technological redesign. It is an incremental,
albeit long, step to imagine the basic functions of the labor law regime
systematically embedded in such programs. By the mandate of federal
labor law, decentralized, government-supported "workplace participation
centers" could provide both protected fora for free worker deliberation,
and resources and information for encouraging high-participation, un-
dominated governance choices.
One of the pioneers of such local concertation was the Jamestown
Area Labor-Management Committee (JALMC) in New York State,924 an
economic-renewal initiative sparked in the late 1960s by a representative
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and a dynamic
mayor.925 JALMC was steered jointly by the FMCS official, the mayor and
city ombudsmen, and union and management leaders. With the help of
federal and state funding, preeminent consultants in workplace participa-
tion, Eric Trist and William Foote Whyte, and the vocational resources of
Jamestown Community College, JALMC established joint labor-manage-
ment committees in many local manufacturing plants. The collaborative
committees implemented training, gainsharing, and problem-solving pro-
grams, and even major organizational redesign. For example, three hun-
dred employees, with the support of JALMC, contributed their intimate
924. The story of JALMC is told in Simmons & Mares, supra note 782, at 80-95.
925. The mayor, Stanley Lundine, is now Lieutenant Governor of New York.
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shopfloor know-how to a joint committee's plan to redesign the Carbo-
rundum glass manufacturing plant, at a final cost that was forty percent
less than the design of an outside engineering firm. Many participating
managers and unionists attested to the gains in trust and worker initiative
thatJALMC yielded-as well as to the widespread managerial resistance
due to entrenched norms of hierarchical control.926
By the late 1980s, several state governments launched systematic pro-
grams that developed similar labor-management-govemment councils in
hundreds of communities.927 Among the foremost programs, Michigan
Modernization Service's (MMS) comprehensive system of "industrial ex-
tension" services helped "small manufacturers upgrade their production
technologies, retrain their workers, revamp their labor-management sys-
tems, find new markets, even launch new companies." 928 From the point
of view of facilitating flexible networks of high-performance companies
that face intense global competition, one of MMS's most notable initia-
tives was the Council of Independent Parts Suppliers in southwestern
Detroit. The Council brought together labor and management repre-
sentatives of twenty auto-parts suppliers to upgrade technology, organiza-
tional design, and training, all linked with enhanced labor-management
consultation and worker participation.929 Similar stories of collaboration
and participation in enterprises and networks of enterprises emerged
from Pennsylvania's Industrial Resource Councils (IRCs) and Manufac-
turing Innovation Network Initiative (MAIN); 930 Massachusetts's various
926. A teacher at Jamestown Community College observed: "It takes years of
relentless pushing [of control-minded company managers] to get some changes.
Management knows they should ask for more participation from workers in decision-
making. But it goes against their values." Simmons & Mares, supra note 782, at 94
(quoting Larry Carter). A keen participant-observer in similar programs in Pennsylvania
likewise stated that in the absence of fundamental changes in corporate culture, "'[m]iddle
managers often sabotage the cooperative activities, fearing a loss of authority and
responsibility.'" David Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy 74 (1988) (quoting Robert
Coy, director of several successive statewide economic-development programs).
927. See Gary Florkowski, Area Labor-Management Committees in the 1990s:
Retrenchment or Revival?, in Proc. of the 45th Ann. Meeting of the Indus. Rel. Res. Ass'n,
271, 271-81 (Indus. Rel. Res. Ass'n Series,John F. Burton ed., 1993) (reporting improved
labor-management cooperation and productivity in large-sample survey of area labor-
management committees); Arnold M. Howitt et al., A National Overview of State Labor-
Management Cooperation Programs, in Proc. of the 42d Ann. Meeting of the Indus. Rel.
Res. Ass'n, 58, 58-69 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1990) [hereinafter Proceedings (1990)]
(surveying twelve state programs).
928. Osborne, supra note 926, at 167. A new governor eliminated the program in the
winter of 1990, but some of the area councils continued with employer, union, and other
funding. See Michael Schippani, Labor and Industrial Relations Strategies in the State of
Michigan, in Economic Restructuring, supra note 895, at 109, 119.
929. See Schippani, supra note 928, at 116-18; see also Charles F. Sabel, Can the End
of the Social Democratic Trade Unions Be the Beginning of a New Kind of Social
Democratic Politics?, in Economic Restructuring, supra note 895, at 37, 158-59.
930. The Pennsylvania program facilitated collaborative networks within local
industries, including Pittsburgh-area foundries, Erie plastics manufacturers, and Lehigh
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regional development programs and its Center for Applied Technology
(CAT); and Ohio's county-level Area Labor-Management Committees
(ALMCs).931
The creative efforts of unions and employers have propelled many of
the domestic experiments in regional and local concertation. I have al-
ready mentioned several instances in which unions acted as strategic part-
ners in designing and implementing high-performance, team-based
enterprises: the UAW and Saturn; the Textile Workers and Xerox; the
Communication Workers and U.S. West; and the Steelworkers and
LTV.932 While that are paradigmatic cases of so-called 'jointness" be-
tween labor and management, they of course entailed complex series of
consultations not only between shifting configurations or "slices" among
both sides, but also consultations with other stakeholders, supplier net-
works, organizational consultants, community leaders, and educational-
training institutions. 933 There are also many instances of full-blown re-
gional multi-stakeholder councils, akin to the Jamestown model, that
were initiated by labor and employer associations rather than by govern-
ment catalysts-such as the Philadelphia Area Labor-Management Com-
mittee (PALM) and the statewide MILRITE Council in Pennsylvania.934
Joint programs that offer workers job training, as well-as larger ca-
reer-development and "lifelong learning" opportunities, require similar
innovations in consultative governance and delivery institutions. These
programs, while self-consciously aimed at deepening consultative trust be-
tween labor and management, enable unions simultaneously to provide
richly appreciated benefits to frontline workers and to mobilize members
for active participation in union and workplace governance. Exemplars
include the Alliance for Employee Growth and Development among the
Communication Workers, the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, and AT&T; and the Education, Development and Training Pro-
Valley textile and apparel makers. See Robert Coy et al., Collaborative Restructuring
Efforts: Textile and Apparel Labor-Management Innovation Network, Lehigh Valley,
Pennsylvania, in Economic Restructuring, supra note 895, at 91, 91-108; Sabel, Studied
Trust, supra note 685, at 126-37. See generally Osborne, supra note 926, at 43-81
(providing background information on Pennsylvania and other state programs).
931. See Frank Emspak, Applying Skills-Based Automation Through Participatory
Management: The Center for Applied Technology, in Economic Restructuring, supra
note 895, at 121; Paul F. Gerhart et al., Ohio Economic Development: The Effects of State
Intervention to Improve the Labor-Management Relations Climate, in Proceedings (1990),
supra note 927, at 46, 51-53; Sabel, Studied Trust, supra note 685, at 124.
932. See supra text accompanying notes 613-618.
933. The United States labor movement has produced important historical precursors
of the recent experiments. Most notably, since the interwar period union engineering
departments have set enterprise efficiency and design standards for employers in the
garment industry, see, e.g., Fraser, supra note 39, at 170-77, although without the
emphasis on high-learning, self-revising work processes of today's experiments.
934. See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 926, at 71; Arthur B. Shostak, Robust Unionism:
Innovations in the Labor Movement 21-23 (1991).
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gram of Ford and the UAW.935 Committed organizations like the CWA
and UAW have found that, for such programs to succeed, unions must
devise grass-roots, participatory committees to determine members' local
educational preferences and needs, and must actively mobilize local ac-
tors to spark their interest and commitment. These largely unnoticed
initiatives point toward renewed roles for broader employee organiza-
tions even in-especially in-a world of global competition and flexible,
continuous-learning enterprises. Amidst fluid corporate boundaries and
more flexible external labor markets, trans-enterprise employee organiza-
tions-with the encouragement of a reformed labor law regime-may in-
creasingly function as suppliers of the public goods of training,
education, and career readjustment resources, in addition to serving as
repositories of technological- and work-design capacities based on an em-
ployee rather than a managerial perspective.
b. Overseas Institutions. - There are innumerable foreign models to
which one might turn for practical schemes of decentralized government
facilitation of labor-management consultation and fortification of em-
ployee participation. 93 6 I will at this point simply mention some institu-
tions that serve as reference points in my discussion below. First, German
systems of labor relations offer workers a more robust and independent
role in shopfloor governance than, for example, Japanese enterprise un-
ions, consultative committees, and paternalistic work groups. While this
is due in significant part to the support provided by more centralized (or
regional) union bargaining power, the legal regime also plays a vital role
through direct statutory mandates of the minimal authority of works
councils. In any event, German unionists and works councils have devel-
oped more worker-empowering models both of participatory work-group
process and of enterprise-level representative structures than have
emerged under the Toyota model of lean production. Professor Sum-
mers rightly noted in the mid-1980s that even German works councils
tended to subordinate employees' interests to management's more than
did United States union locals.93 7 The late 1980s, however, saw a belated
surge in German unions' interest in collaborating with works councils to
develop models of group work process independent of managerial ap-
proaches to Teamarbeit.938
935. These and other joint training and "lifelong learning" programs are described in
the papers collected in Joint Training Programs: A Union-Management Approach to
Preparing Workers for the Future (Louis A. Ferman et al. eds., 1991), and in Rosemary
Batt & Paul Osterman, Case Studies for a National Policy for Workplace Training: Lessons
from State and Local Experiments (1993).
936. Some foreign models of government-facilitated, decentralized tripartism date
back to the early nineteenth century. In Denmark and the Kingdom of Wfirttemburg, for
example, the state provided training and technological resources contingent on joint
governance by local masters and journeymen. See Sabel, supra note 582, at 48.
937. See Clyde Summers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker
Participation, 8 Comp. Lab. L.J. 333, 338 (1987).
938. See supra notes 744-745 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Scandinavians have likewise developed models of group-
based technology and organization explicitly based on norms of worker
"self-realization" and deliberately designed to counter the "Team
Taylorist" tendencies of zero-slack production. 939 They have also legally
codified, although implemented only partially in practice, employees'
and their representatives' entitlement to develop the capacity to engage
fully in technological and job design.940 In both Germany and Scandina-
via, however, labor's actual development of such proactive capacities has
come largely through innovative, collectively bargained rights to hold pe-
riodic joint councils with management to map future technological and
workforce skill requirements. 941 But, significantly, the legislative pro-
nouncements had sufficient symbolic effect to "spark[ ] broad discussion
within and among local unions of alternative concepts for worker train-
ing and work organization."942 More striking perhaps are recent large-
scale Swedish experiments in organizational "design conferences." Such
intensive conferences use various configurations of large- and small-
group consultations over several-day periods to involve all employees and
other stakeholders in major organizational overhauls. The progenitors of
939. See Berggren, supra note 601, at 6-20, 90-183; Jonas Pontusson, Unions, New
Technology, and Job Redesign at Volvo and British Leyland, in Bargaining for Change,
supra note 578, at 277, 291-96.
940. See, e.g., Frank Blackler & Colin Broan, The Law andJob Design: Comments on
Recent Norwegian Legislation, 13 Indus. Rel. J. 73, 73-82 (1982).
941. For developments in Germany, see, e.g., Thelen, supra note 744, at 197, 209,
219; Turner, supra note 571, at 185-86; Horst Kern & Charles F. Sabel, Trade Unions and
Decentralized Production: A Sketch of Strategic Problems in the West German Labor
Movement 27 (Jan. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review). On Swedish and Norwegian innovations, see, e.g., Berggren, supra note 601, at
78-90; Bjorn Gustavsen, Technology and Collective Agreements: Some Recent
Scandinavian Developments, 16 Indus. Re. J. 34, 35-41 (1985). Consider, for example,
Turner's description of the system of local, regional, and national "personnel councils" in
the Deutsche Bundespost (a state enterprise combining postal, telecommunication, and
banking services):
[T]he councils have codetermination rights regarding job design and the use of
new technology... [T]he [union representing Bundespost workers] and the
councils have used these rights to support the introduction of new technology
and to ensure that technological change includes an improved quality of working
life for the affected employees.
When new technology is in the planning stages, the personnel councils send
their own specially trained representatives to study the equipment and analyze its
impact on jobs and working conditions. On the basis of their independent
analysis, personnel councils then negotiate with management concerning
appropriate technology and job design.... The personnel council negotiates for
relocation for the displaced [and for] improved working conditions and
ergonomics [for remaining workers] ....
Turner, supra note 571, at 186.
942. Thelen, supra note 744, at 208 (describing impact on Swedish Metalworkers'
Union of legislation establishing grants for jointly administered training, research and
development, and work innovation).
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these conferences self-consciously base them on Habermasian ideals of
egalitarian communication. 943 Similar experiments in intensive large-
group conferences designed to involve stakeholders in, and commit them
to, the redesign of economic enterprises and community institutions are
legion, in North America and abroad.944
C. An Outline of Deeper Labor Law Reform
1. Pieces of the Puzzle, Already on the Table. - A variety of legislative
proposals and administrative changes incorporating some of these inno-
vations-particularly the state and regional industrial extension and
training programs-have surfaced at the federal level under the Clinton
administration. The possible connection between these disparate federal
initiatives and labor-law-reform proper has not yet been drawn.
The proposed Manufacturing Technology and Extension Act of 1993
would authorize substantial increases in the budget of the Commerce De-
partment's National Institute of Standards and Technology for purposes
of creating a network of thirty National Manufacturing Technology Cen-
ters and one hundred satellite Manufacturing Outreach Centers. A
stated goal of the Senate bill is "to help United States manufacturers,
especially small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, to adopt
best current manufacturing technologies and practices and, as appropri-
ate, new advanced manufacturing equipment and techniques."945
Meanwhile, the proposed Workers Technology Skill Development
Act of 1993 would authorize the Department of Labor to make matching
grants to democratically elected "worker organizations," educational insti-
tutions, and other nonprofit organizations. 946 The purpose of the grants
is to provide training and other resources to enable workers and their
organizations to gain "the expertise necessary for effective participation
with employers" in developing and implementing "advanced workplace
technologies and advanced workplace practices and forms of work organ-
943. The best English-language overviews are in P.H. Englestad, Action Research and
Network Development (1992); Bj6rn Gustavsen, Dialogue and Development: Theory of
Communication, Action Research and the Restructuring of Working Life 39-120 (1992);
Bj6m Gustavsen, Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue, 6 Econ. & Indus.
Democracy Rev. 461, 461-72 (1985).
944. They range from Kodak's "stakeholder conferences" for designing new
technological systems, see McKersie & Walton, supra note 827, at 270, to Tavistock-inspired
"large Group" conferences at a British construction equipment manufacturer, see Eric J.
Miller, Organizational Development and Industrial Democracy: A Current Case-Study, in
2 Group Relations Reader 243, 256-65 (Arthur D. Colman & Marvin H. Geller eds., 1985),
to various community-wide consultative conferences focusing on particular projects or
issues. For a popularized account of many of these, see the dozens of case studies sketched
in Marvin R. Wiesbrod et a., Discovering Common Ground (1992).
945. S. 4, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 212 (1993) (pending in committee); cf. H.R 820,
103d Cong. 1st Sess. § 202 (1993) (pending in committee) (stating similar goal).
946. See S. 1020, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-5 (1993) (pending in committee). The
term "worker organizations" appears to be broader than "labor organization" as defined in
NLRA § 2(5).
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ization."947 The grantees may use the funds themselves or may assist state
extension services or federal Outreach Centers to develop cooperative
labor-management programs for implementing new technologies, auton-
omous work teams, job redesign for "expanded responsibility and auton-
omy for frontline workers," multi-skilling, and continuous-learning
programs.948 The bill also directs the Departments of Labor and Com-
merce jointly to gather and disseminate, through the Outreach Centers
or otherwise, information about "best practice cases" and about the best
training and organizational services for helping worker organizations de-
velop such proactive capacities.
At the same time, the Department of Labor has created a new divi-
sion-the Office of the New American Workplace-to promote high-per-
formance, cooperative workplaces.949 Finally, there is a rash of proposals
for enhanced provision of training, skill upgrading, andjob readjustment
resources for frontline workers-by contrast with past labor market pro-
grams more narrowly targeted at especially disadvantaged and unem-
ployed workers.
My proposals for more robust labor-law reform can be understood as
an integration of these various institutional and funding proposals into a
greatly revamped and decentralized version of a venerable, sprawling ad-
ministrative network: the NLRB and its Regional Offices. The remaining
subsections, finally, set out the basic components of such reform. I leave
for future work the drafting of statutory language specifying the more
precise architecture of these new building blocks.
2. The Institutional Component: Regional "Centers for Advanced Workplace
Participation. " - As intimated above, the institutional core of my propos-
als is a system of regional offices-call them Centers for Advanced Work-
place Participation-that combine the current functions of the NLRB
regional offices and the germinating Manufacturing Outreach Centers.
The Participation Centers would have several functions. First, they
would, as in the legislative proposals mentioned above, serve as informa-
tional clearing-houses for benchmark practices in technology, par-
ticipatory and high-challenge work processes, and democratic
organizational design. Second, they would provide a high-visibility, one-
stop link between regional employers and employees, on the one hand,
and federal and state resources for workplace training, career adjust-
ment, technological development, organizational design, and perhaps
other purposes (e.g., marketing strategies or start-up capital for smaller
businesses) on the other. The actual service-providers-that is, the grant-
ees of such resources-would include employer associations, unions and
other employee organizations, private research and development firms,
organizational consultants, and educational institutions. Third, the Cen-
947. S. 1020 § 3(2).
948. Id. §§ 4(5), 4(6), 5(c).
949. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), July 19, 1993, at A-3.
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ters would supervise and protect the process of employee deliberation
and choice over workplace governance modes, and serve the other en-
forcement and mediation functions currently vested in the NLRB Re-
gional Offices and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
3. The Self-Governance Component: Ensuring Workers'Active Choice Among
Governance Modes. - As already mentioned, workers should be allowed
and required to choose among the variety of governance modes de-
scribed in more detail below. (Under one version of my experimental
scheme, discussed below, workers would be required to deliberate over
their governance choice anew at designated intervals.) This proposal en-
visages a restoration of the policy prevailing in 1933-35, when workers
chose among not only nonunion and unionized workplaces, but also em-
ployer-supported representation plans (company unions). As discussed
above, some commentators have suggested that if legal reform fortifies
protection of employees' right to unionize, then workers who failed to
unionize could be deemed to have "chosen" any extant management-im-
posed employee-involvement schemes permitted by the concurrent re-
peal of Section 8(a) (2).950 But if workers must bear even the
hypothetically diminished transaction costs of organizing and choosing
independent unions, then it is hard to justify giving management the
freedom unilaterally to impose representative or participatory structures
that hold all the risks of manipulation and entrenched antiunion "natu-
ralization" discussed at length in Part V above.
By the same token, there are affirmative justifications for a require-
ment that employees actively endorse such in-house entities. First, the
requirement provides workers an occasion for conscious reflection and
discussion about the dangers of manipulation and paternalism (as well as
the potential benefits) inherent in such schemes. Indeed, one of the
facilitative functions of the regional Centers' staff would be to inform
workers about the widely different forms and outcomes-both pathologi-
cal and empowering-that team systems can yield. Recall that the legisla-
tion already pending in the Senate would authorize Outreach Centers to
disseminate information about best-practice autonomous teams and rep-
resentative committees. My proposal integrates this function into the la-
bor law regime proper. Second, such conscious, informed deliberation
would help prepare workers to monitor the good faith of both their em-
ployee representatives' and employers' performance if employees ulti-
mately opted for the schemes. This would diminish the possibility that,
after workers have chosen participatory or representative structures, em-
ployers could quietly build manipulative practices into teams or coopt
committee representatives "behind workers' backs." In these respects,
legal institutions would in part play the role ascribed to critical theorists
themselves-the role of dialogically apprising subordinate actors of the
950. See supra text accompanying note 835.
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opaque power relations that may shape their preferences and
perceptions. 951
Third, because such schemes are typically more successful when
workers are highly committed, 952 their formal endorsement may enhance
the effectiveness of nonunion participatory workplaces. At the same
time, if workers are informed about both the perils and promise of in-
house schemes, they may be less likely to experience the shattered expec-
tations that undermine participation if management oversells the scheme
to overcome workers' skepticism about management-initiated programs.
The imprimatur of government-supervised selection-and of the legis-
lated, benchmark minima for in-house schemes discussed below-would
also likely enhance workers' capacity to wield the empowering norm of
democratic participation in consultations with management.953 Finally,
trans-enterprise unions would face healthy, revitalizing competition if
workers could periodically choose among in-house options and a range of
existing and emergent employee organizations-so long as workers'
ongoing freedom to deliberate and choose governance modes is in fact
protected. This brings us to the central problem of ensuring employees'
egalitarian deliberation against the backdrop of employers' entrenched
anti-unionism and control of workplace communication channels.
4. The Process Component: Formal, Nonadversarial "Conferences for Em-
ployee Choice."
a. The Familiar, Intractable Problem of Egalitarian Deliberation Under
Asymmetric Power. - Basic features of the workplace make the problem of
legally ensuring open, well-informed employee discussion about enter-
prise governance appear intractable, as students of labor law well know.
The most important feature, as already summarized, is employers' au-
thoritarian control of workplace interaction and communication. This
permits subtle or covert intimidation not only against potential union
supporters during workers' deliberations but also against incumbent em-
ployees who testify at subsequent NLRB unfair labor practice trials.
One apparent solution is to make unionization or even some fuller
form of workers' control the default position in the employment rela-
tion.954 Employees would then deliberate from an initial position of
greater collective self-protection against employer intimidation. 95 5 Em-
ployees' recent revealed preferences, combined with the theory of adap-
951. See Geuss, supra note 128, at passim.
952. See supra notes 645-655 and accompanying text.
953. See supra notes 778-787 and accompanying text.
954. In Senate hearings on the Wagner Act, the legal realist Robert Hale argued
compellingly that an individual worker faces less coercion and greater autonomy under
mandatory unionism than under a state of nonunionism. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra
note 135, at 51, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist, supra note 47, at 81.
955. Although Wagner was confident that administrative sanctions would protect
nonunion workers against employer coercion, see Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1444 n.291,
other contemporaneous labor progressives argued that only the workplace presence of a
union could meaningfully safeguard workers from managerial anti-unionism.
959
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tive preferences, may add to the appeal of this solution. That is, workers
who have experienced union representation express high absolute levels
of satisfaction with their unions and substantially stronger preferences for
unions than those who never have.956 In the face of the high transaction
costs, free-rider problems, and fear borne by union supporters, the pref-
erences of nonunion workers may tend to accommodate the nonunion
status quo.
957
The appeal of mandating unionization as the workplace default posi-
tion is somewhat (although, to my mind, not decisively) diminished so
long as workers are allowed to choose authoritarian workplace govern-
ance. If an incumbent workforce chooses managerial fiat over joint de-
termination, the governance choice by the next "generation" of
employees (after workforce turnover) will again require legal protection
against employer intimidation. At the same time, if workers are either
not free to opt out of democratic workplace governance or not required
affirmatively to choose unionization, their commitment to participate
and to monitor representatives, and their representatives' reciprocal in-
centive to mobilize and be responsive to workers, may tend to diminish
under the familiar iron law of oligarchy.958 And, on the plane of princi-
ple, if not free to opt out of unionism, employees would lose the right to
choose for themselves the tradeoff, if any, between welfarist 959 and other
values, on the one hand, and the value of decentralized democratic par-
ticipation, on the other.960
I believe that, on balance, the default state of unionization would
more accurately reflect the undominated long-term subjective prefer-
ences of employees in the current economic environment and would pro-
vide a more protected setting for ongoing egalitarian deliberation about
956. See supra note 899.
957. See supra note 842-860, 896-900 and accompanying text; Weiler, Governing the
Workplace, supra note 3, at 278 n.69; Cass I Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and
Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1041 (1984).
958. See Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Tendencies of Modem Democracy 15, 70 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., 1962)("organization implies the tendency to oligarchy"); cf. Estreicher, supra note 524, at 53
(arguing that "[w] orks councils cannot simply be imposed on an overwhelmingly nonunion
workplace that has yet to develop even a system of collaborative representation). There is
historical evidence that unions tend to ossify when not faced with the need for continuous
.organizing" of even current members. The automatic dues-deduction from paychecks
afforded unions during World War 11 appears to have reinforced the labor movement's
adherence to a "service" rather than "mobilizing" model of unionism. See supra note 935
and accompanying text. That is, in order to fund collective action, union stewards no
longer had continually to organize the membership. See Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor's
War at Home: The CIO in World War II 79-81 (1982).
959. In pecuniary terms, labor's possibly enlarged distributive share from more
efficient production.
960. Recall that seeing decentralized democracy as a weighty ideal does not
necessarily entail that more centralized democratic participation and other values are less
weighty. See supra notes 663-665 and accompanying text.
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governance modes.961 But because a mandate of "default" unionization
would likely launch my proposals into the political ozone,9 62 it is worth
exploring intermediate critical-pragmatic proposals that do not incorpo-
rate such a mandate.963 (In the spirit of my proposals below for decen-
tralized experimentation, however, a regime of default unionization
could still be tried on a regional basis.)
Before turning to such intermediate proposals, it is important to in-
sist on legal reformation at least to the extent of permitting management
and unions to initiate unionized workplaces prior to employee choice. I
have in mind the kind of pre-hire agreement between unions and em-
ployers that launched the Saturn plant. Although the NLRB General
Counsel declined to file an unfair labor practice complaint against the
UAW and GM, Saturn's birth was beclouded by the NLRA's ban on em-
ployer recognition of a union prior to its achievement of majority support
among an established employee complement.96 4 In light of the fact that
workers' governance choice is, if anything, more freely made in a union
rather than a nonunion setting, there is no principled reason to block the
desirable joint union-management planning of work processes and orga-
nizational design from scratch.
In addition to the presence of employer control of worker livelihood
and workplace communicational channels, the legal regime confronts a
debilitating absence from worker deliberation-the lack of a third-party
watchdog. During political elections, the mass media put at least weak
constraints on campaigners' misrepresentations and stronger constraints
on outright intimidation or bribery of voters. There is generally no such
961. I use the term "undominated" in a relative, not absolute, sense. See supra note
125. That is, I do not deny that unionized workers experience various processes of
domination or manipulation deployed by unions, fusions of union-management elites, and
many other institutions outside the workplace. But the evidence that employees who have
experienced both union and nonunion workplaces strongly favor the former is telling. See
supra note 899 and accompanying text. And there is no doubt that unionized workers are
vulnerable to much diminished levels of overt coercion and manipulation compared to
nonunion workforces. Finally, my proposals for protected deliberative Conferences
safeguard employees against both employer and union intimidation and manipulation
during employees' deliberative process and indirectly deter such coercion even outside
Conferences. See infra notes 970-975, 982-983 and accompanying text.
962. Cf. Gottesman, supra note 832, at 2807 (summarizing view that employers
opposed to mandated German-style works councils "would find political pay dirt in the
deep-seated American commitment to freedom of contract").
963. My intermediate proposals do retain a residue of the political dream of
mandating default unionism, in the form of offering enterprises (cumulative) valuable
organizational resources conditioned on workers' or managers' choice of (cumulatively)
democratic governance modes, including empowered teams, strategic joint committees,
and full-fledged unionization. See infra notes 971-72, 980, 995, 1003, 1041-42 and
accompanying text.
964. It is no coincidence that an era of fluid enterprise boundaries and fast-changing
products should raise the pre-hire problem on a broad scale. That problem has always
inhered in such short-product-cycle sectors as construction and apparel manufacturing.
See Piore & Sabel, supra note 109, at 115-20.
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independent monitor of the day-to-day communications and interactions
during workplace campaigns, let alone from the time workers enter the
sophisticated nonunion enterprise. Workers must discount the reliability
of campaign propaganda; their decision-making is thus further removed
from the ideal of fully informed deliberation.96 5 The absence of an on-
the-spot monitor and arbiter not only weakens deterrence of misrepre-
sentation and intimidation. It also entails that legal remedies, including
rerun elections, may come long after employees' intangible psychic re-
sources for collective mobilization are beyond restoration.
b. The Solution: Government-Facilitated Deliberative Conferences. - The
legal regime should afford employees a protected forum, radically re-
moved from the day-to-day context of employer authority, in which they
can openly discuss their workplace governance options. It should also
ensure that workers are well and accurately informed about the content
and possible consequences of those options. The staff of the Centers for
Advanced Workplace Participation could serve as facilitators of intensive
Conferences-akin to the North American and Swedish organizational
design conferences-in which workers would meet in a series of large
and small group settings to discuss and ultimately to make their govern-
ance choice. The cost of such Conferences-in terms of administration
and foregone production-would be substantially offset by other propos-
als, discussed below, that would diminish the resources, time, and turmoil
otherwise devoted to anti-union campaigns.
Adapting the pending Senate legislation, the Participation Center
staff could provide organizational, technological, market, and work-de-
sign information relevant to the employees' deliberations. But the Cen-
ters should also provide employees with access to nongovernmental
sources of information and expertise. Prior to the Conferences, employ-
ees could choose, through some minimal threshold showing of interest,
to invite representatives of unions or other employee organizations, pri-
vate consultants, training institutions, and the like to participate in the
Center-facilitated discussions. Again adapting an idea from the proposed
Workers Technology Skill Development Act, the Centers could provide
advance information about the various "best practice" representatives
who are likely to interest participating employees of enterprises in partic-
ular sectors or regions.
In the early stages of the series of group meetings, employees should
be guaranteed intensive periods of deliberation outside the property and
presence of management and employer-aligned consultants. Such ini-
tially excluded managerial employees should, however, be confined to a
much smaller group of upper management than the current expansive
965. Absurdly, the Reagan Board saw this impairment of workers' deliberation as a
ground for allowing employer misrepresentations. The Board argued that in their
deliberations, workers, when unprotected from misrepresentations, will not credit
campaign information. Hence, there is no need to protect the conditions for meaningful
deliberation. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
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corps of "managerial employees" who are excluded from NLRA cover-
age.9 66 As flexible organizations increasingly blur the hierarchical line
between high-discretion and low-discretion jobs, the judicially invented
managerial exclusion becomes that much more incongruous. In the
present period of organizational flux, the regional Centers should again
exercise context-specific discretion to decide the extent to which particu-
lar layers of "managerial" employees are subjectively integrated with up-
per management and therefore likely to distort the employee phase of
Conference deliberations. At Saturn, in fact, white collar employees who
might well be deemed "managerial" in a traditional workplace have ex-
pressed heightened desire for inclusion in the channels of collective
voice already enjoyed by the broad complement of team employees.967
Nonetheless, after early stages in the series of group meetings, upper
management representatives and their consultants should not only be
free, but required, to participate. Joint employer-management delibera-
tion would begin a process of collaborative rather than adversarial rela-
tions in workplace governance. The Conference procedure would be
paradigmatic of consultative relations, just as the current NLRB election
campaigns set the tone for the adversarial relations that follow. Of
course, management's participation would also provide invaluable exper-
tise and information, and encourage managerial employees' commit-
ment to the governance mode ultimately chosen by nonmanagerial
employees. The Conferences would thus constitute facilitative stake-
holder arenas for fluid organizational self-design and transformation.
At all stages, the Center's staff would chair the discussions, balancing
the value of wide distribution of employees' speech opportunities with
the goal of constructive discussion. The staff would also ensure that
outside and managerial representatives have sufficient, but not filibuster-
ing, time allotted for their presentations and discussions with employees.
Conferences of employees from large enterprises or multi-employer net-
works would necessarily make greater use of discussion among employee
subgroups, and among representative panels of employees with opportuni-
ties for observation, questions, and discussion by assemblies-of-the-whole.
It is worth noting-for those who doubt the legal practicability of such
conferences-that a little-known provision of German labor law allows
unions unilaterally to initiate an analogous assembly of an entire enter-
prise workforce to deliberate over whether to establish ongoing represen-
966. The current managerial employee definition and exclusion is the product of
decisional law-not statutory directive, which excludes only narrowly defined supervisors.
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (formulating broad managerial
employee exclusion). The Supreme Court vaguely defines "managerial employees" as
those who are "aligned" with upper management and exercise discretion to formulate and
implement managerial policy. See id. at 272-73. For a dissection and critique of this
doctrine, see Karl E. Mare, The Bitter and the Sweet: Reflections on the Supreme Court's
Yeshiva Decision, 13 Socialist Rev. 99 (1983).
967. See Rubinstein et al., supra note 613, at 368.
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tative works councils.968 In addition, longstanding proposals by the
European Commission would mandate employee election of representa-
tives who would meet in large-scale conferences with management in or-
der to determine the structure of (proposed) participatory councils. As
in my proposals, European workers would be entitled to resources neces-
sary for effective participation.9 69
The Conference concept has several aims. The first is to create as
pure a setting for egalitarian, informed deliberation as is possible in a
highly impure world. Ifwe are socially committed to affording employees
the free collective choice of workplace governance modes-and, in prin-
ciple, we already are9 7 0-then that choice is surely better made in my
proposed setting than in furtive fragmented meetings or under the uni-
lateral surveillance of a party (the employer) capable of inflicting great
cost on the choosers.
Second, by encouraging employees to invite third-party representa-
tives not financed by employers, the Conference system would create a
robust "market" for unions, employee associations, and other labor-ori-
ented consultants who have proactive capacities in organizational and
technological design and other training and career resources, all geared
to the needs and preferences of employees. 97' In other words, an appeal-
ing role for well-equipped, mobilizing unions or wholly new forms of em-
ployee organization would be built-in to the new institutional scheme. 972
As part of their various joint labor-management programs, unions such as
the UAW and CWA have already developed sophisticated methods for
determining the job-design and career-development needs and prefer-
ences of different work groups (and fancy multi-media presentations to
encourage members actively to make use of the educational and other
resources provided by such programs).
At the same time, the legal regime can safeguard against Center/
Grantee interest-entrenchment and rent-seeking by affording employees
968. See Manfred Weiss, German Labour Law and Industrial Relations 157 (1986).
969. See Roger Blanpain, Labour Law and Industrial Relations of the European
Community 193, 196 (1991).
970. That principle, of course, was embodied in the Wagner Act and survived the Taft-
Hartley Amendments unscathed if not strengthened. As discussed in Barenberg, supra
note 31, at 1450 n.309, the prevailing principle of workers' free choice does not include
the option of full workers' control in a previously capitalist enterprise, unless through
unionization workers achieve sufficient bargaining power to negotiate for it.
971. Again, S. 1020 takes a step toward encouraging such proactive capacities, but
with no connection to the labor law regime, and no affirmative means for encouraging
employees to make use of those services-both crucial features of my proposal.
972. Important exemplars are the extremely dense structures for member
participation that the local unions at the Saturn auto plant and the Sarnia Shell chemical
plant have developed in tandem with the unions'"co-management" commitments. See
Rubinstein et al., supra note 613, at 358-59 (describing Saturn); Anil Verma & Joel
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joint Governance in the Workplace: Beyond Union-Management
Cooperation and Worker Participation, in Employee Representation, supra note 3, at 197,
227.
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and managers a choice among Centers when they participate in Confer-
ences or seek other Center resources. That is, although Centers would
provide decentralized services or linkage with other resource-providers,
no Center would have a regional monopoly on its various statutory
functions.
Third, the Participation Center's staff would constitute the third-
party "watchdog" currently absent from employee deliberations. To some
degree, the Conference method would shift labor regulation in the direc-
tion of the mediating, consultative role that New Dealers initially envis-
aged for federal labor boards.9 73 The Center facilitators could intervene
on the spot to ventilate charges of misrepresentation. Their presence,
obviously, would chill overt intimidation by employers during those
group discussions in which management is included. More important,
the legal regime should return to the pre-Taft-Hartley ban on all em-
ployer discussion of major workplace governance decisions which occur
outside the protected context of Center-facilitated Conferences. The em-
ployers' First Amendment interests would be sufficiently preserved by this
(concededly drastic) time, place, and manner restriction. The restriction
is justified in light of the inherently coercive974 nature of anti-union man-
agerial and supervisory speeches in the captive-audience setting of the
workplace-as Learned Hand and William 0. Douglas, among many
others, well understood.975 Further protection would be afforded em-
ployer speech rights by the right, discussed presently, of either labor or
management to call for deliberative Conferences.
This raises the questions of how and when the Centers should con-
duct Conferences. There are good pragmatic and theoretic grounds for
encouraging decentralized experimentation and flexibility as to both
these questions. The regional Centers should experiment to find the op-
timal Conference formats for enterprises and networks of varying sizes
and sectors. 976 The Swedish and North American organizational confer-
973. See Gross, supra note 261, at 18-21; Tomlins, supra note 83, at 109-10.
974. The First Amendment does not prohibit government limitations on coercive
threats or offers by employers or others. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S.
469 (1941); Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 79-109, 239-59
(1989) (analyzing relation between First Amendment and government restrictions on
threats and inducements).
975. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 (1941) (Douglas, J.) (stating that
mere "[i]ntimations of an employer's preference, though subtle, may be as potent as
outright threats of discharge"); NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)
(L. Hand, J.) (stating that "[w] hat to an outsider will be no more than the [employer's]
vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation of a
determination which it is not safe to thwart").
976. Such flexibility and capacity for experimental learning is, of course, one of the
recognized virtues of decentralized, consultative models of legal regulation. See, e.g.,
Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 177-80 (1982); Steven Kelman, Regulating
America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health
Policy 221-37 (1981); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The
Reform of the American Regulatory State (1992).
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ences mentioned above use many different, evolving configurations of
small and large group meetings, including aggregations of representa-
tives from a variety of slices through departments or work groups. In-
deed, as a matter of action-research and reflexive-dialogic principle, the
participants are encouraged to suggest designs for the conference ses-
sions that would be most helpful to their shifting purposes. 977 Just as the
pre-Wagner Act labor boards developed a "common law" of adversarial
unfair labor practices and election procedures over a period of years, so
the regional Centers could develop a flexible common law of consultative
Conferences. Unlike post-Wagner Act legal doctrine, however, the new
legal regime should not freeze into law a single model for securing stake-
holder deliberation and employee choice. The law should permit the
format of deliberative stakeholder Conferences to change continually
over time and place as a result of institutional learning, variable eco-
nomic conditions, and reflexive transformations in the identities, con-
figurations, and consequent governance needs of the collaborating
parties. Remember, however, that any forum for protected deliberation
and information-provision would be an improvement over the current
regime's failure meaningfully to protect employee free association.
The Participation Centers should also experiment with alternative
rules for calling deliberative Conferences. Among the imaginable models
worth trying are a "mandatory" and a "stakeholder-petition" regime. In
the mandatory regime, the Centers would require workers from desig-
nated enterprises or networks to convene, deliberate, and cast workplace
governance ballots. The mandatory nature of the Conferences is no
more coercive than employers' current captive-audience speeches to
large and small employee groups, nor than the minimal proposed reform
of subjecting workers to mandatory union reply speeches. The content of
the Conferences, moreover, would be explicitly based on principles of
deliberative democracy, unlike such authoritarian captive-audience
presentations.
In the mandatory model, the law might require workers to recon-
vene at designated intervals. The designated intervals between Confer-
ences for a given workforce should be long enough to ensure that the
employees' governance choice has a chance to prove itself, and to pro-
vide employees a sense that the organization is necessarily committed to
making the employees' participation option work. Five years seems about
right.978 Before expiration of the designated term, either employees or
977. See Gustavsen, supra note 941, at 31-38. On the capacity of dialogic participants
reflexively to discuss and transform the conditions within which they deliberate, see Seyla
Benhabib, Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary
Ethics 32 (1992).
978. This interval is not arbitrarily chosen. Many high-participation workplaces lose
their euphoria after two or three years and must readjust to find new sources of dynamism.
Many succeed, although many also yield perhaps too quickly to discouragement, especially
when management is not fully committed. The public standard of a five-year interval
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management could petition the Participation Centers to hold "special
Conferences" to reconsider the basic governance decision if special eco-
nomic hardship or crisis in the enterprise or network can be shown, or if
employees establish a threshold "showing of interest" in more par-
ticipatory governance modes than were chosen at the previous Confer-
ence. The Centers could also call special Conferences, hold mediations,
or use other nonadversarial dispute-resolution mechanisms if employees
make a sufficient showing that the employer is manipulating governance
mechanisms for purposes of influencing workers' future governance
choice. Adversarial arbitrations or trials of unfair labor practices-with
highly potent sanctions-could be held in reserve in the event that such
consultative processes proved fruitless.
Under the stakeholder-petition model, the Centers would convene
Conferences only upon a threshold showing of interest either by employ-
ees or by management. In order to minimize the incentives for employ-
ers to preempt such petitions by building nonunion organizational
fortresses, 979 the required showing-of-interest should be much less strin-
gent than under the current rules for triggering an NLRB representation
election. Some percentage of the workforce well below thirty percent
should suffice; and the law should require only that employee-petitioners
show an interest in holding a Conference, not that they indicate a prior
commitment to union representation.
Managers may wish independently to petition the Center to convene
a Conference in order to obtain the valued training, organizational and
technological know-how, and marketing or financial resources that would
be conditioned on workers' governance deliberations. The experience of
the state, local, and foreign programs discussed above shows that both
employee representatives and managers may have incentives to seek out
the resources of the various regional councils and manufacturing exten-
sion centers-even when the string of enhanced labor participation is
attached.980 The stakeholder-petition model may have the advantage of
ensuring that the likely constrained time and resources of the Centers go
to those enterprises in which some substantial stakeholders are primed to
act as organizational change agents. Still, I believe it is worth testing
might inhibit premature abandonment of the organizational innovation. It might also
generally encourage lengthened managerial time horizons. There are many instances of
successful, jointly governed, team workplaces in which union officers and members have
actively pressed for longer organizational time horizons than exhibited by managers who
rotate through plants for short stints. See, e.g., Rubinstein et al., supra note 613, at 357.
979. See supra notes 886-895 and accompanying text.
980. Presently unfolding developments in Italian regional institutions are particularly
interesting. Employers voluntarily seek employee training and readjustment resources
through local union-management consortia under rules that condition such funding on
acceptance of collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment. See Personal
Communication with Charles Sabel (Oct. 18, 1993) (on file with author).
1994]
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whether initiatives by the Centers themselves, as in the mandatory model,
could catalyze private stakeholders.98 1
There is good reason to believe that this regime would substantially
reduce the level of adversarial unfair labor practice charges. The bright-
line rule-again, with potent sanctions in reserve-against all employer
anti-union campaigning outside of protected Conferences would erase
much activity that spawns unfair labor practices. So too would employers'
awareness, especially in the mandatory Conference model, that employ-
ees are personally familiar with regional Center staff, who stand ready to
monitor managerial abuses and quickly call mediations or full-blown
Conferences to ventilate charges that could damage managerial credibil-
ity in the presence of the entire workforce. Under the mandatory model,
employees and managers would also know that their commitment and
practice under existing governance modes would be publicly ventilated at
regnlarly designated intervals. Much experience with labor-management
cooperation shows that in an environment in which "participation" and
"cooperation" are trumpeted norms, either party (union or employer)
suffers great loss of legitimacy and loyalty if employees perceive a clear
breach of those norms.98 2 Management is widely aware of the damage to
employees' morale and productivity if it is the perceived culprit. As for
post-Conference unfair labor practices in unionized settings, the precipi-
tous drop in rates of adversarial grievance arbitration in existing labor-
management cooperation schemes is a positive harbinger.
This points to one of the most important aspects of the idea of
nonadversarial Conferences administered by regional Participation Cen-
ters. It promises dramatic legitimation of the norms of participation, co-
operation, consultation, and trust. The Center's facilitators would design
the Conference, and especially those deliberations that include manage-
rial representatives, as an intensive exercise in trust-building consultation.
Such trust-building consultative processes and techniques are already sur-
prisingly well-refined in the wake of substantial experience in joint labor-
management programs.985 The Conferences themselves would afford
vast opportunities for further refinement and learning.
Perhaps more important than the demonstration effect of the
nonadversarial Conference process would be the direct legitimation of
participatory and empowering governance norms through the highly visi-
ble commitment of the federal government to "Advanced Workplace Par-
ticipation." That commitment would be personalized through the Center
staffs face-to-face encouragement of employees to select feasible par-
ticipatory organizational forms that offer the skill upgrading, career de-
981. The success of the national CWA in "selling" career-development resources and
local participatory committees to frontline workers illustrates the potential for an "outside"
entity to spark employee interest and action. See supra notes 935, 972 and accompanying
text.
982. See supra notes 819-824, 935 and accompanying text.
983. See sources cited supra notes 647-652, 713, 927-935.
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velopment, and organizational capacities for which United States
workers, apprehensively facing the new flexible labor market, thirst.98 4
(The success of the AT&T/CWA Alliance in mobilizing similar worker
participation and career development through decentralized committees
is one of many encouraging precedents.) The funding incentives dis-
cussed below would also give unions, other employee organizations, and
labor-oriented consultants, engineers, and educators an interest in pro-
moting a renewal of the symbols and slogans of workplace democracy.
Finally, if workforces widely emerged from their deliberations with grass-
roots endorsements of high-participation workplace governance, substan-
tial "refraining" of employees' and ultimately employers' images of orga-
nizational life might ensue. A similar combination of robust legal
enforcement and evolving public norms helped diminish the behavioral
manifestations, and to some degree the underlying psychological force,
of entrenched employer and employee attitudes about racial and gender
segregation and harassment on the job.985
5. The Governance Options. - In addition to the fully nonunion op-
tion, workers should be afforded the nonexclusive choice-set of autono-
mous work teams, middle-level and strategic representation on joint
committees, and independent unions for collective bargaining. Under
the new Participation Center system and the economic environment of
flexible organization, the legal regime should transform and protect
these options in the ways sketched broadly below. I offer a new Section
8 (a) (2) jurisprudence applicable specifically to self-managing teams and
joint strategic committees. Although the several opinions of Board mem-
bers in the recent Electromation case986 leave open some interesting doctri-
nal questions about the legality of such "employee involvement schemes"
as quality or efficiency "circles," 987 my concern here is only with the more
comprehensive organizational innovations that characterize thoroughgo-
ing team-based enterprises. For the reasons offered in Part V, such para-
digm-shifting organizations present the most significant opportunities
and dangers from the point of view of both productivity and radical de-
mocracy. My proposals here also pretermit the question of legal reforms
designed to encourage employee ownership.988 Although I believe such
984. On newly flexible external labor markets, see supra notes 579, 624 and
accompanying text.
985. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance:
The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 Am. J. Soc. 1401 (1990).
986. See supra note 14.
987. "Quality circles" are small groups of workers who meet occasionally to discuss
minor production problems or employee grievances. See, e.g., Edward E. Lawler III &
Susan A. Mohrman, Quality Circles After the Fad, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 65,
65-71. They are a relatively superficial form of so-called parallel workplace innovations-
that is, arrangements that are grafted onto traditional bureaucratic organizations without
fundamental structural changes in enterprise decision-making and work processes.
988. Alan Hyde has offered the strongest arguments for such legal reform. See Hyde,
supra note 877.
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reforms deserve careful and sympathetic attention, the existing evidence
suggests strongly that, in the absence of comprehensive changes in orga-
nizational decision-making of the sort signified by self-managing teams
and joint strategic committees, formal worker ownership does not sub-
stantially serve the goals of workplace democracy or competitiveness. 989
a. Autonomous Teams. - The empirical synopsis in Part V demon-
strated that there are good grounds for skepticism about the proposition
that management-created work teams and representational structures are
as benign as any other presently unregulated employer-established work
arrangement or benefit.990 Workers should be protected under a revised
Section 8(a) (2) jurisprudence against those team structures that are
pregnant with abusive manipulation of employees' workplace governance
choice and with tendencies toward degeneration into fragmented, super-
intensification of work processes ("Team Taylorism"). This proposal con-
cords with the view of many political economists who reject the claim that
the "Toyota System" of lean production is the universal workplace model
for our time.991 Indeed, in its newer plants, Toyota itself has had to "hu-
manize" the work process in response to the increasing dissatisfaction
and resistance of a "maturing," over-stressed workforce.992 For those who
are troubled by the prospect of governmental micro-management of
work arrangements, recall that my proposal signifies an expansion of gov-
ernance options relative to current legal strictures, and leaves the choice
of those options to the most affected private stakeholders (employees).
The language and legislative intent of Section 8(a) (2), if read as honestly
as the Board has recently done, now unequivocally bans any employer-
established-and-supported employee entities, whether participatory or
representative. 993
The precise features of formal work groups that mark the line be-
tween empowered, autonomous teams and dominated, paternalistic
teams should again be refined through common-law evolution by the Par-
989. See supra note 877.
990. Professor Gottesman suggests that managerial "employee involvement schemes"
are likely to spur employees to fuller forms of collective dealing. See Gottesman, supra
note 832, at 2805 n.169. His optimism about the Tocqueville Effects (to use my
terminology) of fully management-controlled structures sits uneasily with his view that the
government-imposed consultative structures-virtually identical in structure to
management-imposed schemes, but with the added independence of guaranteed funding
and continued existence-proposed by Professor Weiler would be fruitless exercises in
employee demoralization or management domination. See id. at 2807.
991. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 605, at 23-37; Berggren, supra note 601,
at 3-55, 232-56; Richard Edwards & Paolo Garonna, The Forgotten Link: Labor's Stake in
International Economic Cooperation 59-94 (1991).
992. See Masami Nomura, Farewell to 'Toyotism'? Recent Trends of a Japanese
Automobile Company 1-22 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Kazuo Sugeno, Japan: The State's Guiding Role in Socioeconomic
Development, 14 Comp. Lab. L.J. 302, 315, 318 n.30 (1993).
993. See supra note 14; Barenberg, supra note 31, at 1442-61 (discussing Wagner'sjustifications for banning company unions).
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ticipation Centers' facilitators and arbitrators. For administrative practi-
cability, that doctrine would best consist of bright-line, objective structural
team features. Rough benchmarks are already available from the experi-
ence of North American, German, and Swedish unionists who have
fought on this contested terrain.994 Among the candidates for leading
indicators of autonomous teams are the following:9 95
* Team leaders-facilitators should be chosen by team mem-
bers or by rotation from among team members, not appointed
by upper management, and should be subject to recall. Man-
agement should be prohibited from playing any role in the elec-
tion of team leaders.
e Team members should have the right to meet for speci-
fied periods at specified intervals, with pay, without the presence
of managerial or supervisory representatives.
* Teams should have the right to meet, again at specified
intervals and durations, with other teams, again without the
presence of managerial or supervisory representatives.
* Individual team members should be entitled (on a rotat-
ing or lottery basis) to attend, or receive full minutes of, any
meetings held between team leaders-facilitators as a group and
managerial representatives.
e Teams should be entitled to specified periods of train-
ing-from trainers selected from the Participation Centers' la-
bor-oriented consultants and educators-in technological and
organizational design, group-process and problem-solving skills,
ergonomics, and health and safety standards.
* Teams should have ongoing access to Participation
Center staff, resources, and third-party consultants, including in-
dependent unions and other employee associations.
* Teams should be entitled to design their own group dis-
cussion processes.
e Team leaders should be entitled, with sufficient advance
notice, to participate in representative joint consultations with
management on matters of team performance requirements,
compensation systems, work design, and technology that poten-
tially affect work design, and should be entitled to have union
representatives or other consultants attend and advise during
such consultations. An empowered version of this requirement
would give teams the right to seek Participation Center media-
tion or arbitration if management rejects team proposals for
994. See, e.g., Local Agreement Between UAW Local 2166 and GM Shreveport,
excerpted and reprinted in Parker & Slaughter, supra note 39, at 135-39; Parker &
Slaughter, supra note 39, at 46-51 (advising unions on contractual team rights); Thelen,
supra note 744, at 205 n.5 (noting that IG Metall's principles of group work looked to
Swedish Metalworkers' program); Turner, supra note 571, at 161 (enumerating West
Germany's IG Metall unions' principles of group work).
995. This list is an amalgam of my own reaction to the empirical literature on "team
Taylorism" and the various union programs for group work cited supra in note 994.
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work design that demonstrably meet management's specified
cost/performance goals.
Teams that do not meet these or similar indicia of employee autonomy
should be banned, either by reinterpretation of Section 8 (a) (2)'s current
proscription of employer "dominat[ion]" of employee entities, or by new
legislative proscription.
b. "Strategic Action Councils: Autonomous In-House Representatives at In-
termediate and Upper Levels. - The German model of statutorily mandated
"works councils" has drawn much interest and support among North
American academics. 996 Indigenous, nonmandated models of represen-
tative committees are also widespread-in the form of nonunion strategic
task forces and project teams;997 joint union-management steering com-
mittees established by collective bargaining;998 and the employee-man-
agement committees established at the enterprise and multi-enterprise
levels by the state and local development programs mentioned above.999
Consonant with spreading domestic terminology, I refer to such repre-
sentative committees as Strategic Action Councils'000 rather than the
somewhat anachronistic "works council" label that originated in nine-
teenth-century Europe. 1001
The last indicia of team autonomy enumerated in the previous sub-
section-the right to representative consultation with management on
matters that concern the teams-points, especially in its empowered ver-
sion, toward minimal features of strategic action councils-at departmen-
tal, plant, divisional, and enterprise levels-that should be among
employees' governance options. Indeed, the structural features that indi-
cate team autonomy can be readily adapted to serve as benchmarks for a
revised Section 8(a) (2) jurisprudence ensuring the autonomy of strategic
representatives in high-involvement organizations. Management must
not unilaterally choose employee representatives; rather, the rank and
file should be entitled to decide whether they directly elect, or union and
management officers jointly choose, such representatives-as was re-
cently debated and decided among the Saturn rank and file. 10 0 2 The em-
ployee representatives must be entitled to meet among themselves
without the presence of managerial representatives. They must have a
right to Participation Center resources, training, and consultants relevant
to their consultations with management on all strategic issues. In order
996. See sources cited supra note 868.
997. See, e.g., Kochan et al., supra note 641, at 93-100.
998. See supra notes 932-33 and accompanying text. For a generalized model of such
joint committees, see Neal HerrickJoint Management and Employee Participation: Labor
and Management at the Crossroads (1990).
999. See supra notes 924-934 and accompanying text.
1000. The Saturn Plant, for example, uses this term.
1001. For the early origins of works councils, see, e.g., Stephen J. Havlovic, German
Works' Councils: A Highly Evolved Institution of Industrial Democracy, Lab. Stud. J.,
Summer 1990, at 62, 64-65.
1002. See Rubinstein et al., supra note 613, at 361.
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to monitor their representatives, individual frontline workers must be en-
tifled on a rotating basis to observe those consultations 003
Leading proponents of joint representative committees in the
United States propose that the powers of such committees be more cir-
cumscribed than in the German prototype. More specifically, some
American commentators propose vesting employee representatives only
with the power and resources to bring suits to enforce existing employ-
ment statutes or contractual rights.10 0 4 Professor Weiler, offering a "re-
constructive" alternative to his more limited samizdat and fumigation
proposals discussed in Part VI, supports "Employee Participation Com-
mittees" vested with the right to information and consultation on substan-
tive matters of work organization, but without the authority to seek
binding arbitration of unsettled issues.'005 Commentators proffer three
justifications for these circumscriptions. First, affording employees the
potent statutory threat of binding interest-arbitration' 006 appears to vio-
late sacrosanct principles of "freedom of contract" and thus faces certain
political death. 100 7 A second argument simply yields to the weight of ex-
isting institutions: interest-arbitration introduces a principle utterly dis-
tinct from the central tradition of United States labor relations-
adversarial collective bargaining °008 Weiler advances a third argument
based on more rigorous policy analysis. He maintains that third-party in-
terest-arbitration is a poor, and addictive, substitute for the parties' more
knowledgeable, welfare-enhancing, and participatory negotiated tradeoffs
among subtle workplace variables.1009
These arguments may be well-taken as applied to proposals for statu-
torily mandated representative councils within the present regime of ad-
versarial bargaining and trial-type arbitral or NLRB dispute-resolution
1003. I will not burden the reader by fully enumerating the straightforward analogies
between the structural indicia of team autonomy, listed above, and of representatives'
autonomy. The following text addresses the more difficult salient issue of the degree of
strategic representatives' power sufficient to pass muster under my revised Section 8(a) (2)
jurisprudence.
1004. See Gottesman, supra note 832, at 2807-08.
1005. See Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 3, at 290; see also Janice R.
Bellace, Mandating Employee Information and Consultation Rights, in Proc. of the 43d
Meeting, supra note 669, at 137, 142; Summers, supra note 937, at 338.
1006. "Interest-arbitration" denotes the arbitration of the substantive terms and
conditions of workplace relations, as distinguished from "grievance-arbitration" which
interprets and enforces terms and conditions already established by contract or otherwise.
1007. See Gottesman, supra note 832, at 2807 (summarizing the argument that
employers who oppose the legislative mandate of works councils vested with arbitral rights
"would find political pay dirt in the deep-seated American commitment to freedom of
contract").
1008. See, e.g., Bellace, supra note 1005, at 137-38 (arguing from explicit premise
that consultative rights will supplement, but not alter, basic structure of unionization law);
Summers, supra note 937, at 338.
1009. The point is well argued in Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New
Directions in Canadian Labour Law 229-35 (1980), and in Weiler, Striking a New Balance,
supra note 3, at 371-79.
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mechanisms. My proposal, however, would not impose joint committees
by government fiat. It is therefore not subject to the critique that it dis-
places private ordering. Again, to the contrary, it would add a presently
proscribed option to the already socially endorsed right of workers to
choose governance modes. Indeed, it adds an in-house representative
option, for which employer lobbyists have been clamoring. 01 0 I have no
illusions that, by characterizing workers' choice of highly empowered ver-
sions of such in-house representatives as "private ordering," employers'
political resistance will weaken. But short of abandoning my project of
imagining a labor-law regime that would ensure meaningful worker delib-
eration and choice over high-participation work systems, I must take em-
ployers' all-out political resistance as given.10 11 My point is that the
capacity of employers misleadingly' 01 2 to clothe their opposition in the
rhetorical garb of "market-ordering" adds no further grounds for me-or
others who support deliberative workplace democracy-to abandon the
critical-pragmatic exercise of envisaging an intermediate "radical reform"
program. 1013
The third argument, albeit powerful in the context of adversarial
bargaining, is less decisive in a regime predicated on dramatic enhance-
ment of collaborative workplace problem solving and norms of consulta-
tive, nonadversarial impasse resolution. A key purpose of deeper labor
law reform should be to facilitate the organizational paradigm-shift away
from the prevailing norm and expectation that the central means of deter-
mining substantive workplace conditions are adversarial threats to deploy
ballistic economic power during periodic negotiations of contract terms
that are thereafter policed (and effectively fleshed out) by adversarial en-
forcement mechanisms. There is no contradiction in the proposition
that achieving such a shift requires a diminution of power asymmetries
between the parties-that is, an enhancement of employees' latent bar-
gaining power. To the contrary, German works councils can achieve
higher levels of trusting consultation with management than can United
1010. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1011. True, in part for reasons of political pragmatism, I bracketed the appealing idea
of mandating unionization or even fuller worker democracy as a default, if not permanent,
workplace arrangement. But that idea, I believe, would be unpalatable to much wider
national constituencies than corporate managers and investors. In any event, political
caution was not the sole ground for my provisional retreat. I see both intellectual and
political value in imagining intermediate "radical reform" programs that preserve and
realize the principle of employee governance choice and that may appeal to deeply held
values and interests of substantial portions of the citizenry in a time of organizational flux.
Although the distinction is a fine one, this is "pragmatism" not in the sense of political
expedience, but in the philosophic sense of "immanent social critique." See Walzer, supra
note 130.
1012. Misleading, because the issue is what type of market to construct. See Unger,
supra note 344, at 513-24; Klare, supra note 869, at 13-39, 55-67.
1013. See supra note 1011.
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States local unions precisely because of the reserve power afforded them
both by statute and by a cohesive labor movement. 014
Hence, affording worker representatives the power ultimately to de-
mand binding arbitration need not cause the parties to abandon the re-
sponsibilities of problem-solving in favor of "addiction" to easy third-party
arbitral resolution. Such power can instead reciprocally reinforce the
changed context of consultative norms and relations within the enter-
prise and expectations of primarily consultative dispute resolution by the
regional Participation Centers. A cycle of high-trust consultation may re-
place a cycle of low-trust adversarialism. The most advanced, jointly gov-
erned workplaces in the United States, in fact, provide for arbitration
when decision by labor-management consultation and consensus fails.
The conjunction of consultative, substantive problem-solving and reserve
arbitral power leads to dramatically reduced rates of interest- and griev-
ance-arbitration. 015 Indeed, the foremost scholar in this empirical area
concludes that, in various countries, flexible networks of high-trust, col-
laborative enterprises flourish only where there are such regional "arbi-
tration boards or councils" to regulate substantive disputes. 016 In any
event, the alternative reform route-the establishment of relatively pow-
erless councils, whether funded at management's discretion after the pro-
posed repeal of Section 8(a) (2), or by legal mandate-would too likely
lead to the French model of employer-dominated enterprise committees
or to the Japanese tendency toward excessively paternalistic consultative
committees and work groups. 01 7
c. Independent Unions, Under New Rules. - Ensuring that employee
representatives have an independent source of latent power-through
the regional Centers' reserve arbitral powers and its other resources-
would also lessen the need for complex regulation of union officials' par-
ticipation as employee representatives.
One of the murkiest and least examined doctrines under Section
8(a) (2) is the judicially created distinction between management's lawful
"cooperation" with an independently established union, and manage-
ment's unlawful "support" of the union. The courts have addressed the
question either in the routine instances of collective bargaining agree-
ments that provide paid time to enable employee-stewards of a bona fide
local union to engage in grievance-administration, 101 8 or in such idiosyn-
cratic instances as when an airline agrees in a takeover deal to reimburse
1014. See Turner, supra note 571, at 91-171; Summers, supra note 937, at 336.
1015. See Anil Verma & Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joint Governance in the
Workplace: Beyond Union-Management Cooperation and Worker Participation, in
Employee Representation, supra note 3, at 197, 206-23; Rubinstein et al., supra note 613,
at 353.
1016. See Sabel, Studied Trust, supra note 685, at 118.
1017. See supra notes 724-747, 761-776, 895 and accompanying text.
1018. See, e.g., NLRB v. Basf Wyandotte Corp., 798 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1986);
Duquesne Univ., 198 N.L.R.B. 891, 892-93 (1972).
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a national union's investment-banking fees. 10 19 But the question be-
comes more salient and interesting in the case of a seemingly vibrant
independent union-such as a local of the UAW or the CWA-that forms
a web of committees, task forces, and programs run and funded jointly
with the employer. When has the cooperative union been unlawfully cap-
tured by the employer's support?
Several circuit courts have answered this question by applying an ex-
tremely diffuse subjective test.10 20 That test effectively converts the
Supreme Court's early justification for banning all company unions into a
case-by-case standard. 1021 In other words, the circuits inquire whether
the collaboration between the employer and the employee entity actually
either systemically coerced the workers' governance choice or gave them
the false impression that they had independent representation when in
fact management had "overborne the will" of the labor organization.
The intractability of such a dual subjective inquiry-into the minds of
individual workers and the collective "will" of their organization-is re-
flected in bald judicial conclusions that generally rest on no actual psy-
chological evidence or theory whatsoever. 10 22
For purposes of predictability and to serve the policy of safeguarding
workers against the pathological in-house structures discussed above, the
law should return to an objective test. The legal regime should simply
apply the same structural standards of autonomy enumerated above to
joint committees and teams in unionized workplaces as to those in nonu-
nionized workplaces. Joint committee representatives in unionized work-
places would thus add the union's reserve strike threat to the reserve
right to arbitrate substantive matters that are not successfully resolved by
in-house cooperative consultation or by the Participation Center's media-
tion. The rules designed to empower in-house strategic representatives
would concurrently protect against the appearance or reality that either a
union official acting as such a representative, or the official's organiza-
tion, is a creature of management. 10 23 Again, the German case is on
1019. See, e.g., Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, 897 F.2d 999, 1016 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding lawful cooperation because there was no employer intent to influence
employees' governance choice and no evidence that the transaction made union beholden
to employer).
1020. See, e.g., id.; Basf Wyandotte, 798 F.2d at 856; NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc.,
724 F.2d 535, 546 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1213-14
(1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1968).
1021. Some of the circuit decisions explicitly quote the Supreme Court's "hegemonic
consciousness" rationale for the ban, stated in its 1938 Pennsylvania Greyhound decision, see
supra notes 164, 214 and accompanying text, but apply that justification as a case-by-case
standard rather than as the underpinning of a per se objective test, see, e.g., Lawson Co. v.
NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 1985); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918
(6th Cir. 1968).
1022. See cases cited supra notes 1020-1021.
1023. That is, my expanded reform proposals would lessen the need for rules
analogous to those carefully crafted by Michael Harper to avoid the appearance of
cooptation of union officers serving as employee representatives on corporate boards under
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point. Unionists compose the bulk of elected works councils representa-
fives even in nonunion workplaces. The statutory mandate of works
councils' independence and power helps ensure the appearance and re-
ality of vigorously independent union organizations, notwithstanding the
undeniably collaborative relations between labor and management pro-
moted by works council consultations. 10 24
Adversarial distrust between union and management could still gen-
erate a rule-bound, grievance-intensive contractual relation under my
proposed reforms. But the legal regime's normative, instrumental, and
educational encouragement of workers to opt for team participation and
consultative representation along with unionization would mitigate that
possibility. Again, unionization in this context would begin to resemble
more closely the still-evolving German model. Facing the growth of flexi-
ble production and global competition, Germany's centralized unions in-
creasingly provide decentralized empowerment and expertise to enhance
the effectiveness of employees who are mobilized through cooperative
structures within the enterprise. 0 25
The proposed regime would thus encourage the spread of collective
bargaining agreements like the "Enterprise Compact" 10 26 between GM
and the UAW governing the Saturn workplace. By contrast with the hun-
dreds of pages of rules and fine-print in traditional collective agreements,
the Saturn contract, with no fixed termination date, codifies in a few
pages a set of nonadversarial grievance and problem-solving principles
and processes; team and consultative-committee structures with full
codetermination authority; flexible job classifications (one for general
employees, three for skilled trades); and basic compensation and sched-
uling principles.
The legal regime should also encourage more encompassing and
more empowering unions both to promote democratic political mobiliza-
tion and to achieve the synergies between empowered representation and
the current labor law regime. See Harper, supra note 870, at 1-90. The potential conflict of
interest, also identified by Harper, between union officers' simultaneous representation of
different employee groups-that is, bargaining unit members and team or council
constituents-would remain. My proposals, however, encourage larger bargaining units.
Any subgroup represented by union officers would likely have its subjective interests
amplified, not suppressed, within the larger united front of the bargaining unit-perhaps
representing an enhancement of democracy in the unions' inevitable internal coalition
politics. See Banks & Metzgar, supra note 823, at 24-58 (describing democratic
mobilization of subgroups by union representatives within larger unit). This contrasts with
the paradigmatic case considered by Harper within the existing regime, namely, the
potential sacrifice of the interests of smaller bargaining units if union officers serve on
wider joint committees or boards.
1024. See Thelen, supra note 744; Turner, supra note 571, at 91-198.
1025. See Thelen, supra note 744, at 25-60, 155-200, 227-336; Kathleen Thelen, The
Politics of Flexibility in the German Metalworking Industries, in Bargaining for Change,
supra note 578, at 215, at passim.
1026. The Bluestones coined this apt term. See Bluestone & Bluestone, supra note
616, at 219.
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frontline team participation, goals defended above in Part V. Hence, I
support the several reform proposals, canvassed in Part VI, to enlarge the
scope of union power: the authorization of minority or proportional bar-
gaining where there is no majority representative; the ban on permanent
replacement of strikers; and the protection of secondary concerted ac-
tion. Because regular "outside" strikes are less effective in the new era of
global capital mobility, the law should also restore workers' rights to en-
gage in such "inside actions" as work slowdowns-weapons which may be
particularly effective in "just-in-time" enterprises. 10 27
To serve the same ends, the legal regime should also revise the rules
of bargaining-unit determination. Rather than limiting workers to enter-
prise and sub-enterprise bargaining units, as under current legislation,
the law should permit workers relatively freely to define multi-employer
units.10 28 This would serve several desirable purposes apart from simply
enhancing the bargaining power and scope of employee representatives.
First, workers could institutionalize or "internalize" their secondary-strike
power.10 29 That is, enterprises that would otherwise be secondary em-
ployers outside the scope of the bargaining unit would become primary
employers within the unit. The internalization of the "externalized" costs
often borne by secondary employees during primary strikes would en-
hance both democracy and efficiency. All effected employees would par-
ticipate in the decision whether to trade the costs for the benefits of
wider concerted action.
To the extent that multi-employer bargaining takes sector- or region-
wide wage floors out of competition, it is all to the social good. Employ-
ees of smaller and medium sized firms would have greater capacity to
close the inequitable wage gap between workers performing identical
tasks in small and large firms, and across firms more generally, within the
same regional sector. 030 More important perhaps, employers in more
encompassing, higher-wage sectors would have incentives to prosper by
using high-performance, high-productivity technologies and organiza-
tional forms, rather than following the low-wage, labor-sweating line of
least resistance to which American managers have been prone. 103'
1027. See Labor Resource Center, Holding the Line in '89: Lessons of the NYNEX
Strike 10 (n.d.).
1028. Current law allows multi-employer bargaining not by workers' choice of multi-
employer units, but by all parties' (unions' and employers') consent to aggregate
enterprise or sub-enterprise units after the latter are unionized. See Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412-17 (1982).
1029. See Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 Va. L. Rev. 353, 416 (1984).
1030. See William T. Dickens & Kevin Lang, Labor Market Segmentation Theory:
Reconsidering the Evidence 24 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
4087, 1992) (summarizing and citing empirical studies).
1031. See Porter, supra note 583, at 84; Lester Thurow, Toward a High-Wage, High-
Productivity Service Sector 3-11 (Economic Policy Inst. 1989); Arndt Sorge & Wolfgang
Streeck, Industrial Relations and Technical Change: The Case for an Extended
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Further, multi-employer units would facilitate the development of
collaborative networks among smaller and medium sized firms in the new
environment of fluid enterprise boundaries. That is, the changing eco-
nomic climate enhances the potential "relational-contract" benefits of
multi-employer consultation with workers' organizations. 103 2 An instruc-
tive historical referent is the role of encompassing unions in disseminat-
ing best-practice technology and organization to small manufacturers in
the fast-changing apparel industries. 0 33 . (The next subsection discusses
some additional potential benefits of trans-enterprise unionism, in the
area of training and career readjustment.) A good contemporary exam-
ple is, again, the Saturn operation, where employees of subcontracting
parts-suppliers have been folded into the UAW local representing Saturn
workers. 0 3 4 At the same time, participatory teams and strategic action
councils would allow employers and employees to devise desirable spe-
cific arrangements at the enterprise, plant, or work-group level-as is al-
ready done through local units in current multi-employer bargaining
relations. 10 35
As under current law, the Participation Centers would review work-
ers' choices of bargaining units for appropriateness, although with even
greater deference than the Board currently gives to workers' unit defini-
tion. The Board's longstanding measure of appropriateness-that units
encompass workers with a "community of interest"-is already quite mal-
leable.' 03 6 Nonetheless, the Board tends to give great weight to historical
commonalities of terms and conditions of employment and to existing
alignments of "interests" and personnel administration. 0 3 7 The law
should be more sensitive to the possibility that workers (and employers)
will over time come to new understandings of their subjective interests as
a result of deliberative Conferences, the new governance institutions that
emerge from the Conferences, and fast-changing organizational arrange-
ments. Hence, the Participation Centers should give employees in re-
gional enterprises that are vertically and horizontally related sufficient
advance notice and information to allow their "showing of interest" in
common participation in Conferences to deliberate over the possibility of
creating multi-employer units.
Perspective, in New Technology and Industrial Relations (Richard Hyman & Wolfgang
Streeck eds., 1988); Freeman & Katz, supra note 10, at 2-26.
1032. Cf. Leslie, supra note 1029, at 417-18 (canvassing possible relational benefits of
multi-employer bargaining and ultimately expressing doubts about their importance, but
within discussion premised implicitly on traditional hierarchical enterprises and
adversarial collective bargaining).
1033. See supra note 933.
1034. See Rubinstein et al., supra note 613, at 360.
1035. See Leslie, supra note 1029, at 417.
1036. See 3 NLRB Ann. Rep. 174 (1938).
1037. See John E. Abodeely, The NLRB and the Appropriate Bargaining Unit 7-84
(1971).
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6. The Vote on Governance Options. - The Participation Conference
process would end with a series of secret ballot votes by employees,
through which they could choose any combination of the first or last
three of the following four basic governance options: nonunionism, au-
tonomous teams, strategic councils, and unionism. A majority of voting
employees in any department could authorize autonomous teams. A ma-
jority of employees in any department, plant, division, or enterprise could
authorize representative Strategic Action Councils. 038 On the question
of unionization, employees could choose to organize into "minority" un-
ions that bargained only on behalf of their voluntary members. But if a
majority selects exclusive union representation in an appropriate unit
(whether sub- or supra-enterprise) that includes the substantial bulk of
such a minority, the larger exclusive union representative would displace
the minority representative. This would encourage more encompassing
union structures, and would spread the monopoly gains from a more
powerful minority that would prefer to keep those gains to itself.1039 At
the same time, in internal union politics, the majority would have to be
responsive to the interests of such a minority in order to ensure the po-
tential mobilization of its latent bargaining power on behalf of the entire
group. Indeed, such intra-union consultations illustrate one way in which
employees' chosen governance structures would likely induce transforma-
tions in employees' perceived commonality of interests. 10 40 Further, the
structures of shopfloor teams and intermediate and upper level councils
would afford meaningful fora for minorities with special needs and
preferences.' 041
Employees would have incentives to select union governance mecha-
nisms to garner greater bargaining power and training, technological,
and organizational-design resources. Similar incentives would encourage
employees to select undominated teams and strategic councils through
which they could assert their subgroup interests. Recall that a statutory
requirement of such structures under a reinterpreted or redrafted Sec-
tion 8(a) (2) is a right to designated amounts and kinds of valuable ca-
reer-development resources.
1038. Allowing workers to choose teams or representative councils at more balkanized
levels would likely be ill-advised, although experimentation on the question may be
warranted. Traditional organizations often demoralize employees by suffocating isolated
outposts of participatory work governance.
1039. See Leslie, supra note 1029, at 393-96.
1040. The social interaction of employees already generates a similar phenomenon.
Wage structures tend to be more egalitarian than the range of bargaining power among
work groups in an enterprise would predict. Employee groups with greater bargaining
power often support such structures on grounds of fairness. See Elster, supra note 35, at
236-38.
1041. Some women and racial minority groups support the dissemination of team and
representative structures for precisely this reason. See Mary Hollens, Speaking for
Ourselves: How 'Teams' Affect People of Color, Lab. Notes, Apr. 1993, at 8 (discussing
opposing views on this question).
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7. The Importance of Linking Programs for Training, Organizational Rede-
sign, and Employee Choice of Workplace Governance Options. - The incentive
system should be designed to provide increasing levels of program re-
sources to employees and managers in increasingly democratized organi-
zations-that is, organizations that combine more of the participatory
options of teams, strategic councils, and unions. Indeed, the possible po-
tency of such incentives rests precisely on the enormous, front-loaded in-
vestments in human capital required for success in the new, high-
performance organizational forms, as well as on the heightened value to
workers of career readjustment resources in flexible labor markets. 0 42
The creation of a single system that links the traditional functions of
labor law (workplace governance administration) with employee training
and organizational modernization programs has several virtues apart
from supplying incentives for workplace democratization. Such linkage
would likely improve the performance of the training and modernization
programs themselves. First, participatory structures of workplace govern-
ance would provide a vehicle for employees to monitor employers to en-
sure that government funding is not used to subsidize pre-existing
employer-provided training or other resources-a persistent problem in
government-funded training programs. 0
43
Linking worker training with ongoing capacities for organizational
redesign and governance choice would also mitigate a set of problems
endemic to such "displaced worker" programs as Title III of the Job
Training Partnership Act of 1982 and its successor, the Economic Disloca-
tion and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act of 1988. The latter programs
reach workers too late-after they've been "displaced."' 0 44 Such pro-
grams face the challenge simultaneously to provide income maintenance
and to retrain workers outside the context of on-site job requirements.
My proposals, to the contrary, would provide workers concurrently with
improved capacity to assess future skill or career-adjustment contingen-
cies and to obtain appropriate resources while on their currentjobs. The
much-debated problem of "skill-matching" would be mitigated. Workers
could retrain in anticipation of specific, albeit never fully certain,job and
organizational reconfigurations, rather than receive generalized training
for categories of wholly hypothetical jobs that may not materialize when
1042. Human capital may account for fully 20% of the start-up investment in high-
participation enterprises. See Rosemary Batt & Paul Osterman, A National Policy for
Workplace Training 15 (1993); Porter, supra note 583, at 630; Rubinstein et al., supra note
613, at 350.
1043. See Batt & Osterman, supra note 935, at 43; cf. John H. Bishop & Mark
Montgomery, Does the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Create Jobs at Subsidized Firms?, 32
Indus. Rel. 289, 301-02 (1993) (noting analogous problem in government-subsidized
hiring programs). But cf. HarryJ. Holzer et al., Are Training Subsidies for Firms Effective?
The Michigan Experience, 46 Indus. Lab. Rel. Rev. 625, 635 (1993) (finding one-time rise
in training after introduction of state subsidies).
1044. See Adam Seitchik & Jeffrey Zornitsky, From One Job to the Next: Worker
Adjustment in a Changing Labor Market 121 (1989).
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the training programs end. 0 45 In high-participation enterprises func-
tioning in the new environment of flexible labor markets, the parties with
the greatest incentive to seek out appropriate career-development re-
sources, the employees themselves, are also intimately involved in job
redesign and network reconfigurations. This is yet another by-product of
the background blurring of conception and execution in the high-learn-
ing enterprise. Employees increasingly redesign the work processes they
need to skill to perform.
Finally, the linkage of training, modernization, and workplace gov-
ernance choice through regional Centers has the potential to spawn local
institutions that accelerate the generation and dissemination of innova-
tions in work and organizational processes-key capacities for economic
success. The fluidity of enterprise boundaries, the volatility of markets,
and the withering of internal career ladders produce a familiar collective-
action dilemma. Individual employers cannot count on capturing the re-
turns to non-firm-specific employee training, including the problem-
solving and organizational design skills characteristic of the high-per-
formance workplace. 10 46 And neither employers nor employees can
count on reaping optimal returns on firm- or network-specific human
capital investments. Funding for general or specific training through re-
gional Centers can help fill these public-goods gaps. Funding for career-
readjustment can also serve as insurance against failure to reap expected
returns on firm-specific human-capital investments.
Beyond the provision of resources themselves, however, is the
Center's creation of conditions that may nurture the emergence of con-
sortia of firms and employee organizations with incentives mutually to
monitor and disseminate the best-practice use of those resources. 10 47 In
their clearinghouse function, the Centers can set and impose perform-
ance benchmarks in training and organizational and technological de-
sign. The continuing receipt of such resources by employees, employers,
and their organizations should be conditioned on the Centers' evaluation
of the recipients' effectiveness in using the resources from the standpoint
of enterprise productivity and democracy. Organizations that exceed cur-
rent best-practice performance among similarly situated network enter-
prises should be entitled to greater levels of future resources. Such "rank-
1045. See Peter T. Kilborn, U.S. Study Says Job Retraining Is Not Effective, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1993, at Al (summarizing internal Labor Department audit and other
critics of worker retraining under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, on the ground that
workers are "retrained" for nonexistent jobs).
1046. This may explain why Japanese workers increasingly depend on employment
security within networks of related enterprises (keiretsu) rather than within single
enterprises. See Personal Communication with Professor Tadashi Hanami (Mar. 22, 1994)
(on file with author).
1047. This paragraph is indebted to the important analysis in Sabel, supra note 681,
and to information communicated to me by Sabel about currently emergent local
organizations that provide training and readjustment resources to employees and
employers in Italy.
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hierarchy" incentives could be reinforced if the total resources available
to identifiable networks or associations of enterprises were conditioned
on the performance of the entire network. If funding incentives are ap-
propriately designed, individual firms and workforces would thus have
incentives both to raise the average performance of firms within the col-
laborative network and to improve their own performance in the rank
hierarchy among firms. 10 48
CONCLUSION
Thus, the institutional, symbolic, and resource-incentive features of
the new regime of labor law would cumulatively encourage the transition
from low-trust, low-productivity to high-trust, high-performance organiza-
tions. More important, the new legal policy would concurrently dissemi-
nate high-challenge, continuous-learning work processes and promote
employees' capacities for individual self-revision, organizational redesign,
and collective self-governance. The law, that is, would safeguard workers
against organizational forms with a high potential for structural coercion,
distorted communication, and psychological manipulation, and would fa-
cilitate, although not guarantee, trust-enhancement through employees'
collective empowerment. The new legal regime would adapt Senator
Robert Wagner's radical pragmatist vision to the economic and cultural
possibilities in the crisis of bureaucratic production. 0 49
1048. As Sabel points out, such an incentive structure among firms and workforces
within collaborative networks is homologous to the incentive structure among work teams
within Japanese firms. See id.; see also Aoki, supra note 634 (discussing such rank-
hierarchy incentives among work teams in core Japanese firms).
1049. There is much solid evidence that the quality of employees' skill and
performance is a leading determinant of national productivity. For a leading quantitative
study, see WilliamJ. Baumol et al., Productivity and American Leadership: The Long View
258-60 (1989). Compelling studies based on vast comparative knowledge of nations,
industries, and firms include Piore & Sabel, supra note 109; Porter, supra note 583, at 109,
626-30 ("Labor-management relationships are particularly significant in many industries
because they are so central to the ability of firms to improve and innovate."). I
nevertheless do not underestimate the importance of many legal rules, institutions, and
symbols outside labor law that influence not only workers' bargaining power and
productivity but also other important aspects of the structure and performance of
enterprises, such as rates of capital formation and innovation. See Baumol, supra. Other
important legal regimes may include the law of corporate finance, ownership, and control;
broader labor market and macroeconomic policies; tax, antitrust, intellectual property,
and transnational trade law, and educational mandates and policies. This Article has
focused on one important piece of the legal policy puzzle.
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